PREFACE

The text of this edition is that prepared by me for the *Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis* with a few corrections and modifications. Such as it is, it is the only text based on the three archetypal MSS., the *Clarkianus* (B), the *Marcianus* (T), and the *Vindobonensis* (W). The readings of T are taken from a photograph in my possession, those of W from the collation of Professor Král of Prague.

In the Introduction and Notes I have chiefly endeavoured to elucidate the argument, and to show the importance of the *Phaedo* as an historical document. Grammatical points have only been dealt with when they seemed to have a direct bearing on these problems. The interpretation of an ancient document must always be based on grammar, but an edition of the *Phaedo* is not the place for a full discussion of general grammatical problems like the constructions of οὐ μη and μη οὐ.

I have given references throughout to the second edition of my *Early Greek Philosophy* (E. Gr. Ph.²), where I have discussed more fully the historical background of the dialogue. I hope to have an early
opportunity of discussing certain textual problems in a more scientific way than is possible in an edition like the present.

The reader will see that I am under great obligations to the editions of Wyttenbach and Heindorf. Of more recent editions I owe most to that of the late Sir William Geddes.

J. B.
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INTRODUCTION

I

IF only we may take the Phaedo for what it professes to be, it surely stands quite by itself in European literature. It does not, indeed, claim to be a word for word report of all Socrates said to the inner circle of his followers on the day he drank the poison in prison. By letting us know incidentally (59b 10) that he was not present, Plato seems to decline responsibility for the literal exactitude of every detail. But, for all that, it does on the face of it bear to be such an account of that memorable day as its author could conceive a favourite disciple giving not long afterwards to a group of deeply interested listeners. That means a great deal. Though he was not present when the Master died, it is certain that Plato continued in close association with others who were,¹ and they must often have talked about Socrates together. Further, the narrative is put into the mouth of Phaedo of Elis, who was certainly still living when the dialogue called by his name was written. So, no doubt, were the chief interlocutors, Simmias and Cebes, and

¹ The statement in Diog. Laert. ii. 166, iii. 6 that, just after the death of Socrates, Plato retired with other Socrates to Megara, the home of Euclides (cp. 59 c 2 n.), rests on the authority of Hermodorus, who was a disciple of Plato and wrote a book about him. Even apart from this, it is certain that the Socrates kept together and remained in touch with Plato. Some of them, like Theactetus and the younger Socrates, were subsequently members of the Academy.
probably others of the company.\(^1\) In these circumstances, it is not easy to believe that Plato intended his readers to regard the *Phaedo* simply as an ‘imaginary conversation’.

Of course, as has been indicated, he need not have meant every detail to be taken as historically exact. If we choose to suppose that he introduced into the *Phaedo* sayings and doings of Socrates which really belonged to other occasions, there is nothing to be said against that; for such concentration of characteristic traits in a single scene is quite legitimate in dramatic composition. A certain idealization might also be allowed for; but we should expect the idealizing process to have taken place in the minds of Plato and the rest before the dialogue was written, and to have been in the main unconscious. We may say, then, that the *Phaedo* professes to be nothing less than a faithful picture of Socrates as Plato conceived him when he wrote it. It professes to be even more. We are certainly led to believe that it gives us a truthful record of the subjects on which Socrates discoursed on the last day of his life, and of his manner of treating them. No reader who made his first acquaintance with Socrates here could possibly suppose anything else. This, then, is what the *Phaedo* professes to be; and if only it is this, it is the likeness of a great philosopher in the supreme crisis of his life, drawn by a philo-

\(^1\) It is impossible to discuss the date of the *Phaedo* here; for this would involve an inquiry into that of the *Republic*. I may say, however, that I regard it as proved that the *Phaedo* is earlier than the *Republic*, and as probable that it was written within ten years of the death of Socrates. But, in any case, Phaedo, who lived to found the school of Elis, is a mere lad in 399 B.C. (cp. 89 b3), while Simmias and Cebes are *vivis positi* (89 a3). No one would assign the *Phaedo* to a date at which it is reasonable to suppose they were dead.
sopher who was greater still, and was also one of the most consummate dramatic artists the world has known. It would not be easy to find the match of such a work.

II

But are we entitled to take the *Phaedo* for what it professes to be? The general opinion apparently is that we are not.\(^1\) It is admitted, indeed, that the narrative portion of the dialogue is historical, but most interpreters doubt whether Socrates talked about immortality at all, and many deny that he held the belief set forth in our dialogue. Hardly any one ventures to suppose that the reasons given for holding this belief could have been given by Socrates; it is assumed that they are based on doctrines formulated by Plato himself at least ten years after Socrates had passed away. I cannot accept this account of the matter. I cannot, indeed, feel sure that all the incidents of the narrative are strictly historical. These are, in my opinion, the very things for which a dramatic artist might fairly draw on his imagination. I have only an impression that they are, broadly speaking, true to life, and that they all serve to bring before us a picture of Socrates as he really was. But the religious and philosophical teaching of the *Phaedo* is on a very different footing. Whatever Plato may or may not have done in other dialogues—and I say nothing here about that\(^2\)—I cannot bring myself to believe that he falsified

\(^1\) I refer mainly to current opinion in this country. Some references to views of another character will be found below (p. xiv, n. 2).

\(^2\) It is obvious that we must apply a somewhat different standard to a dialogue like the *Phaedo*, which is supposed to take place when Plato was twenty-eight years old, and to one like the *Parmenides*, which deals with a time at least twenty years before he was born. If it can be
the story of his master's last hours on earth by using him as a mere mouthpiece for novel doctrines of his own. That would have been an offence against good taste and an outrage on all natural piety; for if Plato did this thing, he must have done it deliberately. There can be no question here of unconscious development; he must have known quite well whether Socrates held these doctrines or not. I confess that I should regard the Phaedo as little better than a heartless mystification if half the things commonly believed about it were true.

III

The interpretation which finds nothing in the Phaedo but the speculations of Plato himself is based on the belief that 'the historical Socrates', of whom we may get some idea from Xenophon, is quite a different person from 'the Platonic Socrates'. What the latter is made to say is treated as evidence for the philosophy of Plato, but not for that of Socrates himself. This does not mean merely that Plato's Socrates is idealized. That might be allowed, if it were admitted that Xenophon too idealized Socrates after his own fashion. If it were only meant that each of these men drew Socrates as he saw him, and that Socrates was, in fact, a different man for each of them, the truth of such a view would be self-evident. We should only have to ask which of the two had the better opportunity of seeing Socrates as he really was, and which was the more capable of understanding and portraying him. But very much more than this is meant. Shown, as I believe it can, that the latter dialogue is accurate in its historical setting (cp. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 192) and involves no philosophical anachronism, the Phaedo will a fortiori be a trustworthy document.
It is meant that Plato has used Socrates as a mask to conceal his own features, and that the Platonic 'Socrates' is, in fact, Plato.

The general acceptance of this view in recent times is apparently due to the authority of Hegel. Speaking of Socrates, he lays down that 'we must hold chiefly to Xenophon in regard to the content of his knowledge, and the degree in which his thought was developed',¹ and this dictum became a sort of dogma with the Hegelian and semi-Hegelian writers to whom we owe so much of the best nineteenth-century work in the history of Greek philosophy. It can only be made plausible, however, by isolating the Memorabilia from Xenophon's other writings in a way which seems wholly illegitimate. We must certainly take the Oeconomicus and the Symposium into account as well; and, in estimating Xenophon's claim to be regarded as a historian, we must never forget that he was the author of the Cyropaedia.

The Apology of Socrates which has come down to us under Xenophon's name raises another question. It is pretty clearly based on Plato's Apology, and it contains a rather clumsy plagiarism from the Phaedo.² This has led many scholars to deny the authenticity of the work; but the more Xenophon's methods are studied the less cogent do such arguments appear, and there is now a growing disposition to regard the Apology as Xenophon's after all. If so, we have to face the possibility that he derived much of his knowledge of Socrates from the writings of Plato.

As for the Memorabilia itself, there is no doubt that it is a strangely constructed work, and the 'higher critics'

¹ Gesch. der Phil. ii. 69.
² Cp. 89 b 2 n.
INTRODUCTION

have condemned whole chapters as interpolations. It is not necessary to discuss their theories here; I only mention them at all in order to show that the book presents a real problem, and that the time has gone by for speaking of its historical character as something beyond cavil. If, however, we wish to avoid the conclusions of the critics, we can only do so by putting something better in their place. The question we must ask is whether it is possible to give an account of Xenophon's Socratic writings which will explain them as they stand. I believe that it is; but I also believe that it is 'the historical Socrates' who will then appear as the fictitious character.

IV

By his own account of the matter, Xenophon was quite young—hardly more than five and twenty—when he saw

1 It has quite recently been argued that two of the most important conversations (i. 4 and iv. 3 are derived from Plato's Timaeus, and were inserted in their present place by Zeno, the founder of Stoicism (K. Lincke, Xenophon und die Stoa, Neue Jahrbücher, xvii (1906), pp. 673 sqq.).

2 This view is gradually making its way. Raeder, while speaking of the distinction between the Platonic and the historical Socrates as 'a recognized truth', is equally emphatic in stating that the Platonic Socrates must be distinguished from Plato himself (Platons philosophische Entwicklung, p. 53). Ivo Bruns Das literarische Porträt der Griechen, 1896 insists upon the fact that both Plato and Xenophon give faithful portraits of Socrates as they knew him, only it was a different Socrates that they knew. C. Ritter (Platon, i, p. 71) says that Plato's Socrates, 'even though poetically transfigured, is yet certainly the true one, truer not only than the Socrates of comedy, but also than that of Xenophon'. My colleague Professor Taylor's Varia Socratica (St. Andrews University Publications, No. IX. Oxford, Parker) came into my hands too late for me to refer to it in detail. Though I cannot accept all his conclusions, I am glad to find myself in substantial agreement with him.
Socrates for the last time.¹ When he made his acquaintance we do not know; but of course Socrates was a familiar figure to most Athenian lads. We can see pretty clearly, however, that Xenophon cannot have associated regularly with Socrates after he reached the age of military service. It is very significant that, as he tells us himself (An. iii. 1. 4), it was the Boeotian Proxenus who wrote to him suggesting that he should attach himself to the expedition of Cyrus. That certainly looks as if he had already served a pretty serious military apprenticeship, and in these years most of the fighting was at a distance from Athens. The fact that a Boeotian professional soldier knew him to be a likely man for an adventure of this kind seems to imply that he had already given proof of such inclinations; and, if so, his intercourse with the teacher who had not left Athens for years must have been intermittent at best.

That Xenophon did know Socrates personally, I see, however, no reason to doubt.² What he tells us on the subject in the Anabasis rings true, and is in complete harmony with what we know otherwise. He says (An. iii. 1. 5) that, when he had read the letter of Proxenus

¹ The youth of Xenophon at the time of the expedition of Cyrus was first pointed out clearly by Cobet (Novae Lectiones, pp. 539 and 543). In the Anabasis (iii. 1. 14 and 23) he tells us himself that he hesitated to take command of the Ten Thousand because of his youth. Now two of the generals who had been killed were thirty-five and Proxenus was thirty, so Xenophon must have been appreciably younger. Cp. also iii. 2. 37; iii. 3 sq., and iv. 2 where he insists upon his youth. As Croiset says (Litt. grecque, vol. iv, p. 340, n. 1), 'Si l'on se laissait aller à l'impression générale que donne l'Anabase, on attribuerait à Xénophon en 399 plutôt vingt-cinq ans que trente.' The fact that Apollodorus gave his floruit as the archonship of Xenaenetus (401/0 B.C.) does not weigh against this; for that is merely the date of the expedition.

² It has been doubted by E. Richter, whose work I have not seen.
he consulted Socrates the Athenian on the matter. Socrates had misgivings. He was afraid—and the event proved him right—that, if Xenophon attached himself to Cyrus, it would damage his prospects at Athens, so he advised him to consult the Delphic oracle. But Xenophon had already made up his mind, and only asked the Pythia to what gods he should pray and sacrifice to ensure a prosperous issue to the journey he had in view and a safe return. The oracle, of course, gave him the answer he sought, but Socrates blamed him for not asking first whether he should undertake the journey at all. As it was, he bade him do as the god commanded. This story throws great light on what Xenophon afterwards wrote in the *Memorabilia*. We read there (i. 1. 4) that Socrates used to warn his friends to do this and not to do that, on the strength of premonitions from his 'divine sign', and that for those who did as he told them it turned out well, while those who did not repented of it later on. We are also told that Socrates used to advise his friends to consult oracles on difficult questions, but in matters within the reach of human intelligence to use their own judgement.

It is not, surely, without significance that Xenophon should tell us this at the very beginning of the *Memorabilia*, just as the story given above from the *Anabasis* occurs at the precise point in the narrative where he introduces his own personality. It seems as if it had been the centre round which his personal memories of Socrates naturally grouped themselves. In those days, as we know from other sources, Socrates struck many young men chiefly as one possessed of a sort of 'second sight'. In the *Theages* (wrongly included in the Platonic canon, but still an early work) we read (128 δ 8 sqq.) how
Charmides consulted Socrates before beginning to train for the foot-race at Nemea. He neglected the advice given him, 'and it is worth while to ask him what he got by that training!' So, too, Timarchus declared, when he was being led to execution, that he owed his plight to disregard of a warning given by Socrates. And there were others. A certain Sannio consulted Socrates, just like Xenophon, before starting for the wars, and Socrates is represented as saying that he expects him either to lose his life or come within an ace of doing so.

It was not his second sight alone, however, that attracted these young men to Socrates. If they had regarded him as a mere clairvoyant, their feelings to him would not have been what they plainly were. No doubt it was Alcibiades who did most to make Socrates the fashion; but we can see from the Symposium that Plato had good grounds for believing that his enthusiasm was based on a conviction that Socrates was a man of no common strength of character. In particular, all these young men knew him to be a brave soldier and a good citizen. His services at Potidaea, where he saved the life of Alcibiades, and at Amphipolis, and above all his personal courage in the field of Delium, were matter of common report. In the dialogue called by his name (181 a 7 sqq.), Plato makes Laches express the high esteem in which Socrates was held in military circles, and all that would appeal strongly to the group of young men I am trying to characterize. The close of the war with Sparta had left them without any very definite occupation, and they were very ready to try their luck as soldiers of fortune. They were not all Athenians—the Thessalian Meno was one of them—and in any case they had no local
patriotism to speak of. They were willing to fight for any one who would employ them, and they were naturally attracted by a man who had not only given proof of bravery in the field, but had also a mysterious gift of foreseeing the chances of military adventures.

Nor would these young men think any the worse of Socrates because he was an object of suspicion to the leaders of the Athenian democracy. They were mostly hostile, if not actually disloyal, to the democracy themselves. They would certainly be impressed by the action of Socrates at the trial of the generals after Arginusae. Xenophon was very likely present on that occasion, and he mentions the matter with some emphasis in the *Hellenica* (i. 7. 15).

That Xenophon belonged to this group we may readily admit, without supposing him to have been a member of the more intimate Socratic circle. As we have seen, he can have had little time for that, and this makes his testimony to the existence of such an inner circle all the more valuable. In dealing with the charge that Critias and Alcibiades had been associates of Socrates, he points out that they were so only for a time and to serve their own ends. Besides these, and others like them, there were many who associated with Socrates in order to become good men, and not to further any political ambitions of their own. The names he gives—Crito, Chaerephon, Chaerecrates, Hermocrates, Simmias, Cebes, Phaedondas—are all familiar to the readers of Plato.

1 *Mem.* i. 2. 48. The mention of the Theban Phaedondas, of whom nothing is known (ep. 59 c 2 n.), might suggest the suspicion that Xenophon merely took his list from the *Phaedo*, were it not that Plato calls him *Phaedondes*, just as he calls Archytas *Archytes*. It almost seems as if Xenophon knew him personally by his Boeotian name.
With one doubtful exception,\(^1\) they are those of men whom he represents as supporting Socrates at the trial or in the prison or both.

Now, if Xenophon is here speaking from his own personal knowledge, he confirms the statements of Plato in the most remarkable way; for he bears witness to the existence of a circle of true disciples which included the Theban Pythagoreans, Simmias and Cebes. If, on the other hand, he has merely taken his list of names from Plato's *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo*, he must mean at the very least that Plato's account of the matter is quite in keeping with the memories of his youth. The reference to Simmias and Cebes in the conversation with Theodote (*Mem. iii. 11. 17*) shows further that he knew they had been attracted to Athens from Thebes by their desire to associate with Socrates, or at least that he accepted this as a true account of the matter.

There is nothing so far to suggest that Xenophon had any special information about Socrates, or that he was in any real sense his follower. His behaviour in the matter of the Delphic oracle is highly characteristic, and he tells the story himself. It represents him as a self-willed lad who thought he might guard against the consequences of his actions by getting a favourable response, no matter

\(^1\) Most editors follow Groen van Prinsterer in changing the MS. Ἐμοκφάτης to Ἐμογένης, which would bring Xenophon and Plato into complete agreement. It is to be observed, however, that, in the *Timaeus* and *Critias*, Plato represents Hermocrates as present, and that he meant to make him the leading speaker in the third dialogue of the trilogy. I do not think it likely that Plato should have invented an impossible meeting, and Hermocrates may have come to Athens and made the acquaintance of Socrates during his exile. If he did, the fact would certainly interest *Xenophon*. 

b 2
how, from the Pythia. That is quite human, and we need not be too severe upon him for it; but it hardly inspires confidence in him as a witness to the beliefs of Socrates about things unseen and eternal.

V

Turning a deaf ear to the warnings of Socrates, young Xenophon left Athens to join the expedition of Cyrus, and he never saw Socrates again. He had, therefore, no first-hand knowledge of his trial and death, while Plato was certainly present at the trial. Further, though it is just possible that Xenophon revisited Athens for a short time in the interval between his return from Asia and his fresh departure with Agesilaus, he spent practically all the rest of his life in exile. He was, therefore, far less favourably situated than Plato for increasing his knowledge of Socrates by conversation with others who had known him. Phaedo, indeed, was not far off at Elis, but he never mentions Phaedo at all. He might very easily have made inquiries among the Pythagoreans of Phlius; but, in spite of the exceptional sympathy he shows for Phlius in the Hellenica, he never says a word about Echecrates or any of them. We have seen that he does mention Simmias and Cebes twice (in both cases for a special purpose), but it is very significant that no conversations with them are reported in the Memorabilia. It seems to follow that Xenophon did not belong to the same circle as these men did, and we can very well believe his sympathy with them to have been imperfect. He does appear to have known Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus (Phaed. 59 b 7 n.), but that is apparently all.

Where, then, did he get the conversations recorded in
the Memorabilia? To a considerable extent they are discussions at which he cannot have been present, and which he had no opportunity of hearing about from oral tradition, as Plato may easily have done in similar cases. It does not seem probable that they are pure inventions, though he has given them an unmistakable colouring which is quite his own. In some cases they seem to be adaptations from Plato. It is difficult to believe that what he makes Socrates say about Anaxagoras, and the hazy account he gives of the method of hypothesis, have any other source than the Phaedo. It is highly probable that some of the conversations come from Antisthenes, though I think it a mistake to regard Antisthenes as his main source. We must bear in mind that there were many 'Socratic discourses', of which we get a very fair idea from what Wilamowitz calls 'the Socratic Apocrypha'. If we take up the Memorabilia when we are fresh from the Theages or the Clitopho (to the latter of which there seems to be an allusion in the Memorabilia), we shall find the book much easier to understand in many respects. If I mistake not, we shall have the feeling that Xenophon got the substance of many of his conversations from sources of this kind, and fitted these as well as he could into his own recollections of the

1 For Anaxagoras cp. Mem. iv. 7. 6 with Phaed. 97 b 8, and for ὑπόθεσις cp. Mem. iv. 6. 13 and Phaed. 92 d 6 u. That both passages are misunderstood proves nothing against this view.

