THE HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR IN GERMANY, BETWEEN THE KING OF PRUSSIA, AND THE EMPRESS OF GERMANY AND HER ALLIES.
HISTORY
OF THE
WAR in GERMANY.

PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE.

In order to convey a more clear idea of the history of this war, and of its various operations; we think it may be useful previously to shew the motives which induced the several powers of Europe to undertake it. And also to give an exact description of the country where it was carried on; because, the knowledge of these two points will, it is imagined, enable the reader to form a proper judgment of the generals who conducted the different armies, and of the propriety of their manoeuvres, to obtain the end each had in view.

As the reasons which determined England to declare war against France are generally known: a detail of them would be needless. We shall therefore relate those of other nations only.

OF FRANCE.

The French convinced from experience, nothing could more effectually contribute to realize that superiority, which they arrogated to themselves in Europe, than the cultivation and improvement
ment of their American colonies, resolved, on concluding the peace of Aix la Chapelle, to promote with care and vigilance every scheme that seemed calculated to distress our, and advance their own settlements. The first step towards accomplishing this end, was to find a means to cut off our communication with the Indians, on whose friendship the greatness of our colonies much depends. This, in the end, would naturally unite them to the French, who could furnish them with what they wanted in exchange for the different commodities of that country, and by degrees be made an instrument to drive us out of it. They begun to execute their plan by establishing a chain of forts behind our settlements, and by occupying many countries, until then, thought, at least neutral. Though they had not as yet compleated it, what was already done had such an influence on our inland trade, as made us tremble at the fatal consequences which would necessarily follow, if we did not, in time, exert ourselves and repel the injuries they intended us. Some measures, though ineffectual, were taken for that purpose, and hostilities were ordered to be committed against the French both in Europe and America. As they were not prepared sufficiently to avow their pretensions, they only opposed remonstrances and a seeming moderation to our repeated attacks. By this means they proposed to gain time, make us relax in our preparations, and render us odious to the other courts of Europe. In all which they succeeded, more or less, as the history of those times, fully evinces.

Finding at length that the contest must be decided by arms, and that however formidable their land army was, the dispute in America was unequal, and would probably be determined in our favour, as it depended entirely on the means of transporting and sustaining an army there, and consequently was intimately connected with a superiority at sea; they wisely formed a scheme for attacking
tacking Hanover; the conquest of which they supposed easy, and from the king’s natural affection for that country, they hoped a restitution of it would make them regain whatever they lost in America, or procure them some other advantages. In the mean time their army would be maintained from the contributions to be raised in the conquered country, and by its position on the Elbe, overawe Germany, and effectually give laws to the contending parties.

This plan was in the beginning attended with all the success imaginable, and in the end was rendered ineffectual, only by the rapaciousness and ignorance of the French general who then commanded.

The French system was, we think, well concerted and even great. They had then, including the militia, near 220,000 men, maintained at a great expense; these would remain entirely useless, if the war was limited to America, or even to England, for want of a marine, which could not be formed in time of war; and the less so, as we had already acquired too great a superiority.

A German War, was for all these reasons both eligible and necessary, the expense of it to them, was comparatively nothing at all, being reduced to the simple difference, between maintaining an army in the field, and keeping it at home. They had troops sufficient to form an army in Germany, to guard their country, and to conquer America; supposing their marine had been capable to protect their transports into that country. To supply this extraordinary expense, they proposed making every country between the Rhine and the Elbe contribute. This they believed would produce more than sufficient for that purpose; so that they would have an immense army maintained and enriched at the expense of others. Add to this, that being limitrophes, this alone gave them infinite advantages over us.
Whereas if England proposed sending an army into Germany, the
must form it out of nothing, that is, she had not one man as yet
inlisted for that purpose, and whatever English would be sent there
must be replaced by new levies, in order to carry on the necessary
war in America. As to the Germans, they knew we must pay for
them at an extraordinary price, all which expense must be paid by
England alone, as it was not possible she could make any conquest
to bear any considerable part of it. These circumstances, the
French naturally supposed, would exhaust the nation’s treasure, call
the king’s attention, consequently that of his ministers to the
affairs of Germany, relax our preparations for America, produce
murmurs in the people, disunion in our counsels, and at last reduce
us to the necessity of submitting to whatever terms they should
think fit to impose. To them much more justly may be applied
that remarkable saying, America was conquered in Germany. The
only or at least the most probable means they had of saving or
conquering America, was to carry on the war with success in
Germany.

It was indifferent to the French, whether they entered Germany
as allies to Prussia, or Austria, as either would answer the object
they had in view. It is probable, however, they would have
chose the first connexion, as they could with more ease hurt the
Austrians than the Prussians. Being informed of our alliance with
Russia, they instantly sent a minister to Prussia to conclude a treaty
on the same footing as that in the war of 1741; but finding we had
been forced to renounce the alliance of the former, and embrace that
of the latter, they naturally accepted the friendship of the two im-
perial courts, and under pretence of fulfilling their engagements
contracted by this new alliance, they immediately prepared an army
of above 100,000 men, about 20,000 of which were destined to
march
march to the Mayn, and from thence where the empress should choose; the remainder, which was to form the main army, was ordered to the lower Rhine, and from thence proceed against Hannover and its allies. The command of this army was given to Marshal D'Etries, as a recompense for having negotiated the treaty of Verfailles; and had not the favour of an intriguing mistress prevailed in the choice of those employed afterwards to execute the French plan, all the efforts of England and its allies though supported by some of the ablest generals, that this or any age has produced, could not in all probability have prevented its future success.

Of Austria.

The empress had ever reflected on the loss of Silesia with infinite regret, being attended with a very great diminution of her revenues and power. These thoughts were aggravated by observing the ascendancy which this additional power gave the king of Prussia, whom it is said she personally disliked: she saw him treated everywhere with respect, feared and courted by most of the courts in Europe. No wonder therefore, that animated with these sentiments, she should form a plan for recovering Silesia. This seems to have been the chief object of her counsels, ever since she had ceded it to Prussia, as appears evident, from the papers published by the king on this subject. She applied to the empress of Russia, and irritated that princess against the king of Prussia to such a degree, that she was easily prevailed upon to concur in any measures concerted for his ruin. The two imperial Courts were therefore united, by new and strong alliances: the object of which was very extensive, and tended not only to the recovery of Silesia;
Silesia; but to annihilate the king of Prussia, whose dominions they proposed dividing among them. The better to accomplish this end, they invited the king of Poland to accede to this alliance. He however declined it, till he saw the two empresses act with such vigour, as would make it safe for him to declare against Prussia. Experience had taught him that the Prussians could oppress him with more ease and facility, than the Austrians protect him.

The Austrian minister at Petersburg had contributed all he could to the success of the treaty of subsidy between that court and England, with a view to make us, as usual, pay the expense of those troops, which the two imperial courts intended to employ only for their own particular service in attacking Prussia, and thereby facilitate the recovery of Silesia. Probably things would have gone to their wishes, if the king of Prussia had not declared he would consider as enemies those who brought any foreign troops into the empire; which indicated plainly he would not only hinder the Russians from coming to the succour of Hannover in case of need, but would perhaps treat that electorate as an enemy's country. The king of England very justly considered, that the Russians would be of no use to him, to protect his German dominions, if they were at war with Prussia. For whatever success they might have on the Baltic against that prince, they could never hinder him, being so very near, from occupying the electorate, a country without any natural or artificial strength.

For which reason his majesty very prudently, as we think, preferred the friendship of Prussia, and renounced to that of the two empresses. That of Germany, for whose advantage alone the alliance with Russia had been made, being thus disappointed, easily persuaded the other to break her treaty with us; and the more so, as these courts never had any other object in forming it, than to receive
in Germany.

To receive a subsidy that would enable them to carry their schemes against Prussia into execution, and by no means to act in concert with us, but on condition we concurred likewise in the plan they had formed for his ruin. Our connexions therefore with him, brought the treaty with Russia to nothing, and very naturally produced another alliance between the two imperial courts and that of France, whose views we have already explained.

OF PRUSSIA.

The late king of Prussia had cultivated the arts of peace, I mean those which fall more particularly under the cognizance of a prince, justice and interior policy, from principle. The military art rather for shew, than with any particular view, or love of glory. He had left at his death 67,000 men well disciplined, and his magazines abundantly furnished with artillery, stores, &c.

The death of the then emperor Charles VI. left the affairs of the house of Austria, in the utmost confusion, and distress. This the king of Prussia thought a favourable opportunity to assert the claims he had to some part of Silesia, and by such a bold enterprize, at the beginning of his reign, satisfy the ambition he had, to appear a formidable and enterprising power, capable to hold the balance of the empire, and protect those princes who should hereafter recur to him for succour. He was the first who began the war against the empress, which having succeeded to his wish, he concluded by a treaty that gave him all Silesia.

The recovery of this most fruitful province had been the principal object of the Austrian counsels ever since, which finished, as we have already related in an alliance with Russia calculated for that end. Though they had for many years been occupied by this one object
object, yet in 1756, they were not prepared to put it in execution, and had fixed the following year for that purpose.

The king of Prussia perfectly informed of what they had projected against him, thought it prudent to anticipate their operations, and attack the principal power of the confederacy, whom, being as yet unprepared, he hoped to crush, and thereby dissolve the league before they could unite and bring their plan to bear. With this view he entered Saxony: This brought on the general war in Germany, of which we propose giving an exact account in the following Work.

Of Saxony.

Avarice, an impotent ambition, a spirit of intrigue combined with indolence, a total neglect of every thing that tended to the welfare and interest of the country, an immoderate love for finews, pleasures, and pageantry, had been long the characteristics of this court. No wonder! the man who governed in the name of a too indulgent master, had brought with him into the ministry those habits he had contracted while a page. Attendance cost him nothing, his life had been dissipated in the idle and trifling occupations of a courtier; his great and indeed only talent was the profusion of an eastern monarch, which his vile partisans called magnificence. He was assiduous only in besieging his royal master, to prevent truth and virtue from approaching him; so that this humane and good prince, who had the greatest desire to promote the good of his people, was never permitted to know they were unhappy and wanted his protection. Though this minister knew that
that the abject state, to which his bad conduct had reduced Saxony, 
made it impossible for him to undertake any thing of consequence. 
He was, however, always intriguing with the courts of Vienna, 
and Peters burg, and forming projects for aggrandizing Saxony, at 
the expence of Prussia without having prepared any one means of 
realizing this vain chimera, or even provided for the common defence 
of the country. The money raised with difficulty on the poor sub-
ject, to provide an army for his defence, was dissipated in building 
magnificent palaces for the favourite, in expensive journeys, &c. 
to satisfy his abject and low vanity: so that the country, which 
might easily raise and maintain an army of 50,000 men, had scarce 
15,000 without artillery or magazines; and therefore fell an easy 
prey to an ambitious and powerful invader.

Of Russia.

Though the plan, formed and pursued with unwearied 
activity and vigilance by Peter the Great, had not since his 
death, been cultivated with equal care and success; however, what 
he had already done, made this empire powerful; and therefore 
respected and cared for. The vast extent of this empire, the variety 
of its productions, and the number of its inhabitants, form so many 
and such great sources of power, that a small neglect, which 
in lesser states would be immediately and severely felt, pass in this 
country unnoticed, and produce no sensible or direct bad effect. 
Its resources are so many, that in some measure they may be said 
to supply those mistakes which happen in the administration, and have
have kept up the lustre of the empire, though the plan of the first Peter has not been steadily adhered to.

While the Ottoman empire was formidable, this court and that of Vienna were naturally connected. The fear of a common, and powerful enemy, united them by the strong tie of mutual safety. Since the decline of the Turkish empire, she finds it no less necessary to cultivate the friendship of other princes, particularly that of the maritime powers, who take off a vast quantity of useless commodities. This brings a proportionable sum of money into the empire, which, there circulating, puts that vast machine in motion, and renders it therefore formidable. Hence the facility, or rather avidity with which the northern powers in general embrace every opportunity of taking subsidies. The luxury and magnificence of their courts are thereby kept up, and their princes abundantly supplied with all the superfluities, which vanity has made necessary, and their armies maintained at the expense of others. To these general motives may be added others, the late empress of Russia had, as we have already said, conceived a most violent aversion to the king of Prussia, and therefore readily concurred in any measure concerted for his humiliation, and the more so, as they flattered her with the hopes of extending her dominions on the Baltic, a thing long aimed at, by the Russians; she therefore with pleasure contracted an alliance with us, which would enable her to execute the designs of her hatred and politics at our expense. But finding we would not break with Prussia, she instantly renounced our friendship, and embraced that of France, who promised her such subsidies, as would enable her to put her troops in motion, and act according to her own principle.

No country
No country has in so short a time changed the principles of its constitution so much as this, except Denmark. Sweden in a very few years, from a most despotick government, as it was in Charles the XIIth's time, is now the most limited monarchy in Europe. Denmark, on the contrary, in near the same period, from a free government, is become entirely despotick. Neither seems to have got much by the revolution, as the power and credit of either does not appear to have been thereby augmented at home or abroad, particularly Sweden, whose interests in foreign courts is much sunk. The power of the crown is too limited, and that of the different states which form the constitution, too complicated, to admit of any plan that requires wisdom in deliberation, and vigour in the execution. An attempt was made some years ago to change the constitution, by augmenting the power of the crown, which could not have been executed without endangering the lives and fortunes of many: it was discovered in time, and some of the authors punished; as those who endeavour to subvert the constitution in favour of tyranny justly deserve. Though the plot was rendered vain, it left, however, an universal spirit of discontent, not to say hatred and animosity against the court, whom they naturally supposed had favoured at least, if not promoted a plot, calculated merely to augment the influence of the crown. They seemed particularly exasperated against the queen, a woman of superior talents, and sister to the king of Prussia, to whose instigation they attributed the attempt made against their liberty. The French,
who by subsidies, and that spirit of intrigue which distinguish their ministers in every court, laid hold of this occasion, to make the Swedes declare against his Prussian majesty. The war, however, being undertaken against the will of the king, was prosecuted without vigour, and they therefore embraced the first opportunity of concluding a peace, which they never ought to have broke. The Swedes must keep a watchful eye on the Russians, who aim at further conquests on the Baltic: this cannot be executed, without endangering the safety of Sweden. Prussia and Denmark have a common interest in opposing the progress of the Russians. How impolitick therefore were the Swedes to have acted on quite contrary principles. Had the confederacy succeeded against Prussia, Sweden and Denmark, particularly the former, would have been the victims of their bad policy, and fell an easy prey to the ambition of Russia.
A MILITARY DESCRIPTION OF THE SEAT of WAR.

OF BOHEMIA and MORAVIA.

These two great provinces belong to the empress of Germany. They are separated from Silesia, Lusatia, Saxony, and part of Bavaria, and Austria, by a continued chain of very high mountains, which necessarily renders the communication between those countries very difficult, there being very few military roads *. The first of these goes from Olmutz, in Moravia, to a town called Sternberg, and there divides itself into two; the one goes by Hoff to Troppau, and Jägerndorff, in the Austrian Silesia; the other passes by Friedland, Wurbenthal, and Zuckmantel, and from thence goes to Neifs. These two roads, particularly the last, may be considered as one continual defile, formed by the mountains, ravins, rivers, &c. and therefore may, no doubt, be defended by a few troops, if properly placed, against a numerous army. The Prussians have indeed one very great advantage: they can, by sending two corps, the one by Jägerndorff, and the other, out of the

*A road where infantry, cavalry, heavy artillery, and all kind of carriages can pass.

county
county of Glatz, from Habelschwert towards Altstadt, and Schonberg, force the Austrians to quit any position they may take, between Freudenthal and Neis, by cutting off their communication with Olmutz, from whence they must necessarily draw their subsistence. Whereas these can take no central position, that will effectually hinder the Prussians from entering Moravia, by the way of Zuckmantel, from the county of Glatz, and by Troppau, and unite these three columns with safety; Olmutz being too far back, can be of no use to guard the passages between Moravia and Silesia.

As the king of Prussia cannot from any place, more conveniently, carry on the war against the empress's dominions, than from Neis, into Moravia, nor where his successes would be attended with more fatal consequences; it is surprising her majesty has not thought proper to oppose, on that side, a stronger barrier than Olmutz, which is certainly a very indifferent place. The fine defence general Marshal made, during the last war, was owing as much to the weakness of the Prussian army, as to his own talents and vigilance, as will evidently appear by the history of that famous siege. This fortress is so far back, that it leaves all the avenues leading from Silesia and Glatz, into Moravia, quite open, and a considerable body of men cannot be sent far into the mountains, without evident risk: nothing would be more efficacious to check the Prussians, than the building a fortress, either in the neighbourhood of Altstadt, or between, Freudenthal and Zuckmantel; or lastly, between Jägerndorff, and Johannisthal. The first, would be a check on Glatz and Neis, at the same time, and enable the Austrians to make continual incursions into those two provinces, without any risk: nor does it appear possible for the Prussians to penetrate into Moravia, either from Glatz or Neis, without previously taking this fortress.
fortress; because a corps of troops posted here, and sustained by a strong garrison, would cut off all communication with those two places, and soon force an army that would advance towards Olmutz, to fall back or perish.

The second and third, would, indeed, effectually hinder the Prussians from advancing into Moravia, 'till they had taken them: but the siege of them would be more easy, because such a body of troops might be sent from upper Silesia, and from Glatz, to seize the defiles between them, and Moravia, as would make it impossible to relieve them.

Most men think that a camp, or fortress, is well placed, if they cannot be approached without great difficulty, which is true only, in case they have in themselves all the resources necessary for their defence; but as that seldom or ever happens, the perfection of the one and the other would be, to find a situation that presents to the enemy all the difficulties possible; and which, at the same time, may be easily succoured, if necessary. The difficulty to find such a situation, or the want of that sure, coup d'œil, has determined many engineers, to choose the plains for their fortresses, which frees them from the censure of having ill chose their ground, and flatters their vanity, by giving them an opportunity, to produce all the different works they have seen in the schools, and make such a fine appearance on paper.

Another road goes from Olmutz, by Litau and Alstadt, into the county of Glatz. The next principal road, is that, which goes from the circle of Königigratz, by Neuflat and Nachod, into the county of Glatz, and from thence into the other provinces of Silesia: it is not less difficult than the others above-mentioned, being like them, one continual defile, particularly, when it enters the Prussian dominions, where it is almost impossible for a considerable body of troops to march, if they meet with any resistance; especially, in going from
from Bohemia towards Glatz, as the mountains rise gradually; from
whence appears, that the Prussians can with more ease penetrate into
Bohemia, than the Austrians can, into the county of Glatz. The first
have another considerable advantage; they can be provided with every
thing from the fortress of Glatz, which gives them a safe retreat,
when pushed back by superior forces: they are masters of the ave-
nues which lead into Bohemia; which, being entirely open and
fruitful, they can enter with ease, and subsist for a considerable
time; whereas the Austrians cannot enter the country of Glatz at
all, if the passes are properly guarded, and even should they force
back the posts placed in them, they can find no subsistence in the
country, and must begin their operations by the siege of Glatz,
which, from its very advantageous situation, can scarce be taken,
though left to the defence of its own garrison, and certainly not at all,
if there is a considerable body of troops in the country to sustain it.

The history of the last and preceding wars, confirms what is here
advanced. In the first, it was reduced by famine, and, in the last,
chance, cowardice, and ignorance, of all which, general Laudhon
took proper advantages, were the immediate causes of its being
taken.

The next road goes likewise from the circle of Königgratz, by
Trautenau and Landschut, to Schweidnitz, and Jauer, in Silesia.
This, like the others, is a continual defile, and so difficult, that
when the passes are properly guarded, no army can penetrate into
Silesia, on this side. The Prussians have a fine position near Land-
shut, from whence they may, by an easy march on the left, cover the
road that goes from Friedland to Schweidnitz, and sustain effectually
any corps, they may send to Schmidberg and Hirschberg. It was
from this camp that Fouquet, with an inconsiderable army, so
often
often baffled the attempts made by the Austrians, though much superior, to penetrate that way into Silesia, and was at last overpowered, and entirely defeated in it, by his own fault.

The Prussians have here the same advantages as on the side of Glatz. The fortress of Schweidnitz, being another place of arms, supplies them with every thing they want; and being so near, enables them to begin their operations, much sooner than the Austrians. The mountains are filled with villages, where an army may be put in cantonments with safety, if care is taken to occupy the defiles, between them and Bohemia, which they can do with ease, being within the Prussian dominions: nothing therefore, can hinder them from invading that province on this side, even if the Austrians had an army there; because that army cannot take any position nearer the avenues that lead into it; than behind the Elbe, some where between Königshoff and Königsgraatz, which can, effectually, hinder the Prussians from advancing any farther; but cannot prevent their entering it.

When one considers that the Prussians must, from the situation of their country, make their chief efforts on this side, as well, because they can penetrate with safety in various columns, can be supplied, abundantly, from Glatz and Schweidnitz, with provisions, stores, &c. and can retire without danger in case of misfortune, one is amazed, to see her majesty leave this province, entirely, defenceless, and exposed to the continual ravages of the enemy. As there is no kind of fortress, nothing less than an army, can defend it against the incursions, that may be made from the county of Glatz, and from the mountains of Landshut.

If the enemy once passes the Elbe, above Königsgraatz, all the provinces on the right of that river, must be abandoned; the troops posted on the frontiers of Lusatia, must instantly, fall back to Prague,
for fear of being cut off. Even the army itself must fall back into the circle of Chrudim, in order to cover Moravia, and keep open the communication with Austria and the Danube. Whereas, if a fortres capable of containing 10,000 foot and 4000 horse, was placed behind the Elbe, between Königshoff, and Konigigratz, with caserns and magazines vaulted, bomb-proof, the Prussians, could not take it, without infinite trouble; and it would certainly hold out some months, if we judge by their skill, on other occasions, and give time, to come to its relief. This situation is so advantageous, that it not only covers the country on that side, but likewise facilitates the means of entering Silesia. As it may be made a general place of arms, to supply the armies destined on that side, nor can the enemy leave it behind him and penetrate into the country, because the garrison alone, with some croats and hussars, would cut off his communication with Silesia and Glatz, in such a manner, as would soon force him to retire, or make him, and his army perish, though he should leave a corps of 20,000 men, to observe the place, to secure his convoys.

Besides, a fortres of that kind, and a numerous garrison, must force the enemy to keep a considerable corps, both in the county of Glatz, and in the mountains of Landshut. The advantages of such a fortres, are infinite, and in my opinion, renders it absolutely necessary.

The next road goes from the circle of Buntzlau, by Bakhofen, Swigan, Libenau, Riechenberg, where it divides into two; the one goes to Friedland, and thence towards Griefenberg, in Silesia, Seidenberg, in Lusatia. This road passes likewise through many very high mountains; and therefore not easily to be passed, if there are troops to defend the defiles.

Though the king of Prussia, will never make his chief effort on this
this side, having no place of arms, at a proper distance, yet as in every war with the Austrians, he will think it necessary to occupy Saxony, some division of his army will always enter Bohemia, on the side of Lusatia, while it remains quite open as at present: wherefore it would, no doubt, be very proper, to have as near the frontiers as possible, some considerable forts, which a division of twenty thousand men, can neither suddenly take, nor safely leave behind them, nor could any troops take their winter quarters, any where in the mountains, from Friedland to Schandau, or even at Grießenberg, Marklissa, Lauban, and Gorlitz, if a considerable forts is placed in the neighbourhood of Friedland: neither can the communication be kept up between Silesia and Saxony, unless an army be posted to secure it. To these great and obvious reasons may be added, that as Silesia, is quite an open country, without any forts to cover it, from Marklissa to Croßen, near Frankfort, it might be attacked, on that side rather, than on that of Moravia, and Bohemia, which now can’t be done, without leaving an army to cover these two provinces. But if they are secured, by the forts proposed to be made in Moravia, and near Königgratz; the Austrians might, we think, enter Silesia, by the way of Lusatia, provided they have a place of arms, near Friedland, which would enable them, as we think, to act with safety and vigour on that side. The want of it, rendered ineffectual, the victories gained by the Russians at Zulichau, and Cunnerfsdorff, and every attempt, the Austrians made, on the Queifs, and Bober.

Should the different forts, above proposed, be executed, 30,000 men, besides their garrisons, will, it’s thought, be more than sufficient to cover Bohemia, all the remainder of her majesty’s forces, may then, act with success on the Queifs, and Bober, otherwise not.

The next road goes likewise from the circle of Buntzlaub, by
Leypa, and Gabel, to Zittau, in Lusatia: this is the least difficult of any as yet described. In the mountains, however, about Gabel, there are some defiles, which may easily be guarded, with few troops.

The next road goes from the same province, by Rumburg, and from thence towards Löbau, in Lusatia. This is extremely difficult, and, during the course of the war, I do not remember it was taken by any considerable corps, excepting by that of the prince of Prussia, after the battle of Kollin. Little use can be made of these two last roads, by the Prussians, being so far from their depots, excepting for some division of their army, when they propose invading Bohemia on different sides at the same time, and therefore it seems useless, to fortify them.

The next, and one of the most important roads, in all this country, is that which goes from Prague, by Budyn, Lowositz, Aussig, Peterswald, and Ghifhubel, where it enters Saxony. This road is one continual defile, from Lowositz to the last mentioned place, runs close to the Elbe, from Lowositz to Aussig, where the river Bila cuts it, another deep ravine beyond Peterswald; and a third at Ghifhubel. In each of these three places, are such advantageous positions, that twelve or fourteen battalions, would be able to defend them against an army, though there be no kind of fortresses, and if there was a good one, it would be scarce possible to invade Bohemia, on the side of Saxony, with success. Whenever an army proposes passing from the one country into the other, it is absolutely necessary to be masters of the Elbe, because it is by that river alone, such armies must subsist, the mountains being so high, and the roads so bad, that for many months in the year, no carriage can pass; a fortress therefore here, would be an invincible obstacle for an army coming from either country.

The next road goes likewise from the plains of Lowositz, over
over the mountains by Töplitz, and from thence by Zinwalde, into Saxony. This road is very bad, and so full of defiles, that it is scarce fit for any but infantry: there are many positions to be taken on it, the principal one is near Toplitz.

The next goes out of the circle of Saatz, by Laun, and Commotau, and from thence over the Basberg into Saxony. This and the next which goes likewise from the circle of Saatz, by Caaden, over the Kupferberg, into Saxony, are extremely difficult, and when the defiles have been properly guarded the Prussians have always been repulsed. During the war, excepting in 1757, when prince Maurice passed there in two columns. Scarcely any thing but light troops ever attempted passing these defiles.

From the circle of Ellenbogen, there go two roads, the one over the mountains to Plauen, and the other through Egra. Both these, are in some measure impassable, for an army coming into Bohemia, because it would not be safe to pass through such great defiles, so near a fortress. These are the principal roads and passes, which occur, in the counties where the war was carried on in that part of Germany.

Bohemia and Moravia are watered by many rivers, the principal of which are the Teifs, which rises in the mountains of Silesia, called Schneeberg, and runs by Alstadt, Muglitz, Littau, Olmutz, Hradisch, &c. and falls into the Danube, at Presburg; in the latter part of its course, it is called the Morava: it is not navigable, nor can any position be taken on its banks, to stop an enemy coming from Silesia. The best, however, is on the heights about Littau with the right extending towards Olmutz, and a corps further on towards Muglitz, otherwise a column coming down the Teifs would render that position very hazardous.
dous. This is, no doubt, the most proper position of any to cover Olmutz, which cannot be attacked while an army is here, nor can it well be forced, by any indirect manoeuvre to quit it, being supplied with provisions from Olmutz, nor can an enemy advance towards Austria, leaving that fortress, and army behind him.

There are many more, small, rivers between Olmutz and Brinn, which, passing through the mountains, furnish every where excellent camps. Moravia, in general, is a very strong country, and may be defended by a small army against a very numerous one, as appeared in the war which happened after the death of Charles the VIth. For then prince Charles, aided by the great Kevenhuller, at the head of a very inconsiderable body of troops, compared with those of the enemies, drove them entirely out of that country, and Bohemia, merely by the superiority of manoeuvres, which the face of the country permitted him to execute.

The Elbe rises in the mountains of Silesia, called the Riesengebürge, and runs by Arnau, Königshoff, Jaromitz, Königgratz, Pardubitz, Neuhoff, Kollin, Nimburg, Brandeis, where the Iser falls into it, Melnitz, where the Moldau comes into it, Leitmeritz, above which, the Egra falls into it, Auslig, and from thence to Königstein in Saxony, it is navigable only as far as Lowositz, where it grows considerable. In all this extensive course few good positions can be taken on its banks. The first and most important of any upon it, and indeed in the whole country, is between Königshoff, and Königgratz, from whence an army can effectually hinder an enemy coming from Schweidnitz and Glatz, from penetrating into the interior parts of Bohemia.
There are other positions to be taken, between Nimburg, and Brandeis, which cover Prague against an army coming from Luflatzia. Between these places and Saxony, no position can be taken on its banks, because it runs parallel, to the road that passes from the one country into the other; so that only the right or left wing of an army camped between Lowofitz and Augig, can be posted on it, according as the front is placed.

On the Zaffava, one position only of consequence can be taken, and that at Beneschau, from whence you may cover the two great roads that lead from Prague to Vienna.

The Moldau, on which some positions may be taken, which cover Bohemia, Upper and Lower Austria, in case any attempt be made from Voigtland in Saxony. It was from these positions that the French, under marshal Maillebois, were effectually prevented from penetrating into Bohemia, and relieving marshal Belleisle, then besieged in Prague.

This is the strongest place on the river; and indeed in the whole country, and is well fortified; but being commanded by the neighbouring hills, very extensive, and divided by the Moldau, it requires such an immense quantity of stores and artillery, and such a numerous garrison, that it seems doubtful whether any attempt should be made to defend it or not, excepting by a couple of battalions, merely to protect it, from plunder, by capitulating. The fate of this city, in the war of 1741, shews the truth of this opinion. The first time, it was taken by assault, with a garrison of near 4000 men in it; the second time, it resisted a very few days only; and the third, it was abandoned precipitately by the Prussians, on their quitting Bohemia. In this last war, its fate would have been decided in a few days more, and it would have been taken with an army in it.
The Egra rises in the circle of that name; and runs by the town of Egra, thence by Ellenbogen, Saatz, Laun, and Budyn; and a little way from this last town it falls into the Elbe. The only town of strength on this river is Egra, which is well fortified; but being commanded by a hill, on the left of the river, it cannot make any long defence; and therefore in the last war, it was debated, whether it should be dismantled, or not.

It is remarkable, that, in general, the banks on the right of this river are highest; and consequently furnish easy means for its defence. There are many good positions to be taken on it; the first and principal however is, that, on the right of the river behind Budyn, by which an enemy, coming from Saxony, by the way of Auffig, (which, as we have said, is the principal debouché into Bohemia) may be effectually stopped, if another strong corps is placed higher up, towards Laun, which at the same time stops any column coming by the way of Commotau. This body of troops must be strong enough to dispute the passage, 'till the army posted at Budyn has time to come up, which may be done by an easy march on the left; and if in 1756 the duke of Aremberg's corps had taken this position, instead of falling back to Mickovitz, the king of Prussia would have found it difficult to pass the Egra, and probably would have failed in the attempt, as Gen. Brown could have opposed him with a very numerous army.

This country, like most others in Europe, was formerly governed by the feudal system; it is still so, in some measure, and notwithstanding the vast power of the house of Austria, the nobility have some privileges: for these reasons there is an infinite number of towns fortified, or rather surrounded with an old wall, after the Gothic manner, whose use is very great and
and extensive, as they furnish effectual means to carry on the *petite guerre* with success, and consequently harass an enemy extremely, by rendering his convoys and subsistence precarious, which at last must force him to abandon the interior part of the country, and approach the frontiers. They likewise enable you, with a small army, to dispute every inch of ground with your enemy, who will not presume to separate his troops 'till he has forced you back on the Danube. For this reason, the Prussians, French, and Saxons, in the war of 1741, though they were soon masters of it, on the appearance of any small army against them, they were obliged to abandon it; and indeed we don't think it can be preserved, if conquered, unless you include Moravia and Austria, as far as the Danube; then indeed, having this great river for a barrier, it may be kept, otherwise not.

Though the country, from what we have said, will appear strong, and is really so; it has, however, many inconveniences; which make it impossible to hinder an invasion, particularly on the side of Silesia. The mountains, which separate these two countries, make a part of Silesia, and therefore belong to the king of Prussia, who is thereby master of the defiles, near which, he has the fortresses of Neisse, Glatz, and Schweidnitz, where he can, with ease and secrecy, make the necessary preparations; and in one march, he may enter Bohemia in three different columns, which nothing in the world can prevent, as no position can be taken near enough to the Debouchés, to prevent his subsisting, and encamping so advantageously, between your army and the mountains, that you cannot force him to repass them. The nearest and best positions that
can be taken to cover the country from an invasion, on the side of Schweidnitz and Glatz, are those already mentioned, behind the Elbe, at Königshoff and Königigratz, which, however, you must abandon, unless you are strong enough to hinder him from entering Moravia on your right, by the way of Zuckmantel, as it happened in the campaign of 1758, and out of Bohemia on your left by Friedland and Gabel. If you fail in this, you must instantly fall back into Moravia, to cover Vienna; or to the Moldau, to cover Prague. In the interior part of the country, the best position, without doubt, is that in the neighbourhood of Collin and Czaflau, as you may from thence, in a few marches, be either behind the Elbe at Königigratz, approach the Moldau, or fall back into Moravia, as the case may require.

The positions to be taken in that part of the country, are those of Lötumischel, Müglitz, Littau, with strong corps towards Zuckmantel and Troppau, to cover the debouches on that side, where they are securely posted, and can be attacked only in front: in which case they fall back on your army, or on Olmutz. By taking either of these positions you cover Moravia and Austria, and have your communication open with Bohemia, where no enemy dare separate, while you are in force in Moravia. Another great inconvenience in the defence of this country, is, that no considerable magazines can with safety be placed, any where, but at Prague or Olmutz, which are too far back from the frontiers, and your army must be supplied from thence by land carriage, a thing very difficult at the end of a campaign, particularly if the war continues long in the country, and makes horses and oxen scarce.

This
Of Silesia and the County of Glatz.

This country lies from south to south-east of Bohemia. It extends in length from Liebenau, on the frontiers of Brandenburg, to Upper Silesia, on the frontiers of Poland and Hungary, near 240 miles. Its breadth, including the county of Glatz, to Millitsch, on the frontiers of Poland, is near 120 miles. It is peopled, by near a million and a half of inhabitants, and produces an yearly avenue of about four millions of dollars, and is one of the most fruitful and richest provinces in Europe.