2 Clitopho 408 d 2 πῶς ποτὲ ὑπὸδεχόμεθα τὴν Σωκράτους προτροπὴν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ ἀρετὴν; ὡς ὅταν μόνον τοῦτο, ἐπεξελθείν δὲ οὐκ ἐν τῷ πράγματι καὶ λαβεῖν αὐτὸ τελέσαι; . . . 410 b 4 νομίσας σε τὸ μὲν προτρέπειν εἰς ἀρετής ἐπιμέλειαν καλλιστὶ ἀνθρώπων δρᾶν . . . μακρότερον δὲ οὖν ἐν. Cp. Xen. Mem. i. 4. 1 Εἰ δὲ τινὲς Σωκράτην νομίζοντες, ὦς ἔνοι γράφοντες τε καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ τεκμαρφόμενοι, προτρέπασθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπως ἐπὶ ἀρετὴν κράτιστον γεγο- νέναι, προαγαγεῖν δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτὴν οὐξ ἵκανόν κτλ.
brave old man with the gift of second sight, whose advice he had sought in early life without any particular intention of taking it.

VI

It is not even necessary for our purpose to discuss the vexed question of Xenophon's veracity, though it is right to mention that, when he claims to have been an eye-witness, his statements are not to be trusted. At the beginning of his Symposium he says he was present at the banquet which he describes, though he must have been a child at the time.¹ He also claims in the Oeconomicus to have heard the conversation with Critobulus, in the course of which (4. 18 sqq.) Socrates discusses the battle of Cunaxa, though it is certain that Xenophon saw Socrates for the last time before that battle was fought. These things show clearly that we are not to take his claims to be a first-hand witness seriously, but the misstatements are so glaring that they can hardly have been intended to deceive. Xenophon was eager to defend the memory of Socrates; for that was part of the case against the Athenian democracy. He had to eke out his own rather meagre recollections from such sources as appealed to him most, those which made much of the 'divine sign' and the hardiness of Socrates, and occasionally he has to invent, as is obviously the case in the passage of the Oeconomicus referred to. When Plato

¹ The banquet is supposed to take place in 421/0 B.C. In Athenaeus 216d we are told that Xenophon was perhaps not born at that date, or was at any rate a mere child. It follows that Herodicus (a follower of Crates of Mallos), whom Athenaeus is here drawing upon, supposed Xenophon to have been only twenty years old at the time of the Anabasis. This is probably an exaggeration of his youth at that date.
reports conversations at which he cannot have been present, he is apt to insist upon the fact that he is speaking at second- or third-hand with what seems to us unnecessary elaboration, but Xenophon's manner is different. He says 'I was there', or 'I heard', but that is only to make the narrative vivid. We are not supposed to believe it.

VII

In view of all this, it is now pretty generally admitted that Xenophon's Socrates must be distinguished from the historical Socrates quite as carefully as Plato's. That seems to leave us with two fictitious characters on our hands instead of one, though of course it is allowed that in both cases the fiction is founded upon fact. But how are we to distinguish the one from the other? We require, it would seem, a third witness, and such a witness has been found in Aristotle. It is pointed out that he was a philosopher, and therefore better able to appreciate the philosophical importance of Socrates than Xenophon was. On the other hand, he was far enough removed from Socrates to take a calm and impartial view of him, a thing which was impossible for Plato. Where, therefore, Aristotle confirms Plato or Xenophon, we may be sure we have at last got that elusive figure, 'the historical Socrates'.

This method rests wholly, of course, on the assumption that Aristotle had access to independent sources of infor-

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1 Cp. especially the openings of the Parmenides and the Symposium.
2 This is the distinctive feature of Joel's method in his work entitled Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates. Though I cannot accept his conclusions, I must not be understood to disparage Joel's learning and industry.
INTRODUCTION

mation about Socrates. There can be no question of first-hand evidence; for Socrates had been dead fifteen years when Aristotle was born, and a whole generation had passed away before he came to Athens for the first time. He might certainly have learnt something from conversation with Plato and the older members of the Academy, and he might have read Socratic dialogues no longer extant. It is impossible to suggest any other source from which he could have derived his information, and these do not come to much. It is to be supposed that Plato and his friends would represent Socrates much as he appears in the dialogues, while the lost Socratic writings would not take him far beyond Xenophon.

In practice, too, this criterion proves of little value. Aristotle himself does not tell us a great deal, and the Aristotelian Socrates has to be reconstructed with the help of the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Magna Moralia*. This seriously vitiates the results of the method; for the considerations urged in support of Aristotle’s trustworthiness cannot be held to cover these later works. As to the remainder, Zeller is clearly right in his contention that Aristotle never says anything about Socrates which he might not have derived from works which are still extant.¹ There is no sign that he had even read the *Memorabilia*, and in fact the presumption is that, when Aristotle says ‘Socrates’, he regularly means the Socrates of Plato’s dialogues. No doubt, like all of us, he sometimes refers to the Platonic Socrates as Plato, but that is natural enough on any supposition; the really significant fact is that he so often calls him Socrates. Indeed, he was so much in the habit of regarding the dialogues

¹ *Phil. der Griechen* ii. 94, n. 4.
of Plato as 'discourses of Socrates' that he actually includes the *Laws* under this title. It is surely quite impossible to suppose that he really meant to identify the Athenian Stranger with Socrates. If he was capable of making a blunder like that, it would not be worth while to consider his evidence on the subject at all. It is far simpler to assume that, for Aristotle, Socrates was just the Platonic Socrates, and that, in speaking of the *Laws* as 'discourses of Socrates', he has made a slip which would be intelligible enough on that supposition, but wholly inexplicable on any other. If that is so, and if 'discourses of Socrates' meant to Aristotle 'dialogues of Plato', we can make no use of what he says to check the statements of Xenophon, and still less to support the view that the Platonic Socrates is unhistorical. Aristotle is always ready to criticize Plato, and if he had been in a position to contrast the real Socrates with Plato's, we may be sure he would have done so somewhere in unmistakable language.

It cannot be said either that Aristotle's statements as to what 'Socrates' really meant are of much help to us. He is by no means a good interpreter of philosophical views with which he is not in sympathy. He is, for instance, demonstrably unfair to the Eleatics, and the Platonic Socrates is almost equally beyond his range.

1 Pol. B. 6. 1265 a 11 το μεν ὅν περιττόν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Ἀθηναίου Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψόν καὶ τὸ καυστήρα καὶ τὸ ζητητικόν κτλ. Aristotle has just been speaking of the *Republic*, the paradoxes of which he also ascribes to Socrates, and he goes on to the *Laws* with these words: 1265 a 11 τῶν δὲ Νόμων τὸ μεν πλείον μέρος νόμοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, ὀλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν (sc. ὁ Ἀθηναίος). The editors say that the Athenian Stranger is identified with Socrates, and seem to be unconscious of the absurdity of such an identification.
It looks after all as if our only chance of learning anything about Socrates was from Plato, but we must of course subject his evidence to the same tests as we have applied to Xenophon and Aristotle. In the first place we must ask what opportunities he had of knowing the true Socrates. He is singularly reticent on this point in his dialogues. We learn from them that he was present at the trial of Socrates but not at his death, and that is all. He has completely effaced his own personality from his writings. We may note, however, that he likes to dwell on the fact that his kinsmen, Critias and Charmides, and his brothers, Glaucon and Adimantus, were intimate with Socrates.

Plato was twenty-eight years old when Socrates was put to death,¹ and we cannot doubt that he had known him from his boyhood. The idea that Plato first made the acquaintance of Socrates when he was grown up may be dismissed.² It is inconsistent with all we know about Athenian society, and especially that section of it to which Plato's family belonged. It was common for parents and guardians to encourage boys to associate with Socrates, and to beg Socrates to talk with them. Plato was the nephew of Charmides, and we know that

¹ This rests on the authority of Hermodorus (ap. Diog. Laert. iii. 6). Cp. p. ix, n. 1.

² The current story that Plato made the acquaintance of Socrates when he was twenty does not rest on the authority of Hermodorus at all, though it is quoted in Diogenes Laertius just before the statement referred to in n. 1. Others said that Plato associated with Socrates for ten years. Both figures, I take it, are arrived at by a calculation based on the solitary datum furnished by Hermodorus. Some counted from the beginning and others from the end of Plato's two years as an ἐφηβος. If that is so, there was no genuine tradition.
Charmides was warmly attached to Socrates when Plato was in his 'teens. Even later, as we know from Xenophon, Socrates prevented Glaucon from speaking in public before he was twenty, 'being well-disposed to him because of Charmides and Plato.'\(^1\) In these circumstances, it is inconceivable that Plato did not meet Socrates over and over again in the gymnasia and elsewhere. Xenophon may have known Socrates in this way too, but the presumption is far stronger in the case of Plato. Moreover, the son of Ariston would certainly be a far cleverer boy than the son of Gryllus, while his artistic susceptibility and his keen eye for the characteristic would be early developed. The sketches he has left us of the Master's way with boys in the gymnasia are too vivid to be wholly imaginary.

When he grew up, Plato does not seem to have left Athens. No doubt he saw some service; but he tells us himself that his ambitions were political,\(^2\) and by his time the political and military careers were quite distinct. If he had qualified himself, like Xenophon, to be a professional soldier, we should have known something about it.

\(^1\) We learn from the dialogue called by his name that Charmides came under the influence of Socrates as a boy, three or four years before the birth of Plato. We learn from Xenophon that he kept up the close relationship to him which began then. It was Socrates who did him the doubtful service of urging him to enter public life in spite of his shyness (Mem. iii. 7), and in the Symposium (1. 3) Xenophon represents him as associating with Socrates along with Critobulus, Hermogenes, and Antisthenes. He is made to say that he could associate more freely with Socrates when reduced to poverty by the war. For the conversation with Glaucon, cp. Mem. iii. 6. 1. These data cover the whole period of Plato's boyhood and early manhood.

\(^2\) Ep. vii. 324 b 8 sqq.
Plato, then, had exceptional opportunities of knowing Socrates, but this does not prove that he belonged to the inner Socratic circle.¹ The evidence does not carry us beyond the probability that he belonged to the group of young men—‘the sons of the richer citizens, who have most time to spare’²—who gathered round Socrates for the pleasure of hearing him expose the ignorance of pretenders to knowledge. That is a different group from the one to which Xenophon belonged, but it is equally well marked, and it is not the inner circle. We can infer no more from the passage in the Apology where Socrates offers to call Adimantus to prove that Plato had got no harm from associating with him.³ The fact that Phaedo thinks it necessary to explain Plato’s absence from the scene in the prison may mean a little more, but that refers to a later date.

If we regard the Seventh Epistle as Plato’s—and I do not see who else could have written it—the matter appears in a clearer light. Plato does not say a word in it about having been a disciple of Socrates, though he speaks of him as an older friend for whose character he had a profound admiration.⁴ His ambitions, as we have seen, were political, not scientific. He was in his twenty-fourth year when the Thirty were established, and his kinsmen urged him to take office under them; but the behaviour of Socrates in the affair of Leon of Salamis ⁵

¹ We cannot draw any inference from Xenophon’s omission of his name from the list. To mention the kinsman of Critias and Charmides would have spoilt the point he is trying to make.
² Apol. 23 c 2.
³ Apol. 34 a 1.
⁴ Ep. vii. 324 d 8 φίλον ἄνδρα ἐμοὶ πρεσβύτερον Σωκράτη, ὦν ἐγὼ σχεδὸν οὐκ ἀν αἰσχυνοίμην εἰπὼν δικαίωταν εἶναι τῶν τότε.
⁵ Ep. vii. 324 e 2 ἐπὶ τινα τῶν πολίτων μεθ’ ἐτέρων ἐπεμπον, διὰ ἄξονα ὡς
opened his eyes to the real character of the oligarchy. When the Thirty fell, he was at first impressed by the moderation of the restored democracy, and once more thought of entering public life, but the condemnation of Socrates proved to him that there was no hope in that direction either. 1 In fact, though his first awakening went back to the year of the Thirty, his final conversion dated only from the death of Socrates. He probably rose a new man from the sick-bed on which he was then lying. It would not be the only case of a man called to be an apostle after the death of his Master.

Such seems to me the most probable account of the relations between Socrates and Plato; but, even if he was not a disciple in the strict sense, his opportunities for learning to know Socrates as he really was were vastly greater than those of Xenophon. Above all, he was at Athens during the last two years of his life, while Xenophon was in Asia. So far as the Phaedo is concerned, the statement of our earliest authority, Hermodorus, that, after the death of Socrates, Plato threw in his lot with the Socratics and retired with them to Megara, the home of Euclides and Terpsion, is of the first importance. 2 We may be sure that he made it his business to hear every detail of the Master’s last words and actions from all who had been present, and he makes Phaedo express the delight they all took in speaking of him, while Echecrates

1 Ep. vii. 325 a 5 sqq. Plato says that he was prevented from entering public life by the impossibility of effecting anything without a party and the proved impossibility of acting with either party.

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voices the desire of all admirers of Socrates for exact information about him. That Plato was really in a position to give a full and true account of the day described in the *Phaedo* is not, therefore, open to doubt.

IX

Still, it will be said, the ancient idea of historical truth was so different from ours, that we cannot look for what is called an 'objective narrative' from such a writer as Plato. It is usual to refer to the speeches of Thucydides in support of this contention, and they are really rather to the point. It seems to me, however, that they prove something different from the position they are supposed to illustrate. Thucydides tells us that he has put into the mouth of each speaker the sentiments proper to the occasion, expressed as he thought he would be likely to express them, while at the same time endeavouring, as nearly as he could, to give the general purport of what was actually said.¹ Even that would carry us a considerable way in the case of the Platonic Socrates in the *Phaedo*. It would surely mean at the very least that Socrates discussed immortality with two Pythagoreans on his dying day, and that implies a good many other things.

But it is really the contrast between the speeches of Thucydides and the dialogues of Plato that is most instructive. Broadly speaking, all the orators in Thucydides speak in the same style. Even Pericles and Cleon can hardly be said to be characterized. In Plato

¹ Thuc. i. 22. Observe that he only professes to give τὰ δὲ οὕτω, what was called for by the occasion, not τὰ προούκοντα, what was appropriate to the character of the speakers.
we find just the opposite. Even the Eleatic Stranger and the speakers in the *Laws* have a character of their own, and only seem shadowy by contrast with the rich personalities of the earlier dialogues. This realism is just one of the traits which distinguishes the literature of the fourth century from that of the fifth. Aristotle had observed the existence of the new literary *genre* and calls attention to the fact that it had not received a name. It had two distinctive marks, it used prose for its instrument and it was an imitation. It included the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and also 'the Socratic discourses'.¹ This classification of the Platonic dialogue with the mime is one of Aristotle’s happiest thoughts. If the anecdotes which are told of Plato’s delight in Sophron are historical,² we can see what suggested it; but in any case, it is true. Plato’s dialogues really are mimes, but with this difference, that the characters are all real and well-known people. They are just the opposite of the speeches in Thucydides.

The critics have, no doubt, discovered a certain number of apparent anachronisms in the dialogues. It is said that, in the *Symposium* (193a 2), Plato makes Aristophanes refer to the διοικισμός of Mantinea which took place in 385 B.C., and that, in the *Meno* (90a 4), he makes Socrates refer to the enrichment of Ismenias by Persian gold as recent, whereas it happened after the death of Socrates. The latter instance, however, is extremely doubtful; for Ismenias was an important figure at Thebes considerably before the death of

¹ *Poet.* 1447b 2 sqq.
² The story that Socrates was a student and imitator of Sophron rests on the authority of Duris of Samos (FHG. ii, p. 480).
Socrates.\(^1\) and the former is probably a misunderstanding. Aristophanes does not mention Mantinea, and what he says about the διουκισμός of the Arcadians by Sparta may very well refer to the dissolution of the Arcadian Confederacy, which was quite recent when the banquet described in the *Symposium* is supposed to take place.\(^2\) For my part, I am quite ready to accept the dictum of Wilamowitz that there are no anachronisms in Plato; but, even if there were one or two of the kind just mentioned, they would be of little account. They would have to be regarded as slips which no one would have noticed unless he had been looking for them, and which do not detract in the least from the historical character of the dialogues in which they occur.

On the other hand, we must note certain positive features which show that Plato was not only a realist in his character-drawing, but had also a strong sense of historical perspective and a genuine feeling for historical values. In particular, he has avoided completely a very subtle form of anachronism. He has a wonderful way of keeping up the illusion that his dialogues belong to the pre-revolutionary period. The Revolutions of 404 and

\(^1\) Cp. E. Meyer, *Gesch. des Alterth.* v. §§ 854, 855. The chronology of the *Hellenica* is certainly at fault in regard to these transactions, and Persian gold may well have found its way to Thebes before the supposed date of the conversation described in the *Meno*.

\(^2\) Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. *Die Xenophontische Apologie*, Hermes xxxvi (1897), p. 102. n. 1. He points out that Plato does not make Aristophanes mention Mantinea at all, and that the allusion does not correspond to what we know of the Spartan treatment of Mantinea in 385 B.C. The Arcadian League struck coins with the superscription 'Αρκαδικόν, and these coins cease after the battle of 418 B.C. As the *Symposium* is supposed to take place in 416 B.C., Aristophanes is alluding in a natural way to an event then recent.
403 B. C. made a complete break in the politics and literature of Athens. A new world had arisen, and the carry-over, so to speak, was far less than at the French Revolution. There is hardly a single statesman or writer of the fifth century whose activity was prolonged into the fourth. Aristophanes is the exception that proves the rule; for the Aristophanes of the Ecclesiazusae and the Plutus is a different man from the Aristophanes of the Lysistrata and the Birds. It is important to realize this gap between the centuries and to keep it constantly in view if we wish to understand Plato's art.

The majority of the dialogues are supposed to take place before the Revolutions, and Plato never loses sight of this for a moment, though many of his personages came to play a leading part in the troubled times which he had cause to remember so vividly. Critias and Charmides were kinsmen of his own, and he must have been affected by the tragedy of the life of Alcibiades. Yet there is not the slightest hint of all this in the Charmides or the Symposium. Critias is still a cultured politician and poet; Charmides is still a modest and beautiful lad; Alcibiades is still at the height of his wild career. Coming events are not even suffered to cast their shadows before, as an inferior artist would have made them do. Like the great dramatist he was, Plato has transported himself back to the age of Pericles and the age of Alcibiades, and portrayed them as they seemed to the men who lived in them, not as they must have appeared to his contemporaries and to himself, when the glamour of the great time had passed away.

Nowhere, perhaps, is Plato's self-restraint in this respect better seen than in the picture he has drawn
of Aristophanes. It is almost the only one of his literary portraits which we can fully appreciate. We can form a fairly clear idea of Aristophanes from his comedies, and there can be no doubt that Plato's Aristophanes corresponds admirably to it. The Platonic Aristophanes is thoroughly Aristophanic, and this raises at least a presumption that the Platonic Socrates is Socratic. But, above all, what strikes us is the relation of good fellowship in which Socrates and Aristophanes stand to one another. The Clouds had been produced some years before, but they are still the best of friends. At that time, there was really no reason why Socrates should resent the brilliant caricature of Aristophanes, and Alcibiades does not hesitate to quote it in his encomium (Symp. 221 b 3). No one in these days would take a comedy too seriously. At a later date, things were rather different. Even if what Socrates is made to say about Aristophanes in the Apology is not to be taken quite literally, the Socratic circle must have felt some resentment against him after the condemnation. Yet Plato keeps all that out of sight; such thoughts belong to the fourth century and not to the fifth.

It seems to me that the reason why Plato's power of transporting himself back to an earlier time has met with such scant recognition is just the success with which he has done it. As we read him, we can hardly realize that he is calling up a time which was passing away when he himself was a boy. The picture is so actual that we feel it must be contemporary. That is why so many writers on Plato speak as if the first half of the fourth century ran concurrently with the second half of the fifth.¹ They

¹ It is no wonder that lesser writers should be deceived, seeing that
think of Plato as the adversary of the 'Sophists', though, when he wrote, there were no longer any sophists in the sense intended. They were merely memories in his day; for they had no successors. Even Thrasymachus belongs to the generation which flourished when Plato was a child.¹ So, too, the problems discussed in the dialogues

Eduard Meyer, who has done more than any one to make the historical background of Plato's life intelligible, falls under the illusion. He says (Gesch. des Alterthums, vol. iv, p. 429) that the Symposium¹ proves nothing as to the relations of Socrates with Aristophanes, but only as to those of Plato. . . . Two such diametrically opposed natures as Socrates and Aristophanes could have no relations with one another, but it is quite natural that Plato and Aristophanes should have found and understood each other'. He finds a confirmation of this in the Ecclesiazusae, which he regards as a parody of Plato's Republic, but which he says is quite free from the bitterness and malice of the Clouds, so that Plato and Aristophanes may have been on excellent terms. Now Meyer also holds (loc. eit.) that Aristophanes was in earnest when he attacked Socrates, and that Plato was quite right in ascribing the chief responsibility for his master's death to him. We must apparently believe then that, some half-dozen years after the death of Socrates (the Ecclesiazusae was probably produced in 392 B.C.), and within a few years of the time he wrote the Phaedo, Plato 'found and understood' the man whom he rightly regarded as mainly responsible for the death of Socrates, and then thought it appropriate to write a dialogue in which he represents Socrates and Aristophanes as boon companions. If that can be true, anything may. The fact is that the Aristophanes whom Plato might very well have 'found and understood' is just the Aristophanes of the Symposium, not the revenant who wrote the Ecclesiazusae and the Plutus. But Plato was only a baby when the Clouds was produced, and a mere boy at the time the Symposium took place. What we may really infer is that the references to Aristophanes in the Apology are little more than Socratic persiflage like the similar allusion in the Phaedo itself (70 c 1), and that Plato knew very well that Aristophanes was not in earnest, and that no one supposed he was. Constantin Ritter has, in my opinion, put this matter in a truer light (Platon, i, p. 50, n. 1).

¹ Thrasymachus is about the last representative of the 'Sophists' (though Plato never gives him that name), and he was early enough to be satirized in the Δαιταλής, the first comedy which Aristophanes wrote. That was in 427 B.C., before Plato had learned to speak. It is improbable
are those which were of interest at the time they are supposed to take place. That of the Strong Man, for instance, which is the subject of the *Gorgias*, belongs to the end of the fifth century. It is also the theme of the *Herakles* of Euripides.

It naturally follows from this that, when Plato does wish to discuss questions which had come up in his own time, he is quite conscious of the impropriety of making Socrates the leading speaker. If we adopt the chronology of the dialogues now generally received, the *Theaetetust* is, with one striking exception, the latest in which Socrates leads the discussion. In the *Parmenides*, he is quite a youth, and the immature character of his views is shown by Parmenides and Zeno. In form, the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* are a sequel to the *Theaetetus*; but Socrates, though present, takes hardly any part in the argument, which is conducted by an anonymous stranger from Elea. The *Timaeus* and the *Critias* profess in the same way to continue the *Republic*, but here too Socrates is no more than an 'honorary president', as a recent writer puts it. We can see that the same was meant to be the case in the *Hermocrates*, a dialogue which Plato designed but never wrote. In the *Laws*, Socrates disappears altogether, and his place is taken by an 'Athenian Stranger' who seems really to be Plato himself. The only exception to this rule is the *Philebus*, and that exception is easily accounted for, as the dialogue deals with subjects which Plato makes Socrates discuss elsewhere. In fact the *Philebus* is the crucial case. It must

that he was still living when Plato began to write, and the theories which he is made to uphold in the *Republic* are not such as any one is likely to have maintained in the fourth century.
be later than some, at least, of the dialogues just mentioned, and the fact that Plato once more makes Socrates take the lead shows that it was solely in the interests of historical verisimilitude that he refrained from doing so in other dialogues.

X

Of course, if we are to regard Plato as our best authority, we shall have to revise our estimate of Socrates as a philosopher. The need for such a revision has long been felt, though it has never been taken thoroughly in hand. Even before Hegel laid down that Xenophon was our only authority for the philosophy of Socrates, Schleiermacher had suggested a much more fruitful method of studying the question.¹ He started from the consideration that, as Xenophon himself was no philosopher, and as the Memorabilia does not profess to be anything more than a defence of Socrates against certain definite accusations, we are entitled to assume that Socrates may have been more than Xenophon is able to tell us, and that there may have been other sides to his teaching than Xenophon thinks it convenient to disclose in view of his immediate purpose. He goes on to show that Socrates must have been more than Xenophon tells us, if he was to exercise the attraction he did upon the ablest and most speculative men of his time. The question, then, is: 'What may Socrates have been, besides what Xenophon tells us of him, without, however, contradicting the traits of character and principles of life which Xenophon definitely sets up as Socratic; and what must he have

¹ Ueber den Werth des Sokrates als Philosophen (Works, Section III, vol. ii, pp. 287 sqq.).
been to give Plato the occasion and the right to represent him as he does in his dialogues?’ This is surely the proper light in which to regard the question, and it was formally acknowledged to be so by Zeller, though the consequences of so regarding it have not been fully recognized. I would only add one more question to Schleiermacher’s, and it is quite in harmony with his method. We must ask, I think, very specially ‘What must Socrates have been to win the enthusiastic devotion of the Pythagoreans of Thebes and Phlius and of the Eleatics of Megara?’ That question is forced upon us by any serious study of the *Phaedo*, and the answer to it reveals Socrates to us in a very different light from Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*.

XI

For one thing, this consideration suggests that Socrates cannot have stood aloof from the scientific movement of his time. Xenophon does not really say that he did. He tells us, indeed, that Socrates dissuaded his friends from spending their lives in the study of higher mathematics and astronomy, but he adds in both cases that Socrates was not unversed in these subjects himself. It would be quite like Socrates to tell a young man to leave these things alone till he had learnt to know himself, and that would account for all Xenophon says.¹ Nor does

¹ *Mem.* iv. 7. 3 καίτω δέ όνδε τούτων γε αὐτών ἢν (sc. τῶν δυσαννέτων διαγραμμάτων, as Xenophon quaintly calls them), ib. 5 καίτων οὔδε τούτων γε ἀνήκοος ἢν (sc. the planetary orbits, their distances from the earth, the times of their revolutions and their causes, i.e. the whole higher astronomy of the Pythagoreans). Certainly Socrates held that there was something more important than this knowledge, and what Xenophon tells us as to his advice not to waste one’s life in such studies would be amply accounted for by the recollection of some such saying as that re-
Aristotle say anything inconsistent with the account given by Socrates of his intellectual development in the Phaedo (96 a 6 sqq.). He only says that he applied his new method of universal definitions to ethical subjects alone; and, as the Phaedo represents the discovery of the new method as subsequent to the scientific studies of Socrates, there is no contradiction at all. On the other hand, the narrative in the Phaedo is confirmed in a striking way by our earliest witness, Aristophanes. As was pointed out long ago by F. A. Wolf, Socrates was only about forty-five years old, and Plato and Xenophon were babies, when the Clouds came out (423 B.C.), and it is quite possible that Socrates was still known chiefly as a student of natural science at that time. The really decisive argument, however, is this, that, if we take the Phaedo and the Clouds seriously, making due allowance for comic exaggeration in the latter, we get an account of the scientific position of Socrates which fits exactly into what we know of the intellectual atmosphere of the middle of the fifth century B.C., and which would be inconceivable at any other date.

In the first place, the cosmological theories burlesqued in the Clouds are mainly those of Diogenes of Apollonia, who had revived the theory of Anaximenes that Air was...
the primary substance. 1 Indeed, the whole comedy is based on this. According to Diogenes, Air condenses into Mist, and becomes visible in the form of Clouds. That is why the Clouds are the divinities of the Socratic school. 2 Further, Diogenes held that Air was ‘what we think with’, and that is why Socrates swings aloft in the air. The damp of the earth would clog his thought. 3 The theories of Diogenes were fashionable at Athens when Socrates was a young man, and it would only be natural for him to adopt them at that date.

Another influence with which we must reckon is that of the Anaxagorean Archelaus. The statement that Socrates was his disciple is far too well attested to be ignored. Ion of Chios apparently said that he visited Samos with Archelaus, and in any case the statement was known to Aristoxenus and (what is more important) to Theophrastus. 4 It is, therefore, no Alexandrian fragment. Archelaus is not mentioned in the Phaedo by

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Cp. also E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 408, n. 3.
2 See E. Gr. Ph. 2 pp. 409 sqq.
3 Cp. Phaedo 96 b 4 n. and Clouds 225 sqq. where Socrates explains that he could not rightly have discovered ‘the things aloft’, εἶ μὴ κρεμᾶσας τὸ νόμμα καὶ τὴν φροντίδα ἵνα τὸν ὁμοίων áéρα. If he had tried to do so on the ground, he would have failed οὗ γαρ ἀλλ’ ἦ γὰρ βία | ἐλευθεροαντίθεν τὴν ηλιακὴν τῆς φροντίδος. Cp. Theophrastus, de Sens. 44 (of Diogenes) φρονεῖν δ’, ὡσπερ ἐλέχθη, τῷ ἀέρι καθαρῷ καὶ κηρῷ, κοινῷ γὰρ τὴν ἡλιακὴν τοῦ νοῦν.
4 Diog. Laert. ii. 22 Ἰων δὲ ὁ Χίος καὶ νέον ὄντα (sc. Σωκράτης) εἰς Σάμον συν Ἀρχέλαω ἀποδημήσας. Ion may, however, have meant another Socrates, as Wilamowitz suggests (Philol. Unters. i. 24), viz. Socrates of Anagyrus, who was a colleague of Pericles and Sophocles in the Samian War. For the evidence of Aristoxenus, see Diels, Vors. 2 p. 323. 34 sqq. For Theophrastus, cp. Diels, Dox. p. 479. 17 Καὶ Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Αθηναῖος, ὁ καὶ Σωκράτης αὐτογεγομέναι φασίν, Ἀναβατόροι γενομένα μαθηταί. See also Chiapelli in Arch. f. Gesch. der Phil. iv, pp. 369 sqq.
name, but Socrates says he had heard the book of Anaxagoras read aloud by 'some one' and had been deeply impressed by it (97 b 8 sqq.).

The narrative in the Phaedo goes on to tell us how Socrates grew dissatisfied with the doctrines of Anaxagoras. That also is characteristic of the time. Gorgias certainly, and Protagoras probably, had given up science in the same way. And we can see pretty clearly that the dialectic of the Eleatic Zeno was what shook the faith of all three. In the Parmenides, Plato has told us this of Socrates in so many words, while the problem of the unit, which had been raised by Zeno, holds a prominent place in the enumeration of his doubts and difficulties in the Phaedo (ɛ6 e 7 sqq.).

But there is another influence at work and from a different quarter. In the Phaedo there are several references to the doctrines of Empedocles. Socrates was in doubt whether 'what we think with' was Air or Blood (96 b 4). The latter was the doctrine of Empedocles, and Aristotle tells us it was adopted by Critias. What is more important still is that Socrates was troubled in his youth by the question whether the earth was flat or round (97 d 8), and that implies Pythagorean influence. The philosophers of Ionia all held that the earth was flat, and it was only from some Italian source that Socrates could have learned the other theory.

1 Cp. E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 417. Gorgias had been an Empedoclean (ib. p. 234, n. 4), and Plato at least suggests that Protagoras had been a Heraclitean (ib. p. 188). The experience of Socrates was only one effect among others of the 'bankruptcy of science' in the middle of the fifth century (ib. 406).

2 Arist. de An. A. 2. 405 b 6. As Empedocles joined the Athenian colony of Thurii in 444 B.C., his views may easily have become known at Athens.

3 Cp. 97 d 8 u.
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This influence of Western cosmological ideas upon Socrates is confirmed in a curious way by Aristophanes. It is quite natural that Socrates should be classed with those who busy themselves with 'things aloft' (τὰ μετέωρα), but we regularly find that 'the things beneath the earth' (τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς) are associated with these in his case.¹ Now it was Empedocles who first paid much attention to the subterranean. The volcanic phenomena of Sicily and the Orphic interest in the House of Hades both led him to dwell upon the question of the earth's interior,² and this double interest is beautifully brought out in the closing myth of the Phaedo. Aristophanes knows this point too, and his words ἐρεβοδιφόσιν ὑπὸ τῶν Τάρταρων³ might have been written in ridicule of the very theories which Plato has put into the mouth of Socrates at the end of our dialogue.

Further details as to the science of the Phaedo will be found in the notes; here I only wish to point out that the curious fusion of Ionian and Western theories which characterizes it is inexplicable unless we regard it as belonging to Athens in the middle of the fifth century B.C. At no other date, and in no other place, could such a fusion well have taken place.⁴

¹ Cp. Apol. 18 b 7 τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστῆς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς πάντα ἀνεξητηκώς. Clouds 188 ζητούσιν ὑπὸ τὰ κατὰ γῆς.
³ Clouds 102. The interest of the myth in the Phaedo is mainly eschatological, but it also gives us a complete theory of τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, explaining incidentally tides, volcanoes, earthquakes, and the like. The subterranean rivers are specially Empedoclean.
⁴ The Ionians remained unaffected by the more scientific cosmology of the West. Democritus still believed that the earth was a disk hollow in the centre. As explained in the note to Phaedo 109 b 3, the theory of Socrates represents an attempt to combine this view with the theory of a spherical earth. At any date earlier or later than that of Socrates.
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XII

According to the Phaedo, when Socrates gave up natural science in despair, he found satisfaction in what is generally known as the Theory of Ideas. I have tried to explain this theory simply in the Notes, so far as such an explanation is necessary for a right understanding of the Phaedo; we have only to do here with the fact that it is represented in our dialogue as already familiar to Socrates and all his associates, whereas it is generally held to be a specifically Platonic doctrine, and one which was not even formulated by Plato in any dialogue earlier than the Phaedo itself. This is evidently a problem of the first magnitude and cannot be treated fully here. I can only restate the conclusion to which I have come elsewhere, namely, that the doctrine in question was not originated by Plato, or even by Socrates, but is essentially Pythagorean, as Aristotle tells us it was.¹ A few further considerations, which tend to confirm this view are, however, strictly pertinent to the present inquiry.

We have seen that there was a point beyond which Plato did not think it right to go in making Socrates the leader of his dialogues. Now, if the 'Ideal Theory' had originated with himself, and if, as is commonly believed, it was the central thing in his philosophy, we should certainly expect the point at which Socrates begins to take a subordinate place to be that at which the theory is introduced. What we do find is exactly the opposite.

such an attempt would have been an anachronism, and it is only at Athens that it would seem worth making. The Ionians did not trouble themselves about a spherical earth nor the Westerns about a flat one.

¹ E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 354 sqq.
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The dialogues where Socrates falls into the background are just those in which the ‘Ideal Theory’ is criticized, or in which nothing at all is said about it; where it is assumed and affirmed, Plato has no hesitation in making Socrates its mouthpiece. Indeed, with one remarkable and significant exception, no speaker but Socrates is ever made to expound the doctrine at all, and the exception is the Pythagorean Timaeus.¹

It has been said that to question Plato’s authorship of the ‘Ideal Theory’ is ‘to deprive him of his birthright’. It is at any rate a birthright he has never claimed; indeed, he has done everything in his power to bar any such claim on his part. He has made Socrates discuss the theory with Parmenides and Zeno almost a generation before his own birth, and he has indicated that it was not unknown to the Eleatics. Nor is it only Socrates who is represented as familiar with the theory. In the Phaedo, the Theban Pythagoreans, Simmias and Cebes, know all about it and are enthusiastic believers in it. Men of such divergent views as Antisthenes and Euclides of Megara are present, but no one asks for a proof of it, or even for an explanation. It is simply taken for granted. When Phaedo repeats all this to the Pythagoreans at Phlius, the same thing happens. Echecrates, who shows himself anxious for exact information on other points, asks no questions about this one. As I have argued elsewhere (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 355), it is surely incredible that any philosopher should introduce a novel

¹ Tim. 51c 4 εἶναι τι φαμεν εἴδος ἑκάστου νοητῶν. Here we have the ‘we’, which is such a marked feature of the discussions of the Phaedo, and this time it is used by a Pythagorean. The Timaeus was written years after the Phaedo, but it still preserves the old way of speaking.
theory of his own by representing it as already familiar to a number of distinguished living contemporaries, and that in reporting a conversation at which he distinctly states he was not present.

Plato's own contribution to philosophy is a great enough thing, quite apart from the theory of 'forms' expounded in the *Phaedo*. This is not the place to discuss it, but it seems worth while to consider how it has come about that in modern times the 'Ideal Theory' of the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* has often been regarded as practically the whole of it. In the first place, about the middle of the nineteenth century, most of the dialogues from which we can learn anything of Plato's riper thought, the dialogues in which Socrates no longer takes the leading part, were declared to be spurious. In the second place, the importance of Plato's oral teaching in the Academy, which did not find full expression in his dialogues, was seriously underrated. This was due to a natural reaction against the theory of an 'esoteric doctrine', which had been much abused; but it cannot really be disputed that many of Plato's fundamental doctrines were only expounded orally. Aristotle over and over again attributes to him precise statements which may be implicit in the later dialogues, but are certainly not to be found there in so many words. The task of reconstructing Plato's mature philosophy from the unsympathetic criticisms of Aristotle is a delicate but not, I believe, an impossible one.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the later dialogues were reinstated one by one in the positions from which they had been thrust, and a serious attempt was made to understand Aristotle's criticism of Plato.
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It was assumed that there was a 'later theory of Ideas' which in many respects contradicted that set forth in the Phaedo and the Republic, and this had one very salutary effect, that of directing attention once more to those dialogues which had always been held in antiquity to contain the genuine philosophy of Plato. At the same time, I am convinced that the theory of an earlier and later theory of Ideas is only a half-way house. Aristotle knows nothing of such a distinction, and he would have delighted to insist upon it if he had. The time has come, I believe, for a return to the older and better view. I prefer, accordingly, not to speak of 'Plato's earlier theory of Ideas', because I do not believe the theory was Plato's at all; and I prefer not to speak of 'Plato's later theory of Ideas', because I am not clear that Platonism proper is adequately described as a 'theory of Ideas', however true it may be that it is based on the Pythagorean doctrine to which alone that name is really appropriate.  

1 This view is specially associated with the name of Professor Henry Jackson. Though I cannot accept all his results, I must not be taken to undervalue his great services to Platonic study. The genuineness of Plato's later dialogues was first clearly established by my predecessor, Professor Lewis Campbell. 