It has been already said, that it is separated from Bohemia, by a chain of mountains, running from Zuckmantel, on the frontiers of Moravia, to Greiffenberg on the river Queifs. From Luface, it is separated by this river, which runs by Greiffenberg, Marklissa, and Lauban, and falls at Halbau into the Bober. This last river serves as a barrier, on the side of Upper Luface, till it falls into the Oder at Croffen.

The advantageous situation of this country, enables the king of Prussia to invade Bohemia with facility and success: whereas any attempt from Bohemia against Silesia would be attended with much danger and difficulty. A small army posted, any where, in the neighbourhood of Glatz, with two corps; the one between Freywald and Johansthal, and the other about Trautenau, would, I am persuaded, render any attempts against it, vain and fruitless. An army so posted cannot be forced by any direct manœuvre, because the country is extremely strong, and it might retire under the cannon of Glatz: and though either of the two corps posted, as we suppose, on the right and left, were pushed back; you could not presume to advance into Silesia with an army, leaving
ving the enemy in the county of Glatz; because from thence, he could cut off your communication both with Bohemia and Moravia; and consequently, in a few days, would force you to fall back into these countries, or perish in the mountains, as the country between these mountains and the fortresses of Neiff's and Schweidnitz, could not supply an army for two days only. Much less could you attempt anything against these places, if there be any troops in the county of Glatz; or any corps, however inconsiderable, in the neighbourhood of them, your army must subsist from your magazines in Bohemia, which you cannot possibly bring into Silesia, while the enemy is in force in the county of Glatz. And though there be no enemy there, your transports, however numerous, are soon wore out, particularly if any rain falls, which makes the roads absolutely impassable. Then you must not think of bringing up your heavy artillery, ammunitions, &c. till the place is entirely invested, and you have formed a considerable magazine near your camp. Such preparations require much more time than is necessary, to enable the king to come to its relief. Hence it appears, how difficult, the conquest of Silesia must be, while there is any small army to cover it. The progress of the Austrians in the campaigns of 1757, 1760, and 1761, was, we think, entirely owing to the bad conduct of the Prussian generals; which we shall demonstrate when we give an account of those campaigns.

This country is watered by small rivers, and, like Bohemia, is covered with woods, and intersected with hills and valleys: and consequently furnisheth, every where, excellent camps. The chief positions on this side, are those in the neighbourhood of Glatz, at Frankenftein, Wartha, &c. of which we have given an account. On the left is one near Otmoschau, which covers Neiff's.
Neifs: on the right is that of Landshut, which covers Schweidnitz. There is another on the heights of Würben, between Schweidnitz and Breslau, which covers both: another, behind the Reichenbachisch Wesser, with the right at Pültzen, and the left at Faulebrucken, which answers the same purpose: another between Liebenthal and Löwenberg, which is excellent, and covers the country effectually against an army advancing by the way of Görlitz, Marklissa, and Lauban.

Further down the Queifs, is a good camp between Naumburg and Buntzlau, but it should not be occupied, except in some very particular case: as the enemy could pass the Queifs, and enter Silezia on your left, by Lauban; near which is a very good camp for a small corps to serve as a vanguard to the army posted at Löwenberg. Still further down, on the Bober, is a good camp at Sagan, and at Christianstadt, which covers that side effectually.

The only navigable river in this country is the Oder, which rises in the mountains of Hungary, not far from Jablunka. It runs by Rattibor, Kofel, Oppelen, Terschen, Brieg, Breslau, Groß Glogau, Frankfort, Cuftrin, and Stettin, a little below which it falls into the Baltic.

The first place of any strength you meet with, on this river, is Kofel, which, though very small, is strong by its situation, and could it contain a numerous garrison, would be a respectable bulwark against the Austrians and Hungarians. The other places we have named, as far as Breslau, are of no other use, than to cover the country against the incursions of light troops, and to form magazines, and secure the fruits of the earth in case of a war.

Breslau,
Breslau, the capital of Silezia, is a large and well-peopled town; but though pretty well fortified, is not capable of making any considerable defence; because it is commanded by a neighbouring height: it has no out-works of consequence. Besides, great part of the town or suburbs are without the wall; under the cover of which, you may begin your approaches very near; and the ditch not being protected by a good glacis, and a well-pallisaded covered-way, you may get into the town in a very short time. 'Tis however, in other respects, of great use; as you may with safety form there magazines of provisions and stores: and you may lodge there a good body of troops to recover themselves during the winter quarters. It may likewise cover a camp, if the ground is well chosen. Its garrison, when left to itself, ought to be numerous, in order to protect the country. From Breslau, still following the course of the river, you come to Gross Glogau, which may justly be esteemed the key and bulwark of Lower Silezia. It is a strong fortress, when compared with those of this country, though nothing at all compared with those in Flanders.

There are generally immense magazines, and a numerous garrison in this town. It covers the country so effectually, that no enterprise of consequence can be undertaken on that side of Silezia, until you are master of it. The taking of it will be no easy matter, as the king will always have an army in this neighbourhood, to observe an enemy coming from Poland, and if it be too weak to keep the field, it will find a secure retreat under the cannon of this fortress, from whence it cannot be forced by any direct manoeuvre. Should the enemy attempt to leave you behind, and march to Breslau, you can be there before him; or by sending a body of huslars into Poland, cut off
off his subsistences so effectually, as to force him immediately to abandon his designs and return to the frontiers of that country: and as the king takes care to have all the corn of the country deposited at Breslau and Glogau, the enemy finds nothing but the growing crop, on which no army can subsist a day; particularly in that part of the country bordering on the Oder, which is generally sandy, and therefore by no means fruitful. From hence it appears, that an army coming from Poland cannot, however numerous, undertake any thing solid. No magazine can be formed nearer the frontiers of Silesia, than at Posen, sixty miles from Glogau. Such a magazine, however abundant, can scarcely supply the daily consumption of a numerous army, while it remains in that neighbourhood, much less can it be transported to Glogau, and supply the army there for at least two months. How can the heavy artillery, an immense quantity of stores necessary for such a siege, be brought there? How, therefore, undertake it? even supposing, what probably will never happen, that it be left to the defence of a common garrison, and that there be no army to cover it. This shews why the Russians could not, for want of a sufficient magazine at Posen, approach the frontiers of Silesia till the month of July: and then their operations were chiefly regulated by the necessity of making the army subsist, rather than with a view to any military enterprise. As they could not subsist in any one place, long enough, to think of undertaking any thing of consequence; they were, notwithstanding their repeated victories, obliged in the month of october, to abandon a country, which their own ravages, and the nature of the circumstances, had rendered incapable of supporting them during the winter. They must necessarily fall back on the Lower Vistula, where they
they have their magazines. For these reasons, all the operations of this army were reduced to marching from the Vistula into Silesia, and after fighting and ravaging the country, to the returning again on the Vistula.

We shall conclude this description of Silesia with observing, that the greatest advantage arising from the favourable situation, and nature of this country, in our opinion, consists in this: that the king, covered with the places of Silesia, is enabled to make all his motions with safety and celerity; that his armies are abundantly supplied, on the spot where they encamp; that a small corps, protected by these places, supply the place of a great army, and that so effectually, that nothing of consequence, can be undertaken in that country while they exist. Whoever considers attentively what we have said on this subject, will probably feel his admiration for the king of Prussia, and his contempt for the Austrian and Russian generals, considerably diminished.

Further down the Oder, in the marquisate of Brandenburg, lies the city of Francfort, a rich and populous place. It is of no other use, however, when considered in a military view, than to cover magazines, which you must form here, and at Croffen, for an army you may send on the Warta towards Posen, and those parts of Poland.

Further down, at the confluent of the Warta into the Oder, is Cuscin. This place is small, and not at all strong, yet the Russians, who attacked it in 1758, failed in their attempt. It held out till the king came and relieved it, by gaining the battle of Zorndorff. This confirms what we have said of the difficulties, attending such an enterprise, as the siege of Glogau, or indeed of any place of considerable strength, unless you can form your magazines near such places, or that the country itself should be able to
to supply your army. But this can never happen as to ammu-
nitions and stores, nor even as to subsistences; if care is taken
to make the farmers deposit their grain in those places, where
a siege is expected.

The situation of Custrin is very advantageous, and may be
considered as one of the chief keys of Silesia and Brandenburg,
particularly the last, whenever an invasion is expected from the
Lower Vistula, that is, from Warsaw to Dantzig.

Some one column must pass here, and it would be no ways
safe to penetrate into Brandenburg, without having previously
taken Custrin and Stettin. It were to be wished, that some
means could be found to augment the fortifications of the for-
mer, so as to make it capable of holding a numerous garrison
of horse and foot. This would add infinitely to its importance,
and it would then effectually cover the country on that
side. Stettin, from its situation chiefly, is capable of a long de-
fence, as appeared when it was taken from the Swedes, in the
beginning of this century. It is of infinite consequence to the
king of Prussia, as it covers Brandenburg and Pomerania, in such
a manner, that though these provinces may be overrun and ra-
vaged, they can never be conquered: and we doubt whether
any of those powers, who may hereafter have views on this
town, will be in a condition to take it, without having made
a couple of successful campaigns, there being so many things
to be done previous to the siege of such a place.

Colberg is on the sea coast, and though many miles distant
from Stettin, it may be considered as an outwork to that place,
it being the only post in that neighbourhood, where magazines
may be formed to besiege that fortress. No considerable sup-
ply of provisions can be got, from the produces of the country:
it must be brought from Livonia, Finland, Sweden, &c. by sea. So must the artillery, ammunitions, and stores, which cannot be transported from the Vistula by land. Hence it appears of what consequence Colberg is; and we are therefore much surprised, that the king of Prussia should have neglected this place. Its fortifications are small and insignificant beyond conception, and could not, if properly attacked, have held out two days. The defence it made redounds as much to the honour of the governor, as it does the imputation of ignorance on the besiegers.

If this place was made fit to hold a garrison of 4000 foot, and 2000 horse, we think it would be impregnable to a Russian army; as they could scarce ever be provided with the necessary means to reduce it. Besides, it would effectually stop the progress of an army coming that way; especially if Cuffrin was likewise put in the situation we have mentioned. Glogau, Cuffrin, Colberg, and Stettin, may be rendered insuperable barriers, on this side the Prussian dominions; as Neisfs, Glatz, and Schweidnitz, are on the other. The putting these places in a respectable condition, is the more necessary, as Pomerania and Brandenburg are open on that side, and have absolutely no interior defence.

The frontiers of Pomerania, towards the Swedes and Mecklenburgers, are strong by nature, and do not require the help of art; as the Prussians are too powerful to fear any thing from that quarter.

Of Prussia I shall only say, it cannot be effectually defended while it depends on the house of Brandenburg; because those who attack it are borderers, and have therefore at hand all the means that can insure success, and all the resources necessary to recover
recover themselves after a defeat: whereas those who are to defend it, are deprived of every advantage, and were they subject to no other loss, than what naturally attends war, in one campaign, they would be reduced to the necessity of abandoning it, as they could not possibly be recruited in time, receive horses for remounting their cavalry, or be supplied with stores, &c. we are therefore surprized his majesty should attempt to defend it: He, probably, held the Russians in such contempt, that he did not doubt of their being easily beaten, and forced back into their own country. But he saw his error; and therefore, after his first campaign, abandoned the country. Could his majesty change this country with the Poles for that on the Lower Vistula, it would be much for his advantage. I shall dwell longer on the subject of defending a distant country, when I examine the war in Westphalia and Portugal, independent of politics, and merely in a military view.

To the left of Pomerania, the king has the strong fortress of Magdeburg on the Elbe, a place of great strength, and of equal importance; as he may form there in twenty-four hours, such a body of troops, as will keep in awe the Saxons on the one side, and Holstein, Mecklenburg, and Hanover on the other. As to the king's dominions on the Rhine, we rather think there should be no fortress: because it would be almost impossible to defend them against an enemy who is on that frontier: and it would be too difficult to wrest them from him, should he become master of them: whereas, if left open, he will be obliged to abandon them.

The fate of Wesel in this last war confirms our opinion.
OF SAXONY and LUSACE.

In speaking of Bohemia and Silesia, we have already said, that the first is separated from Saxony by a chain of mountains running from Egra to Pirna, and from Lusace by the same chain of mountains running from Pirna to Friedland. From this place, Lusace is separated from Silesia, by the Queifs and Bober. In all this, so extensive, frontier, nor indeed on that towards Brandenburg and Thuringue, can any position be taken, by any army the elector of Saxony can raise, so as to cover his country effectually, because it is not strong, either by art, or nature. However, to preserve the capital from an enemy, coming by the way of Aufflig from Bohemia, a camp may be taken behind the ravin of Ghishubel, or further back at Gross Zedlitz: this indeed is a resource for a few days only, because the enemy, by marching a column on the right of the Elbe by Schandau, may come and encamp on the heights near the Weissenhirsch, from whence he will soon destroy Dresden, or force you to a composition: still more useless would any camp in Lusace be, because you can from no one place there, cover that country, or any part of Saxony, either towards Bohemia, or on the side of Brandenburg, and lower Saxony.

The situation of the Prussian dominions enables his majesty to form different points of attack from Magdeburg, Brandenburg, and Silesia, and his being so much superior to the elector of Saxony, would render all the efforts of that prince in the defence of his country vain. It is an unhappy situation; but such it is.
Saxony alone cannot withstand either Prussia or Austria; and therefore, by force, or persuasion, must be made a party in every war between these contending rivals. And as the country is entirely open on the side of Prussia, he can over-run it and be at the capital, before it is possible for the Austrians to bring an army to cover it. We think, therefore, that Saxony should unite herself to the house of Brandenburg. In the beginning of the war, which happened at the death of Charles the sixth, Saxony was connected with Prussia, and certainly suffered nothing from this connection; and had she not altered her system, it is my opinion she might have reaped some advantages from this union. In the last part of that war, she was united with Austria, and was the victim of it. In a few days, Saxony was lost, and could not be recovered, but by the mediation of England, and on such terms as the victor thought proper to impose.

The transactions of this last war confirm our opinion, and shews the absolute necessity of changing her political system. She must forget that she has been equal to the house of Brandenburg: her jealousy must give way to sentiments of self-preservation, which we think can be insured only by entering into strong and close connections with Prussia.

The interior of this country is intersected by many small rivers, and by an infinite number of ravins, generally so deep, that they are almost impassable. Parallel to the Elbe runs the Mulda; it rises in the mountains called the Erzgebirg, and it falls into the Elbe, near Deßau. Its farthest distance from the Elbe, is about twelve miles: though it is nowhere very deep, yet as it runs through a deep ravin, whose banks are very high
high and craggy, it is impossible to pass it, if you meet with the leaft opposition.

Between this river and the Elbe, are many good camps, but no one position that can effectually cover the capital.

The first camp is on the right of the Weiftritz, with the right wing at Plauen, and the left, on the mountain by Potchapel. To make this camp secure, you must have a strong corps on the other side of the ravin by Posendorff, between Rabenau and Dippoldiswalda, to cover your flank and watch Friberg. The enemy coming up the Elbe may encamp with safety, on the heights of Keffelsdorff.

The second camp is further down the Elbe, with the right at Monzig, and the left at Rothfchenberg, with a deep ravin in front, through which runs a marshy rivulet.

On the other side of this ravin, is another excellent camp, called the Kattfenhaufer, which the Prussians have often occupied during the war. They likewise occupied one near Meiflen; which was as bad as possible, as will be evident, when we come to give an account of some actions which have passed there, during the war.

The third is at Lomatch. The fourth is at Ochatz, which may be made very strong, by throwing up some few redoubts before the center, and beyond the right.

The fifth is at Strehlen, which is good, whichever way it is taken; but you must have a corps at Hubertzburg.

The last of any consequence is at Torgau; which is a good one whatever way you place your front. However strong these camps may be in front, no army can remain long in them, if they are not secured by strong corps, on the left side of the Mulda, and on the right of the Elbe; but if this precaution is neglected, an army, for example, destined to cover Dresden and
and Bohemia, must instantly fall back on that town, to secure its communication with Bohemia, if the enemy sends a corps, beyond the Mulda or the Elbe. The same thing will happen to an army coming up that river; a corps posted beyond those rivers will soon force him back to secure his communication with the Lower Elbe, and with Brandenburg. This will be confirmed by the operations of the war in that country.

Having explained the views of the different powers at war, and given a proper description of the country, wherein it was prosecuted. We shall now proceed to give an account of its various operations, hoping to make it an useful, and agreeable work to all military men; for whose use it was chiefly undertaken.
HISTORY
OF THE
WAR in GERMANY.

CAMPAIGN of 1756.

The king of Prussia attempted to enter into a negotiation with the court of Vienna, and by that means gain time, by which he hoped to find some methods of dissolving the confederacy; or at least to prevent its immediate effect. But, finding all his proposals rejected with disdain, he resolved to anticipate his enemy's designs, and carry the war into their dominions, rather than wait their attacking him in his own. The possession of Saxony is not only convenient, but almost necessary, in order to invade Bohemia with success. His majesty therefore determined to occupy it; he was the more confirmed in this resolution, as he knew the elector had tacitly concurred in all the schemes concerted for his ruin, and waited only for a sure opportunity to concur also in the execution.

With this view, an army, consisting of near seventy battalions and eighty squadrons, divided into three different corps, entered the electorate on the 29th of August: the right wing composed one, and marched, under the command of prince Ferdinand of Brunswic, from the duchy of Magdeburg, by Hall, Leipzig, Borna, Chemnitz, Friberg, and Dippoldisvalda, and thence towards Dresden, the place designed for the rendezvous of the army. The center, commanded
commanded by the king in person, composed the second corps, and marched on the left of the Elbe, by Wittenberg, Torgau, Meissen, and thence by Kesseldorff to Dresden. The left wing formed the third corps, and was commanded by the duke of Bevern, who marched from the neighbourhood of Frankfort on the Oder, by Elsterwerda, Bautzen, Stolpen, and Lohmen, and there encamped on the right of the Elbe opposite to Pirna. The whole Prussian army assembled in the neighbourhood of Dresden, on the 6th of September. His majesty's intention seems to have been to persuade the king of Poland to join him in attacking Bohemia, or, which is more probable, in case of a refusal, to have a pretence for seizing Saxony, as it really happened soon after.

The disposition of the king's march into Saxony, we think very fine, as there was not above 15,000 men in that country; which were not assembled, as yet, in a body; and, even had they been so, they were still inferior to either of the king's columns, nor could they advance against any one of them without being cut off from Dresden by the other two, as appears evident from the inspection of the map of that country.

The event confirmed the goodness of the disposition; the Saxons were obliged to abandon the whole country; and at last they united, to the number of about 14,000 men, in the well-known camp of Pirna. His Polish majesty had chosen this position because it was thought impregnable; and, as he imagined, secured a communication with Bohemia; from whence only he could expect any succours, and where he could retire in case of necessity.

Encouraged by these considerations, he resolved to reject the proposals made him by the king of Prussia; how honestly we will not pretend to determine, but not wisely, as will evidently appear when we come to give our observations on this transaction.
The king of Prussia, who proposed invading Bohemia, and reducing it to his obedience before the empress could assemble her troops, or any of the other confederates be in a condition to attack him, had, on his entering Saxony, ordered Marshal Schwerin, at the head of an army, consisting of thirty-three battalions and fifty-five squadrons, to enter that province by the way of Nachod and Neustadt. But, finding the Saxons would not come into his terms, and were so advantageously encamped that he could not force them, he found it necessary to change his plan of operations.

He did not think it safe to penetrate into Bohemia and leave the Saxons masters of the Elbe behind him, as he had no magazines in that country; nor could he convey, what little was to be found, over those immense defiles into Bohemia, not having transports sufficient for that purpose. For these reasons he resolved to reduce the Saxons before he advanced any further; to prevent them from receiving any succours; secure a passage for himself, when found necessary; and observe the motions of the Austrians. A considerable corps, first under the command of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, and afterwards under that of Marshal Keith, was sent to take post at Johnsdorff in Bohemia. Marshal Schwerin was ordered to keep his position at Auest, opposite to Königsfritz. This, the king justly imagined, would oblige the Austrians to send an army on that side to oppose his further progress; and, if they thus divided their forces, their efforts to disengage the Saxons, should they attempt it, as most probably they would, must be much less formidable.

The empress, either with an intention to conceal her designs against the king of Prussia 'till she and her allies were sufficiently prepared to execute them, or from the uncertain, slow, and dilatory counsels of her ministry, had not as yet assembled any considerable forces in Bohemia: however, on the motions of the Prussians,
she ordered all those that were then in the country to form two camps: the smallest, commanded by prince Piccolomini, at Königgrätz, to oppose Schwerin: the greatest, commanded by marshal Brown, at Kollin, which was destined to march as soon as possible to the relief of the Saxons.

The king encamped at Groß Zedlitz, in the neighbourhood of Pirna: his whole care was to block up the Saxons, and reduce them by famine, as he could not attack them with any probability of success. In this he succeeded to his wish; for, before the end of September, they were reduced to the most deplorable condition, and in want of every thing.

The empress, informed of their situation, and knowing that it depended on that army, whether Bohemia or Saxony should be made the seat of war, ordered M. Brown to march, and attempt to relieve them at any rate. Upon this the marshal quitted his camp at Kollin, and arrived the 23d of September at Budyn on the Egra, in order to be at hand to Concert measures with the Saxons for succouring them. Here he was forced to remain 'till the 30th, to wait for the artillery and pontoons, then preparing at Vienna.

In this situation things continued 'till the 28th, when his majesty, accompanied by some general officers, went to marshal Keith's camp, in order to examine that position, and change it, if any motions of the enemy should make it necessary, and then return to the camp at Pirna. But, while he was here, advice was brought him, that M. Brown, having at length got his artillery and pontoons, was preparing to pass the Egra; which shewed plainly his intention of relieved the Saxons.

The king thought he could not frustrate this design more effectually, than by advancing further into Bohemia, and force M. Brown back, by a battle, if necessary. His majesty, therefore, ordered his vanguard, consisting of eleven squadrons, 400 hussars, and
in Germany, 1756.

and six battalions, to march on the 29th of September from the camp of Johns dorff, and occupy that at Tirmitz, beyond the ravin and river at Auslig. Being here further informed, that the enemy was to pass the Egra that very day, and encamp at Lowofitz, he thought it necessary to pass the mountains of Bascopol and Kletchen, put the defiles behind him, and occupy the avenues leading into the plain before M. Brown's camp; that he might, without difficulty, advance and attack him, if he found it convenient; and therefore, as soon as the head of the army, which had been ordered to follow to Tirmitz, appeared, he, on the 30th in the morning, with the vanguard, set out for Welmina; where the whole army arrived, without any other difficulty but the badness of the roads, at eight o'clock at night.

The king fearing the enemy would march in the night, and occupy the mountains of Radofitz and Lobosch, and, by taking such a position, not only make it impossible to attack them, but force his majesty to fall back to Auslig, which could not be done without the utmost difficulty, he resumed his march, passed the ravin, and occupied the mountains on the other side; the vanguard in C. C. and the rest of the army in G. G., where they remained the whole night, in the order they had marched; it being too late to camp, and the more so as the ground had not been sufficiently reconnoitred.

The first of October, in the morning, the Prussian army, consisting of sixty-five squadrons, twenty-six battalions, and 102 pieces of cannon, was formed in I. I. the infantry in two lines, and the cavalry in three, behind; as well for want of ground, as from its nature, which rendered it improper for cavalry to act in.

The right wing of the infantry was posted in the village of Radofitz, at the foot of a hill of the same name. Before this is another hill, called the Homolkaberg, which, though much lower, than
than the former, is however so high that it commands all the plain underneath, as far as the village of Sulowitz. The king afterwards advanced his right wing to this hill, and placed a battery of heavy cannon upon it.

The center occupied the valley formed by that mountain and the Loboschberg, on which the left wing was posted: this last mountain is prodigiously high and steep, and runs into the plain, almost to Lowofitz. The side of it is covered with vineyards, which are separated by stone walls; in these M. Brown had posted some thousand Croats, who were sustained by several battalions of Hungarian infantry; K. K. parallel to these mountains, and at some few hundred yards distant from the foot of them, runs a marshy rivulet, which in many places spreads itself in the plain, and forms several large lakes; between this rivulet and the hills, on which the Prussian army was formed, runs also a very deep ravin, from Sulowitz to Lowofitz. The only passes over this rivulet and ravin are at these two villages, and over a narrow stone bridge between them. The ground behind this rivulet rises a little, particularly towards Sulowitz; on this the Austrian army B. B. consisting of seventy-two squadrons, fifty-two battalions, and ninety-eight pieces of cannon, was posted. It was formed in two lines, and a corps de reserve: the infantry was in the center, and the cavalry on the wings, as usual; that on the right, however, a little before the action began, marched forwards, and occupied the plain N. N. on the left of the village of Lowofitz, L. L. M. Brown had ordered this village to be fortified, and had placed some of his best infantry in it, with a prodigious quantity of artillery. He had likewise raised a large battery, and some redoubts, on the plain before it. By this means he thought he had rendered his right inattackable; his center, and left, covered by the marshy rivulet, and the ravin above-mentioned, were in
in reality so; and therefore he resolved to wait the event in that position.

As to the king's disposition we have nothing to say; excepting that from the beginning he ought to have placed his cavalry in the center, from Loboschberg to Kinitz; this would have enabled him to leave more infantry upon the Homolka mountain, and to have reinforced still more his left, where he proposed making his chief effort. From this position he might have sustained those squadrons he sent to attack the enemy's horse, whereas they could be of no use behind the infantry, as they could not, in that situation, protect it, in case they were repulsed at Lowositz.

The king's activity in marching from Johnsdorff to Welmina shows he knew how important it was to put the defile behind him; a general maxim, when you advance towards an enemy, which we presume to recommend, for reasons too obvious, in our opinion, to require an explanation.

The Austrians should, we think, have sent some heavy artillery on the right of the Elbe, and have placed a battery, as we have represented in the plan; this would have taken the Prussian infantry in flank, while they advanced through the plain, from the Loboschberg, to attack Lowositz. Why the Austrian horse passed the ravine to attack the Prussians in Q. Q. we cannot conceive; as it could not serve any purpose whatever.

The action begun, about seven in the morning, between the Prussian's left wing, and the troops which M. Brown had posted in the Loboschberg; and was sustained by an irregular fire, without any considerable advantage on either side 'till near 12 o'clock: then the day, which had been so foggy that nothing could be distinguished at the distance of a hundred yards, began to clear up. A large body of Austrian horse N. N. was discovered in the plain by Lowositz, as well as some infantry in and about that village, and
and at the redoubts and battery. As no regular line appeared then, the king thought it was only the rear-guard; and he was the more persuaded of this, because, from some motions heard the night before, in the enemy's camp, he imagined the army had either passed the Elbe at Leutmeritz, or was retired back to the old camp at Budyn. To be certain, however, he ordered a regiment of dragoons and some horse O. O. to pass through the intervals of the infantry and attack that cavalry. They did so in Q. Q. and drove them back beyond the ravin: in pursuing them, they advanced so far, that they were exposed to a heavy cannonade from Lowositz and Sulowitz, and it was with great difficulty and loss that they could retire under the protection of their infantry in R. from whence they were commanded to resume their first position behind the line.

By this time the fog was entirely dissipated, and the Austrian army appeared very clearly, in the position we have shewn in the annexed plan.

The king, having examined it for some time, judged the right to be the weakest for many reasons, and chiefly, by its being commanded from the Loboschberg. He therefore ordered his second line to enter into the first, with the cavalry in the center, that he might extend his front and occupy the Homolka and Loboschberg in force: this being soon executed, the whole army marched, inclining always to the left; from whence he proposed making his attack. This left being reinforced, and protected by the fire of a very numerous and well-served artillery, advanced down the Loboschberg towards Lowositz, and with great ease drove the Croats K. K. though supported by the best of the Austrian infantry, out of the vineyards into the plain: this will appear very natural from the description we have given of this mountain, which overlooked the vineyards in such a manner, that the troops placed in them could
could not raise their heads high enough to direct their shot at the Prussians while they came down, and consequently made but a feeble resistance.

M. Brown sent several battalions of his best infantry from his right to sustain them in the mountains; and general Lacy, who commanded them, made several vigorous, but fruitless, attacks at the foot of the mountain, in one of which he was wounded. At last he was convinced it was needless to renew the attempt, and therefore fell back towards Lowofitz.

The Prussians, being now quite masters of the Loboschberg, were ordered to halt at the foot of it, in order to reform the line, which had been a little disordered, as well by the action itself, as by the irregularity and difficulty of the ground, and to bring up the artillery: a precaution so necessary, that the neglect of it has very often been the cause of the loss of many battles which might have been won.

As soon as they were formed, they advanced in several lines S. S. towards Lowofitz, keeping their left close to the Elbe to avoid the fire of the battery L. L. the right still continued on the Homolka mountain: by this disposition the enemy's left and center were prevented from attempting any thing on that side, and the king was enabled to withdraw his left without danger, if it was repulsed at Lowofitz: which indeed was not very probable; because, from the situation of the ground, he could reinforce it with greater facility, and in much less time, than the enemy could his right: consequently could bring a greater number of men into action, at the same time, which generally must decide the fate of it.

Marshal Brown, believing that the victory depended on his being able to keep Lowofitz, threw almost his whole right wing into it, and about it; the action therefore was here, long and obstinate; at length however it was determined in favour of the
Prussians, and chiefly by the help of their artillery, which had set the village on fire. This circumstance, and the want of ground to form upon, put the Austrians in confusion; and, as they could not be sustained by a proper line for want of room, the communications not having been made broad enough to permit three or four battalions to march up in front to support them, they were forced to abandon it, and fall back with precipitation on their cavalry. *

Marshal Brown, seeing his right wing forced, ordered his left to advance through the village of Sulowitz W. W. and attack the enemy's right: this they attempted to execute, but in vain; a small number only of the infantry could pass the village; and those were unable to form on the other side under the fire of a numerous heavy artillery, which played on them from the battery on the Homolka mountain, within a few hundred yards of the dam over which they were to pass the marshy rivulet at Sulowitz: the few who had passed were therefore obliged to fall back instantly into the village, which they repassed in confusion, as many houses were already on fire.

This attempt of the marshal's was too unreasonable to have been undertaken with any other view, as we think, than merely to draw the enemy's attention that way, and gain time to put his right in some order, and facilitate a retreat.

This he executed in a masterly manner, V. V. He ordered his center and left to make a movement to the right, by which they occupied the ground, in the instant the right quitted it, behind Lowofitz.

* When a village is intended to be supported, the retrenchment must be separated from the houses by an interval, sufficient for the troops to form in, between the houses and retrenchments; and the village must be cleared behind, that you may march two or more battalions in front, otherwise you cannot defend it; the instant 'tis put on fire you must abandon it in such confusion as sometimes communicates to the whole line.
in Germany, 1756.

Lowofitz. This infantry, sustained by the right wing of the cavalry, covered the retreat so effectually, that no attempt was made to trouble it.

The marshal took a new position a little further back: the left and center continued at some distance behind the marshy rivulets, and the right formed an angle with the line, having the front towards the plain, behind Lowofitz and the Elbe. So that the enemy could not pass through Lowofitz and form on the plain, with his rear immediately on the Elbe, under the fire of a numerous artillery; and the left so, as to form such a line, his battalions and squadrons must have presented their flank in marching to take up their ground.

These reasons induced, or rather forced, the king to remain satisfied with the advantage he had gained, and keep his line behind Lowofitz, X. X. While marshal Brown continued in this position, the king had by no means effected his design. The action was not any ways decisive, and therefore had not made it impossible for M. Brown to attempt the relief of the Saxons. He was now just as much in a condition to undertake it as before the action, his loss having been inferior to that of the Prussians; neither could the king attack him with any probability of success, as he must, in passing the marshy rivulet, expose his army to those difficulties which M. Brown had, by experience, found unsurmountable.

From this very embarrassing situation his majesty's superior talents extricated him. He sent the duke of Bevern with a large body of horse and foot to Tschikovitz, as if he proposed turning the enemy's left flank, and hemm them in between the Elbe and the Egra. This manoeuvre had its desired effect. Marshal Brown, fearing the event, hastened to repass this last river, and occupy his old camp at Budyn, which he did without any loss.

Thus
Thus ended the battle of Lowositz, which begun at 7 o'clock, and ended at three. Both parties claim the victory. It must however be confessed that the Prussians have the best right to it, if we judge from the consequences of the action, which is the only certain rule to go by in similar cases.

The Auffrians did certainly intend to disengage the Saxons, and with that view advanced to Lowositz. The king could have no other object in view than to prevent their executing this plan. This end was obtained by the battle of Lowositz, and the subsequent manoeuvres, which forced the Auffrians back behind the Egra, and so hindered them from undertaking any thing of consequence for the relief of their friends the Saxons. Had the Prussians gained a more compleat victory, they would have been enabled to take their winter quarters in Bohemia.

The los of the Auffrians on this occasion amounted to 19 officers, 420 private men, killed: 105 officers, 1729 men, wounded: 711 missing, or taken prisoners: and 475 horses killed and wounded: in all, 2984. Among the dead was count Radicati,* lieutenant general of horse, who commanded the right wing. Among the wounded and missing was major general prince Lobowitz, and many field officers. Among the many who distinguished themselves, Marshal Brown, in his letter to the empress, takes particular notice of general Odonell,† who, after the death of Radicati, commanded the right wing of the cavalry, prince Lówenstein, Lacy, &c. &c. The los of the Prussians, in the cavalry, amounted to.

* Count Radicati was born in Piemont. In 1739 he was lieutenant colonel in Verne's horse; wounded at the battle of Grotzka; in 1740 was made a colonel; in 1745 a major general; in 1751 he obtained a regiment; and in 1754 a lieutenant general. He had the reputation of a good officer, and particularly for his talents in exercising the troops.

† Count Odonell is born of a very good family in Ireland: he was for some time lieutenant colonel in Ollone's dragoons; in 1742 a colonel of Baleyn's; in 1746 a major general, as a recompence for his bravery and conduct at the battle of Parma. In the expedition against
in Germany, 1756.

To 11 officers, 281 private men, killed: 28 officers, 424 men, wounded: 8 officers, 238 private men, prisoners. In the infantry, 5 officers, 423 men, killed: 53 officers, 1374 men, wounded: 5 officers, 458 men, taken prisoners. In all, 3308. Among the dead were major generals Oertzen, Lüderitz, and Quadt. And among the wounded was lieutenant general Kleif, who died soon after of his wounds.