2 Aristotle is commonly said to have denied that Socrates held 'the theory of Ideas', but there is really no such statement in all his writings. What he does say is that Socrates did not make universals 'separate' (χωριστά) from particulars, and that is quite true of the Platonic Socrates. In the Parmenides he is represented as puzzled about the precise relation of the forms to particular things, and in the Phaedo (100 d 5) he is not sure whether παρουσία or κοινωνία is the right term. So, too, particulars 'partake in' or 'imitate' the forms: but always and everywhere the particular thing is what it is because the εἶδος is immanent in it. We know from Plato's Sophist that there were 'friends of the εἶδος' who did 'separate' the intelligible from the sensible, and it is with these that Aristotle contrasts Socrates. The true Peripatetic interpretation is preserved
It remains to be added that I have only discussed in the notes that aspect of the theory of Ideas with which we are concerned in reading the *Phaedo*. So far as that dialogue goes, it is a purely logical and scientific doctrine. The possibility of science extends just as far as the theory of Ideas will carry us and no further. Where it can no longer be applied, the region of myth begins. I am well aware that the doctrine has another aspect, to which attention has been specially called by Professor Stewart. In certain dialogues the Ideas are regarded as objects of ecstatic contemplation, and appear, to some extent, in a mythical setting. With that we have nothing to do at present. I may say, however, to avoid misunderstanding, that, while I quite agree with the demand for a 'psychological' explanation of this way of presenting the doctrine, I can by no means admit that the explanation is to be looked for in the *ψυχή* of Plato son of Ariston. The idea of ecstatic vision is most prominent in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, that is to say, in just those dialogues where Plato's dramatic art is at its best, and where, therefore, if my general principles of interpretation are sound, Socrates is most truly Socrates. The soul of the man who stood transfixed in silent, brooding thought for twenty-four hours in the camp at Potidaea is surely the soul to which we must look for a psychological explanation of the beatific vision described in the *Phaedrus*. On what else can his thoughts by Aristocles the teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias (fr. i) Ὢχ ἡμιστα δὲ καὶ Σωκράτης, αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐγένετο πῦρ ἐπὶ πυρί, καθάπερ αὐτὸς ἐφι Πλάτων. εὐφυέστατος γὰρ ὁ καὶ δεινὸς ἀπορήσαι περὶ παντὸς ὀτύνουν, ἱπειδήνεγκε τάς τε ἡθικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς σκέψεις, ἐτὶ δὲ τὴν περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν, πρῶτος ἐπιξειρήσας ὁρίζεσθαι πάντα δὲ ἐγείρον λόγον καὶ περὶ πάντων ζητῶν, ἐφθη τελευτήσας.
have been concentrated during that day and night? Surely not on the things he discusses in the Memorabilia?

XIII

The best book on Greek beliefs about the soul has no chapter on Socrates. Even Plato, the writer says, had not clearly conceived the thought of immortality so long as he continued to regard the world from the standpoint of a slightly developed Socraticism. This view is based on two considerations. It is said, in the first place, that in the Apology Plato makes Socrates treat the question of immortality as an open one, and that the Apology is more historical than the Phaedo. In the second place, it is pointed out that Xenophon does not make Socrates say anything about immortality in the Memorabilia. The inference is that the belief was foreign to 'the historical Socrates'.

When, however, we look a little closer at these facts, their significance is seen to be rather different. Plato's Apology professes to give us the speeches delivered by Socrates at his trial; and, though it would be absurd to treat it as a word for word report, it is doubtless historical in its main outlines. Even if it is not, it is clear that Plato has taken pains to make it such a speech as might actually have been delivered in an Athenian court, and it is quite certain from the practice of the orators that, in addressing the judges, it was impossible to assume immortality as distinct from mere survival. The old belief in powerful and dangerous ghosts had disappeared, and nothing very definite had

1 E. Rohde, Psyche, ii, p. 265 (557).
2 As Gomperz puts it, the Apology is 'stilisierte Wahrheit'.
taken its place. No doubt the average Athenian would allow that the souls of the departed had some sort of existence—the religious observances connected with the dead imply that—but he had lost all faith in the primitive belief that they continued to interest themselves in the affairs of this world. 'If by any means,' says Demosthenes, 'the departed should be made aware of what is now taking place,' and that is the standing formula.¹ Nor is there any evidence that people thought of the next life as a better life, or of the house of Hades as a better world. It was believed, indeed, that those who had been initiated at Eleusis enjoyed a better lot than others. They alone could properly be said to live after death; but even that was a shadowy sort of life, and as far removed as possible from the immortality preached by the Orphic sectaries and the Pythagoreans. According to them, the soul was divine and immortal in its own right, and it was only after separation from the body that it could become truly itself. The soul of the Orphic votary dwelt with God and the saints and attained to complete purity and wisdom, while the initiated of Eleusis were at best a class of privileged shades.

Had there been any real belief in a better life, it must have found expression in the Funeral Speeches, and especially in that part of them which was regularly devoted to the consolation of the survivors²; but we

¹ Cp. Dem. Lept. 87 εἰ τινὲς τούτων τῶν τετελευτηκότων λάβοιεν τρόπῳ τινὶ τοῦ νυνὶ γεγονόμενον πράγματος αἰσθήσιον. At the end of his speech against Eratosthenes (100) Lysias goes so far as to say οἴματε δ' αὐτοῖς (τούς τεθνεὼσας) ἡμῶν τε ἀκραοέσθαι καὶ ἰμάς εἰσεθαί τὴν ψήφον φέροντας, which is the strongest statement in the orators. Cp. also Isocr. 19. 42 εἰ τίς ἐστιν αἰσθήσις τοῖς τεθνεῶσι περὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε γεγονόμενων, Plato, Menex. 248 b 7 εἰ τίς ἐστι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσιν αἰσθήσις τῶν ζώντων.

² Rohde, Psyche, ii, p. 203 (495), n. 3.
find nothing of the sort even in the *Menexenus*, which is put into the mouth of Socrates. The writer, whether Plato or another, has felt bound to conform to the usual practice in this respect. Nor is there any trace in Aeschylus or Sophocles of a belief in a blessed immortality. It is Euripides who says 'Who knows if *life* be death and death be *life*?', and is laughed at by Aristophanes for doing so. We see from this how foreign such a thought was to the Athenian mind. Euripides, like Socrates, had been influenced by strange doctrines, and he, like Socrates, was considered 'im- pious'.

In the *Apology*, then, Socrates only speaks as he was bound to speak. He wishes to show that death is no evil to a good man, even if the ordinary view of it is correct. At the worst, it is a dreamless sleep, and a night of dreamless sleep is better than most waking days. But that is only one possibility. There are certain 'sayings' according to which death is really a migration of the soul to another world; and, if these are true, we may hope after death to join the company of Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer. It is surely clear that Socrates himself is more in sympathy with this belief than the other, though he may not say so in as many words, and though he speaks with a certain reserve on the subject. Even in the *Phaedo* he makes certain reservations. He is sure that the soul is immortal, and that the purified soul only leaves the

1 This, and not 'popular opinion', I take to be the meaning of τὰ λεγόμενα in *Apol.* 40c7, d6. Cp. notes on *Phaedo* 63c6 and 70c5. The term belongs originally to the language of the mysteries, in which τὰ λεγόμενα are opposed to τὰ δρώμενα, and is used elsewhere in Plato of the mystic doctrine or ἱερὸς λόγος.
body to be with the wise and good God; he is not sure that it will enjoy the company of the saints and heroes of old.\(^1\) Both in the *Phaedo* and elsewhere he steadily declines to commit himself to the details of the Orphic doctrine. It is a ‘probable tale’, and we may hope that it, or something like it, is true. In this respect the *Phaedo* does not go a step further than the *Apology*, and the language of the *Apology* really implies the belief explicitly stated in the *Phaedo*. Whatever concessions he may make for the sake of argument, Socrates lets it be clearly seen that his beliefs about the soul are not those of the man in the street.

The same considerations help to explain the silence of Xenophon in the *Memorabilia*. He is seeking to prove that the belief of Socrates about the gods was just the same as that of other pious people,\(^2\) and it would never have done to suggest that he held peculiar views about the soul. The doctrine of the soul’s immortality was, and remained, a heresy. Even Plato’s brother Glaucon is represented in the *Republic* as startled when Socrates propounds it as something he seriously believes and thinks he can prove.\(^3\) And yet Xenophon knew the doctrine perfectly well. Even in the *Memorabilia*, he lets slip the statement that the soul ‘partakes in the divine’, a phrase which really implies the whole theory.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) *Phaed.* 63c 1.

\(^2\) Mem. i. 1. 3 ὅ ὁ δ’ οὐδὲν καυνότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων κτλ.

\(^3\) Rep. 608 d 3 οὐκ ἠθησαί, ἵνα δ’ ἐγώ, ὅτι ἄδανατος ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐ-δέποτε ἀπόλλυται;—Καὶ δὲ εἰμβλέψας μοι καὶ θαυμάσας ἐτέρι Μὰ Δι’, οὐκ ἐγώγε· σὺ δὲ τοῦτ’ ἔχεις λέγειν;

\(^4\) Mem. iv. 3. 14 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχῆ, ἡ, εἰπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἄνθρωπίνων, τοῦ θείου μετέχει, ὅτι μὲν βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῖν φανερῶν, ὃρᾶται δὲ οὗτ’ αὐτῆ. The invisibility and divine nature of the soul are just the
Further, this view, which could not safely be developed in the Memorabilia, is worked out at considerable length in the Cyropaedia, where the dying Cyrus is made to formulate it in language almost identical with that of the Phaedo. Of this fact there can only be two explanations. Either Xenophon is borrowing from the Phaedo, or Plato and Xenophon are drawing from a common source. Further, this source must be Socratic; for the kinship of the dying speech of Cyrus with the argument about the invisibility of the soul ascribed to Socrates in the Memorabilia is patent. It is possible that Xenophon derived it from Hermogenes, from whom he professes to have heard what he knew of the trial and death of Socrates; but, on the whole, it is more likely points made in Phaedo 79 b 1 and 80 a 8, while βασιλεύει refers to the argument of Phaedo 79 e 8. Cp. Rohde, Psyche, ii, p. 2 (205). 'If the soul is immortal, it is in its essential property identical with God. Among the Greeks, whoever says immortal says God; these are interchangeable notions. Now in the religion of the Greek people the true fundamental proposition is that, in the divine order of the world, humanity and divinity are locally and essentially distinct and must remain so. A deep gulf separates the worlds of man and God.' Even so innocent-looking a phrase as τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχει ignores this gulf, and therefore implies the mystic doctrine. There are some other passages about the ψυχή which seem to be reminiscences of the Phaedo. Cp. i. 2. 4 τήν τής ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν ὡς ἐμπυκίζειν (cp. Phaed. 65 a 10), i. 4. 13 τήν ψυχήν κρατιστήν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέψυξε (ὁ θεὸς), i. 2. 53 τής ψυχῆς ἐξελοίσης, ἐν ἡ μοῖρῃ γίνεται φρόνησις. These go far beyond the popular use of the word ψυχή.


2 Cp. Cyr. vii. 7. 17 οὔτε γὰρ νῦν τοι τήν γὗ ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ἑωράτη with the passage about the invisibility of the soul quoted p. li., n. 4.

3 Xen. Apol. 2.
that he simply took it from the *Phaedo*, adding some
touches of his own. If so, he at least knew nothing
inconsistent with the ascription of such arguments to
Socrates.

But we can go much further than this. We have
positive evidence, dating from a time when Plato and
Xenophon were children, that Socrates was commonly
believed to hold strange doctrine about the soul. In the
*Clouds* of Aristophanes (v. 94), Strepsiades says, pointing
to the house of Socrates—

\[ \psi\nu\chi\omega\nu\, \sigma\sigma\omicron\omicron\omicron\upsilon\, \tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\tau^1 \, \epsilon\omicron\sigma\tau\iota\, \phi\rho\omicron\nu\tau\iota\omicron\omicron\tau\iota\omicron\upsilon\rho\iota\nu, \]

and, however natural such a way of speaking may appear
to us, it was not natural for an ordinary Greek in the fifth
century B.C. It is sufficiently established that the use of
the word \( \psi\nu\chi\eta \) to express a living man's true personality
is Orphic in its origin, and came into philosophy from
mysticism. Properly speaking, the \( \psi\nu\chi\eta \) of a man is
a thing which only becomes important at the moment
of death. In ordinary language it is only spoken of as
something that may be lost; it is, in fact, 'the ghost'
which a man 'gives up'. Yet we find Aristophanes
trying to raise a laugh by representing Socrates and his
disciples as 'souls' or 'ghosts' even in their lifetime.\(^1\)

\(^1\) The *φιλِψυχος* is the man who clings to life. To risk one's life is
\( \theta\epsilon\iota\nu, \tau\rho\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota\nu, \kappa\omega\nu\delta\upsilon\nu\epsilon\iota\epsilon\iota\upsilon\omega\nu\, \pi\epsilon\rho\iota\, \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\). Cp. Rohde, *Psyche*, i, p. 47 (43), n. 1; ii, p. 141 (432), n. 1. From Homer downwards, the \( \psi\upsilon\chi\eta \) is so regarded;
wherever it means more than this, we may trace the influence of mysti-
cism or philosophy.

\(^2\) Cp. van Leeuwen, *ad loc.* 'innuit non vivos vegetosque illic habitare
homines sed mera e\( \iota\delta\alpha\)\( \lambda\alpha\) k\( \alpha\mu\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\omega\), vek\( \iota\nu\)\( \circ\nu\)\( \epsilon\omega\theta\epsilon\phi\iota\nu\) quaedam \( \dot{\alpha} \mu\nu\nu\nu\dot{\eta} \dot{\alpha} \dot{\alpha} \kappa\alpha\rho\eta\nu\) quibus
φ\( \rho\iota\iota\epsilon\iota\upsilon\circ\nu \epsilon\iota\mu\epsilon\iota\delta\iota\iota\epsilon\iota\upsilon\nu\iota\nu, \) Socrati \( \psi\nu\chi\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\iota\dot{\omicron} \) (Av. 1555 qui locus omnino est
conferendus) obtemperantia. Cf. infra vs. 504. ubi unus ex eorum numero
dicitur \( \dot{\eta} \mu\iota\nu\nu\nu\)\. This is the popular view of the *μελέτη θανάτου* (81 a 1)
See note on θανάτωσι, *Phaed*. 64 b 5.
The same point is made in the chorus of the *Birds* where Socrates is represented as calling up the souls of the dead.¹ This, at any rate, cannot be aimed at 'the Sophists', and the caricature would be wholly pointless unless the real Socrates taught even at that date something like the doctrine of immortality and the 'practice of death' (μελέτη θανάτου) which, as we know from the *Phaedo* itself, seemed so ridiculous to the mass of men.²

The truth is that, apart from the prejudice which insists on seeing Socrates as a 'rationalist', there is nothing to cause surprise in the fact that he was influenced by mystic doctrines. We have only to remember the character of the man and the times he lived in. The fusion of science and mysticism, to the great advantage of both, had been the characteristic feature of the generations immediately preceding his own, and his youth was passed at a time when it was much in evidence. He had even spoken with Parmenides at Athens,³ and he was only about twenty years younger than Empedocles, who joined the Athenian colony of Thurii when Socrates was about five and twenty.⁴ A little later, the Pythagoreans were expelled from the cities of Magna Graecia, and took refuge at Thebes, Phlius, and

¹ Cp. van Leeuwen, *ad loc.* ‘Sic ridetur philosophus de animi immortalitate disputare solitus dum vitae lenocinia aspernatur’. The context makes it clear that ψυχαγωγεῖ is to be taken in the strict sense of ghost-raising. Chaerephon 'the bat' is represented as playing the part of the 'spirit'.

² *Phaed.* 64 b 1 sqq.

³ E. Gr. Ph.² p. 192, and, for the connexion of Parmenides with Pythagoreanism, *ib.* pp. 194 and 221.

⁴ E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 229 and 237. It is nowhere stated that Empedocles visited Athens, but it would be strange if he did not, seeing that he went to Thurii.
elsewhere. All this could not but impress a young man who had a strong vein of mysticism in his own nature, as is shown by what we know of his ecstatic trances and the 'divine sign'. We are told expressly that he had the latter from boyhood. It would be much more difficult to account for all this, if we were to suppose Plato rather than Socrates to have been the mystic. By his time Orphicism had degenerated into a mere superstition, and the barefooted Pythagorists who still maintained the original practices of their order would be quite unsympathetic to him. The Pythagoreans whom he knew had dropped all that, and busied themselves only with science and politics. It is a fine historical touch in the Phaedo that the young Pythagoreans, Simmias and Cebes, are not very familiar with the mystic doctrine, and require to have it explained to them by Socrates.

XIV

But Socrates was no Orphic for all that. He had another characteristic which kept him from turning mystic out and out. That was the Attic εἰρωνεία, that shrewd, non-committal spirit, natural to a people of farmers and tradesmen, which Aristophanes has depicted for us in his typical Athenian figures, and which Demosthenes denounced. Enthusiasm tempered by

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1 E. Gr. Ph. p. 99.
2 Apol. 31 d 2 εἰμι δὲ τοῦτ’ ἐστίν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρχόμενον. The twenty-four hours trance at Potidaea happened when Socrates was about thirty-seven, five years before Plato was born.
3 E. Gr. Ph. p. 103, n. 2.
4 E. Gr. Ph. p. 319 sq.
5 The proper meaning of εἰρων is 'sly', 'cunning', malin, and εἰρωνεία is not regarded as exactly a good quality. In the Platonic dialogues, it is
irony (using both words in their Greek sense) may serve as a formula for the Socratic ἕθος.¹ Xenophon gives us too little enthusiasm and Aristophanes too little irony; it is only in the Platonic Socrates that both elements are harmoniously combined in a character with a marked individuality of his own. The Platonic Socrates is no mere type, but a living man. That, above all, is our justification for believing that he is in truth 'the historical Socrates'.

only the opponents of Socrates who ascribe it to him. The Scots words 'canny' and 'pawky' express something similar. Demosthenes speaks of it as a bad trait in the Athenian character (Phil. i. 7, 37). At its worst, it leads people to shirk their responsibilities; at its best, it is a salutary νάφε καὶ μέμνασθ' ἀποστείν. For the way in which Socrates refuses to commit himself to the positive details of the mystic theology cp. 63 ει. τ. It is clearly a personal trait.

¹ Or, as Gomperz puts it, 'a hot heart under a cool head.'
NOTE UPON THE TEXT

The dialogues of Plato were arranged in nine tetralogies by the grammarian Thrasyllus in the reign of Tiberius. The first tetralogy comprised the Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo, i.e. those dialogues which deal specially with the trial and death of Socrates.

At some subsequent date the dialogues were edited in two volumes, the first of which contained tetralogies I–VII, the second, tetralogies VIII–IX, with some spurious works. As one or other of the two volumes was apt to be lost, the MS. authority for tetralogies I–VII is quite different from that for tetralogies VIII–IX and the spurious dialogues.

The leading representatives of the first volume are the Bodleian MS., E. D. Clarke 39 (B), the Venice MS. App. class. 4, 1 (T), and the Vienna MS. 54, suppl. phil. gr. 7 (W).

B. The Bodleian MS., commonly called the Clarkianus after E. D. Clarke, who discovered it in the island of Patmos, was written for Arethas in the year 895 A.D. It was held by Cobet and others that it was our sole independent authority, and all recent texts of the Phaedo are based more or less consistently on this hypothesis.

T. The Venice MS. or Marcianus (tenth century A.D.? is the original of the great majority of existing Plato MSS., and in particular of the MS. from which the Aldine text was derived. The text of Stephanus also goes back to the same source. These MSS. were arbitrarily classed by Cobet and at one time by Schanz as deteriores, and the chief work of Platonic critics
down to the last quarter of the nineteenth century was to bring the text more and more into accordance with B, and to eliminate readings which came from other MSS.

The credit of inaugurating a better method belongs to Schanz himself. In 1877 he showed that T was of co-ordinate authority with B, and that we must take account of both. In some ways T represents the tradition even more faithfully than B. For instance, it contains the old scholia, while B has a new set composed in the ninth century A.D., probably by Arethas himself.

Unfortunately, Schanz had edited the Phaedo before he made this discovery, and he has not republished it since. The readings of T were first published by the present editor in 1899.

W. The importance of this MS. had been seen by Bast, and an imperfect collation of it was used to some extent by Stallbaum, but its omission from Bekker's apparatus criticus led to its being generally ignored till Professor Král of Prague once more called attention to it. Its claims to be regarded as a co-ordinate authority with B and T were warmly contested by Schanz, but on insufficient grounds. The publication of the anonymous commentary on the Theaetetus from a Berlin papyrus showed conclusively that W represented a very ancient tradition of the text. The MS. was brought to Vienna from Florence, and it seems to have come there from Sicily. The Latin version of the Phaedo made by Euericus Aristippus, Archdeacon of Catana, in the twelfth century, A.D., was made either from it or from a very similar MS. It is to be noted further that the corrections made by the second hand in the Clarkianus (B2), which is probably that of Arethas himself, are taken from a MS. closely resembling W, so that it must represent a tradition older than B.