Marshall Brown, having failed in his attempt to relieve the Saxons on the left of the Elbe, resolved to try his fortune on the right.

Against Provence he commanded a detached corps with reputation. In this battle he commanded the right wing during the greatest part of the action, and distinguished himself very much, for which he had a regiment given him, and was made a lieutenant general. We shall have occasion to mention this gentleman often, in the course of this work, with great applause.

* This gentleman was major general of horse: he had in his youth studied at Halle, in Saxony: he was a long time a standard bearer and subalter in the gens d'armes; in 1725 a captain of horse; in 1739 a major; in 1741 a lieutenant colonel: and having distinguished himself at the battle of Soor he had the ordre pour le merite; in 1745 was a colonel; in 1750 a major general; in 1752 had a regiment given him; at this battle he received three wounds in the head, of which he died the next day.

† Major general Lüderitz was born in 1699. In 1715 was an under officer in the Potsdam guard; in 1719 a cornet; in 1725 a captain of horse; in 1740 a major; in 1743 a lieutenant colonel; and distinguished himself very much at the battles of Hohenfriedberg and Kesselfdorff; in 1745 a colonel; in 1752 a major general. His body was tore to pieces by a cannon ball.

‡ Baron Quadt was in 1728 a major; in 1736 a lieutenant colonel; in 1743 a colonel; in 1747 a major general; and then obtained a regiment.

|| Lieutenant general Kleif was born in 1688. In 1702 he was a cadet; in 1708 wounded in the foot, which left the bone crooked for ever after; soon after he went into the Palatin service, and served the war in Flanders 'till the peace in 1712; in 1716 he returned into the Prussian service; in 1724 was made a major; in 1729 he went as volunteer to Corsica; in 1733 was lieutenant colonel; in 1742 a colonel, and was in almost all the actions of that war in Silesia; in 1745 a major general; in 1747 had a regiment; in 1756 a lieutenant general. In the battle of Lowofitz he was wounded; he continued however on horseback without binding his wounds, 'till 4 o'clock. Soon after the king gave him the order of the black eagle. He died of his wounds in January following at Dresden.
right. It was agreed that the Saxons should pass the Elbe, the 11th of October in the night, near Königstein; and that the marshal should attack the Prussians at Ratmansdorff and Borsdorff the 12th in the morning, while the Saxons did the same on their side. Accordingly he, at the head of about 8000 men, passed the Elbe near Raudnitz, and marched by Neustadtel, Romburg, and Hanf- pach, and arrived at Lichtenhayn, where he encamped, waiting to hear the Prussians and Saxons engaged, (which he knew must happen the instant these last passed the Elbe) that he might likewise enter into action, and execute his part of the concerted plan.

The weather had been so remarkably rainy and stormy, that the Saxons could not effect their passage over the Elbe till the 13th at four o'clock in the morning, and then with much difficulty and loss of time. This gave the Prussians an opportunity of reinforcing all their posts on the right of the Elbe, so that the Saxons found themselves opposed by forces much superior to what they expected.

The ground on the right side of the Elbe, about Pirna and Königstein, is intersected by high mountains, covered with thick woods; they are separated by deep ravins, formed by the rain in autumn, and by the melting snow in the beginning of summer; there are consequently very few practicable roads. These the Prussians had occupied, and fortified, with the utmost care, by retrenchments, abattis, &c.

Among these great mountains is the Lilienstein, extremely high, and so near the Elbe, that there is no room to form upon between the foot of it and the banks of the river; and only one very narrow road.

The Saxons passed the Elbe opposite to this mountain, and endeavoured to form; but the want of room did not permit it; and therefore they lay together in confusion, on and about a small eminence, near the village of Ebenheit. From this situation, surrounded
rounded by every difficulty which art and nature could oppose, it was justly, as we think, judged impossible for them to extricate themselves.

The Prussians, in the mean time, had entered the camp of Pirna early in the morning of the 13th, where they found the rear-guard of the Saxons, and most of the baggage; both fell into their hands, the bridge having been broke before any considerable part of them could pass: desitute of every resource, extenuated with hunger and cold, having been under arms from the 12th at night till the 14th in the morning, deprived of all hopes of being succoured by M. Brown, who now informed them of his being only at Lichtenhayn, and that he could not advance any nearer, it was resolved to capitulate; he, on his part, having waited above two days without receiving any intelligence from the Saxons, thought it necessary to provide for his own safety, and therefore retired. He left no more than 200 men in his retreat, which was trifling, if we consider that he might have been cut off entirely, had the Prussians, encamped at Löwositz, been a little more vigilant; because they might have passed the Elbe, behind him, near Löwositz, or Leutmeritz.

During this transaction the king arrived, the 14th in the morning, at his army in Saxony, and, after much negotiating, a treaty was concluded with the king of Poland on the 18th, by which it was stipulated, that the Saxon army should disperse, and engage not to serve against the king of Prussia, who was to remain master of Saxony; and that the king of Poland should have leave to retire into that kingdom.

The king of Prussia having thus accomplished his designs, for this campaign, ordered his armies to quit Bohemia. This was accordingly done before the end of the month. That commanded by marshal Schwerin fell back into Silezia, and cantoned on the frontiers of Bohemia from Zuckmantel to Greifßenberg. That
under the king cantoned in Saxony, and formed a chain from Egra to Pirna, and from thence through Lusace, as far as the Queifs.

Thus ended the campaign of 1756, which lasted only two months; the transactions of it however justly demand our attention, as well for the reputation of the generals, as for the importance of its event; we shall therefore give our observations on the one, and the other.

The king of Prussia seems to have committed some faults, both as a politician, and as a general. He had known, a long time before he entered Saxony, that a formidable confederacy was forming against him; and yet it does not appear that he ever attempted to make any alliance to counterbalance it, and render its effect vain; which, considering the great ascendency he had acquired in Europe, he might probably have done.

He confided too much in himself, and had too despicable an opinion of his enemies, which might, and indeed ought, naturally to have proved fatal to him.

The next fault that occurs is, that he did not begin the war in 1755, or at least in April 1756; he was then as well prepared, as in the month of August, when he entered Saxony; whereas his enemies were infinitely less so.*

His negotiating with the king of Poland, before and after he entered Saxony, we believe, was intended only to amuse that prince, and prevent him from taking any measures that might obstruct or retard his operations against the Austrians, who no doubt were the only

* We think it a general rule that you ought to begin the campaign as soon as possible; because, if you are on the offensive, you will have time to execute whatever you have proposed to do; if on the defensive, 'tis no less necessary to enter into the field as soon as possible; because, if you are beforehand with the enemy, you confound the forage, and destroy the country from whence he is to live. Add, that you gain time, and make him lose the campaign in driving you out of his country; and, when he has effected it, 'tis too late to undertake any thing against your's.
only object of his projects at this time. Our reasons for this opinion are, that, by the tenor and manner of this negotiation, there does not appear the least tendency to a composition, but on condition of his remaining master of Saxony, and of that army being dispersed, which no doubt he was resolved to accomplish, that he might proceed to invade Bohemia with greater hopes of success.

Whether we consider this transaction in a political, or a military light, it will appear to have been a prudent and wise measure. He knew too much of the sentiments of the Saxon court, with regard to himself, and of the part they took in the confederacy formed against him, to confide in any offers they made him. He could not prudently leave an army of 14,000 men behind him. For, though the king of Poland promised to disperse them, he could with ease assemble them, and augment them at pleasure; and soon be in a condition to make the Prussian monarch repent of his imprudence.

The possession of Saxony, considered in a military light, is of so much consequence, that it is not possible to attack the empress, on that side of her dominions, with the least probability of success, without it. Being extremely rich and populous, an army of 40,000 men can be raised and maintained by this electorate. Magazines may be formed on the Elbe, from whence an army in Bohemia may be abundantly supplied; and, by its position, if you are master of Silesia, you surround Bohemia in such a manner, that you force the empress to separate her armies into so many divisions, that she cannot oppose your entering that country, any where, with success, as appears from the wars carried on there at different times: whereas, if you are not master of Saxony, you can enter Bohemia on the side of Silesia only. This enables the empress to unite, in some measure, her forces, which are effectually covered by Olmutz and Prague, when forced to fall back; from whence they cover Austria; and
in this case the king of Prussia must always leave an army on the Lower Elbe, to cover his own dominions on that side, lest the elector of Saxony, by force or persuasion, should be induced to join the Austrians.

For these reasons we think the invasion of Saxony was a wise measure; how far it may be consistent with justice, those, who are better acquainted with the laws of nations than we are, must determine.

From what has been said, it seems that the king of Prussia committed a capital fault, in not having marched into Bohemia, the moment he saw the Saxons determined to defend their camp at Pirna, and reject the terms which he proposed; because he must certainly know that the Austrian army was not assembled in any considerable numbers; and that it wanted artillery and stores; that it was posted at such a distance as made it impossible for M. Brown to oppose his entering into Bohemia, or stop his progress when he should be there; and therefore would fall back on the Danube, if pressed, as well to cover the capital, as to secure his communication with the troops he expected from Flanders, Italy, and Hungary. His majesty therefore would have found Bohemia abandoned; and, during the winter, he might with ease have reduced Prague and Olmutz; both which places being then quite unprovided, and incapable of opposing any considerable resistance.

The conquest of these two places would have enabled his majesty to begin the next campaign in Moravia, at least; and perhaps on the Danube; with the siege or blockade of Vienna: from whence he might, without any risk, have sent a considerable corps on the frontiers of Hungary; and the army, destined to guard Saxony, into the empire, between the sources of the Main and the Upper Danube. The first would have hindered the empress from receiving any succours from those countries; and the last would effectually prevent...
prevent those princes, who were his enemies, from uniting against
him; encourage those who favoured him; overawe the French in
Alsace, and on the Main; and raise such contributions as would
have recruited and maintained his armies. Had his majesty taken
these steps, he would have cut off all communication with
Flanders and Hungary; and even with the Tyrol, if the army,
which I suppose in the empire, sent a strong corps to occupy Passau
and its castle, at the confluence of the Inn and the Danube; one of
the most important posts on that river; which cuts off all commu-
nication between Vienna and the empire, overawes Upper Austria,
as well as the Tyrol. The few resources left her imperial majesty
would have been soon exhausted.

Marshal Belleisle, on the death of Charles VI. formed a plan
for dividing his dominions.

The French and Bavarians were to march down the Danube,
through Upper Austria, to Vienna. The Prussians and Saxons
were to enter Bohemia, and, having reduced it, proceed to Vienna
likewise.

In the first campaign the French and Bavarians entered Upper
Austria, which they laid under contribution to the gates of Vienna.
The Prussians and Saxons conquered Bohemia; and nothing could
have prevented the entire and compleat execution of M. Belleisle’s
plan, but the ignorance of some of the chiefs, the weaknesses of
cardinal Fleury, and the divisions among the allies.

The king of Prussia being master of all the places on the Elbe,
by leaving a small corps to watch the camp of Pirna, he made it
impossible for the Saxons to undertake any thing against him.
Supposing they quitted their camp, they could not subsist in
Saxony, having neither places nor magazines of any kind; being
at the same time continually harrassed by the corps, which we
suppose, left there to observe them: much less could they advance

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into
into Bohemia, in order to join the Austrians; because they would find themselves inclosed between the king's army, and the corps left in Saxony. In the end, therefore, they must have dispersed of themselves.

His forces at this time were numerous, and he might with ease have brought 110,000 men into the field; 20,000 of which were more than sufficient to block up effectually the Saxons in their camp at Pirna, as appeared from the fact itself; for there was no more under prince Maurice when they were forced to capitulate: The remaining 90,000 were certainly more than sufficient to drive the Austrians to the Danube.

As the army under M. Schwerin was far superior to that under prince Piccolomini, and better provided with artillery, we think he ought to have attacked him; and, if he thought the camp of Königgratz too strong, he might leave him there, and march, on the right of the Elbe, towards Brandeis, or even approach Prague. This manoeuvre would infallibly force M. Brown to quit his position on the Egra, and fall back to cover that place. M. Schwerin risk'd nothing by this motion, because Piccolomini was too weak to execute any solid enterprise in Silesia: and, as to subsistence, the marshal could never be in want; the country, being very fruitful, would have furnished him abundantly. Had what we here propose been executed, the Austrians must have abandoned the circles of Saatz, Leitmeritz, Buntzlau, and Königgratz, in order to assemble their forces about Prague, and keep open their communication with the Danube; and, if we consider the very bad state of that army, it is probable they would have been forced back as far as Moravia: so that the king, even without coming to an action, would have been master of the greatest part of Bohemia, and have taken his winter quarters in that kingdom. Besides, the Saxons,
in Germany, 1756.

Saxons, on seeing their friends forced back, would not have presumed to make any stand in the camp of Pirna.

As to the Austrians, they seem to have committed many faults, and these such capital ones, as might have decided the fate of their empire, had the king of Prussia taken the measures already indicated.

It was well known, even in the month of June, that the king intended attacking the Austrian dominions. From the motions then made in the duchy of Magdeburg and the adjoining country, it was more than probable that part of his troops would march through Saxony. This should have determined the Austrians to send an army there, in order to sustain the Saxons in that country, or at least facilitate their retreat into Bohemia. This being neglected, they should have occupied the defiles as far as the ravin of Gifshubel, and those by Altenberg, by which a communication with the Saxons was kept open. Half the troops then in Bohemia, posted properly in those mountains, would have made it impossible for the Prussians either to reduce the Saxons, or to penetrate into Bohemia.

The rest of the army, destined to act on this side, should have encamped anywhere between the Egra and the abovementioned defiles, and have thrown bridges over the Elbe, in order to send their light troops, on the right of that river, as far as Schandau and Hohenstein.

This would have forced the king to fall back to Dresden. The next campaign the same difficulty would have occurred; and therefore, at last, he must have renounced to the hopes of entering Bohemia on that side; left an army to guard Saxony; and limit his operations to the side of Silesia only. By thus securing the mountains with 20,000 Austrians, and the 14,000 Saxons, they could always enter Saxony, and probably re-occupy it, considering that the
the army of the empire could assemble on the Saala, and with ease penetrate into that country by Voightland, on the Prussians right flank; who, not being covered by any fortress on that side, must fall back towards Wittemberg, and perhaps farther down. This furnished an opportunity of retaking all the places on the Elbe; and of sending a corps, through Lusace, into the marquisate of Brandenburg. The position of Grossenhayn cuts off all communication between Silesia and Saxony, and rendered that between Silesia and Brandenburg precarious; because the light troops, sustained by the army at Grossenhayn, could have made incursions as far as the Oder. Piccolomini's corps, if properly posted, was strong enough to oppose Schwerin, and prevent his undertaking any thing of consequence; which probably he had no intention to do, while the king was hindered from entering Bohemia.

Having neglected to occupy the defiles leading to Pirna, it became impossible to relieve the Saxons, at least on the left of the Elbe; because twelve or fifteen battalions, which the king posted any where between Lowositz and Pirna, could not be forced by an attack on their front; and, if you attempted to turn their right wing, by sending a corps over the mountains at Altenberg, it is so far off that the enemy might, either from his troops in Bohemia, or from those in Saxony, anticipate you. We cannot, therefore, conceive why marshal Brown did not occupy some of these defiles, as, in our opinion, the success of this campaign, and perhaps of the war, depended on this step.

Since these precautions were not taken, it was certainly in vain to attempt any thing on that side of the Elbe. The only thing remaining to be done, in our opinion, was to have left 20,000 men in the camp at Budyn; with a corps, composed chiefly of light troops, to push into the mountains beyond Lowositz, and into those of Altenberg, to draw the Prussians attention that way; and
and with the remainder pass on the right, (leaving something to
mask the bridge at Leutmeritz, and observe the enemy in the
mountains, between Lowositz and Außig) and march on that side
to Schandau and Hohenstein, and attack the Prussians posted at
Ratmanßdorff, and on the Lilienstein.

These posts were very weak on that side, and fortified only
towards the Elbe, to oppose the Saxons, and therefore could not
have resisted one instant; especially if, at the same time, the Saxons
made any considerable effort. By this manœuvre the communica-
tion would have been easily opened; and the Prussians on that
side, if pursued with vigour, could not have retired without loss,
having no more than one bridge, at Pirna, by which they could be
succeeded; on which a false attack might have been made through
the forest of Löhmen, as well to prevent succours, as to alarm the
Prussians; this probably would have made them abandon their
other posts, for fear of losing their communication with the army
encamped on the other side of the Elbe.

The junction with the Saxons being once effected, and all the
right of the Elbe, as far as Pirna, occupied by the Austrians, his
majesty must have fallen back instantly into Saxony, or have
perished in the mountains with cold and hunger.

Marshal Brown risqued nothing by this manœuvre, as the
king, with the small army he had then in Bohemia, would not
have presumed to pass the Egra and attack the 20,000 men left
there; because, by such an attempt, he would give the Austrian
general an opportunity of repassing the Elbe, and occupy the defiles
behind him, relieve the Saxons, and probably reduce his majesty
to the melancholy necessity of seeing his own army and that of
prince Maurice, thus separated, beat in detail.

He attempted, as we have said, to relieve the Saxons with 8000
men only, and could not succeed,
We now come to examine the battle itself, wherein the conduct of M. Brown does not seem, by any means, equal to the reputation he had acquired.

From the description we have given of the ground, it appears evident, that the marshal could not possibly obtain any other advantage, than perhaps to repulse the enemy; which, from the bad choice of his camp, was very improbable. But, even supposing he had beat him back as far as the vineyards on the Loboschberg, he certainly could never have forced him from thence, and from the Homolka mountain; because, to form these two attacks, he must have filed through the villages of Lowositz and Sulowitz, and have formed between those villages and the mountains upon which the Prussian army, with above 100 pieces of cannon, was posted, and in many places within musket-shot of the ground where the Austrians must have formed. I appeal therefore to all military gentlemen, whether in these circumstances such a manœuvre was possible.

Add to this, that the king, though repulsed, could without any danger have sent a strong corps on M. Brown's left, which would have rendered his communication with the Egra so precarious, that he must have fallen back behind that river, as it really happened the night after the action; for it was the sending the duke of Bevern with a corps to Tschiskowitz, rather than any advantage gained in the battle, which forced M. Brown to repass the Egra. From whence it appears, that, though the Austrians repulsed the king, it contributed nothing at all to the relief of the Saxons; because they could not detach, from that or any other camp between the mountains and the Egra, 20,000 men, and less would not do without exposing the remainder to certain ruin.
in Germany, 1756.

Having neglected to occupy the mountains of Lobosch and Homolka, which he might have done, many hours, before the enemy appeared, the only thing remaining to be done, was to have passed the Elbe, the night before the battle, with the whole army, leaving some light troops to amuse the king; these, on being pushed, retired to Budyn.

In this case M. Brown might have detached such a corps to Schandau, as would certainly have opened a communication with the Saxons, and probably have destroyed all the Prussians on that side of the Elbe: with the remainder he covered the whole country effectually, excepting those few villages between the mountains and the Egra, which the king would not have dared to pass, because, having no magazines in the country, and subsisting only, at least chiefly, from what came from Saxony, he could not advance, with an army of about 25,000 men, into an enemy's country, leaving one superior master of the defiles, between him and his other army, subsistence, stores, &c. without exposing himself to certain ruin.

The position, therefore, taken at Lowofitz, was, in our opinion, as bad as possible; nothing could be more inconsistent, with the general theory of war, than to occupy a camp commanded by any neighbouring hills, and where it was impossible to bring as many men into action, at the same time, and in the same point, as the enemy; who, on the contrary, had ground enough to form two thirds of his army to attack Lowofitz; whereas the Austrians could bring a very few battalions, only, to sustain it.

The left and center were inattackable; the only point to be sustained was Lowofitz. This the marshal saw; but did not see that it could not be defended, because it was commanded by the Loboschberg.
If the enemy was repulsed, you could not pursue him, either with cavalry or infantry.

If we consider this position, relative to the relief of the Saxons, the only object then in view, none could be left proper; because, by no one manoeuvre possible, could M. Brown relieve them, though he had repulsed the enemy, who might have taken fifty camps between that place and the Saxons, from whence they would have hindered all communication between them and the Austrians.

We shall therefore conclude, that, in the choice of this camp, M. Brown acted inconsistent with the general rules of war; and with the particular ones, which the nature of the country, and the object he had in view, prescribed.

We hope our readers will not accuse us of presumption, for, having, thus freely, given our opinion of the actions of those men whose reputation is so well established. What we have said is certainly founded upon facts, and consistent with the nature of the country; and, as we think, with the principles of war: we therefore submit our reflections to those who are acquainted with the one and the other. For this purpose, we have furnished them with an exact plan and description of the ground where the battle was fought.

This, with their own knowledge of the military art, will enable them to decide how far our history of this campaign, and our remarks upon its various operations, are reasonable, or otherwise.

Great preparations were made, on both sides, for the ensuing campaign: the empress ordered the troops that lay in Hungary, Italy, and Flanders, to march into Bohemia: all the regiments of hussars were augmented to 1500 men; and those of the cavalry to 1000: two of the former, and one of Hungarian infantry, were new raised: to these were joined, two regiments of infantry, sent by
by the elector of Magence and the Bishop of Wurtzburg, several pulks* of Uhlans,† and three regiments of Saxon light horse: all which, with what was already in Bohemia, formed an immense army, which, according to many gazettes, amounted to above 180,000 men, and was to be commanded by prince Charles of Lorraine.

The Prussians, on their side, were no less diligent and active. The king found it absolutely necessary to get some light troops, to oppose those of his enemies, which were extremely numerous, and had given him much trouble, both in this and the preceding war; and therefore orders were given to raise four battalions of light infantry, which were augmented very much during the course of the war.

There happened in the winter some considerable actions between the light troops; which, though conducted with much valour and prudence on both sides, do not deserve any particular detail; because, in general, they have little or no influence on the success of a war, however necessary in an army: and, though they do not contribute essentially to the good or bad issue of a campaign, there is no doing without them. We shall therefore proceed to give an account of the operations of the campaign of 1757.

* A pulk amounts to about 800 men.
† Uhlans are inhabitants of the Ukraine, and chiefly Mahometans. In person, dress, and manner of fighting, they resemble the Tartars, Calmucks, &c. They are armed with pistols, sabres, a lance 15 foot long, and sometimes with a bow and arrow, instead of a carabine.
THE confederacy, formed against the king of Prussia, was now augmented, by the accession of Sweden and the Germanic body; whose united forces amounted to 700,000 men; whereas those of his majesty, and his allies, did not exceed 260,000.

As many of his enemies could not begin their operations until the season was far advanced, his majesty resolved to take the field as soon as possible; that he might, with his united forces, attack the nearest, and indeed the most considerable of them; the empress of Germany. If he had the good fortune to strike some blow of consequence in the beginning of the campaign, it was very probable this would retard, at least, and perhaps put an entire stop to, the operations of the other confederates.

These motives, which made it necessary for his Prussian majesty to bring matters immediately to a conclusion, made it equally so for the empress to embrace a contrary system.

She therefore determined to remain on the defensive, until her allies took the field, which she knew would oblige the king to divide his forces into so many parts, as would make it impossible for him to oppose, any where, a considerable resistance. This favourable circumstance she proposed waiting for, in order to begin her operations. In the mean time, nothing more was intended, than to provide for the defence of her dominions.

With this view M. Brown distributed the army into four different corps: the first, commanded by the duke of Aremberg, was posted at Egra; the second, under the marshal himself, at Budyn; the third, under count Königseg, at Reichenberg; and the fourth, under count Serbelloni, in Moravia.
By this disposition the marshal thought he could effectually cover Bohemia; as each of these corps was very considerable, and might with ease be assembled in some central position, to stop the progress of the enemy, should he attempt to advance; which it seems the marshal did not expect he would or could do; otherwise, we think, he never would have permitted his magazines to be formed almost on the frontiers, against the most common rules of military prudence.

His majesty, having resolved to penetrate into Bohemia, ordered his army to assemble in four different corps likewise: the one, under prince Maurice, at Chemnitz; the other, under himself, at Lockwitz; the third, under the prince of Bevern, at Zittau; and the fourth, under marshall Schwerin, in Silesia.

As these corps were very strong, his majesty thought he might with safety order them to enter Bohemia separately; but, for fear of exposing them to be beat in detail, the two first were to unite, the moment they passed the defiles, between the mountains about Lowofitz and the Egra; and the two last were to do the same on the Iser, about Turnau: then it was thought, that the four corps, thus united into two, might proceed, without any risk, towards Prague; where the whole was to join.

The king, fearing that the enemy should send a body of infantry to occupy the defiles in the mountains, between Lockwitz and Lowofitz, which might make it difficult, and perhaps impossible, for him to pass them, ordered prince Maurice to penetrate into the circle of Saatz, and instantly occupy them on the side of Bohemia, which would necessarily force the enemy to abandon them, for fear of being hemmed in between the two corps.

Things being thus concerted, prince Maurice quitted his station at Chemnitz, in the beginning of April, and marched by Zwickau and Plauen towards Egra; as if he intended attacking that place,
or at least penetrate that way into Bohemia. To confirm the duke of Aremberg in this opinion, he ordered his light troops to engage some considerable action at Wildstein, the duke's quarters. Upon which this general threw himself into Egra, and ordered his corps to assemble in that neighbourhood. In the mean time prince Maurice returned in haste back to Auerbach; where, for greater celerity, he divided his corps into two columns; the one of which marched by Eibenstock Schwarzenberg to Gottesgabe, and from thence over the Kupferberg to Commottau; the other went over the Schneeberg Schlettau, Annaberg, and Bafberg, likewise to Commottau; from whence he marched by Brix and Bilin to Linay, where he joined the king, on the 23d of April, who had likewise passed the mountains without meeting any considerable obstacle: the few Austrians who were posted at Aussen, under general Draškovitz, having been forced to quit that place on the approach of the king's army.

As the camp of Budyn is very strong, being covered by the Egra, his majesty did not think it advisable to attempt any thing against it in front; he therefore marched higher up the river, towards Kofchitz, where bridges were thrown over it, and on the 26th in the morning the whole army passed.

Here the light troops, and vanguard, met those of the duke of Aremberg, who was then coming from Egra, and proposed either encamping there, or go and join M. Brown at Budyn; but, on meeting the king here, he fell back towards Welwarn.

M. Brown, finding the king had passed the Egra, and was encamped on his left flank, thought it necessary to quit his position at Budyn and retire to Prague, which was executed without any loss.
Upon which the king ordered the bridge at Budyn to be repaired, that he might with greater ease receive his convoys; and then directed his steps likewise to Prague, where he arrived the 2d of May, and took his camp on the Weissenberg, on the left of the Moldau, which the Austrians, now commanded by prince Charles, had quitted, and passed on the other side of the river.

While these things were passing on the side of Saxony, the prince of Bevern put his corps in motion on the 20th of April, and marched the same day from Zittau to Reichenberg, where he found count Königseg, with a body of near 20,000 men, encamped in a valley formed by two very high mountains; the breadth of it, in this place, does not exceed three English miles; through the middle of it runs the river Neis; into which many rivulets, or rather torrents, coming from the mountains, fall. These mountains are covered with thick woods, which make it very difficult for any kind of troops to pass them; for which reasons the Austrian general occupied the valley from one side to the other, having each wing extended only to the foot of the mountains: the right was on a rising ground, which was fortified with some redoubts, and covered by a deep ravin on the right of the Neis: the center was on the left of the river, and also covered by a deep ravin, and some redoubts: between the left of this ravin and the foot of the mountain, on that side, is a small plain; here the cavalry was posted in three lines, there not being room to extend them. On the left of this cavalry was a wood, in which they placed some few battalions, and had begun to make an abattis, which was not compleated. From this description it appears, that the right and center were very strong, and scarce to be attacked at all in front. The prince of Bevern, who, by taking that route, had put himself under the necessity of fighting, in order to join M. Schwerin, had now no choice but as to the manner of doing it: his corps was posted behind
behind a marshy rivulet, which, towards his left, ran so close to the enemy's line, that he could not pretend to pass it, and form under their fire; he therefore resolved to attack the enemy's left; and sent general Leitewitz over the Neifs, to attack, or rather amuse, their right. Things being thus concerted, he ordered his cavalry to advance and attack that of the enemy; this was executed with great bravery, but without success; they were repulsed every time; no wonder! because, in advancing towards the enemy, their left flank was exposed to the fire of the artillery of the redoubts, and that of the infantry behind them; and their right to that of the infantry posted, as we have said, in the wood, to the left of the enemy's horse. The prince, perceiving, at last, it would be in vain to renew the attack, while the enemy's horse was thus protected by the infantry and artillery on both flanks, ordered it back, and at the same time sent several battalions from his right, as high as was possible into the mountain, in order to come on the flank and rear of those which the enemy had posted in the wood, at the foot of it: this was punctually executed; the enemy abandoned the wood, and gave the prince's cavalry an opportunity to renew their attack, which must naturally succeed; that of the enemy, being unable to bear its shock, and the fire of the Prussian infantry, which had now got possession of the wood on their flank. On the retreat of the Austrian cavalry, the prince ordered his whole right to advance, and occupy the ground they had quitted; so that he was on and behind the enemy's left wing, and had, besides, the advantage of the rising ground, from whence he could with ease rake them from the left to the right. In this situation nothing remained for the Austrians to do, but to retire as soon as possible, for fear the enemy should push on towards Liebenau, and cut them off entirely; which he might do, as, in pursuining the left wing, some of his troops were already behind them. The retreat
was made in good order: count Lacy, who commanded the right, covered it; at Liebenau they took a new position, where they were reinforced by some troops, who, on the march of prince Bevern, had quitted the frontiers, and fallen back to join the main body under count Königseg.

Thus ended the combat of Reichenberg, in which the Austrians lost one general, and about 1000 men killed, wounded, and taken; besides some cannon left at Reichenberg. The loss of the Prussians was not much inferior.

Reflections.

As the only object the prince of Bevern could have in view, was to join M. Schwerin, we cannot conceive why he should march by Kratzau and Reichenberg, where the road is much more difficult than that by Gabel and Böhmisch Aycha, which was equally proper to effectuate his junction with Schwerin; and, moreover, was guarded only by some light troops, at Gabel, which he might force, or leave behind, as he pleased, without any difficulty or risk. In taking this last road, he was certainly at liberty to avoid an action; and, if the enemy remained at Reichenberg, he might find twenty positions behind them, and hinder them from retiring to Prague. It is always a great fault to fight, when nothing can be got by it; as in this case. The prince wanted to join Schwerin; he might have done it without fighting, and he could obtain no more by a successful action, as appears from the fact itself. He forced the enemy to quit their camp at Reichenberg; they took another at Liebenau, which he could not have forced, in all probability: he must therefore have remained in the mountains, without any possibility of joining Schwerin, if the march of this general had not determined count Königseg to quit
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quit Liebenau and retire. All which seems to prove, that the prince engaged in an action without any kind of reason, and from which he could not reap any advantage, whatever was the event. An immoderate desire of acquiring glory, makes men sometimes undertake things without sufficiently weighing the consequences. In the action he seems likewise to have been guilty of some faults: he formed parallel to the enemy, whose line could not be attacked, with any probability of success, excepting on the left; which, being once beat, the rest could not keep their ground; yet the prince did not reinforce his right, but left his troops nearly equally distributed throughout the whole line: his left, towards the Neisfs, where it could be of no use at all, was as strong as where he formed his attack.

His attack with the cavalry was certainly ill-advised; for, though it succeeded, he could not prosecute his advantages; for, while the enemy had infantry in the wood, and their center kept its position, his cavalry could not occupy the ground on which that of the enemy stood. From the beginning he should have formed his right as high up the mountains as possible; brought the greatest part of his infantry there; and have done then what he was forced to do at last. The taking such a position would have forced the enemy to retire without fighting. His sending general Leflewitz to attack the enemy’s right was needless. By occupying the wood, and part of the hill, on his right, the action was won; and all the manoeuvres the enemy could make, on their right and center, would have been fruitless.

The Austrians camp seems, from our description of it, very strong; yet, on examination, it will be found otherwise; because the whole was not equally so; and therefore, properly speaking, no part of it. The right and center were strong by nature and art; being, as was said, fortified with redoubts, &c. but, as the
left was weak, they could reap no benefit from them; unless they supposed the enemy so ignorant as to attack them there. From the general position of the ground, it was evident, that, if the left was forced to retire, the enemy, by occupying it, would be in the rear of the center and right, and force them to quit their advantageous position, and fall back instantly towards Johannisthal, for fear of being cut off from Liebenau: on this point, to their left, depended, no doubt, the success of the action. They should, consequently, have sent some of their best infantry into the wood on their left, and have placed some heavy artillery at the skirts of it; which, with that they had already, in the redoubts before their center, would have made it impossible for the enemy to pass the village of Bartzdorff; and the marshy rivulet they had before their front; much less form on this side of the rivulet. The Austrians could bring, against that point of attack, their artillery, their infantry, and their cavalry, to sustain them. In such circumstances prince Bevern could not certainly have formed his attack at all.

When the Austrians saw the enemy prepare to attack their left, Why not make a general motion on that side, and carry their line up into the mountain? This manœuvre would have decided the action in their favour; and, by neglecting it, they were beat.

Their cavalry was too far advanced; which deprived them, in some measure, of the advantage of their artillery on the right, and of the infantry on the left, in the wood.

They should not have posted their whole army in the valley; for, though the mountains which formed it, seemed impassable, yet it happened otherwise: for the Prussian infantry did march through that on the left; gained the higher ground; and forced, consequently, the Austrians to abandon the wood at the foot of it.

No corps whatever must be placed in a valley, unless you are masters of the mountains which form it; and, if you cannot occupy.
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occupy both sides, you must, at least, one: for, though at first fight, mountains, rocks, and woods, may appear impassable; yet, upon a diligent inquiry, the contrary will be always found: for, in every country that is well peopled, there are, and must be, communications between the villages; at least, for infantry: you must, therefore, occupy the mountains and woods with your infantry; the valley underneath with your cavalry; which will hinder any enemy from passing through it. From all which, it appears; that it was a bad camp, and a bad position; because, having neglected to occupy the mountains, it could not be defended; and the troops, posted in the valley, were not only exposed to be defeated, but likewise to be cut off from Prague, and their magazine at Buntzlaw, either by the prince of Bevern's corps, or by that of marshal Schwerin.

The prince of Bevern marched, on the 23d, towards Liebenau; where, as we have said, he found the enemy so advantageously posted, that he did not think it prudent to attack them: and the less so, as he knew the march of Schwerin's corps would necessarily force them to retire.