A special feature of W is the number of ancient variants which it records in the margin. If all the other MSS. were lost, we could still construct a good text from W alone, and that is more than can be said either of B or of T.
In this edition, when W alone is quoted, it is to be understood that B and T have the reading adopted in the text; when B and T alone are quoted, it is to be understood that W agrees with B. Thus, on the first page, it may be inferred that B and T have τὸ φύμακον ἔπιεν and ἀγγέλω, while W has ἐγὼ ἄκοισαμη, οἴδας τ' ἡν and τί οὖν ἡν.

An interesting addition to our knowledge of the text was made by the publication by Professor Flinders Petrie of some papyrus fragments which must have been written within a century of Plato's death (Ars. i.e. papyrus Arsinoitica). On the whole, their text is inferior to that of our MSS., though these are more than a thousand years later. The papyrus represents the cheap texts current in early times, while our costly MSS. are copied from careful editions.

The quotations in ancient writers, especially Eusebius and Stobaeus, sometimes preserve old readings, and often confirm TW as against B. They are, however, taken from MSS. of various degrees of authority and must be used with great caution.
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

EX. Αὐτὸς, ὁ Φαίδων, παρεγέτουν Σωκράτει ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὦ τὸ φάρμακον ἐπιεύ ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλον τὸν ἥκουσαν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Αὐτὸς, ὁ Ἐξέκρατες.

EX. Τῇ οὖν ὅτι ἔστω ἀττα εἶπεν ὦ ἄνηρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἢδέως γὰρ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαμι. καὶ γὰρ οὖν τῶν πολιτῶν Φλειασίων οὐδεὶς πάντι τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ τῶν Ὁθηναίων, οὐτε τις ἔνοσ ἀφίκτα χρόνον συχνοῦ ἐκεῖθεν ὡστὶ ἂν ἤμιν σάφες τι ἀγγείλαι οὐώς τ' ἢν περὶ τοῦτων, πλὴν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιὸν ἀποθάνουν τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὖν οὗτον εἴχεν φραζεῖν.

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὖνδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἀρα ἐπύθεσθε ὄν τρόπον ἐγένετο;

EX. Ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἤμιν ἡγειλέ τις, καὶ ἐθαυμάζομεν γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ύστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανόντων. τῇ οὖν ἦν τούτῳ, ὁ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὁ Ἐξέκρατες, συνέβη· ἐτυχεῖν γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἢ πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὥς εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναίοι πέμπουσιν.

a 2 ἐπιεύ τὸ φάρμακον W a 6 ἐγὼ B: om. T a 7 τῶν πολιτῶν secl. v. Bamberg: Φλιασίων secl. Schaefer b 1 ἀπαγγείλαι W ἦν B: ἦ T a 5 οὖν B: om. T a 8 πέμπουσιν B T: πέμπουσιν κατ' ἔτος B τ W
EX. Τούτο δὲ δὴ τί ἔστών;

10 ΦΑΙΔ. Τούτ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλοῖον, ὡς φασίν Ἀθηναίοι, ἐὰν ὅ
Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς "δὶς ἐπτὰ" ἐκεῖνους ὄχετο

b ἄγων καὶ ἐσωτε ρε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη, τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι
ηὔξαντο ὡς λέγεται τότε, εἰ σωθείειν, ἐκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν
ἀπάξεων εἰς Δῆλον· ὡς δὴ αἰε καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ'
ἐνιαυτοῦ τῷ θεῷ πέμπονtau. ἐπεεδάν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς
5 θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτῶς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν
τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσία μηδένα ἀποκτεινώναι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς
Δῆλον τε ἄφικηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεύρο· τούτῳ δ' ἔνιοτε ἐν
πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχωσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπο-

λαβόντες αὐτοὺς. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας ἐπειδὰν ὁ
ἱερεὺς τὸν Ἀπόλλωνος στέψῃ τὴν πρῶμαν τὸ πλοῖον,
touτo δ' ἐτυχεί, ὡσπερ λέγω, τῇ πρωτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγο-

νὸς. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν
5 τῷ δεσμωτηρῷ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

EX. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τὸν θανάτον, ὁ Φαίδων; τί
ὅτι τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τῖνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι
τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἄνδρι; ἡ οὖν εἰὼν οἱ ἀρχόντες παρεῖναι,
ἀλλ' ἐρήμος ἐτελεύτα φίλων;

c ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρησάν τινες, καὶ πολλοὶ γε.

EX. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμηθῆτι ὡς σαφέστατα ἦμων
ἀπαγγείλαι, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀγχολία τυγχάνει οὖσα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάξῳ γε καὶ πειράσομαι ὡμῶν διηγή-

5 σασθαν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνημένο Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα
καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούσαντα ἔμοιγε αἰε πάντων ἠδυστον.

EX. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὁ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουστομένους γε
τοιοῦτοις ἐτέρους ἔχεις· ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνη ἀκριβε-

στατα διεξέλθειν πῶς· α.

e ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μήν ἐγώγε θαυμάσια ἐπαθὼν παραγενόμενος.
οὕτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸν ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος

a 11 pote θησεύς W b 7 τε B: om. T c 6 τί ἤν ΒΤ: τίνα
d 4 γε B: τε Τ d 8 ἐτέρους ΒΤ: ἐταίρους W
d 9 διεξέλθειν B: διελθεῖν T
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

58 ε

eἰσήρεθεν· εὐδαίμων γὰρ μοι ἀνήρ ἐφαινετο, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπον καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ὥστε μοι ἑκείνου παρίστασθαι μηδ’ εἰς "Αἰδοὺ λύτα ἄνευ τθείας μοίρας λέναι, ἄλλα καὶ ἑκείσε ἄφικόμενον εὐ πράξεων ἕπερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος. διὰ ὡς ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάντως μοι ἑλευνὼν εἰσήρεθε, ὥς εἰκὸς ἀν δόξειν εἰναι παρόντι πένθει, οὔτε αὕ ἱδρογέ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν οὐτων ὄσπερ εἰώθεμεν —καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τουοτοὶ τινες ἤσαν— ἄλλ’ ἀπεχρασά ἄτοπον τὶ μοι πάθος παρὴν καὶ τὶς ἁθήνας κράσος ἀπὸ τε τῆς ἱδρογῆς συγκεκραμένῃ ὁμοῖο καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύτης, εἰνθυμουμένω ὅτι αὐτίκα ἑκείνου ἔμελλε τελεύταν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχέδου τι οὕτως διεκείμεθα, τοτε μὲν γελώντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ ὀδυρύντες, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, Ἀπολλόδωρος— οὕθα γὰρ ποιν τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

EX. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐκείνους τε τοῖνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἶχεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγόγγε ἐτεταράμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

EX. Ἐτυχον δὲ, ὁ Φαιδών, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐτὸς τε ὡς ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρὴν καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐτὶ Ὅρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Λυσχύνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης· ἤν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανεύς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινες τῶν ἐπιχωρίων. Πλάτων δὲ οὕμαι ἠθένει.

EX. Ξένοι δὲ τίνες παρήσαν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ναί, Σωμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνης καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

EX. Τί δέ; Ἀριστιππός καὶ Κλεόμβροτος παρεγένοντο;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δήτα· ἐν Αἰγύπτῃ γὰρ ἐλέγουντο εἶναι.
5 EX. Ἀλλος δὲ τις παρῆν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδόν τι οὐμαί τούτους παραγενέσθαι.

EX. Τί οὖν δή; τίνες φήσι ήσαν οἱ λόγοι;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγώ σοι εἰς ἀρχής πάντα πειράσομαι διηγήσασθαι.

d οἱ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθεμεν φοιτῶν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἦν οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τοῖς Σωκράτη, συνλεγόμενοι ἐώθιν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐν ὧν καὶ ἦδικη ἐγένετο. πλησίον γὰρ ἦν τοῦ διεσωμητηρίου. περιεμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε ἐως ἀνοιχθεῖ τὸ διεσωμητήριον, διατριβοῦτες μετ' ἄλληλων, ἀνεφιγγαρο γὰρ ὑπὲρ ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθεῖ, εἰσῆλθεν παρὰ τοὺς Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μὲτ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὗ καὶ τότε πρωσίπερον συνελήγημεν τῇ γὰρ προτεραια [ἡμέραν].

e ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ διεσωμητήριον ἐσπέρας, ἐπιθύμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφιγμένον ἐνί. παραγγείλαμεν οὖν ἄλληλοι ἤκειν ὡς προφαίτατα εἰς τὸ εἰωθός. καὶ ἦκομεν καὶ ἦμων ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν, ἐπεισέρι μὲν καὶ μὴ πρόσερον παρεῖναι ἐως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ ἃ ἄνοιξαν γὰρ, ἐφι, „οἱ ἐνδικὴ Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἂν τῷ διὸ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτᾷ;‟ οὐ πολὺν ὑγιός ἔπισχὼν ἤκειν καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἠμᾶς εἰσινεὶ. εἰσίνετε οὖν καλελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λευμένον, τὴν δὲ Ξανθίππην—γυναῖκες γὰρ—ἔχουσαν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθήμενης. ὅσι οὖν εἰδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ξανθίππη, ἀνηγήμητε τε καὶ τοιαῦτα ἀττα εἰπεῖν, οἰα δὴ εἰώθασιν εἰς 5 γυναῖκες, ὅτι „Ω Σωκρατης, ὑστατον ὑπερ προσεροῦν ὕποι ἐπιτίθεει καὶ δι' τούτου;‟ καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέπας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα, „‟Ω Κρίτων;‟ ἐφι, „‟ἀπαγεῖτω τις αὐτὴν οἰκάδε.‟'’

Καὶ ἐκείνη μὲν ἀπήγγον τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βωσάων οὐ καὶ κοπτομένην ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζομένος εἰς τὴν
κλίνης συνέκαμψε τε το σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτρωσε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίζων ἀμα, ὡς ἄποτον, ἔφη, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, ἐοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο ὁ καλούσθων οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ ἢδον. ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἑναυτίῳ εἰναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τὸ ἀμα μὲν 5 ἀυτῷ μὴ θέλεων παραγγείλειν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δέ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἔτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδὸν τι ἀναγάζεσθαι ἀεὶ λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, ὡσπερ ἕκ μᾶς κορυφῆς ἤμμερω ὡς ὑπεί. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἑνειόθησεν αὐτὰ Λίσσωτος, σὲ μῦθον ἂν συνθέως ὡς ὁ θεός βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδή οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνήψει καὶ τὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὰς κορυφὰς, καὶ διὰ ταύτα ὃ ἄν τὸ ἔτερον παραγγέλειν ἐπακολουθεῖν ὑπερεραν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον. ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι 5 ἠοίκειν ἐπειδή ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἢν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγευνόν, ἤκειν δὲ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἴδιον. Ὁ οὖν Κέβης υπολαβών, Νὴ τῶν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εἰ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γὰρ τοῦ τῶν ποιμάτων δὲν πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Ἀισώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλων προοίμοιν καὶ ἄλλοι τυχές με ἧδη ἠρωτόν, αἴταρ καὶ Εὐήνοος πρόην, ὅτι ποτὲ διανοθεῖσα, ἐπειδή ἰδοὺ ἦλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτὰ, προτέρου ὀυδὲν πῶς ποησάς. εἰ οὖν τί σου μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐήνοο ἀποκράτασθαι οὔτε 5 με αὐθῖς ἐρωτᾶ—εἰ ὁδὰ γὰρ ὅτι ἐρήμεται—εἰπὲ τί χρῆ λέγειν.

Λέγει τοῦν, ἐφη, αὐτῷ, ὃ Κέβης, ταληθῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκεῖνο βουλόμενοι οὐδὲ τοὺς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνοι εὑρίσκαν. ταύτα—ἡδῆ γὰρ ὃς ὑπὸ ῥάδιον ἔμη—ἀλλ' ἐνυασίων τινῶν ἀποπειράμενοι τί λέγοι, καὶ ἀφοσίωμενοι εἰ ἀρα πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικήν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν.
πάντα τοιάδε: πολλάκις μοι φοιτών τό αὐτό ἐν 5 ὑπνίου εἰν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτε εἰν ἄλλῃ ὅσει φανομενον, τὰ αὐτὰ ἔδε λέγοι, ""Ὤ Σώκρατες," ἐφη, ""μουσικήν ποιεῖ καὶ ἐργάζομαι," καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ ἐπιρρατον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύσθαι τε 61 καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὃσπερ οἱ τοῖς θέουσι διακελεύομένοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ ὅπως τό ἐνυπνίου ὅπερ ἐπιρρατον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικήν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὕσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος, τὸν δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἦ τε δίκη 5 ἐγένετο καὶ ἦ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐορτή διεκώλυε με ἀποδήμησκεν, ἐδοξῆς χρήματι, εἰ ἅμα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τό ἐνυπνίου ταύτην τήν ὑμᾶς ἐφύσεως μουσικήν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπείναι πρὶν ἀφοσίωσιν σασθαι ποιήσαντα ποιήματα [καὶ] πιθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἐώς τῶν θεῶν ἐποίησα οὐ ἢν ἦ παροῦσα θυσία μετὰ δὲ τῶν θεῶν, ἐννοήσας ὅτι τῶν ποιητῶν δειον, εἰπερ μέλλου ποιητῆς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μόνον ἀλλ' οὖν λόγους, 5 καὶ αὐτῶς οὐκ ἦ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταύτα δὴ οὖς προχείρους ἐξοχον μόνους καὶ ἡπιστάμην τοὺς Ἀλκάτας, τούτων ἐποίησα ὅσ πρῶτους ἐπέτυχον. ταύτα οὖν, ὃς Κέβης, Ἐνύμων φράζε, καὶ ἔρρωσθαι καί, ἄν σωφρονὴν, εἶμε διώκειν ὡς τάχυστα. 61 ἀπειμι δὲ, ὥς ἐοίκε, τήμερον κελεύσον γὰρ Ἀθηράιοι.

Καὶ ὁ Σιμμᾶς, Οἶνον παρακελεύῃ, ἐφη, τοῦτο, ὃ Σώκρατες, Ἐνύμων. πολλὰ γὰρ ἦν ἐνετύχηκα τῷ ἀνθρώποις ἐχεῖν οὖν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ἠσθήμαι οὖν ὄπως περιστούσιν σοι ἐκών 5 εἶναι πείσεται.

Τί δὲ; ἦ δ' ὅς, οὖν φιλόσοφος Ἐνύμως; Ἠμοιογε δοκεῖ, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμᾶς.

'Εθελήσει τοῦν καὶ Ἐνύμως καὶ πᾶς ὅτι ἀξίως τοῦτον τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστεν, οὐ μέντοι ἄλογον βιάστεται αὐτῶν

a 8 εἶναι БΤ: εἶναι ἐνόμισεν Β' W πρὸν БΤ: πρότερον πρὶν ἂν Б' W b 1 καὶ БTW: om. W et punct. not. t πειθόμενον БTW sed εἰ ex i T b 5 δὴ Б: om. T b 6 καὶ ἡπιστάμην μένους Β'TW τούτων T: τούτους B b 8 ὡς τάχιστα B: om. G ε 4 σοι B: ἂν σοι T ε 9 μέντοι БТОlymp.: μέντοι γε Б' W
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ 61c

οὐ γάρ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι. Καὶ ἀμα λέγων ταῦτα καθήκε 10
τὰ σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεξόμενος ὦτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ d
διελέγετο.

'Ἡρετό οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης. Πῶς τούτο λέγεις, ὁ
Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δὲ
ἀν τῷ ἀποδημηκοῦντι τῶν φιλόσοφον ἐπεσθαί;

Τί δέ, ὁ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκήκοατε σὺ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ
tῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάφῳ συγγεγονότες;

Οὐδὲν γε σαφές, ὁ Σώκρατες.

'Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω· ἂ μὲν
οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκήκοως φθόνοις οὐδεὶς λέγεις. καὶ γὰρ ὅσως 10
καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκεῖς ἀποδημήσῃς διασκοπεῖν εἰ
tε καὶ μυθολογεῖς περὶ τῆς ἀποδήμας τῆς ἐκεῖ, ποιῶν τινὰ
ἀυτῆς οἰόμεθα εἶναι τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιῶ ἄλλο ἐν τῷ
μέχρι ἦλιον ὅσμων χρόνῳ;

Κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὐ φασὶ θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτῶν ἑαυτῶν 5
ἀποκτείνων, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἣδη γὰρ ἐγώγε, ὅπερ γυνὴ σὺ
ἡρον, καὶ Φιλολάφου ἡκουσα, ὅτε παρ' ἡμῖν διμήτατο, ἣδη δὲ
καὶ ἄλλων τυγιῶν, ὅς οὖν δεός τούτῳ ποιεῖν· σαφές δὲ περὶ
αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδεν ἀκήκοα.

'Ἀλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρῆ, ἐφει τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκού-
σας. ὅσως μέντοι θαυμαστῶν σοι φανεῖται εἰ τούτῳ μόνῳ
tῶν ἄλλων ἀπαίτων ἀπλοῦν ἔστω, καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσπερ καὶ τάλλα, ἐστὶν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιων ὅν 5
θεμαίνει η ἡμῖν, οἷς δὲ βέλτιων τεθυμαίνει, θαυμαστῶν ὅσως
σοι φαίνεται εἰ τούτῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοῦς
ἐαυτοῦς εὐ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλων δεῖ περιμένειν εὐρεγέτην.

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἠρέμα ἐπιγελάσας, ἤττο τε ζεύς, ἐφη, τῇ
αὐτοῦ φωιή ἐπιτῶν.

d l σκέλη B Olymp.: σκέλη ἀπὸ τῆς κλίνης W et marg. T d 8 σα-
φές T W : σαφῶς B e 6 νῦν δὴ B T : δὴ νῦν W a i ἀκούσας
B: ἀκούσα B a 3 τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ B T : τῶν ἀνθρώπων t a 4 ὅν
add. ci. Heindorf a 6 ὅσιον B T : ὅσιον ἐστὶν B 3 T W a 8 ἤττω
s. v. W Olymp.: ἤττῳ ὁ B : ἤττω b : ἤττω T : εἰπτεῖσι W ζεύς B T :
ζεῦ W
b. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειν, ἑφή ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ' εἶναι ἄλογον· οὐ μέντοι ἄλλ' ἢσως γ' ἔχει τυπᾶ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτως λεγόμενοι περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἐν τυπῷ φρουρᾷ ἔσμεν οἱ ἀνθρώποι καὶ οὐ δει δὴ εἰστεν ἐκ ταύτης

5 λύειν οὖν ἀποδιδόσκειν, μέγας τέ τις μοι φαύνεται καὶ οὐ πάσος διδεῖν· οὐ μέντοι ἄλλα τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοῦ εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμῶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τοῖς κτηματίων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. η̂ σοὶ οὖ δοκεῖ ὑπόν;

c. Ὁκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὢς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαντοῦ κτημάτων εἶ
tι αὐτό ἐαυτό ἀποκτείνου, μὴ σημαίναντο σοι ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπάϊνως ἂν αὐτῷ καὶ, εἰ τινα ἔχους τιμορίαν, τιμοροίῳ ἂν;

d. Πάντα γ', ἑφη.

'Ἰσως τούντα ταύτη οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ πρότερον αὐτῶν ἀποκτείνων θεῖν, πρὶν ἀναγκήν τινὰ θεοῦ ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὡςπερ καὶ τὴν γίνον ἡμῶν παροῦναν.

'Ἀλλ' εἰκός, ἑφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτο γε φαύνεται. ὁ μέν-

e. τοι ὕπον ἐλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ράδιως ἂν ἐθέλειν

5 ἀποδημῆσειν, ἐοικεν τούτο, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀτόπῳ, ἐσπερ ὅ

τον ἴν ἐλεγομεν εὐλόγων ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τῶν ἐπιμε-

λομένου ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμῶς ἐκείνων κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ 

ἀγανάκτεων τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτῃ τῆς θεραπείας

5 ἀπὶ τῶν, ἐν' ἐπιστάτουσιν αὐτῶν οὕτε ἀριστοὶ εἰσὶ τῶν ὑπῶν ἐπιστάται, θείος, οὖν ἔχει λόγων· ὥς ποιν τοὺς αὐτός γε αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἐκεῖνον ἐπιμελήσεθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος. ἀλλ' ἀνύποτος μὲν ἀνθρώπος τάχ' ἂν οὐθείητα ταύτα, φευκτέον

e. εἰναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοτο ὅτι οὐ δει ἀπὸ 

g. γε του ἁγαθοῦ φεύγειν ἀλλ' ὅτι μᾶλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ

62 b ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ
αλογίστως ἂν φεύγω; ὁ δὲ νῦν ἐχὼν ἐπιθυμοῖ τοὺς ἂν ἄει εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὐτοῦ βελτίων. καὶ τοιούτων εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ ὁ νυνὶ ἐλέγετο τοὺς μὲν γὰρ 5 φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθυρήσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δὲ ἀφρονας χαίρειν.

'Ακούσας οὖν ὁ Ὁσκράτης ἁσθήναι τε μοι ἐδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς, Ἀεὶ τοι, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερεννίᾳ, καὶ οὐ πάνω εἴθεως ἔθελε πείθεσθαι ὅτι ἄν τις ἐπίη.

Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Ἀλλὰ μή, ἔφη, ὁ Σωκράτης, τινὲς γέ μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης: τι γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι 5 ἄνδρες σοφοί ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀλμεῦνος αὐτῶν φεύγων εἰς ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάσσωτο αὐτῶν; καὶ μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τεύνει τῶν λόγων, ὅτι οὔτω ῥαδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων καὶ ἀρχοντας ἀγαθοὺς, ὡς αὐτὸς ὀμολογεῖς, θεοῦς.

Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε: οἱμαί γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρή με 6 b πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὀφεὶ πρὸς δικαιστὴρ ἤ.

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἕφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

Φέρε ὃ, ὃ ὃς, πειραθῶ πιθανῶτερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἡ πρὸς τοὺς δικαιστάς. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμία 5 τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ἵππην ἤξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς, ἐπείτα καὶ παρ' ἄνθρωποις τετελευτηκότας ἀλμεῦνος τῶν εὐθάδε, ἱδίκουν ἄν οὐκ ἄγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ; τινὶ δὲ καὶ ἵππε ὅτι παρ' ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζον ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθοὺς—καὶ τούτῳ μὲν οὐκ ἄν 6 c τῶν διασχυρισάμην—ὅτι μεντοί παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνω ἀγαθοὺς ἤξειν, εὑ ὅτε ὅτι ἐξερ πῷ τῷ ἀλλῳ τῶν τοιούτων διασχυρισάμην ἄν καὶ τούτο. ὅστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὀμοιος ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ' εὔελπίς εἰμι εἰναί τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι καί, 5

e 5 eir' eir' T sed add. sign. transp. a 2 ὅ om. pr. T
όστερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἁμειώνοι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς η τοῖς κακοῖς.

Τῇ οὖν, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμών, ὁ Σώκρατες; αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν τῷ ἐχεις ἀπέναι, ἢ κἂν ἡμῖν μεταδοθή; κοινὸν γὰρ ὅσον ἐμού γε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τούτο, καὶ ἀμα σοι ἡ ἀπολογία ἔσται, ἐὰν ἀπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσῃς.

Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἐφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τοιὸδε σκεψόμεθα τί ἐστιν ὁ Βούλεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν.

5 Τῇ δὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἀλλὸ γε ἡ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δῶσει τὸ φάρμακον ὦτι χρῆ σοι φράξειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μάλλον διαλεγομένους, δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν τοιούτων προσφέρειν.

ε τῷ φαρμάκῳ εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐνίοτε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δίς καὶ τρῖς πίνεις τούς τι Τοιούτων ποιώντας.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, "Εα, ἐφη, χαίρειν αὐτόν" ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἐαυτῷ παρασκευαζέτω ὡς καὶ δίς δῶσων, ἐὰν δὲ δέγη, καὶ τρίς.

6 Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν μὲν τὶ ὑδή, ἐφη ὁ Κρίτων: ἀλλὰ μοι πάλαι πράγματα παρέχει.

"Εα αὐτόν, ἐφη. ἀλλ' ὑμῖν ὅτι τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἵνα τῶν λόγων ἀποδοθῶν, ὡς μοι φαίνεσθαι εἰκότως ἄνηρ τῷ ὅτι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβων τῶν βίων θαρρεῖν μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὐελπίς εἴναι ἐκείνῃ μέγιστα οὐσεῖσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἐπειδώλ τελευτήσῃ. πῶς ἂν οὐν ὅτι τοῦθεν οὕτως ἔχοι, ὁ Σιμμών τε καὶ Κέρσης, ἔγω πειράσομαι φράσαι.

Κυνωνισοῦσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυχάνουσι όρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι 5 φιλοσοφών λεληθεύτω τοὺς ἄλλους ὦτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηθεύσωσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκοι τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ οὖν τούτῳ ἀληθεῖς, ἀποτελοῦν ὅπου ἂν εἰ ἐν παισὶ τῷ
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64 α

βίω μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τούτο, ἢκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτὸν ἀγανακτεῖν ὁ πάλαι προνοθυμοῦντο τε καὶ ἐπετίθεναι.

Καὶ ὁ Συμμίας γελάσας, Νή τῶν Δία, ἐφη, ὁ Σάκρατες, οὔ πάνυ γέ με τυποῖ γελασεῖοντα ἐποὺργάσας γελάσαι. οἶμαι β γὰρ ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τούτο ἀκούσατας δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρήσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας—καὶ συμφάναν ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ᾿ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ—ὅτι τῷ ὅτι ὦι φιλοσοφοῦντες ἐπανατών, καὶ σφάς γε οὐ λελύθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοι εἰσώ 5 τούτῳ πάσχειν.

Καὶ ἀληθὴ γ᾿ ἂν λέγοιει, ὁ Συμμία, πλὴν γε τοῦ σφάς μὴ λεληθέται. λέξεθη γὰρ αὐτοῦς ἥ τε θαγατῶσι καὶ ἥ ἄξιοι εἰσών θαγάτον καὶ οἶον θαγάτον ὦι ὀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι. εἰπώμεν γὰρ, ἐφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, χαῖρεν εἰπόντες ἐκεῖνοι: ἠγούμεθα τι τῶν θαγατοῦ εἰναὶ;

Πάνυ γε, ἐφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Συμμίας.

Ἀρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τίν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγή; καὶ εἰναὶ τούτῳ τὸ τεθημάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς 5 ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγέν αὐτῷ καθ’ αὐτῷ τὸ σώμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς [ἀπὸ] τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγέσσαν αὐτήν καθ’ αὐτην εἰναι; ἀρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τούτο;

Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ, ἐφη.

Σκέψαι δὴ, ὥγαθε, εἰναὶ ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνόδοι ἀπερ ἐμοὶ: 1ο ἐκ γὰρ τοῦτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἰσεσθαί περὶ ὁν σκοπούμεν. φανεται σοι φιλοσοφὸς ἄνθρως εἰναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡρωνίας καλομένας τὰς τοιάσθε, οἶον σιτίων [τε] καὶ ποτῶν;

"Πλιστα, ὁ Σάκρατες, ἐφη ὁ Συμμίας.

Τὶ δὲ τῶν τῶν ἀφροδισίων;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Τί δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας; δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμονος ἤγεισθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἷον ἰματίων διαφερόντων 10 κτήσεως καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμῶν δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἀτιμάζειν, ειδὼς ὁ πόλλα ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν;

'Ατιμάζειν ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὃ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος.

Οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἐφη, ἣ τοῦ τοιοῦτον πραγ- 5 ματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἄλλα καθ’ ὁσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτῶν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράθηαι;

'Εμοίγε.

'Αρ’ οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δῆλος ἐστὶν ὁ 65 φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅτι μάλιστα τῇν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων;

Φαίνεται.

Καὶ δοκεῖ γέ ποιν, ὃ Συμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποισι 5 ὃ μηδὲν ἢδον τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ’ ἐγγὺς τι πείτεν τοῦ πεθανόντος ὁ μηδὲν φρον- τίζων τῶν ἠδονῶν αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰσίν.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτήν τῆς τῆς φροινήσεως κτήσει; πό- 10 τερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὔ, ἐὰν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ἐξήσει b κοινωνῶν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; οἷον τὸ τοιοῦτο αὐτῶν ἀρα' ἔχει ἀληθείαν των ψυχῆς τε καὶ ἀκοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ ὁι ποιηταὶ ἤμιν ἀεὶ προμοδῶν, ὅτι οὑτ' ἀκονομομεν ἀκριβεῖς οὐδὲν οὔτε ῥόμαιες; κατοι οἱ αὐτοὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ 5 σῶμα αὐσθήσεως μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσίν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολή αἱ γε ἄλλαι πάσαι γὰρ πον τοῦτων φαυλότεραι εἰσίν. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκοῦσιν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἐφη.

Πότε οὖν, ἢ ὃ ὃς, ἢ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπτεται; ὅταν

c τοιούτων B'TW: καὶ τοιούτων B d οι δοκεῖ W α 4 γε ποιο τ Τ W: γε δήπου B a 5 μετέχει C Iambl.: μετέχειν B'TW b3 ημίν æel B: æel ημίν Ιambl. Olymp
μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρή τι σκοπεῖν, ὄηλον ὅτι 
τότε ἔξαπατάται ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ.

"Αληθῆ λέγεις.

"Αρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι εἰπερ ποι ἄλλοθι κατὰ-
ὄηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεται τι τῶν ὁντῶν;

Ναι.

Λογίζεται δὲ γέ ποι τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων 5
μηδὲν παραλυτῆ, μήτε ἀκοῆ μήτε ὅψις μήτε ἀλγηρῶν μηδὲ
tις ἱδονή, ἀλλ’ ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ καθ’ αὐτὴν γίγνεται ἔωςα
χαῖρεν τὸ σώμα, καὶ καθ’ ὅσον οὐναιτα μὴ κοινωνοῦσα
αὐτῷ μηδ’ ἀποτομένη ὀρέγνηται τοῦ ὁντος.

"Εστι ταῦτα.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰσταῖθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχῇ μάλιστα
ατμάζει τὸ σώμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ζητεὶ δὲ αὐτῇ καθ’ δ
αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι;

Φαίνεται.

Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιῶδε, ὥ Συμμία; φαμὲν τι εἶναι δίκαιον
αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν;

Φαμὲν μέντοι γῇ Δία.

Καὶ αὕ καλῶν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθῶν;

Πῶς δ’ οὖ; 5

"Ηδὴ οὖν πώποτε τι τῶν των τοιῶν τοῖς ὁφθαλμοῖς εἴδες;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ’ ὅς.

"Αλλ’ ἄλλη τινι αἰσθῆσιν τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφ’ ὅψιν
αὐτῶν; λέγω δε περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους περὶ, ύπνειάς,
ισχυος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν λόγῳ ἀπάντων τῆς ὁυσίας ὁ
tυχαίνει ἐκαστὸν ὁν’ ἀρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ e
ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὡδε ἔχειν ὅς ἄν μάλιστα ἠμῶν
καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσαται αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν διανοηθήμαι
περὶ οὐ σκοπεὶ, οὔτος ἂν ἐγχύτατα ὦν τοῦ γιγνών ἐκαστον;

Πάνιε μὲν οὖν.

65 b

c 5 τότε B: TW Iambl.: τοιῶτο τε B μηδὲν τοῦτων αὐτῆν W
c 6 μηδὲ B Iambl.: μήτε TW d 6 μέντοι B: τοι TW Olymp.
d 7 α’ Heindorf e Ficino: οὐ T: om. B  
d 9 ηδῆς B: TW: τὶ δὴ B
e 1 ταληθέστατον αὐτῶν T Olymp.
Τον ούν ἐκείνον ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσειν καθαρώτατα ὅστις ὁμιλιτά τῇ ἀυτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἵνα ἐφ’ ἐκαστὸν, μήτε τῷ ὕφνι παρατηθήσεσθαι ἢ τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τῇ τινὰ άλλην άισθησθαι ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογίσμου, ἀλλ’ αὐτῇ καθ’ αὐτῷ ἐλλεκρυνεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ εἰλικρινεῖς ἐκαστὸν ἐπίχειροι θηρεύειν τῶν όντων, ἀπαλλαγεῖς ὅτι μάλιστα ὄφθαλμον τε καὶ οὕτων καὶ ὡς ἐπούς εἶπεν σύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὧς ταράττοντος καὶ οὕκ ἐὼν τὴν ψυχὴν κτίσασθαι ἀλλήλειαν τε καὶ φρόνησιν ὅταν κοινωνῇ; ἄρ’ οὖν οὕτως ἑστα, ὦ Σύμμικα, εἴπερ τις [καὶ] ἄλλος ὁ τενεόμενος τοῦ οἴνου;

Τ’ ἐκεῖνος, ἴησθ’ ὁ Σύμμικα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεισ, ὥς Σῶκρατες.

b Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἵησθ’, ἐκ πάντων τοῦτων παράστασθαι ὅσαν τοιάδε τινὰ τῶν γιησίων φιλοσόφων, ὡστε καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλους τοιαῦτα ἄστα λέγεισ, ὅτι “Κινήσθως τοι οὕσπερ ἀπαγόρευς τις ἐκφέρεις ἡμᾶς μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει”, ὅτι, ἐως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπεφυμενη ή ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακῶς, οὐ μὴ ποτὲ κτησώμεθα ἰκανῶς οὐ ἐπισυμομεμεθε φαμεν δὲ τοῦτο εἴναι τὸ ἄλθης. μνημαί μεν γὰρ ἡμῶν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν
c τροφήν’ ἐτὶ δέ, ἂν τινὲς ρόσσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τῷ τῶν οἴνους θήραν. ἔρωτων δέ καὶ ἐπιθυμίων καὶ φοβίων καὶ εἰδώλων παινοδαπῶν καὶ φλανρίας ἐμπύρπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὡστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἄλθδως τῷ οἴνου ὑπ’

αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονηστα ἡμῶν ἐγχύγηται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ χάρ πολέμου καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τῆν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα


c2 δὲ B Iambl. Olymp.: τε T e8 οἱ B T Iambl. Olymp.: ἡμᾶς οἱ B2 W
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άναγκαζόμεθα κτάσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τοῦτον θεραπείαν: καὶ ἐκ τοῦτον ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ πάντα ταῦτα. τὸ δὲ ἐσχατὸν πάντων ὅτι, εὼν τὸς ἡμῶν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπέζημεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ἐγκύησεις ἀν πανταχοῦ παραπλήσον 5 θύρων οἱ παρέχει καὶ παραχῶν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὡστε μὴ ὀφθασθαι ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ καθοράν τάληθες. ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅτι ἡμῶν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομεν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἰσερχομαι, ἀπαλλακτέων αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῶν ἐσται οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν τε καὶ φαμεν ἐρασταί εἶναί, φρονίσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτή- σωμεν, ὃς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ἡσύνει δὲ οὐ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἴον τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γράφων, ὅνων θάτερον, 5 ἡ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἐστιν κτῆσιςασθαι τὸ εἰδέαν ἢ τελευτήσασθαι τὸτε γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ’ οὐ. καὶ ἐὰν ὃ ἦκεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγύτατο ἐσώμεθα τοῦ εἰδέαν, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδέν ὀμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδέν κουρωνσίμεν, ὃτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιπλώμεθα τῇς τοῦτον φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν 5 ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἐὼς ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς· καὶ οὐτὸ μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλαττώμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσώμεθα καὶ γνωσώμεθα δι’ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἅπως τὸ ἀληθῆς· μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτοῦ ἦ.”

τοιαῦτα ὁμία, ὡ Συμμία, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως;

Παντὸς γε μᾶλλον, ὡ Σωκρατεῖς.

Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὡ ἑταῖρε, πολλή ἐπίσης ἀφικομένῳ οἱ ἐγώ πορεύομαι, ἐκεί ἰκανῶς,

εἴπερ πον ἄλλωθι, κτῆσασθαι τοῦτο οὖ ἔνεκα ἡ πολλὴ
10 πραγματεία ἦμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὡστε ἡ γε
c ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος
γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλω ἀνδρὶ ὅσ ἡγεῖται οἱ παρεσκευάζοντα τὴν
διάνοιαν ὀσπερ κεκαθαρμένην.

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη ὁ Συμμιᾶς.

5 Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἄρα οὐ τούτῳ υμιδαινεῖ, ὡσπερ πάλαι
ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὦτι μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ
σώματος τῷ ψυχήν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν παντα-
χόδεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγεροῦσα τε καὶ ἀδροίζοσθαι,
καὶ οἴκείν κατὰ τὸ ὁνόματον καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παροῦντι καὶ ἐν τῷ
d ἔπειτα μόνην καθ’ αὐτὴν, ἐκλυομένην ὀσπερ [ἐκ] δεσμῶν ἐκ
tοῦ σώματος;

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.

Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο γε θάνατος ὄνομαξεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς

5 ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος;

Παντάπασι γε, ἡ δ’ ὦς.

Ἄυσε δὲ γε αὐτὴν, ὡς φαμεῖ, προνοοῦντι ἄεὶ μᾶλλον
καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ
tοῦτο ἐστὶ τῶν φιλοσοφῶν, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς
10 ἀπὸ σώματος· ἡ οὖ;

Φαίνεται.