This last general assembled his army, on the 18th of April, at Trautenau; from whence he marched, on the 19th, to Konigshoff, where he passed the Elbe. His intentions were to proceed towards Turnau and Liebenau, in order to facilitate the march of prince Bevern's corps; and, being joined with it, go to Prague. This plan was founded on the same principles as that of the king's. Whatever troops the Austrians might send on the frontiers of Lusace, they could not remain there, even though they had beat the duke of Bevern; because the march of Schwerin, behind them, must force them to retire, for fear of being taken between two fires; as it really happened: for, on the 24th, they quitted their camp at Liebenau, and marched with precipitation towards Brandeifs;
Brandeis; and from thence to Prague, where they arrived the 3d of May. M. Schwerin, in the mean time, marched from Königshoff to Gilichin, where he was informed of the action of Reichenberg, and of the enemy's retreat. Upon which he wisely changed his route, and marched on the Iser; hoping still to cut them off from Prague: and, though he did not succeed in this, he arrived at Jungbuntzlau, in time to seize an immense magazine which they had formed there.

Having been joined by the prince of Bevern's corps, he proceeded to Brandeis; where he continued 'till the 4th of May: then he passed the Elbe, and encamped on the other side, not thinking it prudent to advance 'till he had concerted measures with the king.

His majesty, having thrown a bridge over the Moldau, near Podbaba, passed that river, with part of his army, on the 5th; leaving the remainder, under marshal Keith, on the Weissenberg. The 6th, at 5 in the morning, marshal Schwerin's army arrived; and, having reconnoitred the enemy, the whole marched on the left, and soon after the battle begun. We will give here the different relations, that were published by authority, of this memorable action.

That published at Vienna is as follows:

"His royal highness prince Charles of Lorrain was informed, " on the 4th of May, that the king of Prussia had thrown bridges " over the Moldau, near Roslock and Podbaba, in order to join " M. Schwerin's army, by Winorz, and then attack our right, " or cut off the communication with our magazines at Kollin and " Kuttenberg. His royal highness changed his position so, that " the left came to the town of Prague, and the right towards " Maleschitz and Biechowitz. The 5th the Prussians vanguard " passed the Moldau: we ordered several batteries to be raised " before
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"before the front of our army: at 11 o'clock, in the night, the
king ordered his whole army to pass that river, leaving only a
small corps, and a great quantity of artillery, on the Weissenberg.
The junction of his, and Schwerin's army, was made on the
6th, at break of day. Immediately afterwards the whole Prus-
sian army, amounting to above 100,000 men, advanced against
us. M. Schwerin ordered the left wing, which he commanded,
to attack our right, and endeavour to break it; while the king
alarmed our left. His royal highness prince Charles of Lorrain,
whose army consisted of 55,000 only, saw himself obliged, by
the motions of M. Schwerin, to order his second line to enter
into the first, and place it so as to cover the right wing; the
left being already covered by the cannon of Prague. His royal
highness left only two regiments of horse there, and placed the
other thirteen, in three lines, on our right, the better to sustain
it. All these motions were made according as the Prussians
extended themselves, in order to take us in flank; which
M. Schwerin had principally in view. We occupied several
heights; and M. Schwerin had likewise some before him, which
he must occupy before he could approach us. Our artillery
began to fire about 7 o'clock; which, as well as that of the
infantry, produced so great an effect, that the whole line of
M. Schwerin, which, according to the report of the deserters,
had orders to attack us, with their bayonets fixed, was totally
overthrown: while our cavalry attacked Schwerin's; beat it
back three times; and dispersed it. As the Prussians first line
was thrown back in confusion on the second, this fired upon
them, and marched over their dead and wounded companions
towards us. They were, however, received as the first time,
and again beat back. Our right wing, profiting of their victory,
followed the flying enemy, in good order, above 600 paces:
took:
took several pair of colours; 16 pieces of cannon; and a great number of prisoners. Our right, having thus advanced, left a great opening between it and the left. The king of Prussia marched, in the greatest haste, with several columns, and occupied this vacant space; and, at the same time, ordered a fresh body of horse to advance, full gallop, and occupy the ground where his left had stood, and thereby come behind our right, which was pursuing the enemy; so that this right wing, which had been victorious for three hours, was of a sudden surrounded by the enemy: and, to augment our misfortunes, there raised such a cloud of dust, as hindered us from knowing each other; and such a confusion ensued, that it was impossible for us to assemble the men, and put them again in order. Part of our infantry did, however, all that was possible to join our left wing; in which they succeeded; and retired, step by step, under a continual fire, to Prague; where they entered together. Two thousand of our right wing stopped near the field of battle, and thereby sustained the rest of the troops that were in confusion. All our artillery of reserve, the heavy baggage, pontoons, military chest, and 16,000 men from our right wing, assembled, the 8th, at Beneßchau. In two days 3000 Prussian deserters are come to the army, who all declare, that the Prussians have lost, killed, wounded, and missing, above 20,000 men. In dead, and wounded, we have lost, at most, 4000 men; and 2500 taken prisoners; and no more than 20 field pieces are lost. During the battle, major general Beck, with a corps of Croats, attacked the town of Brandeis, sword in hand; beat a Prussian battalion, that was there in garrison, of which he killed 100 men; and, after he had broke the bridge over the Elbe, retired with 5 pair of colours, 2 cannon, 500 horses, a rich booty, and 678 prisoners, among whom was the lieutenant colonel Mardefeld,
in Germany, 1757.

and all the officers of the battalion who were alive; all which he brought to M. Daun's camp. On our side M. Brown was wounded. On that of the Prussians M. Schwerin, and five or six other generals, are killed; and general Winterfield mortally wounded."

The Prussians account of this battle is as follows:

"The king joined M. Schwerin's army the 6th of May, in the morning; and it was resolved to attack the enemy immediately. The imperial army was encamped, with the left, on the Ziakaberg; and the right, on a hill, near Sterboholi. It was determined to attack the enemy's right; the Prussian army, therefore, marched, on the left, through the village of Potchernitz. M. Brown, having observed this motion, ordered his army to march on the right, that he might not be taken in flank. The Prussians were obliged to pass through some hollow ways, and over some marshy ground, on the other side of the village of Bischowitz, which threw the infantry into some disorder; and, the attack having been made in too much haste, they were repulsed. Marshal Schwerin, the greatest general of his time, was killed, with the colours in his hands, at the head of his own regiment. As soon as our infantry was formed again, they renewed the attack against the enemy's right wing. Prince Henry, the king's brother, alighted from his horse, and put himself at the head of his brigade; with which he mounted, or rather climbed up the mountains; and, having beat off the enemy, took several batteries. The cavalry of our left wing, after three attacks, forced that of the Austrians to retire. Our center, in the same manner, beat the enemy's infantry, and pursued them through their camp, which was still standing. Our left wing, to which some cavalry was joined, marched to Michele; and we separated the Austrian army; the right wing of which fled to the Zaffara. Upon which,
which our right attacked the enemy's left, and took successively three batteries, placed on the hills. Our right wing of horse had no opportunity to come to action. Prince Ferdinand of Brunswic attacked the enemy's left in flank; and, as the king, with his left, and a body of horse, had already reached the Moldau, all the Austrian infantry was forced to throw themselves into Prague. They attempted to march out, on the side of Königsaal, but were drove back by M. Keith's corps. We have taken above 4000 prisoners; among whom are 30 officers: besides 60 cannon, and 10 standards. On our side we have lost, 3099 men, 54 officers, 340 horses, killed: 8208 men, 397 officers, and 246 horses, wounded: and 1557 men, 6 officers, missing. Among the dead were M. Schwerin,* and major general Amfiet.

* M. Schwerin was born the 26th of October, 1684. He studied at Leiden, Roßock, and Greifsvalde. In 1699 he served in a Dutch regiment belonging to his uncle; in 1705 he had a company. His uncle having quitted the Dutch service, he did the same; and in 1706 was made a lieutenant colonel in the duke of Mecklenburg's service; in 1707 a colonel. The duke Charles Leopold sent him in 1712 to the king of Sweden, Charles the 12th, at Bender; with whom he continued a year. On his return he was made a brigadier; and in 1718 a major general; in 1719 he commanded the Mecklenburg troops, at the battle of Walmsfoelen, against the Commission's army, and beat them: and, the duke having reformed the greatest part of his troops, the marshal entered into the Prussian service as major general; in 1723 he had a regiment given him; in 1724 was sent as minister to the court of Poland; in 1730 was made governor of Pultz; in 1731 a lieutenant general; in 1732 knight of the black eagle; in 1739 general of infantry; in 1740 a field marshal. He distinguished himself much at the battle of Molwitz, the 16th of April, 1741; where he received two considerable wounds: in 1744 he marched with a great army into Bohemia; where he joined the king, at Prague, and commanded the siege of that place; where he distinguished himself very much; in 1756 he commanded, as we have said, the army in Silesia; and, during that campaign, gave great proofs of his superior abilities in the art of war; and was killed with the colours of his regiment in his hand. He was rather a little sized man; he had, however, a martial look; loved the soldiers; and was very careful of them; and was therefore much beloved by them: and, though he on some occasions was very hot, in all his expeditions he knew how to combine the greatest bravery with the greatest prudence. After the battle of Lowowitz the king wrote to him to act cautiously (d'aller bride en main.) He was twice married, and has left children of both sexes.
Among the wounded were lieutenant generals Fouquet, Hantcharmois, and Winterfield; and major generals Plettenberg, Schöninng, and Blankenfee. These two accounts of the battle are far from being clear and explicit, and give but a very confused idea of the action. We shall therefore add another, wrote by count Schwerin, general adjutant to the marshal of that name, which seems to be, by far, the best that appeared on that occasion.

"In consequence of the measures concerted with M. Schwerin, his majesty passed the Moldau, at Seltz, the 5th of May, 1757, at 8 o'clock in the morning, with the corps he proposed joining to the marshal's army; of which he gave us notice, as had been agreed, by a twelve pound shot, to which the marshal answered with the same signal. At 2 o'clock in the evening his majesty sent Stutterheim, one of his adjutants, to the marshal, with orders, that we, and the column commanded by general Winterfield, should break up at 12 o'clock that night, and compass our march, so that the head of our columns should arrive, exactly at 4 in the morning, upon the heights of Brofiz, where his majesty promised to be, on the right, by Tschimniz. These orders were executed with such precision, that our three columns arrived, at the place of rendezvous, at 4 o'clock; and, at such a distance from each other, as to leave only the space necessary to form the line. We did not meet with any obstacle, on our march, 'till we came to the heights before Brofiz; where Modena's regiment of horse, two of dragoons, and Festetitz's hussars, were posted that night. These fired upon our vanguard, and retired immediately, through Brofiz, to the left wing of their army.

"As soon as the king had wished the marshal and general Winterfield a good morning, he rode, with these two generals, without any other escort than two of his adjutants, captain Platen, lieutenant colonel Oelsnitz, and myself, to one of the highest
highest hills on the other side of Brohiz. From hence we could discover all the enemy's camp very plain; the first and second line from one end to the other. His majesty reconnoitred it with his spying glass. When the enemy perceived seven or eight persons on the hill, he sent us some four pounders, but without effect. His majesty continued above an hour here, to examine their position, and how they were to be attacked. The enemy was posted, with the left wing towards Prague, on the Ziskaberg, behind the Invalides: the right extended about 2000 paces beyond the village of Conradiz, near Sternboholi. Two hundred paces before their front, the mountains were so steep and craggy, that no cavalry or artillery could possibly ascend them. At the foot of these mountains is a deep valley, which was entirely occupied by some hussars and Hungarian infantry. The mountains on our side of the valley were no less steep and craggy than the others: notwithstanding these difficulties, his majesty was inclined to attack the enemy in front. The marshal, on the contrary, represented to him the difficulty of the ground; the great march the troops had made; and the strength of the enemy's position; who had covered the heights before their front with a prodigious quantity of heavy artillery. His majesty, convinced by these reasons, permitted the marshal to go and seek out some more convenient place to form the attack. Upon which his excellency rode, full gallop, before the enemy's right, where the ground on both sides falls gradually, and where he perceived a plain, before the enemy's right wing, near the village of Miesiz, where the infantry could pass over the meadows, and the cavalry and heavy artillery over the damms. As soon as the marshal had reconnoitred the ground, and given an account of it to the king, orders were immediately given to the three corps to move on the left. This was
\textit{was executed with such celerity, that the army, which had received the orders about nine o'clock, marched above four miles through very bad roads, and at half an hour past ten was formed; and at eleven the battle begun on the left wing. All our cavalry was passing the damm, when that of the Austrians first turned out, and formed itself in order of battle, without taking down one tent. They did not probably perceive that our intention was to attack their right flank, till they saw two regiments of our cavalry pass the damm, and form directly on it. This manœuvre drew their attention that way: they then ordered all their cavalry from the left; which, with great celerity, came and formed itself, on a fine plain, on the right, in 104 squadrons, in three lines, with intervals equal to the front of a squadron. This manœuvre was executed with such promptitude, that our lieutenant general, the hereditary prince of Schönacht, who had only 65 squadrons, fearing to be out-flanked, resolved instantly to attack the enemy, without waiting for the right wing which the king had ordered to come and reinforce him. Accordingly the attack was made in the best order. The enemy stood still till we came within 50 paces of them, then they fired their carabines; and at 30 they advanced with a strong pace against us. We were outwinged by 8 squadrons, and therefore 'tis no wonder our cavalry had such a hard task, and was twice repulsed. In the third attack, Stechow's regiment of dragoons, commanded by colonel Winterfield, and general Ziethen, with 20 squadrons of Ziethen's and Putkammer's hussars, advanced with so much bravery, that not only the enemy's cavalry was entirely defeated, but part of it was pushed on their own grenadiers, on the right wing, which threw them back in the utmost confusion. During this attack of the cavalry, the grenadiers of our left wing, and the regiments of
of Fouquet, Kreutzen, and Schwerin's infantry, having passed over some meadows, were forced to advance through a very narrow road, in order to join the rest of the line, which was already formed. As soon as the grenadiers appeared on the other side of the defile, they were received with twelve pounders, charged with cartridges, in such a manner, that they were instantly forced to retire, and quit the defile in the greatest confusion. In the mean time the enemy's fire grew still more violent, and at last obliged the grenadiers to retire back over the damm. They were followed by Fouquet's and Kreutzen's regiments; and, as the second battalion of Schwerin's begun to do the same, the marshal, who had been continually on the other side of the defile, took the colours out of the officer's hands, and rode before the regiment; doing all that was possible to make them advance. He drew the troops, as well as he could, out of the defile; and, having put them again in order, advanced with a strong pace towards the enemy. Scarcely had he marched 12 steps, when he received several shot; one in the ear, another in the heart, and three in the body: he fell instantly from his horse, without the least signs of life. General Manteufel took the colours out of his hand, and gave them to the ensign; who had scarce received them, when a cannon shot came and killed him on the spot. Immediately after this the whole line advanced. Our artillery did great execution. The lines were at above 60 paces distant from each other; when the enemy's infantry, on the right, was observed to be in the greatest confusion. Their center kept their ground much longer, being protected by a great quantity of artillery. His majesty, observing that the enemy's right wing pursued our left with great vivacity, insomuch that it was separated from the rest of the army, laid hold of this favourable opportunity;
in Germany, 1757.

"opportunity; and, with the greatest celerity, marched, with his "right, to occupy the space which the enemy, by advancing, "had left open: and, by this means, separated the two wings "from each other. Now the confusion was general in the ene- "my's army. Our left wing, being again formed, attacked the "pursuing enemy, and drove them back: and, when they endeav- "oured to retire to the army, they found the ground occupied "by the king. His majesty ordered an attack to be made, with "fixed bayonets, on the enemy's left wing, that was likewise "flying. Here a great carnage ensued; particularly in taking "the redoubt; where the second battalion of prince Henry's did "wonders. The enemy's left fled into Prague; and the right, "in confusion, towards Maleschitz and Bischowitz."

Before we give an account of what followed this memorable battle, it is necessary to examine the various operations which preceded it, as well as the conduct of the action itself, that the reader may be able to form a proper judgment of them, as they are in themselves, and independant of the events. For these do not always proceed from fine dispositions; nor are prudent and wise measures constantly attended with happy successes. In general, however, it must be confessed, that few or no enterprises fail, but by some error, which might have been foreseen, and consequently avoided.

The plan, formed by the Austrians, to remain on the defensive till their allies took the field, and thereby give them a favourable opportunity to act with vigour, was certainly wise and prudent: but they seem to have failed in the execution. Two thirds of the enemy's troops were cantoned in Saxony and Lusatia, and the remainder in the neighbourhood of this last province; which indicated, very plainly, that, in case he proposed to invade Bohemia, it would be on that side; particularly as the king was there in person.
person. Besides, by entering Bohemia from the side of Saxony, this last would be covered by that very manœuvre: whereas, if it was done from Silesia, another army must be left to guard Saxony. They ought to have known the king better, than to suppose he would act with part of his forces only, when he had it in his power to do it with the whole. Moreover, if, contrary to all appearances, as well as to the nature of things, he attempted to invade Moravia, he could not, in less than a month, bring his armies on that side; and the Austrians did not require half that time to bring all their forces there. If his majesty sent a corps there only, the garrison of Olmutz, sustained by some Croats, a regiment of dragoons, and another of hussars, would have been sufficient to cover the country.

From all which, it appears, that the Austrians acted very imprudently, in posting a corps of above 20,000 men in Moravia, where they were quite useless. What augments this first fault, was the leaving it there even after the Prussian army was in motion, as well in Saxony and Lusatia, as about Schweidnitz; which demonstrated their intention was to penetrate that way into Bohemia.

This corps should, no doubt, have been placed, during the winter, so as to form a chain from Moravia to Königshoff; and, in the month of March, their quarters should have been drawn nearer each other; and the center placed about Pardubitz. This would have enabled them to assemble, on the least notice, either on the right, towards Leutomischel; or on the left, behind the Elbe, about Schurtz.

When the Prussians were in motion, this corps should have assembled at Schurtz; because, from thence, it was at hand to join count Königlieg; and, being united, were much superior to the duke of Bevern's, or marshal Schwerin's; and therefore might attack
attack either of these generals, if they presumed, which was not probable, to penetrate into Bohemia, and hinder them from joining their forces. But this was neglected, and the corps in Moravia quite forgot; as one may imagine: for, though the enemy had entered Bohemia at the other extremity, about the 20th of April, yet this corps, on the 6th of May, was only arrived at Böhmisch Brodt, within twenty miles of Prague. As to count Königsegg's corps, it has been already observed, that it was posted too far in the mountains, and exposed to be taken in between the prince of Bevern's corps, and that of M. Schwerin.

The Austrians committed the same fault exactly, in the distribution of their troops on the frontiers of Saxony.

It was by no means probable, that the king would order a considerable corps to enter Bohemia, near Egra; because, being at so great a distance from his other columns, it would be exposed to be cut off by the superior forces of the Austrians; who must necessarily take a central position between that corps and the king's, as they had the greatest part of their forces in the circles of Saatz and Leutmeritz.

It was still less probable the enemy would undertake any thing against Egra; which, if provided with a common garrison, cannot be taken without a siege; which most certainly he would not undertake, as it cannot, from its situation, facilitate the operations against Bohemia: and, if against all rules of war, he did lay siege to it, they might in four days have brought their army to its relief. From whence it appears evident, that the placing a corps in the neighbourhood of Egra was of no use, and subject to be cut off from the main army at Budyn, whenever the enemy entered Bohemia by the defiles of Kupferberg and Bafberg; as it really happened: because M. Brown was forced to quit the position at Budyn, in order to join the duke of Aremberg: whereas,
if this general had taken a position at Commottau, with all his light troops, sustained by some battalions of good infantry, in the two last mentioned defiles, it is plain prince Maurice could not penetrate that way, as he did; and, though he had, he could not join the king until he beat the duke, who might have been sustained by the whole army under the marshal at Budyn. This last was likewise ill posted, being too far back to sustain any body of troops he might send to occupy the defiles between Pirna and Lowositz; which we think is the only method that can effectually hinder an enemy that attempts to penetrate that way into Bohemia. The marshal ought, therefore, to have assembled his quarters beyond the Egra, in such a manner as to be able, in one march, to be behind the Bila at Auflig: from whence he might either sustain the light troops placed behind the ravin of Ghishubel, or, as he thought most convenient, let them fall back on his army, and defend the position at Auflig, which, if occupied by an army, cannot be forced. Even, perhaps, it would have been more advantageous to advance with the whole army, behind the ravin of Ghishubel, and have sent the duke of Aremberg, with his whole corps, into the mountains of Basberg; because these positions not only covered Bohemia, but also enabled the Austrians to penetrate into Saxony, if it was thought proper: whereas the different positions, taken by the Austrian army, in order to cover Bohemia, did not answer that end, and moreover exposed the different corps to be beat in detail, and hindered from joining each other; as it happened to that in Lusatia, under count Königseg; and that in Moravia, under marshal Daun; the first having been beat, and the other hindered from joining the rest of the troops at Prague. There is scarce any operation of war more delicate and difficult than the distribution of the troops into winter quarters: it requires a perfect knowledge of the country, and must be regulated by a prodigious
prodigious variety of circumstances: 1. regard must be had to the enemy's disposition; 2. to his general plan of war, and to the particular object he has in view the ensuing campaign; 3. to the object you have yourself in view for the following campaign. If you propose to be on the defensive, the distribution of the troops must be made in such a manner as to be able to unite in different points, without leaving even a possibility of their being intercepted in their march to the place of rendezvous: that these points be choosen as near the frontiers as possible, in order to cover the country; and that they be so well choosen, that the enemy can neither force you in them, nor leave you behind. If you propose being on the offensive, the troops must be so distributed, that, in one march, or two, they form several great corps on the enemy's frontiers, and pass them so as to separate his quarters, and run no risk of being intercepted before they join, and form one body in the enemy's country. Above all things, care must be taken that they are not exposed to be inquieted, during the winter, which the troops must enjoy in peace and safety, as well to refresh themselves, as to form the recruits, &c.

It must be acknowledged that the king of Prussia excells in this, as in many other parts of war: no general has ever opened the different campaigns with more greatness or precision. His quarters were so disposed, that it was scarce possible, from thence, to guess at his intentions; as he could, seemingly, with equal facility, form very different enterprizes: from whence it always happened that he begun his operations with great views, celerity, and exactness: and, when his troops were attacked in their quarters, they always assembled in the places appointed, without ever having suffered any considerable loss; which is the more extraordinary, as he had very few light troops, especially in the beginning. His disciple, prince Ferdinand, has likewise shewn himself infinitely superior.
superior to all the French generals, in this point, as appeared evidently on every occasion.

The Austrians neglected all the rules abovementioned, and were therefore forced to abandon the country, in order to unite the different corps, and moreover exposed to be beat in detail; as we have seen.

Having at last assembled their army at Prague, they were at liberty to attack either the king or marshal Schwerin, who were separated by a great river, and a most difficult country for military operations. They were much superior to either, and therefore ought to have risked an action in those circumstances; otherwise it is in vain to make war. If they thought themselves unequal to the king, or Schwerin, separately, they should not, certainly, have fought them both when united. They should not have permitted the king to pass such a river as the Moldau, in a most difficult place, and within sight of their camp, and remain with a very inconsiderable body of troops, compared to theirs, a whole day and a night on the same side of the river. They ought, no doubt, to have attacked him, either before he passed, or after, before he joined M. Schwerin; or, if they chose rather to attack this last, they should have left 20 battalions on the heights of Broitz, opposite Potbaba, to hinder the king from passing, and march to Brandeis, against Schwerin, without delay.

The enemy having joined all his forces the 6th in the morning, in their presence, and his leaving M. Keith on the other side of the Moldau, in the sight of Prague, indicated very plainly, he proposed bringing things to an issue there. The Austrians should not therefore have been so confident in their numbers, and position, as to send their cavalry to forage, while the enemy was actually making some motions in their presence.
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When they saw the enemy march on his left, they certainly did right to change their position; but this was only part of what they should have done. They ought to have brought all the artillery possible to bear against the village of Podshernitz, and have attacked him as he was advancing in columns through that village, and over the meadows, without giving him time, or ground to form upon. They should have put their horse in two close lines, which would have enabled them to extend their right quite up to the fishponds, which covered their flank effectually, and deprived the enemy of the ground, on which only he could form his cavalry; and, if they kept back their center a little, so as to form a curve, concave towards the enemy, which they certainly might have done, their right being covered by the ponds, and their left by the artillery and infantry of the right wing, in this case, the enemy could not advance at all, without presenting his left flank—which must always be decisive in every action, and particularly in cavalry. But the Austrians neglected all these precautions, and moreover suffered the enemy's horse, though less numerous, to take them in flanks; and were consequently defeated. When Mr. Brown repulsed and pursued the enemy, he ought not to have broke the line, and rushed forward, like a young soldier, who sees and observes only what passes directly before him, without attending to the whole; and thereby regulate this or that particular manoeuvre. When he advanced, he should have ordered the whole line to make the same motion; and, if he did not choose to quit the heights, where his center and left stood, he should have advanced his right, so as to form an oblique line with the right forwards. By this manoeuvre, he was at liberty to bring all his reserve, and the right of the second line, to sustain the point of attack on which the victory depended; and, by keeping the line close, gave the enemy no advantage, how much soever he advanced.
with his right to pursue them to Podschernitz. Even this oblique formation necessarily enabled him to take the enemy's whole line in flank, and rake it from one end to the other. The marshal, by advancing with the right only, broke the line, and thereby left an opening, which the enemy occupied, cut the army in two, and defeated it.

There is in every camp a certain point, which may very properly be called, the key of it, and on which depends the success of an action; while you keep this, the enemy has nothing; and when you lose it, all is lost. The talent of finding out this point, is perhaps the most sublime, and the most rare, of any in the whole art of war. On this talent depends the science of camps, and the methods of attacking and defending them. In the present case, this point was, no doubt, that space of ground between the point of the right wing of infantry, and the pond near Sterboholi, where the cavalry should have been posted, as it is marked in the plan, with the light troops and some regular infantry in Sterboholi, and a battery on the height, before the right wing of horse. While the Austrians occupied this ground, they could not be defeated; but they had studied so little the science of camps, that they did not perceive this point, and formed their cavalry a great way behind it; and were beat.

From all the preceding remarks, it appears, that M. Brown either did not know the country, or did not know how to occupy it properly, in the distribution of his army into winter quarters; and that he committed numberless faults, as well before, as during the action; which necessarily were followed with the loss of it. As we know that he was a good soldier, and by no means a contemptible general, it is far from being impossible, that some private motives might make him less careful and clear-sighted than is consistent with a person of his genius. He was, no doubt, little pleased
pleased to see prince Charles at the head of the army; and, being under the command of another, was, probably, less anxious about the event. Had he been alone, perhaps he would have acted otherwise. This shews, how imprudent it is to employ, together, men whose private views of ambition can scarce ever coincide.

As to the king’s dispositions, they will, no doubt, appear very fine to those who are not sufficiently acquainted with the nature of military operations, or who have not attended to the description we have given of the country wherein these transactions happened. Events, like an impetuous torrent, hurry people away, without giving them time to reflect on their causes, or examine the various circumstances which contributed to produce them; and therefore their opinion of things is seldom established on clear and exact ideas.

Being separated from the enemy by a chain of mountains, and moreover protected by many strong places, he could distribute his troops into winter quarters as he pleased, without any risk; because the nature of the country enabled him to assemble them, before any considerable body of the enemy could penetrate. The disposition of his march into Bohemia, was subject to a prodigious number of obstacles; many of which were, at least might have been, insurmountable.

Prince Maurice’s column was separated from that under the king by an interval of 50 miles; and, moreover, by a most difficult country, full of mountains, woods, ravins, defiles, &c. The enemy had, in this very space of ground, an army much superior to either prince Maurice’s, or the king’s; they might consequently have taken forty positions that would have effectually hindered their junction; and, if they presumed to advance one step into the country, attack either of them separately; and, being much superior, probably defeat them.
Even after their junction, M. Brown, with the duke of Arenberg, was still equal to them, and might have taken several positions between the Egra and Prague, which would have hindered them from approaching the Moldau, and joining Schwerin. Being at last assembled at Prague, they might have attacked either the king or Schwerin, with forces much superior to either. As these were separated by the Moldau, they might have been hindered from joining at all. When the king passed that river, leaving M. Keith on the other side, the enemy were at liberty to destroy either of them, having more time than was necessary for that purpose. The same reasoning holds good with regard to the other two columns under prince Bevern and marshal Schwerin. They were so far separated, that the enemy might have taken such positions as would have hindered them from joining; and might, with superior forces, have attacked either. From whence it appears, that the king, by thus separating his columns at such an immense distance, exposed them to be beaten in detail, and his whole army to destruction. His passing such a river as the Moldau, in sight of an immense army, his staying eighteen hours, at least, with a handful of men, in their presence, ought to have been fatal to him; and, if it happened otherwise, he must thank his good fortune.

* Marshal Keith, knight of the black eagle, of St. Andreas, and Alexander Nevski’s orders in Russia, was born of the illustrious family of Marshall, in Scotland. In 1730 he was a major general in Russia; in 1734 a lieutenant general, and went with the Russian troops into Germany; in 1737 he served against the Turks, and distinguished himself greatly at the taking of Oczakow, where he was wounded; in 1741 and 1742 he commanded against the Swedes, and got the battle of Williamstrand; in 1747 he quitted the Russian service, and entered that of Prussia; in 1749 was made knight of the black eagle, and governor of Berlin, with a pension of 12,000 dollars, besides his pay. He was killed in 1758, at the battle of Hochkirchen, at the head of the Prussian infantry, who had repulsed the Austrians, and were pursuing them. He was middle sized; had a very martial countenance; and was an humane and benevolent man.
in Germany, 1757.

His attacking the enemy in such a strong camp, and in the neighbourhood of a fortress, was certainly very rash, because it was very improbable that he beat them: and, though he did, he could not reap any great advantage from it; as they could always retire into Prague, and from thence march instantly out, and destroy Marshal Keith in his presence, even after he had separated the two wings. 'Tis, in general, very imprudent to attack an army near a fortress; because, in case of success, 'tis impossible to proceed with cavalry, which alone can destroy a defeated army; whatever advantages the infantry may gain, they cannot prosecute them with such vigour and celerity, as to hinder an enemy from making a retreat, and get soon together again. Had the king got such a battle, 20 miles from any fortress, the whole Austrian army would have been destroyed. He was the less obliged to attack the enemy in this position, as, by directing his march towards Kollin and Kuttenburg, where the enemy had their magazines, they would have followed him, and given him a more favourable opportunity to attack them; and, in all probability, he would have met M. Daun, then coming from Moravia, whom he might have crushed. This manoeuvre would have enabled him to destroy the enemy's magazines, and force them to fight on his own terms, or submit to be cut off from Vienna. As to the action itself, he had no choice in his attack; it could be done only on the left; but his seeing, and seizing the critical and decisive moment that M. Brown gave him, by breaking his line, is such a stroke of superior genius, that few, very few, are capable of. His prudence, in re-establishing the line, continually, as he advanced, and his whole conduct during the action, most justly deserve the greatest approbation. What appears rash in the manoeuvres which immediately preceded it, must, probably, be attributed to the necessity of his affairs, and to the knowledge he had.
had of those generals who opposed him. His majesty seems too great a general to commit a common fault.

Prince Charles, with near 50,000 men, having been forced to throw himself into Prague, the king formed the extraordinary project of blockading him in that place. As it is very populous, the addition of near 60,000 men, including servants, and the followers of the army, would, he hoped, soon force them to surrender for want of subsistence.

During this celebrated blockade, nothing happened, but what is common; and therefore, we think, a detail of the operations would be no less insipid, than useless. In such an operation of war, nothing more is to be done, than to occupy such posts, in the neighbourhood of the place, as most effectually prevent any succours, provisions, or intelligence, to enter. Those who are shut up, on the contrary, endeavour to open the chain as often as possible, that their wants may be relieved. The nature of the ground, the number and species of the troops on each side, are the only matters to be consulted, as to the methods to be used on these occasions: no rule can be given as to the manner of occupying properly a piece of ground; genius alone can do it, and precepts are vain.

It is, no doubt, a thing worthy remark, and will appear a fable to posterity, that near 50,000 men, with a train of artillery, arms, &c. should submit to be shut up for six weeks, and reduced to extremity, by an army of equal force. That of the king did not certainly, at the end of May, exceed that of the Austrians; which will appear evident, if we consider how many men he had lost in the battle, by sickness, desertion, and the numberless detached corps. This army, small as it was, formed a chain of posts, which extended many miles, and was moreover separated by the Moldau; over which they communicated by two bridges only.
in Germany, 1757.

the one above, and the other below the town: so that, in fact, the Austrians, had they chose to march out of the place, would have had no more than half the Prussian army to contend with: why therefore they did not, no man, that has the least idea of military affairs, can ever comprehend. A torrent carried one of the bridges away; yet did they continue quiet, and let slip this favourable opportunity, without making any attempt to go out. We have been very often on the ground about Prague, and must own, it is, and will be, a matter of wonder and astonishment, that no effort was made to march out. Had they attacked the Prussians, thus separated by a great river, and divided into so many small detachments, they could not fail in their attempt; they must have destroyed their army. It is no less surprizing, that so great a general as the king of Prussia should think it possible to reduce an army of 50,000 men, in such an extensive town as Prague, with one of equal force. The supineness of the Austrians justified this attempt, and saved his army from inevitable destruction.

When the king summoned prince Charles to surrender, marshal Brown, then sick in bed, being consulted, answered, with no less spirit than amazement, "Est ce que sa majesté croit que nous sommes tous des C—ll—ns. Dites au prince que mon avis est, que son altesse aille sur le champ attaquer le M. Keith."

The celebrated marshal Belleisle, who knew Prague perfectly well, had, in the preceding war, with 15,000 men, defended it for many months against the Austrians; and, being at last reduced to the greatest extremity, quitted it with 12,000 men, and retired to Egra, with safety and glory. This general wrote a letter, while the king was blockading that town; which I have seen; wherein he says, "Je connais Prague, si j'y etois, avec la moitié des troupes, que le prince Charles y a actuellement je detruirais l'armée Prussienne."
While the king was occupied before Prague, he sent out several detachments, in order to raise contributions, and secure, or destroy, the magazines which the enemy had formed in different parts of Bohemia. General Oldenbourg and colonel Meyer were sent into the empire with the same view, and to hinder, or at least retard, the operations of the army of the empire. But all their operations are of too insignificant a nature to deserve any particular detail; none of them had, nor indeed could have, any considerable influence on the general plan of operations. We shall therefore pass them in silence.