Οὐκοῦν, ὡσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐλεγον, γελοῖον ἂν εἴη ἄνδρα

e παρασκευάζονθ’ ἐμαυτόν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὥστι εὐγγυτάτων ὄντα τοῦ
τεθνάναι οὕτως ζῆν, καὶ εἴθ’ ἤκουστος αὐτῷ τούτου ἀγανακτεῖν;

Γελοῖον πῶς δ’ οὖ;

Τὸ ὦτι ἄρα, ἐφη, ὁ Συμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες

5 ἀποδύνασκεν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἢκουστα αὐτοῖς
ἀνυρώπων φοβερῶν. ἐκ τῶν ἔξοικοπε. εἰ γάρ δια-

c1 μοι B : ἐμοὶ B² T W c2 παρασκευάσθαι B T : παρασκευά-
sασθαι W d1 prius ἐκ T Iambl. Protr. : om. B W : alterum ἐκ
gε W d5 ψυχῆς B² T W Iambl. Stob. : om. B d9 ψυχῆς
B² T W Iambl. : τὸς ψυχῆς B e3 γελοῖον scripsi : οὖ γελοῖον
B T W Socrati tribuentes : in Ars. spatium septem litterarum
βέβληται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι, αὐτήν δὲ καθ' αὐτήν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δὲ γεγονόμενον εἰ φοβοῦτο καὶ ἀγανακτούειν, οὐ πολλῇ ἄν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκεῖστε ἑοιεῖν, οὐ ἀφικομένους ἐπέλει ἐστίν οὐ διὰ βίου ῥοπὸν τυχεῖν—/umd δὲ φρονήσεως—ὁ τε διεβέβλητο, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτῶν; ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ νέων ἀποθανόντων πολλοῖ ὁ ἐκώντες ἠθέλησαν εἰς "Ajaxον μετελθεῖν, ὅπο ταύτης ἀγόμενοι τῆς 5 ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὀφεσθαί τε ἐκεῖ ὅπω ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνέστησαν φρονήσεως ὁ ἄρα τοῖς τοῦ ὅτι ἐρών, καὶ λαβῶν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῆς ἀξίως λόγου ἢ εἰ "Ajaxον, ἀγανακτῆσει τε ἀποθυμήσκων καὶ b οὐχ ἄσμενοι ἐστὶν αὐτόσε: οἴεσθαί γε χρῆ, ἐὰν τῷ ὅτι γε ἦ, ὃ ἔταφε, φιλόσοφος: σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσεις ἄλλ' ἡ ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὁπερ ἄρτι ἑλεγον, οὐ πολλῇ ἄν 5 ἀλογία εἴη εἰ φοβοῦτο τῶν θάνατον ὁ τοιώτος; 
Πολλὴ μέντοι ἡ Δία, ἡ δ' ὅς.
Οὐκοιν ἵκαρον σοι τεκμηρίων, ἐφη, τοῦτο ἄνδρος, ὅν ἄν ὑδας ἀγανακτήσατα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ' ἡν φιλόσοφος ἀλλὰ τις φιλοσόφος; ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ ποι c οὕτως τυγχάνει ὁν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτοι τὰ ἑτερα τούτων ἡ ἀμφότερα.
Πάνω, ἐφη, ἔχει οὕτως ὡς λέγεις.
"Αρ' οὖν, ἐφη, ὅ Συμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὄνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία 5 τῶν οὕτω διακεμένους μάλιστα προσῆκει;
Πάντως δὴπον, ἐφη.

ἐ 8 ἐχεῖν B T ct γρ. W: εἶναι W εἰ B: om. T a 4 καὶ ἰδεῶν | ἡ παίδων ἑνεκα Αρσ. δὴ om. Αρσ. a 5 μετελθεῖν B2 T: ἐλθεῖν B W t a 6 τε C: τι B (in ras.) T W b 2 εἰςιν B W t: οἴσει T γε ἦ B Αρσ.: om. T W b 3 δόξει B: δόξει T b 4 . . . θανοῦ ἀλλοθα . . . . . . ὑποθεῖ φρονήσει εἴν Ars.: γρ. ἀλλοθι δυνάτων εἶναι καθαρῶς in marg., B (i.e. μηδαμοῦ ἀλλοθι δυνάτων εἶναι καθαρῶς φρονήσει εὑρεχεί) b 5 . . . άλογία ἐν Αρσ. b 8 ἐφη τεκμηρίων Αρσ. ἀνδρὸς ετ' μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι om. ut vid Αρσ. 0 2 . . . γχάνει φιλο . . . Αρσ. c 4 πάνυ B T Stob.: πάνυ γ' W
'Ανάγκη, ἐφη.
Εἰ γὰρ ἔθελες, ἢ δ' ὄς, εἰνοήσαι τῷ γε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, ὀδεῖς σοι εἶναι ἀτοπὸς.
Πῶς ὣς, ὥς Σώκρατες;
Ὁσθά, ἢ δ' ὄς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἥγοιντα μᾶλλον τὸν μεγάλων κακῶν;
Καὶ μάλ', ἐφη.
Ὁύκοιν φύσις μεσάων κακῶν ὑπομενόσθαι αὐτῶι ὁ ἀνδρείας τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένοσθαι;
'Εστι ταῦτα.
Τῷ δὲδιετριβάν ἄρι καὶ δέει ἀνδρείην εἰςι πάιτές πληρ ὁν 
φιλοσοφὸν καίτοι ἀλογόν γε δέει τινα καὶ δειλία ἀνδρείαν εἰναι.
Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
Τῇ δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶι; οὐ ταῦτα τούτο πεπόθασιν
ἀκολοῦσα τοίς σώφρονες εἰσιν; καίτοι φασμένε ἡ αὑτῶν εἰναι, ἀλλ' ὄμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τοῦτο ὄμοιον τὸ πάθος
τὸ περὶ ταῦτη τῷ εἴθη σωφροσύνην φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἐτέρων ἑδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἑπιθυμοῦντες ἐκεῖνοι, ἀλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπὸ ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. καίτοι καλοῦσε γε ἀκολασταν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἑδονῶν ἀρχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὄμως συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατούμενοι υφ' ἑδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων ἑδονῶν.

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τοίτα δ' ομοίων ἐστὶν ὃ νυνὶς ἐλέγετο, τῷ τρόπον τινὰ δ' ακολουθίαν αὐτοὺς σεσωφρονίσθαι.

'Εοικε γὰρ.

'Ω μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ σὺν αὐτῇ ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ, ἦδονας πρὸς ἦδονας καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, [καὶ] μείζω πρὸς ἔλαπτῳ ὡςπερ τομὸς, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ τόμημα ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεὶ πάντα ταύτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρονίσεις,

[καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα] καὶ μετὰ τούτου [ἀφινεμένα τε καὶ τιμήσαμε] τῷ ὦτι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλληψίδην ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆς, μετὰ φρονίσεως, καὶ προσγεγραμμένων καὶ ἀπογεγραμμένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φοβῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν των των ἄλλων τριών χωρίζομενα 5 δὲ φρονίσεως [καὶ] ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ τῇ τοιούτῃ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῷ ὦτι ἀνθραποδόῳς τε καὶ οὐδὲν υγίεις οὐδὲ ἄληθες ἔχρ, τὸ δ' ἄληθες τῷ ὦτι ἢ κάθαρσις τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρονίσεις μὴ καθαρμὸς τις ἢ. καὶ κυνίππινον καὶ οὗ τὰς τελετὰς ἴσων οὔτων καταστησάμενε τοῦ φαινομενός τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὦτι πάλαι αὐτότεσθαι ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀπέλειπτο εἶξ 5 ἀλῶν ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβύρῳ κείσταται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμενὸς τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἑκεῖστε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει.

ἐνῶν γὰρ δὴν [ὡς] φασιν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς, "ναρδήκοντοροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παύροι" οὔτοι δ' εἰσὶν κατὰ τὴν ἑμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι οἱ οἱ περιφημοφηκότες ὀρθῶν. ὥν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπτον εἰς τῷ βίῳ

αλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προουθημένη γενέσθαι: εἰ δ' ὄρθως
5 προουθημένη καὶ τι ὑψαμεῖν, ἔκεισε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς
eiσομέθα, ἀν θεὸς έθέλη, ὀλίγου ὑστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.
tαυτ' ὦν γιγ., ἐφη, ὦ Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι,
ὡς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας οὐ
e καλεσὼν φέρω οὐδ' ἀγανάκτῳ, ὑγούμενος κάκει οὐδὲν ἢττον
ἡ ἐνθάδε δεσπότας τε ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἑταίρων:
[τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει]· εἰ τι οὐν ὑμῖν πιθανό-
tερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἡ τοὺς Ἀθηναίων δικασταίς, εὖ
5 ἃν ἔχων.

Εἰπώντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα, ὑπολαβὼν ο Κέβης
70 ἐφη· ὩΣ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι,
tὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους
μὴ, ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ἡ, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνη
tῆ ἱμέρα διαφθείρηται τε καὶ πολλοῖς ἦν ἀν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἀπο-
θήμησκη, εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα
5 ὀσπερ πνεύμα ἡ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα ὀιχηται διαπτομένη
cαὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἡ. ἐπεὶ, εὔπερ εἰή ποι αὐτὴ καθ'
αὐτὴς συμφροσμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν
ὡν σὺ νυνί δυῆθες, πολλῇ ἄν εἰή ἐλπίς καὶ καλὴ, ὡ
b Σώκρατες, ὡς ἀληθῆ ἐστιν ὃ σὺ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ
ἐστὼς οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πύστεος, ὡς ἐστὶ τε
ψυχή ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τῶν δύσωμεν ἐχεῖ καὶ
φρόνησιν.
5 Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὡ Σωκράτης, ὡ Κέβης· ἀλλὰ τὶ δὴ
ποιώμει; ἡ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἰτε
eἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μὴ;
'Εγώ γοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἢδεως ἂν ἀκούσαμι ἤμυνα ὁδεμίν ἐχεὶς περὶ αὐτῶν.

Οὐκον γ’ ἂν οἴμαι, ἢ δ’ ὅς ὁ ᾽Σωκράτης, εἰπεὶ τινα νῦν ἂν ἀκούσαντα, οὔτ’ εἰ κωμιδοποιοῖς εἰπη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ c περὶ προσηκούντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρῆ διασκοπέσθαι.

Σκεψίωμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῇ ἡμέρῃ πη, εἰτ’ ἄρα ἐν ὑπ’ Αἰδον εἰσών αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν αὐθρώπων εἶτε καὶ οὖ. παλαιῶς 5 μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τις λόγος οὗ μεμήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὼν εἰνενδε αἰφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεύρο ἀφικνοῦται καὶ γίγνοται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων καὶ εἰ τοῦτ’ οὕτως ἐχεῖ, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζωντας, ἀλλο τι ἡ ἐκεῖν ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεί; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποιν πάλιν ἐγίγνοιτο μὴ d οὕσατο, καὶ τούτο ίκανόν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ’ ἐστί, εἰ τῷ οὕτω φαινοῦν γίγνοιτο ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίγνοται οἱ ζωντες ἡ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐστι τούτο, ἄλλου ἂν τοῦ δεύτερο λόγου.

Ἡσυν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

Μη τοῦτων κατ’ αὐθρώπων, ἢ δ’ ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τούτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾶον μαθέων, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζωῶν πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ συλλημβοῦν ὅσπερ ἐχεῖ γένεσιν περὶ πάντων ὕδωρες ἂρ’ οὕτωσι γίγνεσται πάντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἡ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἑναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὅν τοιοῦτον τι, οἶνον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰώνα ἐναντίων ποι καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα ὅτι μυρία οὕτωσι ἐχει. τούτο οὖν σκεψίωμεθα, ἄρα ἀναγκαίων ὅσοις ἐστὶ τι ἑναντίων, μηθαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτῷ γίγνεσθαι 5 ἡ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτὸ ἑναντίων. οἶνον ὅταν μειζόν τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη ποι ἐξ ἐλάττους ὅποτος πρότερον ἐπείτα μειζόν γίγνεσθαι;

Naì.
10 Οὐκοὖν κἂν ἔλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζων ὄντων πρῶτερον
71 ὑπέρερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται;

'Εστιν οὖτω, ἐφη.

Καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυροτέρου γε τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βρα-

δυτέρου τὸ θάττον;

5 Πάντω γε.

Τί δὲ; ἄν τι χείρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείωνοις, καὶ ἄν

δικαιότεροι, ἐξ ἀδικώτεροι;

Πῶς γὰρ οὖν;

'Εικανὸς οὖν, ἐφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὖτω γίγνεται,

10 ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα;

Πάντω γε.

Τί δ’ αὖ; ἐστὶ τι καὶ τοιώνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον μεταξὺ

ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων ὄντων ὄντων ὄνο γενέσεις,

b ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἐτέρον, ἀπὸ δ’ αὖ τοῦ ἐτέρου

πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐτέρον μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττων

μεταξὺ αὐξήσεως καὶ φθοῦσις, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὖτω τὸ μὲν αὐξά-

νεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν;

5 Ναὶ, ἐφη.

Οὐκοὖν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψυχεῖσθαι

καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὖτω, καὶ εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς

ἀνόρμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐργῷ γοῦν πανταχῶ οὖτωs ἔχειν

ἀναγκαίων, γίγνεσθαι τε αὐτὰ ἐξ ἄλληλων γένεσιν τε εἰναι

10 ἐκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα;

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἢ δ’ ὅσ.

c Τί οὖν; ἐφη, τῷ ἐγώ ἐστὶ τι ἐναντίων, ὡσπερ τῷ

ἐγρηγορήμαι τὸ καθευδεῖν;

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.

Τί;

Τὸ τεθνάναι, ἔφη.
Οὔκοιν ἢς ἀλλήλως τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, ἐπερ ἐναντία ἔστω, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτῶν μεταξὺ δύο δυνῶν οὕτων;
Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
Τὴν μὲν τοῖνυν ἑτέραν συνθηκῶν οὐν νινθὴ ἔλεγον ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, ἔρω, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις. σὺν ὅ ὁ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν. λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέειν, καὶ εκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τῷ ἐγρηγορείνα γίγνεσθαι καὶ εκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορείνα τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτῶν οὔτη μὲν κατιδαρθάνεις εἰναι, τὴν δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι. ἵκανως σοι, ἔφη, ὅ οὐ;
Πάντα μὲν οὖν.
Λέγε δὴ μοι καὶ σὺ, ἔφη, οὔτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. 5 ὁμί τοῖς τὸς φῶς τῷ ἐγὼ τὸ τεθνάναι εἰναι;
Ἐγὼ γε.
Γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἢς ἀλλήλων;
Ναὶ.
Ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζωίτος τῷ τῷ γιγνόμενον;
Τὸ τεθνηκός, ἔφη.
Τί δὲ, ἢ δ' ὁς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος;
Ἀναγκαίον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζωί.
Ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων ἀρα, ὥς Κέβης, τὰ ζωτά τε καὶ οἱ ζωντες γίγνονται;
Φαίνεται, ἔφη.
Εἰςων ἀρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ήμῶν ἐν Ἀιών.
Ὅσικεν.
Οὔκοιν καὶ τοῖς γενεσέως τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα ἢ γ' ἑτέρα σαφὴς οὕσα τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθηύσκειν σαφῆς ὁδηποῦ, 5 ἢ οὐ;
Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
Πῶς οὖν, ἢ δ' ὁς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ αὐταποδώσομεν τὴν

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ 71c

7 αὐτῶν B Stob.: αὐτῶν T
8 e 11 ἐγρηγορέειν... 12 καθεύδειν
B B2 TW Stob.: om. B
d 1 αὐτῶν Stob.
d 5 μοι καὶ σὺ B: καὶ σὺ μοι B B2 TW Stob.
e 2 εἰσὶν ἄρα T W Stob.: ἄρα εἰσὶν B
ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτη χωλή ἔσταται ἡ φύσις; ἡ ἀνάγκη
10 ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθεμένῳ ἐναντίαν τυρνὰ γένεσιν;
Πάντως ποι, ἐφη.
Τίνα ταύτην;
Τὸ ἀναβίωσκεσθαι.
Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ’ ὦς, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ ἀναβίωσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν
72 τεθνεώτων ἄν εἰη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζωύτας αὐτή, τὸ ἀνα-
βιώσκεσθαι;
Πάντω γε.
Ὅµολογεῖται ἃρα ἦµῖν καὶ ταύτη τοὺς ζωύτας ἐκ τῶν
5 τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι ὦνδεν ἤττουν ἢ τοὺς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν
ζωύτων, τούτου δὲ ὦντος ἰκαῖον ποι ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι
ὅτι ἀναγκαίον τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι ποι, ὦθεν ὦ
πάλιν γίγνεσθαι.
Δοκεῖ µοι, ἐφη, ὥς Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὁµολογηµένων
10 ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν.
Ὑδε τοῖµων οὕτως, ἐφη, ὥς Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ’ ἀδίκως ὁµο-
λογήκαµεν, ὅσ ἐµοὶ δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ µὴ ἀεὶ ἀνταποδοθεῖ τὰ
b ἔτερα τοὺς ἐτέρους γιγνόµενα, ὡσπερεὶ κύκλῳ περιµόντα, ἀλλ’
eὐθεῖα τις εἰη ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἐτέρου µοῦν εἰς τὸ καταν-
tικρὶ καὶ µὴ ἀνακάµπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐτέρον µηδὲ καµµῆν
ποιοῖτο, οὐσθ’ ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆµα ἂν σχού
5 καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἄν πάθοι καὶ πάυσατο γιγνόµενα;
Πῶς λέγεις; ἐφη.
Οὐδὲν χαλεπῶν, ἢ δ’ ὦς, εἰνοῦσαι ὥ λέγωι ἀλλ’ οὖν εἰ
tὸ καταδαρθάνει µὲν εἰη, τὸ δ’ ἄνεγείρεσθαι µὴ ἀνταποδοθεῖ
γιγνόµενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδουτος, οὐσθ’ ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ’
c ᾧν λῆµνων τῶν Ἐνυθύμων ἄποδείξειν καὶ οὐδαµὸν ἂν
φαύνοιτο διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ταύτων ἐκεῖνοι πεπονθέναι,
καθεύδειν. κἂν εἰ συγκρίνωτο µὲν πάντα, διακρίνωτο δὲ

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ 72 c

μῆ, ταχῦ ἄν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἰ, ὁ Ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα." ὡσαντως δὲ, ὁ φίλε Κέβης, καὶ εἰ ἀποθηγήσκοι 5 μὲν πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ζήν μεταλάβοι, ἔπειδη δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μένοι εἰ τούτῳ τῷ σχῆματι τὰ τεθνεότα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκοιτο, ἄρ' οὖν πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα τεθνάναι καὶ μηδέν ζῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ χρώτα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ χρώτα θυσίκοι, τίς μηχαίνὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι;

Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

'Εστιν γὰρ, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ὃς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, παντῶς μᾶλλον οὖτο, καὶ ἤμείς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔξαπατόμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἐστι τῷ οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶν τῶν τῶν χρώτας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τάς τῶν τεθνεῶτων ψυχὰς εἶναί [καὶ ταῖς μὲν γε ἀγαθαὶς ἀμείων έιναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαίς e κάκιοι].

Καὶ μήν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης υπολαβόω, καὶ κατ' ἐκείνών γε τῶν λόγων, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθῆς ἐστιν, ὅν σὺ εἰωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἢμῶν ἡ μάθησιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ ἀνάμνησις 5 τυχάναι οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τούτου ἀνάγκη που ἢμᾶς εἰν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρώτῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἂ νῦν ἀναμμηνησκόμεθα. τούτῳ δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ὢν που ἢμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν εἰ τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ εἰδεί γενέσθαι οὕστε καὶ ταῦτῃ ἀδάνατον ἡ ψυχή 73 τι έοικεν εἶναι.

'Αλλὰ, ὁ Κέβης, ἐφη ὁ Σμμίας υπολαβὼν, ποιά τούτων αἰ ἀποδεῖξεις; ὑπομνησίων μὲ· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα εἰν τῷ παρόντι 5 μέμημαι.