Marshal Daun, who now commanded the army in Moravia, which had been the preceding campaign under the orders of prince Piccolomini, having received orders to join the main army at Prague, quitted Moravia, and directed his march for that purpose. However, on the 6th of May, he was only arrived at Böhmisch Brodt, within 12 miles of that place, where he was informed of the battle. He continued here for some days, and then retired to Kollin, as well to avoid an action, as to join the right wing, which, as we have already said, had retired to Beneschau.

The king, fearing that this army, which amounted to above 40,000 men, might not only disturb his operations before Prague, but likewise, by some manœuvre or other, give prince Charles an opportunity to get out of that place, thought it necessary to drive them further back. For which purpose, the prince of Bevern, with about 25,000 men, was ordered to execute this plan.

As this general advanced, the marshal very wisely retired, in order to receive the reinforcements which were in march to join him, and fell back successively to Kollin, Kuttenberg, Goltzjenkau, and Haber.

Having
Having at length received all the reinforcements, artillery, &c. which he expected, he gave orders, the 11th of June in the evening, to march next morning. Accordingly the army quitted the camp of Jenikau the 12th, and marched the same day to Janovitz. The next day general Nadafli was attacked at Pikan; but, being sustained by the whole army, the Prussians were repulsed with loss. This general, having been reinforced, was ordered to march by Maleschau, and take post at Suchdol, while general Beck, with about 6000 men, was commanded to occupy Kuttenberg; which the Prussians had quitted on the 12th, and retired to Kollin. On the 14th the marshal marched to Gintitz, and on the 16th to Krischenau, where he encamped as in A. A. This whole march was conducted with much prudence and vigour; insomuch that the enemy was more than once on the point of being attacked, and probably defeated; being much inferior. The marshal, by the direction of his march, seems to have intended to bring prince Bevern to an action before he was joined by any reinforcements, or to have cut him off from Prague; the difficulty of the roads and the good conduct of the prince prevented it.

The king, being informed of the enemy's approach, quitted his army before Prague on the 13th, and marched towards Kollin; where he proposed uniting the several corps, he had detached, to the army under prince Bevern, and then attack the enemy without delay. On the 14th he marched by Schwartz Kofertetz, and Zdanitz, intending to encamp at Malotitz; but, on approaching that place, a large body of troops was discovered marching behind Zafmuck. Being no ways prepared for an action, having only a few battalions with him, his majesty threw them into the village of Zdanitz, with the cavalry on the plain before it, and continued in this position 'till he was joined by the different detachments he expected.
The camp occupied by the enemy, at Krichenau, was judged too advantageous to be attacked in front, with any probability of success: nor could it be approached on the left, without marching, a great way up, to the source of the ravine which covered it. This would give the marshal time to change his position, as he thought most convenient, and perhaps afford him an opportunity to give the king the slip, and march to Prague. For which reason his majesty resolved to occupy the hills of Chotzemitz, behind the enemy’s right. Accordingly, on the 18th in the morning, the army was ordered to march on its left, along the great road that goes from Prague towards Kollin. During the march, advice was brought that the enemy was retiring; which was soon found to be a mistake; for he had only changed his position, and was observed to be putting his army in order of battle, on the very ground which the king proposed to occupy.

The marshal, seeing the enemy’s army move on its left, easily perceived the king’s intentions were to attack him on his right flank: to avoid which, he ordered his army to move on the right, first to B. B. the reserve in D. D. then to G. G. with the reserve in E. E. and general Nadafti’s corps in F. F. His army, consisting of 60,000 men, was formed in two lines; the infantry on the wings, and the cavalry in the center. The right of the infantry was posted on a high hill, quite close to an open wood occupied by the light troops. At a small distance before the front was the village of Krzeczor, in which some battalions were placed very properly, as they could with ease be sustained by the line. The hill, on which this village stands, presents, towards the right, very high and steep precipices, which cannot be passed by any species of troops. At the bottom of this hill is another village, which was likewise occupied by some infantry. Out of the hill, a little behind this last village, runs a rivulet almost perpendicular to the
enemy's line; the banks of it are very high and craggy. Behind this rivulet Nadauti's corps was at first placed, and then in F. F. so that the enemy could not advance to attack the line, without presenting his flank to this corps. On the left of Krzeczor, on a high and steep hill, is the village of Brzift, a little before the line, also occupied by some infantry. The left was likewise on a very high hill, which commands all the plain about it. Near the left is the village of Podhorz; through which runs a marshy rivulet, which effectually covered that wing. All the ground before the front was very unequal; this obliges a line, marching to attack it, to stop often, in order to close and form again; which is a great disadvantage, particularly being near the enemy, whose artillery cannot fail doing great execution.

The king ordered his army to halt in the plain near Slatiflunz and Novimieilo, while he reconnoitred the enemy's position; whom, notwithstanding the strength of it, he resolved to attack. The army was again put in motion, and soon after the battle begun; of which we shall give the different relations that were published. By which means the reader will be enabled to form a proper judgment of this great and decisive action. The first is that published by the court of Vienna; the second is that of the Prussians; and the last, which is more extensive than the others, was wrote by a French officer, who was at the Austrian army by order of his court.

"As soon as the imperial and royal army quitted the camp of Gintitz, on the 16th of June in the evening, in order to occupy that which had been marked out at Krichenau, his Prussian majesty quitted likewise that of Kaurzim, and posted his army on the heights behind Planian. Upon which the Austrian army changed its position that same evening, and was posted, in order of battle, between two heights, that were to the right and
"and left. On the 18th, in the morning, the enemy marched towards Planian, and halted between that place and the inn called Slatiflanz. At 1 o’clock, however, his army was put again in motion, in four columns. As soon as his excellency marshal Daun perceived that the enemy’s intention was to come on his right flank, he ordered the reserve, and all the second line, to march there, and form a flank to cover the right wing. General Nadasdi, with his hussars and Croats, was likewise ordered there for the same purpose. The first line continued in its first position ’till the enemy’s left wing was seen to advance, in several columns, against the flank and right wing of the Austrian army; then it was ordered to march on its right, quite close to the abovementioned flank; and, at two in the evening, it was at length formed upon the heights. Then the heavy artillery, on both sides, began to play. The enemy’s attack on our right wing was so violent, that it threw the cavalry into confusion: it was, however, put again in order, by the bravery and good conduct of the generals Serbelloni, Daun, Odonell, Trautmanfdorff, and Aspremont; and then they repulsed the Prussians. Notwithstanding which, the enemy advanced on the heights of the village of Krzeczor, still nearer our flank. As soon as they reached the village, they burnt it; which was the signal to their right wing to attack our left. At half an hour after three they made a most violent attack on our flank, and immediately after on our right and left wing. Some hundred men, formed in half a square, penetrated through the flank; they were, however, drove back by our cavalry and the Saxon carabineers. The enemy renewed his attacks seven different times; in each of which he was repulsed; and at last forced to abandon us a compleat victory. Upon which the Austrian army took its third position on the heights, where it remained."
in Germany, 1757.

remained all night, in order of battle; and, on the 19th, retired to the old camp of Krichenau. During the action, the king was on a hill behind his left wing, from whence he gave his orders. The enemy, in their retreat, burnt the villages of Brzafam and Kutlers: their left wing went towards the village of Welin; and their right towards Nimburg. This battle, which lasted from 2 o'clock 'till nine, may be reckoned among the most remarkable and bloody that have happened for a long time. It was conducted, on both sides, with no less valour than prudence; 'till the Prussians were, at length, thrown into the greatest confusion, and forced to take a precipitate flight, by two different ways, and in small divisions; as chance brought them together. Their loss, on this occasion, may be certainly reckoned at 20,000 men: 6500 were found dead on the field of battle; and above 7000 prisoners: among which are lieutenant general Treskow, major general Pannewitz, and 120 staff officers; besides 3000 defectors. We have taken 22 pair of colours, and 45 pieces of cannon. The loss of the Austrian army amounts to above 6000 men, killed, wounded, and missing. Among the first is lieutenant general Lutzow; and among the second were count Serbelloni, general of horse, lieutenant general Wolwart, and major generals prince Lobkovitz, and Wolf. The victory, after God, must be ascribed to the wise and valourous conduct of marshal Daun.* Count Stambach, general of horse, who commanded the left wing, contributed very much to the victory, by the vigorous attack he made on the enemy's

* Leopold count Daun was born in 1705. He was, in the beginning, a knight of Malta, and colonel of his father's regiment; in 1736 lord of the bed-chamber; in 1737 major general, and served against the Turks; in 1739 a lieutenant general; in 1740 he obtained a regiment; in 1745 he was made a general of infantry; in 1748 a privy councillor; in 1751 commandant of Vienna; in 1753 knight of the golden fleece; and in 1754 a field marshal.
enemy's right. Lieutenant generals Kolowrat, Wolwart, Wied, and Sincere; major generals Schallenberg, Le Fevre, and Niclas. Esterhazi, distinguished themselves very much: as did general Nadafti,* with the Saxon light horse, and the other troops under his command. The regiments that formed the reserve, and the grenadiers, suffered very much; having been continu-
ally in action. Among the infantry, the regiment of Botta, commanded by prince Kinfsky, distinguished itself; having fired all their cartridges, they however continued in the line, with their bayonets fixed, and repulsed the enemy. Among the cavalry, the four regiments of Savoy, Ligne, Birkenfeld, and Wurtenberg, distinguished themselves in a particular manner. The artillery, commanded by colonel Feuerstein, was remarkably well served. Among the volunteers, the duke of Wurtenberg, and major general count Czernichew,† likewise distinguished themselves.”

He had, in the preceding war, shewn no less bravery than prudence; and was wounded in the battles of Grotzka and Freidberg, in 1749. He formed the new exercise, and composed the institutions for the new military academy. In 1745, having quitted the order of Malta, he married the countess Kuch, (a favourite of the empress) by whom he has many children. He is a middle sized man, and has the most engaging countenance that can be seen: is uncommonly brave, and cool in action: a degree more of that vigor animi, would make him one of the greatest men of his age.

* General Nadafti is a Hungarian born: he served at first as lieutenant colonel in Baronia's regiment of hussars; and in 1736 colonel; in 1741 major general; in 1744 lieutenant general; in 1753 a privy councillor; in 1754 commandant of Buda, and general of horse; in 1756 bann of Croatia; and in 1758 a field marshal. He served in Italy, Silezia, and on the Rhine; and distinguished himself greatly in the passage of that river, in the preceding war; and by the taking of Schweidnitz in 1757. To recompence his services, her imperial majesty restored him his grandfather's estates; and, though a Hungarian, conferred upon him the government of Buda. He was married in 1745, and has several children. Some dispute happened between him and the other commanders, after the battle of Lissa, and he never appeared more in the army.

† Count Czernichew is a Russian born: he was first an ensign in the Simonowski life-guards; and in 1756 a major general. He is a man of great parts, which have contributed to advance his fortune. At present he is secretary of war.
in Germany, 1757.

The Prussians account of this battle is as follows:

"Immediately after the battle of Prague, colonel Puttkammer, with his hussars, was sent to pursue the enemy; who was followed, on the 9th of May, by the the prince of Bevern and general Zeithen, with 20,000 men. The first remarkable skirmish happened at Suchdol, where the Austrians great magazine of meal was taken. Lieutenant general Ziethen, and major generals Krochow and Manstein, with four battalions, and 1100 horse, were sent from the camp at Kollin on this expedition. They succeeded in taking this magazine; notwithstanding there was a camp of hussars and Croats behind Suchdol, and the heights by St. John's chapel was occupied by the Austrians. General Nadašti sent lieutenant colonel Ballati, with some hundred hussars, to attack lieutenant colonel Varnery, of Puttkammer's regiment, but they were repulsed with losses. Colonel Werner, being sent to observe the Austrians, was attacked, near Krattenau, by colonels Zobel and Lusinski, with 600 horse, which he repulsed, and took 43 prisoners. On the 5th of June, the prince of Bevern quitted his camp at Kollin, in order to attack general Nadašti's corps, who was encamped on the heights near St. John's chapel; but this general made no stand, either there, or on the heights by Kank; which he quitted, as well as the town of Kuttenberg. We took 73 prisoners: and the enemy lost, killed and wounded, above 150 men.

* This general is greatly favoured by the king. In 1740 he served as major of hussars, in Silefia; in 1741 was lieutenant colonel, and decorated with the order pour le mérite; and in the same year a colonel, and had a regiment given him; in 1744 a major general; in 1756 a lieutenant general. After the battle of Prague, in which he distinguished himself, he was made knight of the black eagle. He has commonly commanded the vanguard. After the battle of Breslaw, he made a fine retreat. In the battle of Torgau he gained immortal glory, by occupying the heights of Suptitz, after the king had been forced to quit the field, which tore the victory out of M. Daun's hands. He is now above 60 years old.
men more. The prince of Bevern, on this occasion, took two
magazines of forage and provisions, at Kuttenberg and Neuhoff,
and encamped by Neschkarziz, a village between Neuhoff and
Kuttenberg. This position forced M. Daun to quit his strong
camp at Czaflaw, and fall back first to Goltzjenkau, and after-
wards to Haber. The great number of defiles hindered us
from attacking the enemy's rear-guard, so that this march was
made without any skirmish, excepting that which happened on
the 7th of June, at the defile of Czurckwitz, which alarmed
general Nadafti, who was encamped behind Czaflaw, with his
corps reinforced by the four regiments of Saxon horse. In the
mean while, the army under M. Daun, having been reinforced,
amounted to 60,000 men; and it appeared, his intentions were
to march, with the greatest part of his troops, against that part
of the king's camp, before Prague, on the other side of the
Moldau; and, to cover this manoeuvre, to attack the prince of
Bevern with Nadafti's corps. The prince of Bevern had only
70 squadrons and 18 battalions, and consequently was in need of
a reinforcement. The king, therefore, having drawn his posts
before Prague nearer together, broke up the 13th of June, and
marched with 10 battalions and 20 squadrons, by Kofteletz, to-
towards Zasimuck. On the same day, count Daun ordered gene-
ral Nadafti to attack prince Bevern's fore-posts, and at the same
time made a motion with his whole army on the Prussians flank,
which forced them to retire towards Kollin, and on the 14th
to Kaurzim, where the king's corps joined them. The 15th
and 16th were employed in reconnoitring the roads towards the
village of Wifocka, where the Austrian army stood; which was
not perfectly executed on account of the great number of the
enemy's light troops. Four thousand pandours and hussars
attacked a transport coming from Nimburg, but the escort,
in Germany, 1757.

consisting of 200 men, under major Billerbeck, defended themselves above three hours; and, having received a reinforcement, arrived safe at the camp with the loss of seven men only. On the 17th, as we proposed marching to Schwepitz, we perceived the enemy's army formed on the heights, in a half square, with the right wing extending towards Kuttenberg and Kollin, and the left towards Zasnuck; the front was covered by a chain of fishponds and morasses. We made a motion, so that our right came to Kaurzim, and our left towards Nimburg and Planian, before it. On the 18th we occupied some hills before this place. The army marched on the left, in order to attack the enemy as soon as the necessary dispositions could be made; and our light troops had posted themselves opposite those of the enemy, who endeavoured to form on our left flank; we drove them back beyond Kollin, as far as the heights, which we must necessarily occupy to be able to attack the enemy's right flank. Major general Hulsen, with seven battalions, was ordered to render himself master of them. The infantry was to form a line to sustain this attack, without engaging its right, which was ordered to remain somewhat further back. Our grenadiers climbed up the heights, occupied a village the enemy had abandoned, and took two batteries, each of 12 or 13 pieces behind it; and, of a sudden, our infantry, without giving time to stop them, advanced and attacked all the enemy's first line, which hindered us from sustaining the attack of the heights: four battalions would have sufficed, and the victory was ours. The enemy, taking advantage of this fault, ordered

This general was major in 1740; in 1743 lieutenant colonel; in 1745 colonel; in 1754 major general, and knight of the order pour le merite; in 1756 he had a regiment; and in 1758 was made a lieutenant general. He commanded a considerable corps in Saxony, against the army of the empire, with much reputation, particularly in the action by Strehlen.
some infantry to file behind the line, and attack our seven
battalions; who, though they had suffered very much in three
successive attacks, and from the fire of 40 pieces of cannon,
repulsed them. Norman's dragoons attacked the enemy's in-
fantry, dispersed several battalions, took 5 pair of colours, and
then advanced against the Saxon carabineers, whom they beat
back and pursued as far as Kollin. While our infantry was
engaged with the enemy, it suffered greatly from the heavy
artillery: the battalions were full of large openings. The regi-
ment of cavalry of the prince of Prussia took post opposite the
interval between the regiments of prince Bevern and prince
Henry, in order to cover the abovementioned openings, and
attacked an Austrian regiment of foot that stood over against
them, and no doubt had penetrated, if it had not been exposed,
at the same time, to a battery charged with cartouches, which
threw them back on Bevern's regiment. The Austrian cavalry
pursued them; whereby prince Bevern's and prince Henry's
regiments suffered so much, that they were obliged to be
ordered out of the line. This produced an opening that cut
off our communication with the attack of the heights, and we
were forced to retire. The battalion of guards, on the right,
repulsed four battalions, and two regiments of horse, who at-
tempted to surround them. Our left wing remained on the
ground, where the enemy was posted before the action, 'till
about 9 o'clock, and then retired. The army marched towards
Nimburg without being followed at all. Several cannon have
been left behind, the carriages being broke, and for want of
horses. The loss of this battle obliges us to raise the siege of
Prague. The army on the right of the Moldau marched to-
wards Brandeis, and joined that which came from Kollin; and
M. Keith, with his, marched to Budyn.

The
in Germany, 1757.

"The Prussians account of their loss, is 1450 men, and 1667 horses, killed, in the cavalry; 8755 men, killed and missing, in the infantry; and 3568 wounded: in all, 13,773. The list, published at Vienna, of the loss of the Austrians, is 819 men killed, 3616 wounded, in the infantry; 163 men, 414 horses, killed, 825 men, and 748 horses, wounded, in the cavalry. Among the wounded were 23 staff officers, and marshal Daun himself."

Though the two preceding accounts, particularly the last, are very clear and explicit, I will add that sent to France, because it is impossible that so important an action should be too much explained and examined.

"Marshal Daun, having received orders, on the 11th of June, to march to the relief of Prague, with full power to act as he should think most advantageous for the empress's service, quitted his camp the next morning, and, after a difficult march of some days, arrived on the 15th at Gintitz. His excellency proposed marching, the day following, to Kaurzim, which was the most commodious road to Prague. The king of Prussia had joined the prince of Bevern, with a considerable reinforcement, the preceding evening; and, as he had a perfect knowledge of the country, he no doubt believed, that, by occupying the camp of Kaurzim, he would very much embarrass marshal Daun. Effectively, when the marshal was informed of it, he perceived very well the great inconvenience in which the king had put him by taking this position, while it reduced him to the necessity of marching on his right, or on his left. It was extremly dangerous and difficult to march on the left, on account of the defiles, morasses, and woods; and, if he marched on his right, he must necessarily pass near Kaurzim, and present his flank to the enemy: and lastly, if, to avoid this, he would man..."
"a great way about towards the right, he would be the next day farther from Prague than at present; and moreover would, by that means, afford the enemy an opportunity to take twenty other positions, equally proper to hinder him from approaching that place; which is very easy in this country, where advantageous camps can be found on every spot. The marshal, seeing therefore that he must necessarily come to an action, in order to deliver Prague, resolved to encamp the next morning in the enemy's presence, and reduce him to the necessity either of attacking, or give a proper opportunity of being attacked. Accordingly the army marched to Krichenau. On the 17th, the marshal, being informed that the enemy marched towards Planian, mounted instantly, and went to reconnoitre their motions, in person. Perceiving that the king directed his march towards the Austrians right, he thought it necessary to change the position of his army. It was formed with Planian before the front: the left wing was placed, in two lines of infantry, with a great quantity of artillery, on a high hill, that stood quite alone, in the plain. On the right was another hill, some what lower than the former; on this the rest of the infantry was posted, likewise in two lines, with two lines of cavalry on their flank. At the bottom of the hill, between these two heights, is a plain of about 2500 paces long; here the marshal put two lines of horse, and a third in reserve; because, as the king was equally strong in cavalry, it was imagined he would make his greatest efforts against the center, in order to cut the army in two. His excellency used all the possible precautions to elude the king's intention: artillery was placed on the flanks, and before the cavalry. Things continued in this situation the 17th. On the 18th the king ordered his army to march on the left, along the great road that goes from Prague to Vienna, and he
he endeavoured, continually, to come on the right flank of the imperial army. M. Daun, perceiving the king’s intentions, ordered the corps de reserve to march on the right wing, in order to cover the flank. Between 9 and 10 o’clock in the morning, the head of the king’s army appeared near Slatiflinz, about a mile and a half off, where he continued ’till midday, in order to give his columns time to assemble: then all was put again in motion, and always directed their march towards the Austrians right flank. The marshal, who expected this, ordered his second line to march there, and close up with the reserve. At half an hour past one, the head of the Prussian columns, both infantry and cavalry, appeared opposite the imperial army; which was prepared to receive them. The Prussian infantry formed immediately, and advanced, in good order, to attack the marshal; who likewise marched to meet them. About 2 o’clock, the attack, supported by a numerous artillery, began with such incredible vivacity, that an eye witness only can form a proper idea of it. The imperial army answered with a continual fire, both of small arms, and heavy artillery. The king of Prussia had posted some heavy cannon on a hill, behind his infantry, which did the imperial army much damage. This first attack lasted about an hour and a half; then the fire of the imperial army began to be superior to that of the Prussians, and forced them to quit the field of battle, that they might rest, and put themselves in order to renew the action. This was executed soon after; but they were repulsed, as in the first. Seven successive attacks were made from 2 o’clock ’till half an hour past six, when the last and most violent was made. This attack was general, and lasted ’till past 7 o’clock, when the Prussians were forced to give way on all sides, and retire in confusion. The marshal sent some infantry and cavalry to

in Germany, 1757.
pursue them. The corps of light troops, under general Nadashi, followed them a great way, and brought in many prisoners. The Saxon carabineers stood over against some Prussian infantry, from which, as well as from the artillery, they suffered very much: they desired leave to attack them; which, having obtained, they executed it with much bravery, cut the enemy's infantry to pieces, and took several cannon and colours. This is what happened on the right wing, where the battle was hottest. About two hours after the first attack on our right, that of the Prussian army advanced against the left of the Austrians, in order to attack it; which, considering the strength of its position, ought never to have been undertaken. It stood upon a hill which was almost impossible to ascend, and which was covered with artillery that did the Prussians great damage. The Prussians right wing, being arrived at the bottom of the hill, stopped: upon which the Austrians left, seeing the enemy did not advance, being desirous to attack them, and partake of the glory of the day with the rest of the army, quitted their position, and descended to the foot of the hill. The Austrian infantry attacked that of the Prussians with much bravery; and, after an hour's combat, obliged them to give way. The Austrian cavalry advanced likewise, in order to attack that of the enemy, but these immediately retired towards their infantry. The Austrians were prudent enough not to pursue their advantages on this side, for fear of being separated from their right wing. In about an hour after, the Prussians right wing attacked the Austrians left again; but, in less than half an hour, they were beat back in confusion. They resumed their former position, and fired from all their artillery upon the Austrians, during the whole action. While the second attack was made, six battalions, commanded by count Niclas Esterhazy.
in Germany, 1757.

Esterhazy, having shot all their cartridges, advanced against the enemy with fixed bayonets, and, with great bravery, forced them to give way. This battle was general, and all the corps were more than once engaged, &c."

As this remarkable action makes a considerable epoch in the history of the war, being the first the king of Prussia ever lost, we shall here give our reflections upon it, and upon the different manœuvres that preceded it.

Reflections on the battle of Kollin.

It has been already observed, that the siege of Prague, with about 50,000 men in it, was an imprudent and dangerous enterprise. Sieges are attended with so great expense, and so much loss of time, and men, that they ought never to be undertaken without the utmost necessity. The king of Prussia was then in circumstances that required some decisive stroke; and that as soon as possible; and therefore he should not, by any means, amuse himself with sieges, which he knew would give the Austrians time and means to provide for their defence, whatever was the event of that of Prague. Sieges must never be formed, unless, 1. when the fortresses are placed on the passes which lead into the enemy's country, and in such a manner that you cannot penetrate till you are masters of them; 2. when they are on your communications, and the country does not furnish the necessary subsistence; 3. when they are necessary, in order to cover the magazines you form in the country itself, to facilitate your operations; 4. when they contain considerable magazines of the enemy, and such as are essentially necessary to him; 5. when the conquest of them is necessarily followed by that of some considerable district, which enables you to separate your armies into winter quarters in the enemy's country.
country. In these cases, your first operation must, no doubt, be the siege of some such place; which in all others must be avoided. Not one of these circumstances concurred with regard to Prague: it covers no essential pass into the country, neither contained any considerable magazine, nor was necessary for the king in order to form one there, because the country itself furnished abundantly all kind of subsistence; and, though it did not, his armies could be supplied from Silesia, without any risk; for prince Charles could not, if he remained at or about Prague, prevent it. If, instead of besieging this town, his majesty had sent 20,000 men, the next morning, after the enemy’s right wing, which, as we have said, had fled to Benefschau, and, with the remainder, marched to Böhmisch Brodt against M. Daun, it is more than probable he would have destroyed both: they certainly could not have retired without losing their artillery, baggage, &c. and must have fell back, with the utmost expedition, on the Danube. Then the king was at liberty to besiege Olmutz; which would have given him all Bohemia; because prince Charles must likewise have marched on the Danube, in order to join the remainder of the army, as he could not, in the situation in which he then was, without any magazines or artillery, undertake any thing himself: he could not even approach the king at all, without exposing his army to destruction. His majesty might have taken twenty positions that would have covered the siege of Olmutz, masked the Danube and the capital, and forced prince Charles to march up to Lintz, in order to pass it, and join the rest of the troops. This would have given him all the time necessary to reduce Olmutz, and even Prague itself, which would have been left to a common garrison. His majesty, allured by the uncertain and vain, but flattering, hopes of taking 50,000 men prisoners, lost sight of Daun and the right wing, and with it an opportunity of giving some decisive blow. When he
was informed of the enemy's approach, it was still time to repair
the fault he had committed. He might, and ought to have raised
the siege of Prague, and, with his whole forces, attack M. Daun;
if he succeeded, it was very probable that prince Charles, in so
long a march as he must make from Prague to the Danube, would
give an opportunity to attack him also; and he could scarce ap-
proach the Danube at all, while the king was with an army near
Kollin, as is evident from the inspection of the map.

His majesty knew that prince Bevern narrowly escaped being
oppressed by the superior forces of the enemy; How could he
think that the addition of a few battalions and squadrons would
insure the victory? His whole army was scarce sufficient to con-
tend with Daun, and yet he persists in his first project of taking
Prague, and thereby exposed himself to certain destruction, if the
enemy had done part only of what might have been easily executed,
as well by the garrison of Prague, as by M. Daun after the battle.
It is one of the most essential qualities of a general, not to be in-
satuated with a passion for some favourite and striking project,
because it exposes him to many, and sometimes fatal, consequences.
It is difficult to renounce to an enterprize once embraced, because
it in some measure exposes one to the cenure of want of foresight,
or constancy, both very mortifying to self-love. However, there
is more glory in mending a fault, than to persevere in it. His
majesty, confiding too much in his own superior talents, too little
in those of his enemies, or pressed, perhaps, by the necessity of his
affairs, has been observed, very often, to undertake things much
above the means he had to accomplish them; and therefore no
wonder that many of his projects, though in appearance plausible,
wanted solidity, and consequently have not been always attended
with success. Being arrived at Kaurzim, and finding the enemy
too strongly posted to be attacked with any probability of success,
his majesty might have fell back, and taken some other position, which perhaps would have induced them to advance, and give him an opportunity to fight upon more equal terms: if it be objected that prince Charles, informed of his absence, would attack the army left before Prague, it only proves he was sensible he had expos'd that army to destruction, as it depended on the enemy's knowing a thing, which he might have done by a thousand means. When he resolved to occupy the heights on the right flank of the enemy, he ought not surely to have marched at broad day, because they must necessarily perceive his intention, and in time to make their dispositions accordingly, as it happened. Possibly if the king had sent in the evening a great corps of cavalry, which he could spare in that mountainous country, towards the enemy's left flank, it would have drawn their attention that way, and given him an opportunity to march unobserved in the night, and occupy the height of Chotzemitz: the attempting it by day made it impossible from the first instant. His majesty in marching formed a portion of a circle; the enemy marched on the Chord, and therefore could with ease bring more men into action, at any one point of attack, and in less time, than he could do, though the armies had been equal, which must be decisive; as his majesty was in proportion much stronger in cavalry than in infantry, he ought no doubt to have chosen the most convenient ground on the enemy's front for that species of troops; and, as he had given them an opportunity to reinforce their right, and its flank, where they had brought two thirds of their army, he ought to have refused both his wings, and make an effort with his cavalry, sustained by infantry and artillery, on the center, between Chotzemitz and Erzift, where the enemy had only cavalry; and therefore most probably would have been forced to give way, and their two wings, being thus separated, easily defeated; whereas, by persisting to attack their right, he could bring
bring only his infantry to action, the ground being very improper for cavalry, as well on account of the ravins and woods, as of the villages before the enemy's front. Having resolved to attack this wing, his majesty should have brought here all his infantry, leaving only a line of horse on his right, which would have been sufficient, as the enemy's left could never quit their advantageous position and descend into the plain. This would have enabled him to sustain his vanguard properly, and at a convenient distance; whereas he left it exposed, and quite in the air, his line being too far back: the more successful his vanguard was, the more certain to be destroyed, because the more they advanced, the more they exposed themselves to be attacked on all sides, as it really happened: for, having pierced the first line of the enemy, and attacked the flank of the second, they found themselves engaged with the greatest part of the army in front; and the whole reserve, composed of infantry and cavalry, on their flank; and at the same time exposed to the fire of a very numerous and well served artillery: and, being so far advanced that they could not be sustained by the line, were obliged to give way. If they had been properly supported, and a body of troops sent on their flank, opposite the enemy's reserve, to keep it in awe, the battle was won: the enemy's line was already broke, and had no convenient ground behind to take a new position upon; so that the whole army would have been taken in flank; nor could the reserve quit its position to attack this vanguard in flank, without presenting their own, and losing the advantage of their situation. But, as these dispositions were not made, the enemy's reserve, without any risk, quitted its post, and took the king's vanguard in flank, which, as has been said, being unsupported by any other troops, was forced to give way, and the battle was lost. The general faults therefore of the king's disposition, before, and during the action, were, 1. to have manoeuvred
manoeuvred by day, which gave the enemy time to change their position, according to their circumstances; 2. to have formed an attack where he could not conveniently combine the different species of arms; whereas the enemy had both infantry and cavalry, with a great quantity of artillery, to sustain the point attacked; 3. to have let general Hülsen advance so far, that he could not be supported by the line; and, 4. to have attacked with too little infantry, considering the nature of the ground.

As to the conduct of M. Daun, it appears uniform, and founded upon reasonable principles: after the battle of Prague, it was very judicious; he retired before the duke of Bevern, though stronger than him from the beginning, as well to give his men time to recollect themselves, as to be able to receive the reinforcements he expected. These being arrived, his conduct changes according to the circumstances; he is now as vigorous and active, as he seemed before slow and dilatory. His march was calculated to cut off the prince of Bevern, before he could join the army at Prague, or be reinforced by it; and, though this project did not succeed, it was certainly well laid. His conduct, during the action, appears no less prudent. The enemy made no fault of which he did not take advantage: one only he himself seems to have committed, which was to have kept his line too far back: this gave Hülsen an opportunity of taking the villages, before the front, from between them and the front, and then penetrate through the line, which would certainly have occasioned the loss of the battle, had he been properly supported. Whenever your line is placed behind villages, it must be at a proper distance to sustain them, otherwise they, being taken, will be of great prejudice to you, and advantage to the enemy, whose motions are covered and sustained by them; whereas, if you sustain them properly, he cannot possibly take them, nor advance, leaving them behind; because not only they break
break his line and throw it into some degree of confusion, which favourable opportunity, if improved, will necessarily be attended with a defeat, and also expose it to be taken in flank by the troops posted in them. The possession therefore of villages, provided they are at a proper distance to be sustained, is one of the most advantageous circumstances that can occur in a field of battle; but all these advantages are lost, and turn against you, if you do not sustain them. They are so very advantageous that I would never advise any general to attack them, if he sees they will be sustained, but rather mask them, and put them on fire with haubitz, and choose some other point of attack, which, though in appearance less proper, will, generally speaking, succeed better. If the marshal had marched the 19th with his whole army towards Prague, it is probable that of the king, before that place, would have been destroyed. In war a general must think he has done nothing, while something remains unfinished; he ought to consider all his successes as means only that lead to greater, but never make an epoch of them, or pause to meditate, while in the full career of victory and glory.

On the 19th his majesty quitted the army, which had fought at Kollin, and went to Prague, in order to raise the siege: this was executed the day following without any loss worth mentioning; that part of the army which was on the right of the Moldau, marched down that side as far as Leutmeritz.

* We have a fine example of this given by the famous Marlborough, at the battle of Hockstede; he had attacked several times the village of Oberklaw, but was each time repulsed with great loss; his lordship, very judiciously having left a body of infantry to mask the village, advanced, and broke the enemy's line, which got the battle. The French had garnished all the villages before their front, particularly Oberklaw and Plentheim, with a prodigious quantity of infantry, expecting that the generals of the allies would attack them, and by no means presume to advance and leave them behind; but they were disappointed, beat, and lost all their infantry posted in the villages.
while that under M. Keith took the road of Welwarn and Budyn, where he passed the Egra, and went to encamp between Liboschowitz and Lowositz, opposite the king's division; so that the whole formed only one army, separated by the Elbe, over which they had the necessary communications, and could easily be on either side, according as circumstances might require. With the remainder of his forces his majesty had formed another considerable army, amounting to above 30,000 men, under the command of the prince of Prussia, who took post about Böhmisch Leipa. By this means it was thought they could effectually cover Saxony and Lusatia, and keep open the communication through this last province with Silezia: for, if the enemy marched down the left of the Elbe, and attempted to penetrate into Saxony, by the way of Auffig, the king could, with his army encamped about Leutmeritz, pass the river, and take such positions between Lowositz and Auffig, as would effectually put a stop to their progress; and, if they directed their steps towards Lusatia, the prince's army could easily take some advantageous camp in that mountainous country, which would enable him, though inferior, to oppose them with success, at least till the king had time to make some manœuvre in his favour.

While his majesty was thus occupied in making dispositions to continue in Bohemia as long as possible, the Austrians were no less active in forming their plan to drive him out of it. This could be accomplished in three different ways: the first was to follow M. Keith down the left of the Elbe, and endeavour to penetrate into Saxony, the conquest of which would open the way to carry the war into Brandenburg, and probably furnish some opportunity to put a happy end to it; and the more so, as the Russians and Swedes would be at hand to act in concert, and consequently with more vigour: the second method proposed, was to
leave an army to observe the enemy, and to send the remainder into Silesia, either to besiege Neiße or Schweidnitz, which, it was imagined, would force the enemy to quit Bohemia, in order to cover these important places, on which the preservation of Silesia seems very much to depend: the third and last method that offered, was to keep the army together, and march towards Lužatia, which would force the enemy to retire, or come to an action: and, as this last was most probable, from the known character of the king, it would be advisable to have the whole army united, rather than separate it, to undertake many things at once, and so expose it to be beat in detail. This plan was preferred to the others; accordingly, the whole Austrian army passed the Elbe on the 1st of July, and encamped at Lilsau, which the enemy had quitted the 26th of last month, and marched successively to Jungbuntzlau and Tscheditz, on the right of the Ifer.

Prince Charles sent general Nadaffi, with a considerable corps, likewise on the right of that river, as well to observe the enemy's motions at Leutmeritz, as to cover the march of the army towards Jungbuntzlau. General Morocz was sent also, with a strong body, on the left of the Iser, to observe the prince of Prussia's motions, and to prepare every thing for the march of the main army. The first of these corps having taken post at Mischno, between the prince's army and that of the king, while the other passed the Iser at Bakehofen, on the prince's left flank, his royal highness thought it full time to quit Tscheditz; and, as these two corps were continually on his flanks, he found it necessary to fall back successively to Hirchberg, Neuschloss, and Leipa; from whence he sent general Putkammer, with four battalions and 500 hussars, to occupy Gabel, that he might secure that important pass which leads into Lužatia.
In the mean time the Austrians grand army advanced with slow, but cautious and sure steps, to Munchengratz, and from thence to Hunnerwasler. The enemy's position at Leipa, covered with the Poltz, was thought too strong to be attacked; it was therefore resolved to turn his left flank and attack Gabel, which would necessarily force him to retire, and at the same time open a sure way into Lusatia. Accordingly, general Macquire, with a considerable detachment, sustained by the vanguard, was sent on this expedition. The army advanced to Nimes, in order to cover it. The place was taken the 15th, after a defence of thirty-six hours, and the army immediately passed the Poltz. All these manoeuvres forced the prince of Prussia to quit Leipa; and having, with Gabel, lost the nearest communication with Zittau, where he had a strong garrison, and a very considerable magazine of every kind, he was obliged to make several forced and difficult marches by Kamentz, Georgenthal, Kreywitz, Rumburg, and Unterhennerf- dorff, in order, if possible, to anticipate the enemy; but he was disappointed; for, on the taking of Gabel, they had directed their march to Zittau, where they arrived the 19th, and were then bombarding the town with the most unrelenting fury. They had however neglected to invest it entirely; the prince seized this favourable opportunity, approached the place with his army, and having, during the preceding night, withdrawn the greatest part of the stores, baggage, &c. on the 23d he retired, by Lobau, towards Bautzen, without any other loss than that of colonel Diereck, and about 200 men, who still endeavoured to defend themselves in that general conflagration, which consumed one of the most populous and rich cities of Germany.

The Austrians having thus drove a considerable part of the enemy's forces out of Bohemia, and secured their communications with that country, by occupying Zittau and Gabel, they resolved
Resolved to advance farther into Lusatia, and endeavour to cut off the enemy entirely from Silesia. Accordingly, the grand army marched the 25th from Zittau to Eckartsberg; from whence several detachments were sent on the left, to observe the motions of the enemy; and on the right, down the Neis, in order to secure the passes into Silesia. A small corps of light troops, commanded by colonel Janus, had already penetrated into that country by the way of Trautenau; but it was too inconsiderable to undertake any thing of consequence.

His royal highness prince Charles resolved to continue in the neighbourhood of Zittau until the enemy quitted the frontiers and fell back into Saxony; which he knew they would soon be forced to do, in order to oppose the combined army, that was then forming in the empire, and preparing to march towards the Saala and Leipzig. While these things passed between prince Charles and the prince of Prussia, the king, with near 40,000 men, remained at Leutmeritz in great tranquility, as if he had been no ways concerned in the event. At length, however, the taking of Zittau roused him from his lethargy, and shewed him the unfavourable situation of his affairs, which nothing but superior conduct and activity could reinstate. On entering Bohemia, at the beginning of the campaign, Silesia had been left without any troops, excepting some weak garrisons to cover it. The enemy had taken such a position as made it difficult to send any succours there: they could, therefore, enter that country, and perhaps take some place of consequence before it could possibly be relieved.

To remedy these evils, his majesty quitted Leutmeritz the 20th, and marched successively to Pirna, where he passed the Elbe, Bischoffswerda, and Bautzen, where he arrived the 29th, and joined the army commanded by the prince of Prussia, who retired, and never appeared more in the field, and died soon after.
From hence his majesty marched to Weissenberg, and there waited 'till the arrival of marshal Keith; who, having left a small corps to protect Saxony, followed with the remainder, and joined him in the beginning of August. Having thus assembled a very considerable army, he resolved to open the communication with Silesia; and, if possible, bring the enemy to an action; which might, if successful, retrieve his affairs.

With these views, his majesty quitted Weilienberg on the 15th, and marched to Ostritz. His vanguard took general Beck's baggage at Bernstadt; and some of the light troops, pushing on to Ostritz, they there surprised general Nadafi, at table; who, with the utmost difficulty, found means to escape. All his equipage was taken: some letters were found in it that indicated a design to betray Dresden to the Austrians. This served as a pretext to treat the queen of Poland with some hardship. On the 16th he advanced within cannon shot of the enemy, in order to give them battle; but he found them so advantageously posted, that he did not think it prudent to attack them. However, he continued here 'till the 20th; and then, finding they would not quit their position, returned to his former camp behind Ostritz. Though his majesty had not been able to execute his plan entirely, he had gained an important point by opening a communication with Silesia; which he resolved to keep so, if possible, that his forces might act in concert, at least, if not united. He left, therefore, in this neighbourhood, a considerable part of his army, under the command of the prince of Bevern; and, with the remainder, returned to Dresden, in order to march against the combined army, which was advancing towards Saxony.

Before we proceed to give an account of the ulterior operations of the respective armies, we think it may be useful to examine those which happened after the siege of Prague. In the description we have
have given of this country, it appears, there are three roads that
go out of it into Lusatia: the first, near the Elbe, goes by Leipa,
Kamentz, and Rumburg, towards Bautzen; the second, along the
Iser, by Munchengratz, and Gabel, towards Zittau; the third,
by Reichenberg, and Friedland, towards Lauban: all which are
intercepted by many and great defiles, especially the first and last,
where a corps, composed of a few battalions, would suffice to stop
an army. The plan, formed by the Austrians, to act on the right
of the Elbe, preferable to the left, was certainly well advised;
because they could, with greater facility, drive the enemy out of
Bohemia, than if they attempted it on the other side, where he
could take many positions between Lowositz and Pirna, from
whence they could not force him by any direct motion; and, if
they endeavoured to get on his flanks, it would be attended with
loss of time, and perhaps would fail in the execution. This plan
was attended with another great advantage, that, in forcing the
enemy to retire out of Bohemia, by gaining his left flank, they
cut him off from Silesia, and opened a sure way into it for them-

As soon as the army passed the Elbe, a large corps, under Na-
dafti, was sent to observe the king; and another between that and
the prince of Prusia's army. These two corps were so strong,
that when united they formed a small army, and could with safety
keep close to the enemy, and render the communication between
their two armies very precarious. A third was sent on the prince's
left flank; and, within a march of these different corps, the main
army advanced under prince Charles. By this admirable disposition
he could sustain them, if necessary; and they had a sure retreat by
falling back on his army: he was covered by them; and, keeping
on the left of the Iser, could not be forced to fight against his will.
His measures were so well taken, and executed with so much
vigour
vigour and prudence, that in 20 days he forced the enemy to abandon Bohemia with great loss, and cut off his communication with Silesia.

If, after the taking of Zittau, his royal highness had marched to Stromberg, beyond Löbau, or to Reichenbach, or, lastly, to Jauerick, with a strong corps on the Landscron, and the light troops in the woods behind Löbau, the enemy could never have opened a communication with Silesia. The position of Kleinschónau was too far back, and left the road between Bautzen and Górlitz open; so that the king could always enter Silesia without any opposition. The method, pursued by prince Charles, of acting with strong corps, rather than with the whole army, is attended with infinite advantages: 1. it facilitates the means of subsisting, which, in every country, is difficult, when the army is very numerous; 2. it enables you to engage every day some important combat, without bringing affairs to a decision; 3. they revive the spirits of the soldiers, whom former misfortunes have rendered timid; 4. by taking post on the enemy's flanks you force him to quit every camp, however strong, and consequently to abandon the whole country. All which truths are deduced clearly from the conduct of prince Charles on this occasion.

That of the king does not, on the whole, appear in the same favourable light. His activity in raising the siege of Prague is much to be commended; the least delay would have been fatal to him: his dividing the army into several strong corps, after the battle of Kollin, very much facilitated the retreat. These presented so many objects to the enemy, that he could not immediately determine which was most worthy his attention; nor could he undertake any thing against them 'till he had ascertained their number, species, and postion: in the mean time they retired with tranquility and safety. From the king's conduct, on this occasion, may
may be deduced a general rule for retreating after an action lost. That an army retreating must be divided into as many strong corps as the nature of the country will admit of; because, in this case, the enemy can do you no very essential damage: if he separates his army likewise into many corps, neither of them will be strong enough to undertake any thing of consequence; even, if they keep too close, they may receive some considerable check. Another advantage, arising from this method of retiring, is, that the enemy cannot intercept any one of your corps; because he can neither push between them, nor go so far about as to come before them, without exposing his own troops to be hemmed in between your different corps. If he follows you with his whole army, one only division can be in danger, which may be easily avoided by forming a strong rear-guard, who will get time for the remainder to march off in safety; and the more so, as a small corps marches much more lightly than an army. Care must be taken not to engage the whole corps; because, if the enemy is near, and acts with vigour, it will be lost entirely.

When prince Charles passed the Elbe, it was evident he proposed to advance towards Lusatia, consequently the king should have left M. Keith, with a few battalions and squadrons, in the mountains between Lowositz and Pirna, to cover Saxony, against the enemy's light troops, and with the remainder have taken a position behind the Poltz, about Leipa or Nimis, with a strong corps on his left, towards Liebenau, and another smaller on his right, between him and the Elbe, on the road to Rumburg. This would have made it impossible for the enemy to advance one step till they had dislodged him: they could not think of entering those great defiles, through which the road leading to Rumburg passes, having a corps, as I suppose, in front, and the whole army on their flank and rear; nor could they enter those of Liebenau and
and Reichenberg on his left, for the same reasons: they must consequently either force him to retire, or stop short. It was still more improbable that they would separate their army and send a considerable part of it to make an efficacious diversion in Silesia. Such is the strength of this country, and so many good camps to be found in it, that, if the prince of Prussia, even with his army, had taken the road of Gabel and Zittau, instead of that of Rumburg, it is probable he might have stopped prince Charles, for some time at least. The enemy did not choose to venture between his right flank and the king's army, and they could not easily take a position on his left, that could force him to quit Gabel and Zittau, if he had taken his camp on the mountains between these two places, which he ought to have done, rather than take the road of Rumburg, by which he lost them both, and his communication with Silesia. When the enemy arrived at Hunnerwasser, Why did not the king march instantly from Glaflorff, and come on their flank and rear, while the prince his brother attacked them in front? Nothing in the world could hinder them from acting in concert. This, however, and many other favourable opportunities, which the enemy gave him, were lost. His majesty continued, as we have said, all this while, near Leutmeritz, in perfect tranquility.

The prince's army was, no doubt, too weak to withstand the efforts of the enemy, who were more than double his number; yet we think he might have taken such camps as would have stopped them. When a general has the misfortune to command an army that is much inferior to that of the enemy, he must certainly retire before them, if they send very strong corps on his flanks, as well because his subsistence becomes precarious, as because they may, by a judicious use of these corps, attack him with united forces in front and rear, and entirely defeat him; particularly if the country has many defiles. A general, in such circumstances, has but
but one way to extricate himself; which is, to attack, with his whole forces, whatever corps may be sent on his flank: if he succeeds, once or twice, the enemy will scarce attempt a third time. The prince, having neglected to do this, was, as we have said, forced to retire from camp to camp, and at length to abandon the whole country.

During these transactions in Bohemia, the army of the empire, consisting of 32 squadrons, 32 battalions, 23 companies of grenadiers, 2 regiments of hussars, and 52 pieces of cannon, commanded by the prince of Hildburgshausen, assembled in the circle of Franconia, in the month of August. These were to be reinforced by 30,000 French, under the command of prince Soubize, who had been for some time on the Main. Accordingly, they united at Erfurth on the 21st of August, and assumed the title of the combined army; the object of which, was, to drive the Prussians out of Saxony. This, it was thought, could be executed without any considerable difficulty. The country was in some measure defenseless, there being nothing to guard it but some few weak garrisons, which, though united, could form but an inconsiderable corps, incapable of keeping the field against such superior forces; and, being thus separated, were still less capable of making any effectual resistance. The king, being wholly taken up in observing the Austrians, had not, as they imagined, either time or means to come and oppose their operations.

For these reasons, it was resolved to march down the Saala and begin the campaign with the siege of Leipsig, preferable to any other enterprise, because they would be at hand to receive all kind of succours from Richlieu's army, now entirely at liberty by the convention of Cloystersven, and moreover could, in case of success, take their winter quarters in this part of Saxony, and the next campaign proceed to the entire conquest of it, and of Magdeburg and Brandenburg.
The king knew perfectly well, that, if the progress of the combined army, and that of M. Richilieu, was not immediately stopped, they would soon be on the Elbe; the consequence of which must be fatal to him. Having, therefore, left an army of 40 battalions and 70 squadrons, under the prince of Bevern, to defend Silesia, he quitted Bernstadt the 25th of August, and marched to Dresden, where he assembled an army, and proceeded without delay to the Saala. On the 12th of September he arrived at Erfurth, which the enemy abandoned on his approach, and retired to Eisenach. His majesty followed them, intending to give them battle; but he found them so advantageously posted, that he did not think it advisable to attack them; and, seeing they declined coming to an action as much as possible, he resolved to fall back on the Saala, as well to make his army subsist with more ease, as to be at hand to sustain a detachment which he proposed sending under prince Ferdinand, to cover Halberstadt and the neighbouring country, against the incursions of the light troops, which infested them daily from Richilieu's army; and another, under prince Maurice, between the Moldau and the Elbe, to cover that part of Saxony and Brandenburg. Accordingly, he retired first to Buttelfadt, and from thence to Naumburg, where he arrived the 13th of October. This retreat encouraged the combined army to advance; they resumed their former position at Erfurth, where general St. Germain was posted, with a considerable detachment, to observe the king's motions, and cover the remainder of the army, who, not being able to support the cold, were put into quarters of canttongment.

Prince Charles, seeing the enemy's forces thus separated at an immense distance, and the road into Brandenburg quite open, resolved to send a considerable detachment to Berlin; and, to cover this expedition, another great corps, under general Marshal, was sent upon the Elster. His royal highness proposed, by this enterprise,
to raise the credit of his arms, which the taking of the enemy's capital could not fail to do; to make a diversion in favour of the combined army, because it was not doubted but the king would quit Saxony for some time, and hasten to the succour of his residence; and lastly, to oblige the prince of Bevern to make some considerable detachment, which would facilitate the means to drive him out of his present advantageous position.

Accordingly, general Haddick, with about 4000 men, was sent to Berlin; which he took, and ransomed, and then retired behind the Spree with safety and honour.

Prince Maurice, who, as hath been said, had been detached towards the Elbe, was on his march there when he was informed of the enemy's enterprize against Berlin; he immediately passed that river, and directed his march towards Berlin, in hopes still to anticipate the enemy, or at least intercept him in his retreat; but, on his arrival at Schwelinz, advice was brought that Haddick had been at Berlin, and, having ransomed it, was retired into Lusatia.

The king, having been informed of this enterprize against his capital, and believing at first that the enemy had concerted some solid plan with the Swedes, who were likewise advancing that way, thought it necessary to go and defeat their designs in person. For which purpose, having left about 6000 or 7000 men, under M. Keith, to guard the Saala, and observe the combined army, he quitted Leipzig on the 16th of October, and on the 20th arrived at Annaberg, on the right of the Elbe, where he was informed of Haddick's retreat. Upon which he ordered prince Maurice to resume his position between the Elbe and the Moldau, and with part of the troops returned to Leipzig.

The generals of the combined army, now reinforced by a very strong corps, commanded by the duke of Broglio, resolved to seize this favourable opportunity which the king's absence afforded them, and:
and once more penetrate into Saxony: accordingly, they put their troops in motion, passed the Saala on the 25th, and on the 27th had their head quarters at Weissenfels. From hence count de Mailly was sent to summon Leipsig, which M. Keith refused to surrender. Things were in this situation, when the king arrived with about 10,000 men; and, being joined by the corps under M. Keith, and prince Ferdinand, an army of 22,000 men was assembled, with which he resolved to march against the enemy.

Though the combined army was much inferior to that of the king, it was thought prudent to decline coming to an action, with the Saala behind them; and probably they meant to concert some new plan with M. Richlieu, now entirely disengaged. Accordingly, the whole army repassed that river on the 29th; 4 battalions, and 18 companies of grenadiers, were left to defend Weissenfels; and 14 battalions, with some cavalry, under the command of the duke of Broglio, were sent to occupy Merseburg; which shews they then proposed defending the banks of the Saala.

The king quitted Leipsig on the 30th, and arrived the day following at Weissenfels, which he ordered to be attacked instantly; and, after some resistance, took it sword in hand. The enemy, having for the most part passed the river, put fire to the bridge, which intercepted some of them, who were made prisoners. Their army was divided into two parts: the one, commanded by the prince of Hildburgthausen, remained opposite to Weissenfels; and the other, under prince Soubise, approached Merseburg, to sustain M. Broglio, or cover his retreat, in case it should be thought convenient to abandon that place.

His majesty knew, that, while the enemy had such considerable forces on the frontiers of Magdeburg and Saxony, he could not think of separating his army, to put the troops in winter quarters when the season required it, even supposing he could keep the whole
whole in that country: it was therefore resolved to give the combined army battle, and, if they declined it, drive them so far back that they could not resume their operations, at least for this campaign. Accordingly, bridges were thrown over the Saala, at Weissenfels, Merseburg, and Halle, where the army passed in three columns, and assembled, the 2d of November, near the village of Rosbach, as in A. A. The enemy, having abandoned the design of defending the banks of the Saala, quitted Merseburg, and united their whole forces in B. B. The king examined their position the 3d, and resolved to attack them the next morning. Accordingly, he advanced at the head of his cavalry, in order to occupy those posts which should be found most proper to cover the infantry, and at the same time form his dispositions for the attack. Being arrived in D. D. he perceived they had, in the preceding night, changed their position, and taken another in C. C. which appeared too strong to be attacked: upon which the army was ordered to march on the left, and encamp in E. E. with the left at Rosbach, the center at Schartau, and the right towards Bedra, with the cavalry in the third line.

The commanders of the combined army attributed this retrograde motion of the king to fear. This, and the great force of their army, elated their courage in such a manner, that they resolved to attack him next morning, and so finish the campaign; the fatigues of which their troops seemed no longer able or willing to endure. The king's right and center were deemed too well posted to be attacked with success, consequently they proposed attacking the left on the flank and rear; and at the same time general St. Germain was ordered to take post, with a considerable corps, in N. N. as well to amuse the enemy, as to cover the march of the army: at 11 o'clock it was put in motion, in three columns; the vanguard was composed of Austrian and imperial cavalry, followed by the.
the French and imperial infantry; the whole was closed by the French horse. Being arrived on the hill, opposite the enemy's left flank, they halted, and ordered the French horse to advance, and join the rest of the cavalry at the head.

About 1 o'clock the king was informed that they were in march on his left flank; but, not being able as yet to discover their intentions, he remained quiet for the present, and observed them. At 2 o'clock he perceived they had passed his flank, and continued marching towards Merseburg; upon which he ordered his cavalry and artillery to march on the left, behind the hills, and occupy that near Lunstadt and Reichertswerben, while the infantry followed in all haste.

The generals of the combined army, seeing the enemy quit their camp with an appearance of precipitation, thought they were retiring; which seemed the more probable, as they could not discover any thing of the march, being covered by the hills. Anxious lest the enemy escaped, and they lose the fruits of their fine dispositions, they advanced in great haste with their cavalry, followed, at a considerable distance, by their infantry, hoping to overtake the rear-guard, and, by attacking it with vigour, either destroy it, or force the enemy to a general action. Being arrived near Reicherts- werben, some of the enemy's horse appeared on the heights behind the village; they continued, however, to advance, thinking they were only posted there to gain time, and cover the retreat. This illusion soon vanished; all the Prussian horse was then forming, under the protection of some heavy artillery, posted on the hill, which did great execution, and contributed essentially to the success of the battle. As soon as they were formed, his majesty ordered them to attack that of the enemy; this they executed with promptitude and vigour, broke them, and drove them back in confusion to the village of Befendorff, where they attempted to rally;
rally; but the Prussians renewed their attack, without giving them time to execute it, broke them again, and so effectually, that they quitted the field. In the mean time the generals of the combined army endeavoured to form their infantry; but the king, who had as yet six or eight battalions only come up, ordered them instantly to advance, and attack the enemy, while they were occupied in forming the line. This was immediately executed; and, being supported by the cavalry and artillery, they easily broke those few troops which had formed at the head of the columns, and drove them back in confusion.

Prince Soubise, however, did not give up the affair as lost; the reserve, consisting of five regiments of cavalry, was ordered to advance and sustain the infantry, in order to form the line, if possible. These were instantly attacked, broke, and drove off the field; upon which the infantry, unsupported by its own cavalry, taken in flank by that of the enemy, and moreover exposed to a heavy fire of the artillery and small arms, were unable to keep their ground, much less form a line forwards: they attempted once more to form it behind, between the village of Busendorff and the Luftschiff, under the protection of some French cavalry; but these being over-powered, and forced to retire, after a vigorous combat, the infantry was likewise obliged to quit the field with precipitation. Count St. Germain covered the retreat.

Thus ended the battle of Rosbach; where 22,000 men, conducted with prudence and vigour, defeated above 50,000, with the inconsiderable loss of about 300 men, killed and wounded; whereas that of the combined army amounted to about 800 killed, and 6000 prisoners, including 11 generals and 300 officers, together with 72 pieces of cannon, and other military trophies. Many relations of this battle were published by authority: that of Vienna is too general, and gives a very imperfect idea of it; we shall, therefore, omit it, and give that of Berlin, and another, wrote by an officer.
officer in the combined army; which, with what we have said on
the subject, will enable the reader to form a proper judgment of
this extraordinary transaction.

The Prussians account of the battle is as follows:

"In the beginning of September, the army of the empire, and
the corps commanded by prince Soubise, assembled at Erfurth,
intending to penetrate into Saxony, and render themselves masters
of the Elbe: upon which part of the Prussian army marched
towards Naumburg. Our light troops had a skirmish with those
of the enemy, over which they gained a considerable advantage.
The army passed the Saala, and advanced as far as Buttelstedt.
About this time the convention of Bremerford, between the
French and Hanoverians, was made, and a strong corps from the
duke of Richlieu's army entered the principality of Halberstadt:
prince Ferdinand of Brunswick was sent there; he soon delivered
the country from the French, of whom he took 20 officers and
400 men; but, as the duke of Richlieu advanced with his whole
army, prince Ferdinand retired to Wanfleben, from whence he
could intercept their convoys. His majesty's army marched to
Erfurth, which the enemy quitted and retired into the moun-
tains behind Eisenach. We had a post at Gotha; prince Hild-
burghausen attacked it, but was repulsed with loss. Both armies
continued in this situation 'till the end of October, when a corps
of Hungarian troops marched through Lusatia into Brandenburg:
it was thought that general Marshal's corps would follow them,
which obliged his majesty to send prince Maurice to oppose
them, and he himself followed, and advanced as far as Annaberg,
to intercept them; but the enemy's expedition had no other ob-
ject than to raise contribution, and, on the approach of prince
Maurice, they retired without having collected it at all. While
part of our army marched to succour the electorate, M. Keith,
in Germany, 1757.

"with the rest, retired into Leipzig. The generals of the combined army believed this a favourable moment to put their projects in execution; accordingly they marched cantonwise, part by Naumburg and Zeitz, and part by Weissenfels, in order to take Leipzig, and our great magazine at Torgau. Our army was ordered to assemble at Leipzig, where the different corps arrived the 26th of October. On the 31st we marched, intending to attack the enemy's quarters; we made some prisoners, but went no farther than Lutzen. His majesty, being informed that the enemy retired on all sides, marched with the vanguard to Weissenfels. This city was defended by some of the Bavarian and Circle's troops: we attacked it, and took it, with about 300 prisoners: the enemy burnt the bridge over the Saala to facilitate their flight. The troops of the empire encamped on the other side of the river, over against Weissenfels, posted behind the enclosures and the houses, in order to hinder us from repairing the bridge: they formed a chain on the left side of the river; and marshal Keith, who, with the greatest part of the army, was marched to Merseburg, found the bridge burnt, and the town occupied by 14 French battalions, a detachment of which broke down the bridge at Halle. The field marshal went with a detachment to this last place, and ordered the bridge to be repaired, which obliged the enemy to abandon their posts on the Saala, and retire towards Micheln. We repaired immediately the other bridges, and passed the river by Merseburg, Halle, and Weissenfels: the three columns assembled on the same day near the village of Rosbach. His majesty, having reconnoitred the enemy, found that they could be attacked on the right flank with advantage, which was resolved to be executed the following day: accordingly we marched, the cavalry having the vanguard. When we arrived on the heights, from whence
the day before we had examined the enemy's position, we
found they had changed it: their front was not only parallel
to ours, but was covered by a deep ravine; their right was in a
wood, on a high hill, covered also with three redoubts and an
abbattis.\textsuperscript{*} It was not thought prudent to attack them in this
advantageous position, and so we returned to our old camp.
The enemy, perceiving we did not attack them, ordered some
detachments to follow us; they fired a few cannon shot at our
cavalry, but without effect. The 5th, in the morning, we were
informed the enemy were in motion on their right; and, soon
after, that their whole army was in march: about noon we
perceived the heads of their columns opposite to the flank of
our left wing: we would take no resolution till we knew per-
fectly their intentions. About 3 o'clock we perceived they
had passed our left wing, and directed their march towards
Merseburg: upon which our army was formed in order of battle,
and, having made a motion on the left, we costed them: we
reached the heights, which our cavalry occupied in such a man-
ner, that they came on the flank of that of the enemy, and
after several attacks broke and dispersed them. Our infantry
reached the village of Reichertswerben, where our left was
posted; and, as we perceived the French infantry form in col-
umns, in order to attack us, we anticipated them. The bat-
tle lasted about an hour and a half: six battalions only of our
left wing came to action. We followed the enemy to Burgwer-
ben: the night hindered us from reaping still greater advantages
from our victory. The day following our army marched to-
wards Freidburg: the 7th a strong detachment passed the Saala,
and advanced to Eckartsberg, &c. &c.\textsuperscript{*}

\textsuperscript{*} Trees cut down, and placed so as to form a parapet; behind which the troops, parti-
cularly infantry, are placed.
in Germany, 1757.

The next was wrote by a French officer in the combined army.

"It was resolved to attack the left flank of the Prussian army: accordingly, at nine in the morning, our's marched in two columns. General St. Germain was ordered to take post before our camp, with 9 battalions and 14 or 15 squadrons, in order to attack the enemy in front, when he perceived that we did the same on his flank: The king, having been informed of these motions, which he so much desired, left his camp standing, with part of his army in it, to oppose St. Germain, and to make us believe he was in perfect security: The left wing of his army was hid behind a hill, and covered by some marshy ground, and a village: part of his army was formed behind the above-mentioned hill, on which was a great quantity of artillery. Not far from this hill is another, which joins it, and extends far into the plain. Behind this hill the enemy had his infantry in columns, a great quantity of artillery, and almost his whole cavalry. Our army, having marched about two hours, was now opposite the enemy's flank; we had a fine plain before us, and, perceiving no enemy, we hastened our march. It looked as if we feared the enemy should escape us, and only reconnoitred his front, without taking any notice of his left wing; so were we heartily chastised for it. About half an hour after three our cavalry struck in with that of the enemy, which stood at the bottom of the second hill, and advanced in good order against ours, whom they could easily break; because the cavalry of the empire was so close to them, that they could not fire freely, nor could they form in good order. When the enemy first appeared, the cavalry of the left wing was ordered to advance, which they executed full gallop; but they found that of the right wing retiring in confusion. Notwithstanding this,
"this, the Austrian cavalry, and the regiments of Bourbon, La-
meth, and Fitzjames in particular, fought with success. Scarce
was the combat between the cavalry engaged, when the enemy
directed his artillery to play on the front and flank of our ca-
valry and infantry. Our infantry was immediately formed, but
in some places they were too close, and in others had large open-
ings; they moved to the left, where some brigades were soon
repulsed by the fire of the Prussians: that of Mailly followed
them; that of Wittmer, of which was the regiment of Dief-
bach, kept its ground the longest; and prince Soubise was
obliged to go himself and order it to retire."
All the other accounts concur in the principal circumstances,
and therefore it seems needless to add any more.

REFLECTIONS.
The generals of the combined army do not seem to have formed
any fixed plan of operations, as if they proposed acting according
to circumstances, as they occasionally arose: at first they seem will-
ing to occupy Saxony, provided it might be done without any
risk; they avoid coming to an action during the whole campaign,
and at last, when it was least proper, they engage it. When the
king quitted the Saala, having there only 12,000 men in two dif-
ferent corps, then was the time to advance and attack Leipsig;
they might have taken many positions, which would have made it
difficult, and perhaps impossible, for the king to relieve it; as he
had no more than 10,000 men with him, and about 6000 men
under prince Maurice; so that they would have had only these
16,000 men to contend with. As to the corps under prince Fer-
dinand, he might easily have been forced under the cannon of
Magdeburg; any small detachment from the right of Richlieu's
army
army would have been sufficient for that purpose. Having suffered the king to unite his different corps at Leipzig, it was prudent, no doubt, to repass the Saala, because it is of too dangerous a consequence to engage an action with a great river behind the army; but they should have defended the banks of that river. As they were much stronger than the king, he could not pass it without their knowledge: if they left a strong detachment over against Weissenfels, and another at Merseburg, and with the army had taken a central position between these two places, they could, by an easy march, sustain either of them; and therefore, in all probability, have hindered the enemy from passing at all. If they proposed fighting, they could not have a better opportunity than while the enemy was passing the river; and, if they did not, they should have gone behind the Unstrut, and covered themselves with that river. It is agreed upon, by every one, that the king's army passed the Saala in three columns; one at Weissenfels, another at Merseburg, and the third at Halle; by which means they were separated from each other about seven miles; and that they united at Rosbach. We cannot conceive why the generals of the combined army permitted the enemy to commit so great a fault, without punishing him for it: they could have taken many positions to prevent the junction of these columns; and could, with their united forces, attack either of them separately; as appears evident, from the inspection of the map. Having, during the campaign, declined coming to an action, they should have persisted in that resolution a few days longer; because, from the situation of affairs in Silesia and in Westphalia, it was probable the king would be forced to go against the Austrians in person; and, though he did not, it was impossible for him to oppose effectually the combined army, and that of Richlieu, now disengaged, because he must necessarily have one or the other upon his flank; and, having about
a fifth part of their forces only, he must have abandoned the country, or fell a victim to superiority, if he persisted to wait for them; so that in this very campaign he would have lost either Saxony or Silesia, and perhaps both, had M. Richlieu and the generals of the combined army acted with more judgment.

The plan they formed to attack the enemy's left flank was inconsistent with all the rules of military prudence; because, in case of a defeat, there was no retreat at all for them: they had a river behind them, and the enemy between them and the country to which they must necessarily retire. The conduct of the action was no less imprudent; they could not think the enemy would permit them to envelope his left wing, and cut him off from the Saala; and, as they marched at mid-day, he could not be deceived as to their intentions. No general will suffer an enemy to attack him in flank and rear: How could they imagine such a general as the king of Prussia would commit this fault? When they resolved to attack his left flank, they should have made some demonstrations on his right, to draw his attention that way: and, by marching in the night, approach his left flank, and attack it, without giving him time to change his position. This was the only probable means to bring their plan to bear. The method they took made it impracticable from the first instant they put the army in motion.

When the king quitted his camp with an air of precipitation, St. Germain should have followed him; and a strong detachment of cavalry have been sent on the road to Merseburg, in order to reconnoitre his motions; and, if they found he was retiring, these two corps would have sufficed to beat his rear-guard; and, if it was found he only changed position, they would have kept him at bay, and give time to form the army, or retire into their old camp. Surely it was unpardonable to march with the whole army without any vanguard,
vanguard, which must never be done, particularly if near the enemy. When at length they were undeceived, and found that the enemy was forming on the heights of Reichertswelen, Why persist in advancing? They should instantly have formed their line as far backwards as possible, and by no means attempt it under the enemy's fire, and so near him; because such manoeuvres can never succeed, if the enemy has either conduct or vigour.

The king appears in a very different light: though he sees the enemy in motion all the morning, he is easy and quiet; no ways agitated, as too often is the case; waits 'till he perceives their intentions, and then instantly makes his dispositions. His marching behind the hill was attended with many great advantages: that appearance of a flight elated the spirits of the enemy so as to make them neglect the necessary precautions; they hastened so much that their army was thrown into some disorder while in march; and they were so perfectly deceived, that they found themselves, all at once, with the head of their columns, under the fire of the enemy's line; and so near, that they could not form their troops. The king saw this favourable moment, and ordered his cavalry to attack directly; and, though scarce any of the infantry was come up, he ordered those few battalions to advance before the enemy could make any disposition. One inch of ground, or one instant of time lost, would have given the enemy time and room to form their line; but the king's dispositions were so exact, and so well calculated, that neither happened; and he was most deservedly crowned with victory; which put an end to the campaign in Saxony.

We have already said, that his majesty the king of Prussia, on leaving Lusatia, had left there the duke of Bevern, with a considerable

* Augustus William, duke of Bevern, was born in 1715; in 1733 he served against the French; in 1735 he entered the Prussian service, as lieutenant colonel; in 1739 he was made
considerable body of troops, to observe prince Charles; and, above all things, hinder him from making any solid enterprize against Silesia. Accordingly, the duke, having received a convoy from Bautzen, quitted Bernstadt, and encamped on the mountain, called the Landscron, near Görlitz; and the better to secure the passages of the Neis and Queis, that he might enter Silesia, if necessary, he sent general Winterfield, with a strong corps, between those two rivers, at a place called Moys, near Görlitz.

Prince Charles advanced with the main army as far as Bernstadt, and sent general Nadafti with a considerable corps to Seidenberg, also between the Neis and Queis, as well to observe Winterfield, as to secure a passage over the Neis, and be ready to follow, or anticipate the duke of Bevern, whenever he went towards Silesia.

His royal highness was desirous to force the enemy to quit their present position, and carry the war into Silesia; because not only the army would be maintained at their expence, but, being much superior, could undertake something solid: whereas, if he continued there, the campaign would soon be at an end, and the fruits of their preceding good manoeuvres lost. For these same reasons, it was incumbent on the duke of Bevern to keep things in the present

made a colonel, and wounded at the battle of Molwitz; in 1741 he had a regiment given him; in 1743 was made a major general; in 1747 governor of Stettin; in 1750 knight of the black eagle, and lieutenant general. He distinguished himself in the battles of Hohenfriedberg, Lowofitz, Prague, Chotzenitz, and Breslaw; after which he was made a prisoner, while he went with a servant only to reconnoitre the enemy. He was in 1758 released, without any ransom, for his affinity to the empress. The king seeming offended at his conduct, he retired to his government of Stettin; where he remained till 1762; when he was called to the army in Silesia, and had a corps confided to him, while the king was besieging Schweindnitz. The Austrians, intending to relieve that place, attacked him with an army under the command of generals Lacy, Laudhon, and Odonell, whom he repulsed several times, though they were three times stronger than he was, and gave the king time to come to his aid. He may, no doubt, be numbered among the first generals of this age.
in Germany, 1757.

present situation, and draw on the war, without permitting the enemy to gain any considerable advantage. His position seemed to enable him to obtain this end. The Austrians could not, he thought, enter Silesia, and leave him behind, because he could return into Bohemia, and, by cutting off their subsistence, make it impossible for them to do any thing of consequence in Silesia; and, having a garrison in Bautzen, he was at hand likewise to favour, or be favoured, by the king's operations in Saxony; and, no doubt, could he have kept his position 'till the king had delivered that country from the combined army, the enemy must have been forced back into Bohemia, without even attempting any thing against Silesia.

Prince Charles, perfectly acquainted with all these reasons, resolved to force the enemy to quit their position, and march to Silesia; but, it having been judged too strong to be attacked, it was necessary to obtain by dint of proper manœuvres what could not be done by force. Wherefore, he sent a corps to drive the garrison out of Bautzen, and so cut off the enemy's communication with Saxony, and determined to attack general Winterfield, which would likewise cut them off from Silesia. These resolutions being taken, Nadafti's corps was considerably reinforced, and on the 7th of September the attack was made on that of Winterfield's. This general had posted, on a hill called Holtzberg, at a small distance from his camp, two battalions; against which the Austrians directed their attack, and came upon them before they could either be sustained or called back. They defended themselves with uncommon bravery; infonuch that Winterfield had time to come with some troops to their relief, and facilitate their retreat: upon which the combat became more violent than ever, in hopes of being able to keep their ground; but, having lost a great number
of men, and their general mortally wounded, they were forced to quit their post, and retire to their camp. The Austrians took possession of the Holtzberg; which, however, they abandoned the next morning; having lost, in this bloody action, killed and wounded, about 2000 men.

The duke of Bevern, having lost Bautzen, and with it his communication with the king in Saxony, and moreover fearing the Austrians would now, after the defeat of Winterfield, pass the Neifs with their main army, and so hinder him from entering Silesia, resolved, while it was in his power, to march thither; and the more so, as he could not possibly subsist in his present position, because he could draw nothing from his magazines in Saxony, and what could be had from Silesia was subject to be intercepted by the enemy's light troops, who were extremely numerous, and had a very favourable country, full of woods, ravins, hills, &c. to act in. Accordingly, not daring to pass the Neifs at Górlitz, so near the enemy, he fell down that river to Naumburg, and there passed it; and from thence marched successively, by Buntzlaw and Hainau, to Lignitz, where he arrived the 19th.

Prince Charles, having received information of the enemy's march, put his army instantly in motion, and took his route by Lauban, Löwenberg, Goldberg, Hundorff, Jauer, Nicolstäd, and Greibnig, where he arrived on the 25th. By taking this position he had cut off the enemy from Breslaw, Schweidnitz, and all Upper Silesia. On the following day, he ordered the village of Barfdorff, where the enemy had posted some infantry, to be cannonaded; which, having put the houses on fire, forced them to retire, and take a new position behind it, where they could be sustained by the whole army. Prince Charles intended to attack them, but the duke of Bevern, proposing, if possible, to regain his communication with Breslaw and Upper Silesia, quitted his camp.
camp in the night of the 27th, and directed his march towards Glogau, that he might pass the Oder in safety, if he was followed by the whole Austrian army; but, finding that only the vanguard pursued him, and that only on the right of the Katzbach, towards Parchwitz, he resolved to pass it near Lamperfdorff; which was executed on the 29th; and, having marched up the right of the Oder, he repassed it at Breslaw, and on the 1st of October took his camp on the banks of the Lohe, with the city behind him. By this fine march he once more opened the communication with Upper Silesia, and covered the capital with his army, which was reciprocally covered by it.

Prince Charles found it would be useless to pursue the enemy on his quitting Lignitz, because he could only drive them under the cannon of Glogau, where they could remain in safety, and be provided with all the necessary stores and subsistence: whereas he, on the contrary, had no magazines in the country; nor could he form any, having the enemy in front, and their strong places behind him; so that he must necessarily fall back, and approach the frontiers of Bohemia; from whence only his numerous army could be nourished. For these reasons, instead of fatiguing his troops in a vain pursuit of the enemy, he directed his march towards Breslaw; hoping, no doubt, to take that place before the enemy could come near it, being in itself very weak, and moreover had then an inconsiderable garrison.

Being arrived on the Schweidnitzwasser, a small river within three miles of Breslaw, he found the enemy had anticipated him, and was encamped, about two miles off, between him and that town. These circumstances made it necessary to concert new measures. His royal highness could not possibly continue long in that situation, as well for want of subsistence, as because the winter was growing sharp, and would soon make it impossible for him to keep
keep the field; nor could he presume to separate his army in the middle of an enemy's country, where they had an army, and all the strong places, in their power. It seemed likewise rather dishonourable to retire into Bohemia without having attempted any thing, and so lose the fruits of their past labours; and the more so, as his army was much superior to that of the enemy already, and, besides, his royal highness expected a considerable body of Bavarians and Wurtemburgers, who were on their march, to join him. These motives made him determine to undertake the siege of some fortress, that he might have a place of arms in the enemy's country, and put part, at least, of his army in it, with safety, during the winter, and so be enabled to enter it the ensuing campaign without difficulty; and, having the necessary stores and provisions in this place, prosecute the war with more ease and safety than hitherto had been done.

This resolution being taken, the next object was, to fix upon the place that would best answer the end they had in view: Neifs, being near the frontiers of Moravia, could be attacked with more facility than any other; because they could be supplied with every thing necessary for such an undertaking from Olmutz, and the taking of it would secure a passage into Upper Silesia; and, besides, they would, the ensuing campaign, from thence attack the country of Glatz with more ease than from any other place whatever. To this it was objected, that Neifs was at such a distance, that the army could not arrive there 'till the season would be too far advanced to carry on the siege without infinite pains, and probably without success; and the more so, as the duke of Bevern could be there with his army long before them, and take such a position as would effectually cover the place; and lastly, that, though they should take it, the advantage that would accrue from it was trifling; because they would get scarce any part of the country with it,
in Germany, 1757.

It, while the enemy had Kofel, Brieg, and Glatz, all about it; and that it only covered Moravia, leaving Bohemia quite open to the enemy.

It was next proposed to attack the enemy before Breslaw: if they beat him, not only that fortresses would fall, but they would be at liberty to attack any place in Upper Silesia; which, being left to their own weak garrisons, would soon be reduced: by this means the whole Austrian army, covered by these places, could, with safety be separated, and put into winter quarters. This proposition was very plausible, but thought dangerous; because, in case they did not succeed in this attempt, it would be extremely difficult to retire into Bohemia, from whence they were separated by many high mountains, and had very bad roads to pass through; and, moreover, the town of Schweidnitz, with a strong garrison in it, behind them. These reasons being well weighed, it was resolved to attack Schweidnitz, preferable to the two others above-mentioned; because they would be masters of the principal defiles which lead to Bohemia on that side, and of all the towns and villages behind Schweidnitz; which would enable them to keep the greatest part of the army in Silesia during the winter; and, moreover, if they took it without great loss of time, they could then, with safety, attack the duke of Bevern, having a place to retire to in case of misfortune, or undertake some other enterprize.

Accordingly, general Nadasi, with a very considerable corps, was sent to besiege Schweidnitz; where he was joined by the Bavarians and Wurtemburgers. This town lies in a fine plain, about three miles distant from the mountains which separate Silesia from Bohemia, is rich and populous: originally, when it first came into the power of the Prussians, during the preceding war, it was surrounded only by an old wall, with round towers; in the Gothic manner; but his majesty, considering the advantageous situation of it,
it, as well to facilitate any projects he might hereafter form against Bohemia, as to cover Silesia, resolved to fortify it: accordingly, on the conclusion of that war, he ordered several redoubts, called Star redoubts, because they resemble a star, to be built about it: these were joined by a curtain; and in the intervals, between the redoubts, were placed some small lunettes, or half moons: the whole covered by a ditch, with a covered way pallisaded.

Of all the species of works used in fortification, the Starry redoubt is the worst; because, by the nature of its construction, it can have no flank; and the re-entering angles take up so much of the ground within, that they cannot contain the number of men and artillery sufficient to defend them; and are, moreover, exposed to be enfiladed from one end to the other; so that it is impossible they should make any considerable defence, when properly attacked.

General Nadafli ordered two true attacks, and one false one, to be made; and the trenches were opened in the night of the 27th of October; and, a breach having been made in three of these redoubts, the 11th at night, they were carried by assault; which forced the governor to capitulate the next morning. The garrison, consisting of 4 generals, and about 6000 men, were made prisoners of war: a vast quantity of provisions, artillery, and stores, were found in the place, and 300,000 florins.

During all this time, prince Charles, and the duke of Bevern, remained quiet in their camps by Breslaw; the first to cover the siege of Schweidnitz, and the other to fortify his camp; because he did not dare quit it, and march to relieve Schweidnitz, for fear of losing Breslaw, and be hemmed in between the prince’s army, and that before Schweidnitz.

Prince Charles, having succeeded to his wish, in his undertaking against that place, was encouraged to attack the enemy, though now very strongly fortified; and, therefore, general Nadafli was
was ordered to come and join the main army with that under his command. Accordingly, that general arrived on the 19th, and encamped on the right, as marked in the plan. The two following days were taken up in making the necessary preparations for the attack. Every thing being ready, on the 22d in the morning, the battle begun; of which we give here the different relations, as published by authority; which, with our reflections on the ground and the action, will be sufficient to give a clear idea of it.

That published at Vienna is as follows:

"The imperial and royal army was encamped, with the right at Strachwitz, and the left at Grossmaffelwitz, in two lines, and a reserve. The grenadiers were posted at Grossmochber, to cover the right wing; and some regiments of infantry at Kleinmaffelwitz, to cover the left. The army under general Nadafti stood on our right, beyond Operau, on the left of the Lohe, with some light troops at Hartlieb, on the other side of it. The Prussian army was likewise posted in two lines; the infantry in the first, and the cavalry in the second; both extending from Cofel to Kleinmochber, and from thence, in a strait line, towards Breslaw; so that it formed a half square, with the angle at Kleinmochber; but, when they perceived our dispositions, they changed their position, and that part of the army which extended from Kleinmochber towards Breslaw, was ordered to advance towards the Lohe, and occupy some hills, as well as the villages of Kleinburg and Kreitern, in order to make a front against general Nadafti. They were covered by the Lohe, which is not broad, but the banks of it are very marshy; and had thrown up a great many redoubts and retrenchments. Their right wing was covered by an abatis, or parapet of trees cut down; behind which they had posted their..."
HisTORV of the Wa
hunters or markfmen, and fix battalions of grenadiers, to cover
their right flank. The village of Pilnitz, through which the
Lohe passes, was well fortified with redoubts, before and behind
it, which presented continually some new defence. The fame
was done at the villages of Schmiedfeld, Hofschen, Klein-
moehber, and Grabifchen, with breastworks, ditches, and three
rows of wolf-holes; so that it was almost impossible to pass
them. Besides these works, there were likewise, between and
behind the villages, other redoubts and batteries, with parapets,
as far as the suburbs of the town. On the other side the Oder
they had put some infantry in the villages of Protich, Weida,
Hunnern, Simfdorff, and Rosenthal; and some cavalry between
the villages. Upon the left wing they had moreover two re-
giments of Hufiars.

Such was the situation of both armies: the Austrian amounted
to 60,000 men, and the Prussian to about 40,000.

In consequence of the measures concerted between his royal
highness and his excellency marshal Daun, batteries were raised
the 21st at night, the pontoons brought near the places where
the bridges were to be laid, and all the other necessary prepa-
ration for passing the river and attacking the enemy's works
being compleated, the army marched the 22d, before day, and
was formed, in two lines, on the banks of the Lohe; the first
was composed of infantry, and the other of cavalry. The bag-
gage was sent back behind the Schweidnitz, and the surgeons
ordered to follow the army, and to stay at certain places, where
the wounded were to be brought.

The 22d, the day appointed for the attack, there was a great
fog, which prevented us from seeing the enemy's dispositions.

At

* Round holes, generally about two feet in diameter at the top, one at the bottom, and
near two deep.
In Germany, 1757.

"At nine in the morning we raised four batteries, in which 40 pieces of cannon were placed, which played on the villages of Pilnitz, Schmiedfeld, Hofljenchen, Kleinmochber and Grabischchen, and the redoubts, till 12 o'clock. In the mean while, the fog began to dissipate; upon which we advanced to lay the bridges over the river; and, in less than three quarters of an hour, seven were made in the enemy's presence, and under their fire.

"His royal highness and M. Daun were at Grossmochber, and the signal agreed upon being given by their orders, general Sprecher, who had under his orders major general Richlin, advanced with 35 companies of grenadiers, sustained by 12 companies of horse grenadiers, commanded by prince Lowenstein, and passed the bridge by Grossmochber. These troops were supported by the right wing of the first line of infantry, under the command of lieutenant general Andlau, and major generals duke of Ursel, and baron Unrhue; and, moreover, by the corps de reserve, commanded by lieutenant generals count Wied, and Nicholas Esterhazy, and major generals Blonquet, Wolf, and Otterwolf; and, lastly, by the right wing of the second line, commanded by lieutenant generals Minulph, count Stahremberg, and major generals Wulfen, and Buttler.

"At the same time and place, count Luchesi, general of horse, and lieutenant generals Spada, and Wolwart, and major generals Deville, Kolbel, and Alpremont, with the right wing of the first line of horse, likewise passed. All these troops formed, in two lines, on the other side the Lohe, under the fire of the enemy's artillery, and attacked their cavalry and infantry that were advancing. At 1 o'clock the fire of the small arms began, and lasted very hot, and in good order, about half an hour, without being able to force either side to cede an inch."

Q. 2 "At
At last, the enemy’s horse and foot were obliged to give way upon which our infantry took the village of Grabischen, and the great battery behind it. Our troops advanced still forwards to the retrenchment by Kleinmochber; and, though the enemy had sent there both infantry and artillery, they were, however, drove further back.

The next attack was commanded by lieutenant general count Arberg, and under him major general Lacy, and was sustained by the infantry, commanded by lieutenant general Macquire, and by the left wing of the second line of horse, commanded by count Stambach, general of horse. This column was to attack the villages of Schmiedfeld and Hoflichen; and, at 3 o’clock, passed the Lohe. Counts Arberg and Macquire attacked the redoubts by Schmiedfeld, and, after a most bloody combat, drove the enemy out of them. At the same time, count Wied, who commanded the reserve, advanced against Hoflichen; and, notwithstanding it was covered by breastworks, ditches, and wolf-holes, he took it, as well as the redoubt that was near it.

The third attack against Pilsnitz was more violent, and lasted longer than any of the others. This village is cut in two by the Lohe, whose banks are very high here, and the ground all about is very close and difficult to be passed; and, besides, the entry and the issue out of it were covered by redoubts. General Keuhl, with the left wing of infantry, sustained by the left wing of the second line of horse, commanded by count Serbelloni, was ordered to attack this village, and the neighbouring works; but, by the difficulty of the ground, the strength of the works, and the bravery of the enemy, he was repulsed, with great loss, three several times. At last, however, though it was now near six o’clock, and quite dark, he renewed the attack with so much courage and bravery, that the enemy
enemy was forced to give way, and abandon successively the
village and the redoubts.

We thought that, with the day, the battle was likewise at
an end. The enemy, however, appeared again, and a column
advanced against Kleinmochber, endeavouring to come on the
flank of the archduke Joseph's and Leopold's regiments of horse.
These being sustained by five companies of grenadiers, posted in
the redoubts, commanded by general Sprecher, made such good
manoeuvres, as kept the enemy at a distance, till prince Charles's
regiment of foot, and Luchesi's regiment of horse, had time to
come up, which obliged them to retire for good and all.

Not far from Pilnitz, on the right of the Lohne, the enemy,
had a great abatis, which reached quite to the Oder. Colonel
Brentano, with his Croats, sustained by 1000 men of regular
infantry, was ordered to attack it. He had the good fortune
to succeed, and pass it; but, as we had not then got possession
of Pilnitz, he was forced to retire with some loss. Soon after,
however, he renewed the attack; and, as our left wing was
then advanced to Pilnitz, he passed the abatis, and threw the
enemy into no small confusion.

Major general Beck, with a considerable corps, was sent
over the Oder; and, having drove the enemy out of several vil-
lages they occupied, he cannonaded the enemy's right wing.
over the Oder, at Cofel, in flank and rear.

What we have hitherto related was performed by the army,
which had always remained in this neighbourhood during the
siege of Schweidnitz. Besides these several attacks, general Na-
dafti, with the army he had commanded at the above siege,
(excepting a few battalions) and reinforced by four regiments
of horse, was ordered to divide his troops in three columns,
at the head of which were the grenadiers, sustained by battalions
"and brigades, and having passed the Lohe, to attack the enemy's left wing, that was posted against him. Accordingly, he occupied the village of Hartlieb the 21st, which the enemy held with infantry and cavalry; and, on the 22d, at break of day, he passed the Lohe, and formed his army with the right at Oltaschin, and the left towards Kreitern, where the artillery of reserve was likewise posted. The enemy, whose cavalry extended on the plains of Durjahn, endeavoured to take our corps in the flank, which the good dispositions of general Nadafti prevented.

In the mean time, general Woltersdorff, with 16 companies of grenadiers, attacked the village of Kleinburg, drove the enemy out of it, took one cannon, and advanced to Wölschwitz. The Saxon light horse, who were on the right, were preparing to advance; but, the evening coming on, and the enemy's horse being advantageously posted on a hill, behind some redoubts, general Nadafti thought it would be needless to attempt anything farther.

During this time, the enemy attacked Kleinburg with seven battalions, and some cavalry; and, having put it on fire, retired on the hills behind the redoubts; where they continued 'till they found that the rest of their army was retiring; then they followed them, and passed the Oder, through Breßlaw. We have taken 36 pieces of cannon, and about 600 men prisoners, with above 3000 deserters."

The Prussian account of this battle is very little exact; particularly where it says, that the Austrian's right wing had not only been repulsed, but that it quitted the field, and retired to Neumark, many miles off; which is both false and ridiculous. It is as follows:

"When
When the Austrians had taken Schweidnitz, and the corps employed in that siege had joined the main army at Lissa, they resolved to attack the prince of Bevern's corps before the king could come to succour him. They knew that, in spite of Marshall's and Haddick's corps, he had already passed through Lusatia. Accordingly, on the 22d of November, the attack was made, at nine in the morning. The enemy's army was, at least, three times stronger than ours, as appears by the gazettes they have often published: and general Nadafti had a particular corps opposite the flank of our left wing. The attack succeeded so ill to the Austrians, that their right wing was totally defeated, and forced to retire towards Neumark. Lieutenant general Ziethen, who commanded our left wing, likewise entirely defeated Nadafti's corps, and the enemy thought the battle lost; having been forced, in most places, to fly; but, as on our right some of our regiments had somewhat suffered, the prince of Bevern thought it best to quit the field of battle, which we had kept till 5 o'clock, and retire into our camp, and the following night to pass the Oder, over the bridge that is in the town of Breslaw. The Austrians, finding that every thing was abandoned as far as Breslaw, returned, and occupied the field of battle; which, to their great astonishment, we had quitted. Our loss is midling: that of the Austrians, according to accounts worthy of credit, amounts to above 20,000 men. The 23d we remained behind Breslaw. The 24th, the duke of Bevern rode out at 4 o'clock in the morning, with one servant only, in order to reconnoitre the enemy, and fell in with some of their advanced posts, who made him prisoner. The same day, having waited in vain the duke's return, lieutenant general Kyow took upon him the command of the army. General Lestewitz, who, by the king's orders, was left commander of
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"of Breslaw, could not possibly defend long so extensive a place, "and so ill fortified, against such a considerable army as that of 
"the enemy; and so he must be content to have leave to re-
"tire, with his garrison, and the sick we had left in Breslaw, to 
"Glogau."

The Austrians lost in this action 666, among which one gene-
ral, killed: 4620, of which five generals, wounded: 437 misfiling: 
and about 400 horses killed, wounded, and lost.

No account appeared of the loss of the Prussians.

Reflections on the battle of Breslaw, and the preceding operations.

It has been already observed, that there is, in every camp, some
one essential point, or hinge, which may be called the key of it, 
and on which the strength of it most immediately depends: the 
same holds good as to positions. In a whole country there may 
not, perhaps, be one found which will enable a general to obtain 
his ends. The choice of this point, with regard to positions, de-
pends entirely on, and must be regulated by, the object he has in 
view; by the situation of his magazines; and by the number and 
species of his troops; that he may not only have a good position, 
but likewise a good field of battle, in case he is attacked.

The duke of Bevern had two objects in view: the first and 
principal one was to cover Silesia; and particularly Breslaw, 
Schweidnitz, and Neiss; against which alone the enemy could 
direct their operations: the other object was only secondary, and 
of much less consequence; and was to keep open a communication 
with the Elbe, as well to act in concert with the king in Saxony, 
as because he drew his subsistence chiefly from Dresden. The 
camp he had taken at Bernstädtel, though a little too far back, 
answered, in some measure, these ends: he could be on the Elbe,
or in Silesia, sooner than the enemy, by marching on his right, by Löbau and Bautzen; or on his left, by Lauban and Löwenberg, and so on to Schweidnitz or Breslaw. The only inconvenience of this position, was, that the enemy, being much superior, could send strong corps towards Bautzen, and thereby render his convoys, coming from the Elbe, precarious. This, however, might have been remedied by occupying Bautzen with a considerable detachment of cavalry, and some light infantry, and posting another of the same species about Löbau; which would have formed a chain from his right quite to the Elbe; so that he might, and, as we think, ought to have kept this position as long as possible; which would have stopped the progress of the enemy.

Instead of which, he abandoned it, and took another, still farther back, on the Landfcron, near Görlitz: the consequence of which was, that he instantly lost his communication with the Elbe, and rendered that with Silesia very difficult; nor could he remain in his present situation for want of subsistence: he might, however, still have anticipated the enemy's march into Silesia, and towards Breslaw and Schweidnitz, if, instead of marching by Langenau, Naumburg, Buntzlaw, Hainau, and Lignitz, he had marched by Lauban, Löwenberg, Goldberg, and Jauer; which the king did, the year following, after the battle of Hochkirchen, in much more difficult circumstances: for the whole Austrian army was encamped on the Landfcron, within sight; yet he passed the Neis and Queis, and, in spite of the enemy, went into Upper Silesia, and raised the siege of Neis. If, therefore, the prince of Bevern had taken this route, and even gone to Liebenthal, between Greiffenberg and Löwenberg, with a strong corps on the right of the Queis, between Marklifia and Griesenberg, it would have been impossible for the enemy to advance one step farther: they could not pass between his left and those immense mountains,
called the Riefengeburg, having no road; much less could they march on his right, towards Löwenberg and Lignitz, leaving him master of those immense defiles and mountains which separated them from Bohemia, from whence only they could draw their subsistence, without exposing their army to certain destruction. They must, therefore, either stop short, or come to an action; which he could accept, much to his advantage, in that strong camp of Liebenthal, or decline it, and retire successively to Lahn and Jauer, and lastly to Striegau and Schweidnitz. In all which places there are such camps to be taken, as cannot easily be forced. The country is extremely close, and therefore numbers are of little use, because they cannot be all brought to action: whereas, by taking the march he did, he left that very road open which he ought to have taken, and by that means gave the enemy an opportunity to anticipate him; so that, on his arrival at Lignitz, he found they had taken a position between that town and Jauer, and by that means cut him off from Schweidnitz, Neifs, Breslaw, and all Upper Silesia. Indeed he got afterwards to Breslaw, but this ought to be attributed to his extraordinary good fortune, that the enemy committed a greater fault than he had done. Being arrived at Breslaw, we think he ought to have drawn the principal effects and stores out of it, and sent them to Glogau, and have gone with his army to Schweidnitz, where the enemy must have followed him; because they could not keep Breslaw, even if they had taken it while he was master of Schweidnitz, and of the defiles which lead into Bohemia; nor could they force him, by any manœuvre, to abandon that town, and the neighbourhood; nor, supposing they were masters of Breslaw, could they put their army into winter quarters, while he was in possession of a chain of fortresses behind them, and had an army between them and their own country, with which they could not have the least communication, not even with the.
the capital; so that they must necessarily be forced to quit Silesia, and endeavour to gain Bohemia; which was by no means an easy undertaking; because, as we have said, they were separated from that country by an enemy's army, and three strong fortresses, as Schweidnitz, Glatz, and Neiſs, on the very defiles where they must pass; and, in which, in all human probability, their army, in that advanced season, and harassed by the enemy, would have perished. By staying at Breslaw, and suffering Schweidnitz to be taken, he gave prince Charles an opportunity to take first a post in the country, and by that means enabled him to prosecute his advantages with security; which brought on the loss of the battle of Breslaw, and with it Breslaw itself; and might, if these advantages had been properly improved, occasioned that of all Silesia.

Whenever the Austrians attempt any thing against that country, by the way of Lusatia, the Prussians may, we think, by taking the above positions, even with an inconsiderable army, effectually stop their progress.

As to the conduct of the action of Breslaw, we think that the Prussians, to the many works, which, during seven weeks, they had raised, should have added an inundation, if possible, by means of the Lohe. This would have effectually covered them. The choice of the camp does not appear to have been well made; because the left wing and its flank were not so strong as the front; so that, if the enemy had made the principal attack where Nadafi was, the Prussians must have abandoned their strong camp, and lose the fruits of their long labours, in order to make a front where Ziethen stood; and, moreover, if the enemy ever got possession of the hills behind Kleinburg and Grabischen, the whole Prussian army would have been hemmed in between the Lohe and the Oder, with general Beck in their rear on the other side, and the enemy in front, without sufficient ground to manœuvre upon;
and, in such circumstances, it would have been difficult even to get into Breslaw. It would, I think, have been better to place the right on the town of Breslaw, and occupy the villages that were near and under the protection of it. The left should have been extended to the hills by Kleinburg and Grabischen, which ought to have been fortified with care, and redoubts raised all along the front, from right to left. The army, so posted, could not, we think, have been forced at all; nor could the town be attacked while it was there. When the enemy passed the Lohe at Grassmochber, we think that general Ziethein, instead of extending his left, should, on the contrary, have lengthened his right as far as Grabischen, with his infantry and all the heavy artillery on the hill it, and his cavalry at the bottom of it; and the prince of Bevern’s division should have closed its left with the right of this. By which means, the enemy, who had passed the Lohe there, would have been taken in flank, whether they attacked Grabischen or Grassmochber: whereas, by the dispositions made, there was an interval between Ziethein’s right, and the prince of Bevern’s left, where the enemy entered, and met with no other difficulty than that at Grassmochber. This interval was the key of the camp; and, the instant the enemy got possession of it, the prince of Bevern could not continue where he was, though he had been victorious on his right and center; because, being masters of this interval, if they reinforced that attack, which they might have done, they were on his flank, and would successively have pushed him into the Oder: whereas, if he repulsed the enemy here, the battle was won; because, though they succeeded in their attacks at Pilnitz and Schmiedsfeld, they could not continue in that ground between the Lohe, the Oder, and his army, with Breslaw just before them; and must, therefore, have abandoned those villages, and repass the Lohe.
The event confirms my opinion: for the enemy had got no very great advantage on the right and center; yet it was necessary to retire, because they had taken Grabischen and Kleinmochber, and were, consequently, on prince Bevern's flank; and might, if he continued in the same position, cut him off from Breslaw, and throw him into the Oder.

As to the conduct of prince Charles, it seems to have been no less prudent than vigorous. By sending two corps on the enemy's flank, he forced them to quit their strong camp on the Landferon, and go farther down, in order to pass the Neifs and Queifs; which was an essential advantage to him, because he had, by that means, a nearer road than they to Breslaw and Schweidnitz. When his royal highness came to Lignitz, we think he should have attacked the enemy; and, if that was thought dangerous, he should have sent 20,000 men to besiege Breslaw, then defended by a very weak garrison; and, with the remainder of the army, have covered the siege; which he could easily have done, being still very much superior to the enemy, who could not possibly approach Breslaw, without previously coming to an action.

When the prince of Bevern quitted Lignitz, and marched towards Steinau, on the Oder, prince Charles should have sent a strong corps after him, and with the army have gone to Dyherrnsfurth; and there throw as many bridges as possible over the Oder, in order to be on either side, as circumstances might require. By this means he could cover the siege of Breslaw, and effectually hinder the enemy from disturbing it. Why he permitted the prince of Bevern to march near twenty leagues, and pass the Oder twice, and come to Breslaw before him, while he had only ten leagues to march, and no river to pass, is what cannot easily be conceived. As to the conduct of the action itself, it does not seem to have been entirely prudent and blameless. The three attacks were made precisely against the strongest part of the enemy's camp,
and were, moreover, exposed to great difficulties in passing the Lohe under the fire of their works: whereas, if his royal highness had only made a false attack on the enemy's center and right, and have posted his left by Neukirchen, with some heavy artillery and haubitz near it, and have passed his line by Groffmochber, between Operau and the Lohe, where the bridges must have been laid, and Nadafi's left quite close to the prince's right, so as to form a kind of curve about the enemy, as marked in the plan, he would have avoided the villages and works, in which the enemy placed the greatest hopes, and the difficulties that must occur in passing a river so near them; and, moreover, would have forced them to abandon these very works, in order to take a new position, with their right on the Lohe, and their left towards the hills behind Kleinburg, which would have exposed it to be enfiladed from one end to the other, by the artillery placed at Neukirchen and Groffmochber. When the enemy's right and center quitted their ground, as they must have done, nothing could hinder the light troops from occupying it, and taking them in the rear. For all which reasons, I think, the Austrians should have made their attack where Nadafi was, by which they would have avoided all those great difficulties they met with. Even, if this general, instead of extending his right, had stretched his left so as to close with the right of the army which passed at Groffmochber, and have acted with his usual vigour, it is probable the Prussian army was lost, and thrown into the Oder.

The immediate consequence of this battle was the taking of Breslaw, with about 300,000 florins, and a prodigious quantity of stores in it.

The Austrians, thinking the campaign finished, were preparing to enter into winter quarters; when news came, that the king, at the head of a considerable body of troops, was advancing towards Silesia.
in Germany, 1757.

Silesia. Upon which all thoughts of separating the army were laid aside, and proper measures taken to go and oppose the enemy. With this view, colonel Bulow, with about 3000 men, was sent to occupy Lignitz, in hopes, by that means, to stop the king for some time; as it was thought he would pass near that place. Prince Charles, having resolved to go and meet the enemy, passed the Schweidnitz on the 4th of December, intending to advance further on towards Glogau; but the arrival of the enemy, the day following, prevented it, and occasioned a general action, near Lissa: of which we shall, as usual, give the different accounts, as published by authority.

That of the Austrians is as follows:

"The king of Prussia, having quitted Saxony, and passed through Luska, he arrived, with a considerable corps, at Parchwitz, on the Oder, where he was joined by the army which had been under the command of the prince of Bevern; which, with what he had conducted, amounted to 40,000 men, provided with a fine train of artillery, fascines, gabions, &c. and, having passed the Katzbach, it was easy to foresee that his intentions were to take Neumark and Lignitz; and then, either attack the imperial army before Breslaw, or march to Striegau and the frontiers of Bohemia, in order to cut off our communication with that country.

"For which reasons, it was resolved by his royal highness prince Charles, and his excellency M. Daun, with the unanimous consent of all the generals, to advance, and pass the Schweidnitz without delay, and to secure Lignitz; and, above all things, endeavour to frustrate the designs of the enemy. Accordingly, the garrison of Lignitz was reinforced, and a large corps of Bannalifts, hussars and picquets of horse, sustained by the Saxon light horse, were sent to Neumark.

"The
"The army, having been provided on the 3d of December, for four days, with every thing necessary, and prepared for all events, broke up the 4th in the morning, and passed the Lohe and the Schweidnitz, in order to encamp there. While it was filing over the bridges, advice was brought, that the king of Prussia had quitted Parchwitz the 4th in the morning, and was advanced to Neumark, from whence he had forced our troops to retire. Upon which the baggage was sent back behind the Schweidnitz, and the columns ordered to hasten their march, that the army might be formed; which was accordingly done, in two lines. General Nadafti, with the corps under his command, made a third, which was designed to cover the flank of the left wing; and the corps de reserve that of the right. The army was posted with the right at Nypcrn, the left at Leuthen, and the center at Frobelwitz: all these villages were occupied with infantry, and provided with artillery. In Frobelwitz were eight companies of granadiers, with many picquets: in Leuthen seven companies of granadiers, with several picquets: and several picquets also in Nypcrn. All the companies of granadiers, and the picquets of the reserve, were posted on the right of the cavalry, at the point of a wood that joined it.

General Luftinski, with two regiments of hussars, and some granitzers, sustained by the Saxon light horse, commanded by count Noftitz, was posted so as to cover the left wing; and general Morocz, with two regiments of hussars, and some granitzers, on the right, for the same purpose. Whilst we were making these dispositions, the enemy advanced on this side Neumark, with his right at Krinitsh, and the left at Bischdorff, with his foreposts at Borna. In this situation both armies continued under arms the whole night. The 5th in the morning, before day, general Nadafti, whose corps had made a third line, went,
went, as had been concerted, and posted himself near the cavalry of the left wing, and extended his troops to a hill, that was on the side, upon which some artillery was placed, and an abatis made before it. The Austrians under his command were next the left of the army, and the Wurtemburgers and Bavarians came to be on the flank, and behind the abatis.

At break of day, the enemy made several motions, sometimes to the right, and sometimes to the left, which lasted 'till 12 o'clock; and it appeared he intended to attack the right wing of the imperial army; insomuch that general Luchesi, who commanded there, sent several times to demand succour. The reserve was destined for that purpose; yet the sending of it was postponed 'till the enemy's intentions were fully known: but, as the count repeated his instances, and the enemy's motions behind the hills not being discovered, the reserve was sent him, and M. Daun went there himself, in order to be at hand in case of need. Scarce had the reserve marched, when the enemy's cavalry appeared on our left; which shewed they proposed attacking that wing, and the flank adjoining: upon which his royal highness and his excellency M. Daun ordered prince Esterhafi, general of horse, and generals Macquaire and Angern, with the cavalry and infantry under their command, and all the second line, to march and sustain that flank. About 1 o'clock the enemy approached it, and the fire of the small arms began against the Wurtembergers; which being very hot, forced them back in confusion, leaving their artillery behind them; which brought the Bavarians, who formed the flank, likewise into confusion. These auxiliary troops immediately threw the other regiments of the Imperials in disorder, and hindered those that were coming to sustain them from doing any thing to the purpose. Every possible means was used to bring the troops into order, but
but in vain. During this time, the enemy attacked the village of Leuthen, and the left wing of the army, and had brought there the greatest part of his forces; but he was repulsed three several times with great loss; so that the victory was dubious for a long while. At length, however, the Prussians penetrated in the opening between the left wing and the flank, and so were in the rear of our army. We were forced to abandon Leuthen, and retire towards the Schweidnitz and the Lohe. This was executed in good order, and under a continual fire. In this manner the battle, which lasted from 1 o'clock 'till five, finished.'

The Prussian's account is as follows:

"After the battle of Rossbach, his majesty turned his thoughts towards Silesia, in order to oppose vigorously the progress of the Austrians. Accordingly, his majesty, at the head of 33 squadrons, and 19 battalions, quitted Leipzig the 12th of November, and arrived the 13th at Eulenberg, the 14th at Torgau, the 16th at Muhlberg, the 17th passed the Roder at Grossenhayn, where general Haddick had been with 2000 men, but was retired to Königbrück. He had left some hussars behind the Roder to observe us; but they were drove back by ours, who took about 40 prisoners.

"The 18th his majesty marched by Pölnitz to Königbrück, where the pandours under general Haddick stopped once more; whom he forced to retire towards the corps under general Marshal, in Lusatia, who likewise retired towards Löbau, and never appeared again during our whole march. The 20th his majesty passed over the Black Elster to Camenz; and the 21st over the Spree to Bautzen; from whence Marshal's corps had retired towards Bohemia: the 22d his majesty passed the Old Spree, and went to Maltitz; the 23d to Gorlitz; from whence Haddick's
in Germany, 1757.

Haddick's corps likewise retired towards Bohemia: the 24th he passed the Queifs, and went to Naumburg in Silesia; the 26th to Deutmanfsdorff; the 27th to Lobethau; and the 28th to Parchwitz; where we arrived at 6 o'clock in the evening, and there found the Austrian colonel Gerfdorff, who was just come with about 1100 horse and foot. His majesty ordered him to be immediately attacked, and killed about 80 men, took 150 prisoners, and dispersed the rest. The army passed the Katzbach, and remained some days at Parchwitz, to rest after such a strong march. The 1st of December, the hussars, belonging to the army of prince Bevern, came to us; and the 2d that whole army joined ours. On the 4th we marched to Neumark, where we found some thousand Croats and hussars, who kept the gate opposite to us shut, and endeavoured to get out on the side of Breslaw. In the mean while, some of our dragoons and hussars went about the town, and others opened the gate by force; so that, having drove the enemy out, they fell into the hands of those who had gone on the other side. We killed about 300, and took 600 prisoners, with the bakery of the whole army, a small magazine, and two cannon. Here advice was brought, that prince Charles had quitted Breslaw, and was advanced to Liffa, with his right at Nypern, and his left at Golau, with the Schweidnitz behind him. His majesty thought proper to go and meet him; and therefore ordered the army to break up on the 5th, at 5 o'clock in the morning. At break of day we discovered, on a hill behind the village of Borna, about half a mile from Neumark, a strong corps of cavalry, which, in the twilight, was thought to be the enemy's whole army. Upon our approaching them, we found it was only two regiments of hussars, and the Saxon light horse, commanded by general Noftitz. Our vanguard attacked them immediately; drove...
them back into their camp; and took 500 prisoners. We continued our march, in wet and thick weather, about four miles; and, near 12 o'clock, we discovered the enemy's whole army, in order of battle, behind the village of Leuthen. All the hills before their front were covered with artillery; and the left wing had, besides a great hill with artillery upon it, an abatis likewise. The right had also a great many batteries before it. The king resolved to attack the enemy's left, as soon as our army reached the heights before it. We marched on the right; so that our right wing came up to the Schweidnitz river. We first attacked the wood; and very soon drove the enemy's infantry out of it. When they perceived that we out-winged them, and took them in flank, they were forced to change their position; and, as we were on their flank, they had nothing more to do, than to take the first new position they could find, to hinder us from enfilading their army from one wing to the other. They therefore sent some brigades of infantry on the heights abovementioned, behind the wood: our right wing attacked it; and, after an obstinate combat, took it. The enemy formed a new line by Leuthen, and defended themselves with much bravery; but, at last, were forced to give way. Here our cavalry of the right wing attacked that of the enemy, and defeated it. They were, however, afterwards drove back by the enemy's artillery charged with cartridges: but, being again re-established, they attacked their infantry, and took many prisoners. During these several attacks, the enemy's right advanced. The cavalry of our left attacked that of the enemy, and entirely defeated it: then our regiment of dragoons Bareuth attacked a body of infantry, that was on a hill, behind, while our infantry did the same in front; which soon forced them to fly. His majesty pursued the enemy to Lissa.
in Germany, 1757.

Lissa. The battle began at 1 o'clock, and finished at four. If we had had a few hours more day light, the enemy's loss would have been still much greater. Prince Maurice commanded the right wing under the king, and major general Retzow the left. Our loss consists in 500 men killed, and 2300 wounded: among these is general Roehow, who was also taken prisoner. The enemy's army, which amounted to 80,000 men, never fought with more bravery than this time. Ours amounted to 36,000 men only. The enemy stood in a plain, with some small hills on it, which they covered with artillery. There were likewise many bushes on the plain, of which they took advantage. On their left wing was a considerable wood, where they made an abatis, and took all the measures possible to hinder us from coming on their flank. General Nadafi, with his corps, was likewise posted there, with intention to come on our flank. For which reason, his majesty placed four battalions behind the cavalry of our right; which wise disposition was afterwards of great service to us: for, when Nadafi attacked our right wing of horse, and had thrown some regiments in confusion, the fire of these battalions threw the enemy back in great disorder, and by that means cleared our flank, and enabled our right to act with vigour against the enemy's left, which in a short time was forced to retire. The right wing of our infantry continued to advance in the finest order, though it was exposed to a prodigious cannonading, and the fire of small arms. Our artillery, of which we had no small quantity, did great service, and sustained our advancing infantry; and by degrees silenced that of the enemy, which was at last abandoned. Though the enemy had fought with great bravery during the whole action, yet they seemed to redouble their forces and courage at Leuthen, which was fortified with redoubts and retrenchments.
retrenchments. The combat lasted here above an hour; and
our brave battalions made several attacks, one after another,
before they got masters of the village. This decided the battle;
for the enemy, on losing this village, retired with great pre-
cipitation, and never attempted again to make any considerable
stand. Our cavalry, and particularly the hussars, pursued the
flying enemy; killed many; and took some thousands prisoners.
His majesty pursued the enemy to Lissa, where he ordered the
army to remain that night under arms. Our infantry did won-
ders. We thought, in the beginning, that our left would have
no opportunity to come to action, as our right advanced so
much before it; however, at 4 o'clock, the battle was gene-
ral: even our small reserve was ordered to advance into the
line. Our cavalry had many difficulties, in the beginning, to
encounter, from the ditches and enclosures: at last, how-
ever, by the activity of our brave general Ziethen, it had also
an opportunity of acting. The 6th we followed the enemy,
and the 7th invested Breslaw. General Ziethen, with a great
corps of infantry and cavalry, was sent after them. He has
taken several cannons, and above 3000 wagons. We have
taken, in and since the battle, to the 12th of December, 291
officers, and 21,500 men, prisoners, among whom are generals
Noftitz, and Odonell, 116 cannon, 51 pair of colours, and 4000
wagons."

The loss of the Austrians, not including the Wurttembergers
and Bavarians, amounted to 6,574, killed and wounded. Among
the first were generals Luchefi, Otterwolf, and prince Stolberg:
and among the wounded were generals Haller, Maequiere, Lacy,
Lobkowitz, and Preysac. That of the Prussians consisted of about
5,000 men, not including the cavalry.

Prince
Prince Charles left a very considerable garrison in Breslau, under the command of general Sprecher, and retired to Schweidnitz; and, having provided for the defence of that place, he made his dispositions to retire into Bohemia; which was accordingly executed: and, before the end of the month, the Austrians entirely evacuated Silesia, excepting only the town of Schweidnitz.

In the mean time, the king opened the trenches before Breslau; and, a bomb having fallen into a powder magazine, the 16th in the evening, the attacked bastion, and near half the adjoining curtain, was blown up, and above 800 men of the besieged. This misfortune obliged the commandant to capitulate the 19th at night. The garrison, consisting of above 17,000 men, including 13 generals, and the sick and wounded at the two last battles, were made prisoners of war.

General Driesen had been sent the 16th, with a body of troops, to besiege Lignitz; and, on the 26th, took that place by capitulation. Colonel Bulow, the governor, obtained leave to retire into Bohemia, with his garrison, consisting of near 3000 men.

Thus one victory, improved by a vigorous and active genius, enabled his majesty to recover, in one month, all, excepting Schweidnitz, that he had lost during the whole campaign.

It has been already observed, that, when the king left Saxony, in order to go to Silesia, M. Keith, with about 8000 men, had been sent into Bohemia, with a view to draw general Marshal, then in Lusatia, there; and, by that means, facilitate the march of the king. This end having been happily accomplished, M. Keith, after he had burnt several magazines, and the bridge at Leutmeritz, returned into Saxony; where he put his troops into winter quarters.
Reflections on the battle of Lissa, and the preceding operations.

Prince Charles knew, even before the battle of Breslaw, that the king, with about 10 or 12,000 men, at most, was coming into Silesia: the only object his majesty could have in view, was to join Bevern's army, without which he could attempt nothing at all; nor even, with so inconsiderable a force as that he brought with him, approach the Austrian army, without exposing himself to certain destruction. Wherefore, the only object prince Charles should have had in view, was to prevent him from effectuating this junction. His royal highness should therefore have marched to Parchwitz, and take a position between that place and Lignitz, with a strong corps, on the heights of Pfaffendorff, which would have hindered the king from approaching the Oder; nor even could he have gone to Glogau, without giving them an opportunity to attack him, and consequently defeat him, considering the Austrian army was, perhaps, six times stronger than he was.

The only measure taken by the Austrians, was to send a garrison to Lignitz, which could answer no end whatever, and exposed so many men to be lost. It was by no means probable that the king would amuse himself with a siege of that miserable place, when all Silesia was at stake.

When the Austrians had permitted the king to unite all his forces, and provide them with the necessary artillery, &c. we cannot conceive why all of a sudden they resolved to quit Breslaw, and go to meet him. I know very well, that flattery, too prevalent in camps, as well as courts, had raised their spirits and confidence much above what prudence prescribes: but they could then have no motives to desire an action; because, if victorious, they could not, in that advanced season, pursue the enemy further than Glogau; and, if vanquished, it might prove fatal to them.

Having
in Germany, 1757.

Having passed the Schweidnitz the 4th, they were informed the enemy was advancing towards them; Why not instantly repass that river, and put it before them, rather than behind. Though this river is but small; yet its banks, for the most part, are very marshy; insomuch that an army cannot pass it without the greatest difficulty, and scarce at all if they meet with any opposition. If the Austrians had done this, and have sent a strong corps higher up on their left flank, with their light troops on the same side as the enemy, on the road that leads to Striegau, we do not think his majesty would have attempted to pass the river; and, if he did, the corps abovementioned would have been on his flank during the passage and the action; and, as they were much stronger than he was, having their army covered by the Schweidnitz, they could have posted 20,000 men on their flank; which would have made it impossible for the enemy to pass the river. He would, therefore, in all probability, have marched to Striegau, in order to bring the Austrians from their advantageous situation, by endeavouring to cut off their communication with Bohemia. In this case, the corps, posted, as we suppose, on their left, would have been at Striegau before the enemy; and the whole army must have marched behind Schweidnitz, with the right at Hohen Giersdorf; and the left towards Friberg; which would have secured the road by Landshut to Bohemia, and their communication with that country. This position is very strong, and we do not think they could have been beat in it; nor, in that advanced season, by any manœuvre on their left, be forced out of it; nor could the king continue in the neighbourhood of Striegau, having no magazines within a hundred miles of him. He must, therefore, have given up the point, and retire to Glogau, in order to refresh his troops, who were much in need of rest. These measures being neglected, or never thought of, they should have advanced, and occupied all
the hills before them, particularly that by Lobethlitz, as well to take this advantage from the enemy, as to have room enough behind them to manoeuvre upon; but, from the moment they heard of the king's approach, they seem stupified; they neither advance nor retire. It is impossible for a superior army to be outwinded, but by some fault; yet this happened. The king made great demonstrations against their right, by which they were deceived so long, that he, covered by the hills they had neglected to occupy, had time to bring his whole army on their left. The only remedy then, was to order their right and center to march against his left; and, as they were much superior, and this wing weakened, to reinforce the right. They would have enveloped it, and in all probability destroyed it; nor could the king pursue his advantages on the right, while his left was thus attacked, for fear of being enclosed between the enemy's right wing and the river, where there was not ground enough to act in. They should, at the same time, have formed a line or two behind the flank attacked, with intervals to let the troops repulsed pass, and then advance against the enemy, whom they would have found broke, and in confusion, and, therefore, easily have defeated him.

Instead of which, they ordered the whole army to make a motion on the left, to sustain that wing; so that the columns met their companions retiring, and the enemy advancing in order of battle; which hindered them from being able to form at all; and thus the whole army was defeated, one battalion after another, as must necessarily happen. Troops marching in small and long columns can never open, and form themselves in a line, when near the enemy, and under his fire; and, therefore, such a manoeuvre must never be attempted. They should have endeavoured to keep the enemy back 'till they had formed a line, and then advance, or wait his coming. This not being executed, the battle was lost, and nothing could prevent it.
in Germany, 1757.

It was likewise a capital fault to have put the auxiliary troops, who had never seen an enemy, on the flank. If they had thrown their light troops, and 8 or 10 battalions of Austrians, sustained by Nadafi's corps, and the whole left wing, into the wood, before the village of Sagschutz, and ordered their right and center to advance, and attack the enemy's left, we think they would have gained the victory.

The king's conduct was founded on the most sublime principles of war. Though his army was much inferior to that of the enemy, yet, by dint of superior manœuvres, he brought more men into action, at the point attacked, than they; which must be decisive when the troops are nearly equal in goodness. Wherefore, generals must make it their study, to establish, in time of peace, such evolutions as facilitate the manœuvres of armies; and, in time of war, choose such a field of battle, if possible, as enables them to hide part of their motions, and so bring more men into action than the enemy; and, if the ground, either by its nature, or by the vigilance of the enemy, does not permit them to cover their motions, then a greater facility of manœuvring will answer the same end, and enable them to bring more men to the principal point attacked than the enemy. The only advantage of a superior army, in a day of action, consists in this only, that the general can bring more men into action than the enemy; but, if they do not move with facility and quickness, and are not all brought to action at the same time, that superiority of numbers will be of no use: on the contrary, will serve only to increase the confusion. From whence we will deduce a general rule: "That general, who, by the facility of his motions, or by artifice, can bring most men into action, at the same time, and at the same point, must, if the troops are equally good, necessarily prevail; and, therefore, all evolutions, which do not tend to this object, must be exploded."

Operations


OPERATIONS of the War in Prussia, between the Prussians and Russians.

The king of Prussia, being informed of the Czarina's accession to the treaty of Versailles, ordered General Lewhald, with about 30,000 men, to march on the frontiers of Prussia, and oppose the march of the enemy. Accordingly, this general, having assembled his army in the month of June, advanced to Insterburg, with a corps further on towards Memel, to observe their motions.

In the mean time, the Russian army, consisting of 31 regiments of foot, 14 of horse, 5 of hussars, and about 16,000 Tartars, Calmucks, and Cossacks, amounting in the whole to 62,000 foot, 19,000 horse, and the abovementioned Tartars, &c. broke up in May, and advanced, in four columns, towards the frontiers of Prussia.

Three of which passed through Poland, and the fourth through Samogitia, towards Memel. This last was commanded by General Fermor, and destined to besiege that town. To facilitate which enterprise, Admiral Lewis, an Englishman of reputation, in the Russian service, sailed with a considerable fleet from Revel, with about 9000 men on board, in order to land, and attack Memel on the sea side, while General Fermor did the same on the land side. Accordingly, they arrived before Memel at the end of June, and, on the 5th of the following month, they took that place by capitulation.

This conquest was of infinite consequence to the Russians, because they could make a convenient place of arms of it, and, by means of their fleet, provide it with provisions and stores sufficient to supply the whole army, (who could not possibly be provided otherwise), and consequently prosecute the operations of the campaign.
This expedition being happily executed, the whole army, under the command of M. Apraxin, united in the month of August, on the river Rufs; and from thence advanced towards the Pregel. Upon which general Lewhald quitted the camp at Insterburg, and retired towards Wehlau; where he continued 'till the 30th of August, and then advanced to attack the Russians, who had passed the Pregel, and were encamped at Gross Jagersdorf. This occasioned a great battle: of which the Prussians give the following account.

"Lieutenant general Scherlemmer having reconnoitred the enemy's position, it was resolved to attack them the 30th. We first attacked their left wing. Prince Holstein's regiment, under his own command, Ruesch's, and the second battalion of Scherlemmer, distinguished themselves very much. They took several batteries, and totally defeated the enemy's cavalry. We advanced, over a prodigious number of dead bodies, against the center and right wing of the enemy's army, that was protected by various batteries and retrenchments. We took three of them in the wood, each from 10 or 12 cannons: in one of which the marshal himself gave quarter to a Russian colonel; and in another we made general Lapuchin prisoner. We should probably have kept the field of battle, if, unfortunately, our second line had not fired on our first; the great smoke of the artillery, and of two villages which the enemy had put on fire, having hindered our people from seeing their companions; so that our first line was exposed to the fire of the enemy's infantry, sustained by 150 pieces of cannon, and that of our own second line. We therefore quitted the field of battle, and retired in good order, without being followed. Our loss, in all, amounts to about 2000 men. That of the enemy much above 9000. Among whom are generals Lieven, and Lapuchin." This account, as generally
generally happens with the losers, is very little exact, and no ways worthy to be printed, but impartiality required it.

That of M. Apraxin, to the Czarina, is as follows:

"I had the honour to inform your majesty, that numberless and invincible obstacles hindered us from approaching the enemy on the right of the Pregel. Wherefore, I resolved to pass this river, and force them to come to an action; which was accordingly done on the 28th; and, as the enemy perceived, by this manœuvre, and our ulterior march, that we could cut off their communication with the countries from whence they drew their subsistence, they found it necessary to abandon their strong camp, and likewise pass on our side the Pregel on the 28th.

The 30th your majesty's army, in consequence of the order given the preceding night, was ready to march; and the vanguard, and part of the army, were already in motion; when, at 4 o'clock in the morning, we perceived that the wood, before our front, was filled with the enemy's troops, whose motions had been covered by it. We were not as yet formed, when the enemy came out of the wood in the finest order, and began to fire upon us with their artillery, and soon after with small arms; which continued without intermission the whole action. They attacked our front with great fury; and it required uncommon firmness to resist their efforts. The first and chief attack was against our left wing. They advanced in columns, within gun shot, and then formed the line. When both armies were formed, with the front against each other, the fire of artillery and small arms continued for three hours, and the victory was all this while doubtful. The enemy made all the efforts possible to break our front, but were repulsed in each attempt with great loss. While these things passed on our left, they attacked our right and vanguard (who, from the nature
nature of the ground, were somewhat more advanced than our
left) with two separate corps of cavalry, sustained by infan-
try; but were repulsed in both places. Our artillery, particu-
larly those called the Schwalows, did great execution; and
contributed much to throw the enemy's cavalry in confusion.
Though they met everywhere with the same bad success, they
made one effort more. On our left wing several openings were
found in the line, because the marshy ground made it impracti-
cable to close it. The enemy attempted to penetrate through
these intervals, in order to cut our line in two, and so take it
in flank; but they were mistaken: for we had posted there
some troops out of the second line; so that, scarce had they
entered the wood, when they were received with fixed bayon-
ets, and soon forced to fly with precipitation: which put an
end to the battle, &c."

The rest of general Apraxin's letter contains nothing more than
compliments, no wise necessary to give an idea of the action.

The Russians took 29 cannons, and about 600 prisoners. Their
loss consisted in 800 killed, among which were generals Lapuchin,
Sybin, and Kapnift; and 4260 wounded, among whom were the
generals Lieven, Tolstoi, Bosquet, Villeboy, Manteuffel, Weimarn,
and Plemannikow. That of the Prussians in about 3000 killed,
wounded, and missing.

The Prussians retired to Wehlau, and the Russians continued
in their camp, by Norkitten, 'till the 7th of September; when
they made some dispositions, as if they intended passing the river
Aller, at Friedland, on the enemy's right flank; but it was not
executed. They attempted likewise to disembark some troops in
the Curish bay, but were repulsed by the militia. On the 17th
the whole Russian army broke up, and retired in haste towards
the frontiers; so that, by the end of the month, they had entirely
abandoned
abandoned the kingdom of Prussia, excepting Memel; where they left 10 or 12,000 men. This put an end to the campaign in Prussia.

**Reflections.**

When the Prussians knew that the enemy was in march, they should, one would think, advance to the frontiers, and have made incursions into Poland, to destroy the provisions, or carry it off; which would have retarded very much the progress of the enemy, who had absolutely no other means of subsisting, but what they found on the spot, as they passed; which was rendered still more difficult, by the terror the Tartars inspired, by their uncommon ravages and cruelty. Another advantage would have accrued; that the inhabitants of Prussia would have had time to withdraw themselves, and their cattle, and retire to Konigberg, or some other places of safety: whereas, by staying on the Pregel, the best part of the country was left at the mercy of the enemy.

As to the conduct of the action itself, nothing can be objected to M. Lewhald. He had, no doubt, orders to fight, though much inferior. He formed his army in a line, facing the enemy, which may be considered as a fault, being so much weaker than they; because he could not make any considerable effort, in any one point; his troops being equally distributed throughout the line; so that the enemy had every where a greater number of men in action than he could have. As the Russians were then little known, 'tis no wonder the Prussian general should think his troops superior to theirs, and therefore did not think it necessary to oppose any thing but infantry to infantry, and cavalry against cavalry. But experience has proved, that the Russian infantry is by far superior to any in Europe; insomuch that I question whether...
it can be defeated by any other infantry whatever; and, as their cavalry is not so good as that of other nations, reason dictates, that a mixed order of battle alone can conquer them. They cannot be defeated; they must be killed; and infantry, mixed with great corps of cavalry, only can do this.

If the Russians intended to remain in Prussia, their first care ought to have been to form magazines at Memel, in order to supply the army; because they must know, that it was impossible for the country, even had they observed the most exact discipline, to furnish enough for that purpose. The want of this precaution, both this and all the following campaigns, rendered their victories useless. They made war, and always will, in all probability, like the Tartars. They will over-run a country, ravage and destroy it, and so leave it; because they can never, according to the method they now follow, make a solid and lasting conquest. They put themselves an insurmountable barrier to it. Their own light troops, and the want of a solid plan of operations, will one day ruin their army.

Operations
in Germany, 1757.

OPERATIONS of the War in Pomerania,
between the Prussians and Swedes.

The Swedes, under pretence of guarantying the treaty of Westphalia, sent an army of about 17,000 men, under the command of general Ungern Stornberg, against the Prussians. This army passed the Peen, and, having soon taken Demmin, Anclam, and the islands of Usedom and Wollin, they advanced into the Prussian part of Pomerania; where they raised contributions, without meeting any obstacle: for the garrison of Stettin, consisting of about 10,000 men, under general Manteuffel, could not quit that important place, in order to oppose the progress of the Swedes. At length, however, the army, which had been in Prussia, arrived under general Lewhald; and, before the end of December, forced the Swedes to abandon all they had taken, except the Penamunder and the Anclamer retrenchments, and retire under the cannon of Stralsund.

Thus ended the campaign of 1757, the most important for the number of great actions, the variety of events, and the uncertainty of its issue, of any recorded either in antient or modern history.

We hope our account of it, and our reflections on its various operations, will prove no less agreeable than useful to our readers.

The End of the First Volume.
ERRATA.

Preface, page 1, line 3, and 21, for Didacktical, read Didactic.
--- page 6, line 8, after two, add parts.

Page v, line 5, for Etries, read Etreés.
Page xxxiv, line 9, for on, read in.

Page 3, line 15, for any further; to prevent, read any further: To prevent.
Page 3, line 17, for Auffrians. A considerable, read Auffrians, a considerable.
Page 31, line 10, after Schneeberg, add by.
Page 38, line 3, for Gitchin, read Gitchin.
Page 49, last line, for Eduyyn, read Budyn.
Page 55, line 30, for separately, read separately.
Page 80, line 23, for from, read form.
Page 100, line 17, for coffin, read coffin.
Page 123, line 13, for occasioned, read occasion.
Page 127, line 14, for Lufca, read Lusatia.
Page 135, line 22, dele It has been already observed, that,
Page 147, line 3, for Stornberg, read Sternberg.
RUSSIAN ARMY, October 1, 1756.

KING.

Pr. Keith.

Prince of Prussia.

Pr. Ferdin. of Brunswick.

Quadt.  Itzenplitz.

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Kyau.

Schonaich.

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<td>Sq. Carabiniers. Rocbow.</td>
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RECAPITULATION.

- Caval. —— 65. Sq.
- Canons. —— 102 Pieces.
**Order of Battle of the Prussian Army, October 1, 1756.**

**The King.**
- Marshal Keith.
- General of Infantry, Prince of Prussia.

*Lieut. Gen. Pr. of Bevern.*
- Kleist.
- Pr. Ferdin. of Brunswick.

Kleist Gen. 1st Bat
- 1st Bat. Zastrow.
- 2nd Bat. Bevern.
- 3rd Bat. Blankenstein.
- 4th Bat. Prussia.

1st. Bat. Putkammer.
2nd. Krumkow.

**F. Mar. Geisser.**

- Driesen.
- Schonauich.
- Kyau.

5th. Regt. of Dragoons.
5th. Sq. Pr. Frederick.
5th. Sq. Schonauich.
5th. Sq. Carabiniers.
5th. Sq. Prince of Prussia.

1st. Sq. Garde du Corps.

**Lieut. Gen. Schwerin.**
- Katt.
- Truches.

4th. H. of Sappers.
5th. Sq. Oertz.
5th. Sq. Bevern.

Recapitulation:
- Cavalry: 65 Sq.
- Infantry: 26 Batal.
- Cannons: 102 Pieces.
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Note: The table represents a list of names, possibly military personnel, with ratings ranging from 3 to 4.
### Order of Battle of the Austrian Army, October 1, 1756.

**Marshal Broune.**

|-------------|--------------------------------|-------------|--------|-------------------|

#### Recapitulation.
- Caval. ——— 72. Sq.
Army commanded by the KING, May 4, 1757:

KING.

Hub Keith.
Prussia. Margrave Charles.
Kroßk. Driefen.

Forcade. Prince of Darmstadt.


amt. General Ziethen.

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<tr>
<th>RECAPITULATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>Caval. 78 Sq.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infant. 51 Bat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canons 136 Pieces</td>
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</table>
Order of Battle of the Prussian Army commanded by the King, May 4, 1757.

The King.

Marshal Keith.


Lieut. General Schönaich.


Lieut. General Zieten.


Recapitulation.

Caval. ——— 78 Sq.

Infant. ——— 51 Bat.

Canons ——— 136 Pieces.
the Command of Marshal Schwarin, May 4, 1757.

H W E R I N.

moy, Lehestewitz. Pr. of Bevern Pr. of Schönaich
Kleist. Schönning. Pr. of Wurtemberg, Blankensee.

2. 1. Amfel.
2. 1. Kainth.
5. 5. Pr. de Schönaich.

2. 1. Bat. Forcato.
2. 1. Pr. of Prufte.

C. M. Amfel.

1. Bat. Ingersleben.

1. — Billerbeck.

Pr. Franç. of Brunswick.
Brandies. Norman.

2. 1. Wurtemberg.
2. 1. Mainden.
2. 1. Brandies.
Order of Battle of the Prussian Army under the Command of Marshal Schwerin, May 4, 1757.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lieut. Gen.</th>
<th>Bn. de Schönaich</th>
<th>Fouquet</th>
<th>Hautcharmoy</th>
<th>Leistung</th>
<th>Pr. of Bevern</th>
<th>Pr. of Schönaich</th>
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<td>5th Sq. Katt.</td>
<td>2nd Bat. Leistung</td>
<td>2nd Bat. Trefkow</td>
<td>2nd Sq. Schöning</td>
<td>2nd Pr. of Prussia</td>
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<td>1st Bat. Niemsczinsk</td>
<td>1st Bat. Krockow</td>
<td>1st Bat. Hautcharmoy</td>
<td>1st Bat. Keff</td>
<td>1st Pr. of Prussia</td>
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<th>Maj. Gen.</th>
<th>Plettenberg</th>
<th>Salder</th>
<th>Calckreuter</th>
<th>Pr. Fran. of Brunswick</th>
<th>Brandies</th>
<th>Norman</th>
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Recapitulation:
- Caval. — 40 Sq.
- Inf. — 47 Bat.
- Canons — 116 Pieces.
### Prince Charles of Lorraine, May 6, 1757

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<td>Sq. Y.</td>
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<td>Barenth.</td>
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Order of Battle of the Austrian Army, under the Command of his Royal Highness Prince Charles of Lorraine, May 6, 1757.

Prince Charles of Lorraine.

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<td>Maj. Gen. Löwenstein.</td>
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Generals of Horse.

- General of Horse, Lieut. Gen.
- Major General
- Brigadier General
- Colonel
- Lieutenant Colonel
- Major
- Captain
- Ensign

Squadrons.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artillery.</th>
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<tr>
<td>First Line.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second Line.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reserves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Troops.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL.</td>
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Light Troops.

- Drachkowitz.
- Secleti.
- Okelli.
- Argenteau.
- Detached.
ARMY at COLIN, June 18, 1757.

G. Maurice of Dessau.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pr. Maurice.</td>
<td>2. Pr. of Prussia.</td>
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**Order of Battle of the Prussian Army at Colin, June 18, 1757.**

**The King.**

**General of Infantry, Prince Maurice of Deesau.**

**Trefkow. Pr. of Bevern.**

**Pennavaire.**

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<td></td>
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<td>1. - Manteuffel</td>
<td>1. - Manteuffel</td>
<td>Hallen</td>
<td>Kalken</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>3 Pr. of Prussia</td>
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<td>1. - Finck</td>
<td>1. - Finck</td>
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<td>1.</td>
<td>5 Sq. Guards</td>
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**Maj. Gen. Krolick.**

- 5 Sq. Guards

**Maj. Gen. Igerliebe.**

- 1. Bat. Germing
- 2. Bat. Krenten
- 3. Bat. Krenten

**Maj. Gen. Meinike.**

- 5 Sq. Guards

**Lieut. Gen. Hullén.**

- 10 Sq. Guards

**Maj. Gen. De Zieten.**

- 5 Sq. Guards

**Katt.**

- 10 Sq. Guards

**RECAPITULATION.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caval.</th>
<th>118 Sq.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infant.</td>
<td>32 Bat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars.</td>
<td>82 Pieces</td>
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Plan of the Battle of Lissa or Leuthen. Fought on the 5th December 1757.
Between the Prussians Commanded by the King, and the Austrians Commanded by F. Charles of Lorraine, and won by the Former.
<table>
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<th>Abt. 5, 1757</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goltz.</td>
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<td>1. Bat. Ramin</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Bat. Haak</td>
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<tr>
<th>Ziethen</th>
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<tr>
<td>5. Sq. Pr. Frederic</td>
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<td>5. Sq. Gendarmes</td>
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<td>5. Sq. Steinitz</td>
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<td>5. Sq. Norman</td>
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**Order of Battle of the Prussian Army, December 5, 1757.**

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**Lieutenant General Forcade.**

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**Lieutenant General Prince of Wurtemberg.**

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**Recapitulation.**

- Cavalry: 138 Sq.
- Infantry: 53 Bat.
- Cannon: 167 Pieces.