'Εγὼ μὲν λόγῳ, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστω, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἀνθρώποι, εάν τις καλῶς ἔρωτὰ, αὐτοῖ λέγουσιν πάντα ἡ ἔχει—καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ

73a ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

10 ὁρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οὔτε τῇ ἤσσαν τοῦτο ποιήσαι—ἐπειτα
b εάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγη ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὔτως ἔχει.
Εἴ δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ γε, ἔφη, πείθη, ὄ Συμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι αὖ τῷ δέ πή σοι σκοπουμένῳ συνιδόχῃ. ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ
5 δὴ πώς ἢ καλομεῖνη μάθησις ἀνάμμησις ἔστω;
'Ἀπιστῶ μὲν [σοι] ἐγώγε, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Συμμίας, οὗ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. καὶ σχεδόν γε ἢς ὅν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἤδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι: οὐδὲν μειτάν ἤππον ἀκούομι νῦν πῇ σὺ ἐπ-
10 εχεῖσσας λέγειν.
c Τῇδ' ἐγώγε, ἢ δ' ὅς. ὠμολογοῦμεν γὰρ ὅππου, εἰ τίς τι ἀναμνησθῆσται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρὸτερον ποτε ἐπιστασθαι.
Πῶς γ', ἔφη.
'Αρ' οὖν καὶ τόδε ὠμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστῆμη παρα
5 γίγνεται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμμησιν εἶναι; λέγω δὲ τῶν τρόπων; τόδε. ἐὰν τίς τι ἐτέρουν ἢ ἱδών ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθήσεις λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἑκείνῳ γνώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐτέρου ἐπιστήσῃ οὐ μὴ ἢ αὐτή ἐπιστήμη ἄλλη ἄλλη, ἃρα οὖχι τοῦτο ὁμοίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὐ τὴν ἐννοιαν
d ἐλαβέν;
Πῶς λέγεις;
Ὁλον τὰ ποιόδε ἄλλη ποι ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπων καὶ λύρας.
Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;
5 Οὐκοῦν οὖθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταῖ, ὅταν ὅνωσιν λύραν ἢ ἴματον ἢ ἄλλο τι οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἰσεθε χρήσθαι, πάσχοιοι
toito: ἐγιαστάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐλαβον τὸ

a το ποιήσαι Hirschig: ποιήσει B: ποιεῖν T W b 4 σοὶ T W: σοι
dὲν B (sed ἂν punct. not ) b 6 σοὶ B: om. T W b 7 παθεῖν
Heindorf: μαθεῖν B T W b 9 μέντ᾽ ἂν B² W: μέν ἂν B T πῇ
συ τῇ B: sy πῇ B² W e 1 τῇ B: τῇ δὲ T e 6 τοιὸ B:
toιὸ τῇ ἐτέρου T: πρὸτερον B: Olymp. ἢ (post ἐτέρον) B Olymp.
T 1 c 9 λέγομεν T W: ἐλέγομεν B d 6 ἄλλο τι B: τῇ
εἶδος τοῦ παιδὸς οὗ ἦν ἡ λύρα; τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἀναμνήσις· ὁσπερ γε καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἶχ. 

Μνήμια μέντοι νῦν Δίαι, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὦς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησις τῖς ἐστὶ; μάλιστα ε μέντοι ὅταν τοῖς τοιοῦτο πάθη περὶ ἐκείνα ἀ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μή ἐπισκοπεῖν ήδη ἐπελέξθησο;

Πάντω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Τῷ δὲ; ἢ δ' ὦς· ἐστὶν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἱδόντα καὶ 5 λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπων ἀναμνήσθηκαί, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἱδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνήσθηκαί;

Πάντω γε.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἱδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου ἀναμνήσθηκαί;

"Εστὶ μέντοι, ἔφη.

"Αρ' οὖν οὐκ κατὰ πάντα ταύτα συμβαίνει τῷ ἀναμνήσιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὦμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων;

Σιμμαίνει.

'Αλλ' ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὦμοίων ἀναμμηνήσκεται τῖς τι, ἀρ' 5 οὐκ ἀναγκαίον τόδε προσπαίσχειν, ἐνυφεῖν εἰτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὦμοιότητα εἰτε μή ἐκείνου οὐ ἀνεμνήσθη;

'Ανάγκη, ἔφη.

Σκόπει δὴ, ἢ δ' ὦς, εἰ ταύτα οὕτως εἴχει. φαμέν ποὺ τι εἶναι ἵσον, οὐ ξύλῳ λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθῳ οὐδὲ ἀλλὸ 10 τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταύτα πάντα ἑτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἱσον· φωμέν τι εἶναι ἦ μηδεῖν;

Φῶμεν μέντοι νῦν Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε. 5

"Η καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστιν;

Πάντω γε, ἢ δ' ὦς.

Πάθει λαξόντες αὐτοῦ τῷ ἐπιστήμην; ἀρ' οὖκ εἴς οὖν μνανῇ ἔλεγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἁπτα ἱδόντες 5

ήσα, ἐκ τοῦτων ἑκείνῳ ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἔτερον ὅν τούτων; ἦν
οὖχ ἔτερον σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῇδε. ἄρ' οὐ λίθοι
μὲν ἵσοι καὶ Ξύλα ἐνίστε ταῦτα ὅτα τῷ μὲν ἵσα φαίνεται,
tῷ δ' οὐ;
10 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

'Τι δὲ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἵσα ἐστὶν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἑφαίνη, ἦ ἦ ἴσοτις
ἀνισότης;
'Οὐδεπώποτε γε, ὁ Σώκρατες.
"Οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἔστιν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτα τε τὰ ἵσα καὶ αὐτὸ
5 τὸ ἴσον.
"Οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὁ Σώκρατες.
'Ἀλλὰ μήν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἐφ'η, τῶν ἴσων, ἔτερων οὐτῶν
ἐκείνων τοῦ ἴσου, ὄμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐνενοηκάς τε
καὶ εἴληφας;
10 'Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφ'η, λέγεις.
"Οὐκοῦν ἦ ὄμως οὕτως τούτοις ἦ ἀνομοίοις;
Πάνυ γε.
Διαφέρει δὲ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδένι ἦσ εἰς ἄλλο ἴδοιν ἀπὸ
tαύτης τῆς ὄψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσης, εἴτε ὄμοιον εἴτε ἄνομοιον,
ἀναγκαίοις, ἐφ'η, αὐτὸ ἀνάμμησιν γεγονέναι.
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Τῇ δὲ; ἦ δ' ὅς; ἦ πᾶσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς
5 ἔλλοις τε καὶ οὗς ἕλεγχοι ἐκείνου τῶν ἴσων; ἀρα φαίνεται
ἡμῖν οὕτως ἵσα εἶναι ὀσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅ ἐστιν, ἦ ἐνδεῖ τι
ἐκείνου τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἰον τὸ ἴσον, ἦ οὐδέν;
Καὶ τοιού γε, ἐφ'η, ἐνδεῖ.
"Οὐκοῦν ὀμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τῆς τῷ ἴδοιν ἐννοήη ὅτι βού-
10 λεται μὲν τοῦτο ὅ τιν ἐγὼ ὅρω εἶναι οἰον ἄλλο τῷ τῶν οὕτων,
ἐ ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι ἴσον ἵσα ἐκείνον, ἄλλα'

b 6 ἵσα B: τὰ ἵσα T  b 8-9 τῷ ... τῷ B ἦρ. W: τότε ... τότε
Τ ἦρ. W  γρ. B  e 13 ἦν B: γαρ ἦν B2 TW  d 1 ἀνάμοιον εἴτε ὄμοιον T
d 4 δὲ; B: δὲ τῶν' T  d 5 τοῖς W: ἐν τοῖς E T  d ἦ τῷ ἦ W:
τι TW: τῷ B  d 7 τῷ] τοῦ Heindorf e 1 ἴσον secl. Mudge
ἀλλ' ἐστίν]' ἀλλ' ἀλλὸ ἐστίν in marg. B2
ἐστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖον που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ὥς φησιν αὐτὸ προσευκέναι μὲν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν;

'Ανάγκη.

Τί οὖν; τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἴμεις ἢ οὐ περὶ τὸ τὰ ἱσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἱσον;

Παντάπασι γε.

'Αναγκαῖον ἄρα ἰμᾶς προειδότερα τὸ ἱσον πρὸ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἱδόντες τὰ ἱσα ἐνενοήσαμεν ὅτι ὁρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἶον τὸ ἱσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως.

'Εστι ταῦτα.

'Αλλὰ μή καὶ τόδε ὡμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἀλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατῶν εἶναι ἐννοηταί ἀλλ’ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἱδείν ἢ ἀφασθαί ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἅλλην τῶν αἰσθήσεων ταῦταν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω.

Ταῦτον γὰρ ἑστιν, ὁ Σώκρατες, πρὸς γε ὁ βούλεται ὁδὼσαι ὁ λόγος.

'Αλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἢ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοηταί ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκεῖνον τε ὁρέγεται τοῦ ὁ b ἑστὶν ἱσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεεστέρα ἑστιν ἣ πῶς λέγομεν;

Οὐτώς.

Πρὸ τοῦ ἅρα ἀφεσθαί ἰμᾶς ὅραν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τάλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἐδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ 5 τοῦ ἱσον ὅτι ἑστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἢ ἐκεῖνο προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαύτ’ εἶναι οἰον ἐκεῖνο, ἑστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα.

'Ανάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειμεμένων, ὁ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοιν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἐφωρῶμεν τε καὶ ἕκονομεν καὶ τὰ ἅλλα αἰσθήσεις εἰχομεν;

Πάνω γε.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

c  "Εδει δέ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τοῦτων τὴν τοῦ ἵσου ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι;

Ναὶ.

Πρῶ γενέσθαι ἁρα, ὡς ἐοικεῖν, ἀνάγκῃ ἡμῶν αὐτὴν εἰλη-

5 φέναι.

"Εοικεῖν.

Οὐκοιν εἰ μὲν λαβώντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἐχοῦτε ἐγενόμεθα, ἡπιστήμεθα καὶ πρῶ γενέσθαι καὶ εὗθυς γενό-

10 μενοί ὦ μόνον τὸ ἱσον καὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἐλαττον ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἱσου ἕν ὁ λόγος ἡ-

c 1 d μῶν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτῶν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὡσίον καὶ, ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ ἀπάντων ὡς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ "ἀυτὸ ὁ ἐστὶ" καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτή-

10 σεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρύσεσιν ἀποκρυφομενοι, ὡστε ἀναγκαίον ἡμῶν τούτων πάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι.

"Εστὶ ταῦτα.

Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβώντες ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλελήσμεθα, εἰδότας ἃεὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἃεὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ ἐστὶν, λαβώντα τοῦ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολογεκέναι ὡς οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπι-

5 στήμην ἀποβολῆν;

e 10 Πάντως ὅπουν, ἐφῇ, ὁ Σώκρατες.

Εἰ δὲ γε οἱμαὶ λαβώντες πρῶ γενέσθαι γιγαρόμενοι ἀπω-

λέσαμεν, ύστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεις χρόνευοι περὶ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας ὡς ποτὲ καὶ πρῶ

5 ἐξισομεν, ἃρ' οὐχ ὁ καλοῦμεν μανθάνεις οἰκεῖαν ἄν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν εἰ; τοῦτο δὲ ποιν ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἄν λέγομεν;

Πάνω γε.


dότας Β W t: εἰδότες Τ b καὶ αbatim Β ἢ καὶ Β d 10 Σιωπία om. T e 1 πάντως ΒΤ : παντελῶς Β² W e 3 αὐτὰ ΒΤ: ταῦτα Β W e 5 ἰν T: om. B e 6 εἰ: ἰν Τ: ἰν εἰ B
Δυνατὸν γὰρ ὃτι τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἢ ἴδοντα
ἡ ἀκούσαντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθήσεως λαβόντα ἐτέρον τι ἀπὸ
τοῦτον ἐννοοῖσαί οὗ πολλοθεσίας ἀνύμων ἡ ὁ ὅμοιον ὡστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῦν θάτερα, ἢ τοι ἐπιστάμενοι ὡς αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες. 5
ἡ ὑστερον, οὔς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὔδὲν ἀλλ' ἡ ἀναμμη-
σκοιται οὕτως, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμμησις ἂν εἴη.
Καὶ μᾶλα ὃ τι εὐτως ἔχει, ὁ Σῶκρατες.
Πότερον οὖν αἱρῆτ,' ὁ Σιμμία; ἐπισταμένους ἡμᾶς γεγο-
νέατι, ἡ ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι ὑστερον οὖν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην b
ἐιληφατε ἢμεις;
Οὐκ ἔχω, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐλέσθαι.
Τί δέ; τόδε ἔχεις ἐλέσθαι, καὶ πῇ σοι δοκεὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ;
ἀμὴρ ἐπιστάμενοι περὶ οὖν ἐπισταται ἔχοι ἄν δοῦναι λόγον 5
ἡ οὖ.
Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὁ Σῶκρατες.
'Ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τοῦ-
των οὐ νυνὴ ἐλέγομεν;
Βουλοῦμεν μεντόν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον 10
φοβοῦμαι μὴ αὕροι τηρικάδε οὐκέτι ἢ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς
ἀξίως οὕς τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι.
Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσι σοι ἐπιστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμία, c
πάντες αὐτά;
Οὐδαμῶς.
'Ἀναμμηνήσκοιται ἄρα ὃ ποτε ἔμαθον;
'Ἀνάγκη. 5
Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τήν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὔ
γὰρ ὃ τι ἄφι οὐ γε ἀνθρώπων γεγόναμεν.
Οὐ δήτα.
Πρότερον ἄρα.
Ναί.
Πησαν ἄρα, ὦ Σμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρῶτοι, πρὶν εἶναι εἰ ἀνθρώπῳ εἴδει, χώρας σωμάτων, καὶ φρονήσων εἰχον.

Εἴ μὴ ἄρα ἀμα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες,

ταῦτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας' οὐτοὶ γὰρ λείπεται ἐτὶ ὁ χρόνος.

Εἴει, ὦ ἐστάφρη: ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποιῷ ἅλλῳ χρόνῳ;

—οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχουσί τε αὐτὰς γιγνόμεθα, ὡς ἁρτὶ ὁμολογή-

σαμεῖ—ή ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν ἐν ὁπερ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἣ

ἐχεὶς ἅλλοι παῖδα εἰπεῖν χρόνοι;

Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ ἐλάθον ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰ-

πών.

Ἀρ' οὖν οὕτως ἐχεῖ, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὦ Σμμία; εἰ μὲν ἔστιν

ἀνθρωπίνην ἀπεὶ, καλὸν τέ τι καὶ ἁγαθὸν καὶ πάσα ἡ 

τουαίτι οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀνα-

e φέρομεν, ὑπάρχονσαν πρῶτοιν ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν

οὐσίαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνη ἀπείκαζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτος ὀπέρ

καὶ ταῦτα ἐστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχήν εἶναι καὶ

πρὶν γεγονότα ἡμᾶς: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰς ἅν ὁ λόγος

οὕτως εἰρημένος ἐβ' ἀρ' οὕτως ἐχεῖ, καὶ ἵση ἀνάγκη ταὐτά

tε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονότα, καὶ

εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε;

Ὑπερφυὼς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη οἱ Σμμίασ, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ

αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλὸν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς

τὸ ὁμοιός εἶναι τὴν τοιν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ

τὴν οὐσίαν ἢν σὺ νῦν λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἐχὼ ἐγωγε οὐδὲν

οὕτως καὶ ἐναργεῖς ὅν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τουαίτ' εἶναι ὡς

οἶνον τε μιλῆσαν, καλόν τε καὶ ἁγαθὸν καὶ τὰλα πάντα ᾗ

σὺ νυνὶ ἐλέγεις καὶ ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ ἰκανῶς ἀποδείκται.

Τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητi; ἔφη οἱ Σωκράτης: δεί γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα 

πείθειν.

Ἰκανῶς, ἔφη οἱ Σμμίας, ὡς ἐγωγε οὖμαι καίτοι καρτερό-

c 11 πρὶν ἂν W c 14 ἄμα W: om. B T c 15 ὁ om. W

d 3 ἐν φέτερ B: φέτερ T d 7 ἔφη ἡμῖν ἔχει W d 8 τι B²T W: om. B e 8 ἐφ' ὁ σώκρατες W a 4 πάντα B T: ἀπαντα B²W a 5 ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει B: ἐμοίγε B²T: μοὶ γε W
 ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

77a
tatos ἀνθρώπων ἠστίν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' ὁμίτων ἐνδείκτο τούτο πεπείσθαι αὐτοῦ, ὃτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή; εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι ἦσται, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀποδεδειχθαι, ἀλλ' ἐτι ἐνέστηκεν ὁ νοοῦ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἁμα ἀποθησκοιτο τοῦ ἀνθρώπων διασκεδάζονται ἡ ψυχή καὶ αὐτή τοῦ ἐναι τούτο τέλος ὅτι 5 γὰρ κωλύει Γίγνεσθαι μὲν αὐτῆς καὶ συνίστασθαι ἄλλοθεν ποθεν καὶ εἶναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειος σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀφικνηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τούτων, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευτάν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι;

Εὗ λέγεις, ἐφη, ὁ Συμμία, ὁ Κέβης. φαίνεται γὰρ ὁ 3 ωσπερ ἡμῶν ἀποδεδείχθαι οὐ δει, ὃτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή, δει δὲ προσαποδείξαι ὃτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἦττον ἦσται ἡ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀποδείξει εὔειν.

Ἀποδεεικται μὲν, ἐφη, ὁ Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ ὁ 5 Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ ὃθελετε συνθείναι τούτων τε τῶν λόγων εἰς ταύτων καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων ὁμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίγνεσθαι πάν τὸ ξών ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεώτος. εἰ γὰρ ἦστω μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτή εἰς τὸ ξὺν ἑως τε καὶ γιγαντομενή μιθαμόθεν ἀλλοθεν ἡ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθναίαν γίγνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτῆν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνη εὑρα, ἐπείδῃ γε δει αὖθις αὐτῆν γίγνεσθαι; ἀποδεεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν. ὅμως δὲ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τε καὶ Συμμίας ἑδέως ἀν καὶ τούτων διαπραγματεύσασθαι τῶν λόγων ἐτὶ μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδεινα καί τῶν παῖδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἀνεμος αὐτὴν εκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος δια-

a 9 εἵστιν ... ἀπιστεῖν in marg. T tois in ras T b 2 δοκεῖ om. pr. W w σώκρατες ἐφη T b 4 ἁμα B2 TW: om. B δια- σκεδάζωνται Matthiae b 6 ἁμόθεν Bekker: ἀλλοθεν B TW c 3 δεί B: δειν T ὅτι B: ἐτι el T el s.v. W c 5 ἐξεῖν T: ἐξεῖν B c 9 μεν B: om. TW d 2 καὶ B: τε καὶ ἐκ T d 3 αὐτῆν T B: αὐτή B (ut vid. W d 4 γε B: δε T sed punct. not. αὐτὴν αὐθίς W d 5 λέγετε Par. 1811: λέγεται B TW
φυσά καὶ διασκεδάζωσιν, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ ὅταν τυχῇ τίς μὴ ἐν
γνημίᾳ ἀλλ' ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθηνήσκων.

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάστας, ἔως δεδιότων, ἐφή, ὁ Ὁσκρατες,
περὶ ἀναπείθεων μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὃς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ' ἢ
ὅσοι ἔν τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παις ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται.
τούτων οὖν περὶ μεταπείθεων μὴ δεδίεγα τὸν θάνατον ὅσπερ
τὰ μορμολύκεια.

'Αλλὰ χρή, ἐφη ὁ Ὁσκράτης, ἔπαθεν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἤμερας
ἔως ἂν ἐξετάσῃ.

78 Πόθεν ὅνω, ἐφη, ὁ Ὁσκρατες, τῶν τοιουτῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιφθον
ληψόμεθα, ἐπειδή σὺ, ἐφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις;

Πολλῇ μὲν ἡ 'Ελλάς, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ἐν ἦ ἐνεισὶ που
ἀγαθοὶ ἄνωρες, πολλά δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οὐς
πάντας χρή διερευνάσθαι ζητοῦτας τοιούτων ἐπιφθὸν, μήτε
χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε πόνοις, ὡς οὐκ ἔστων εἰς ὅτι
ἀν εὐκαιροτερον ἀναλύσκοιτε χρήματα. ζητέων δὲ χρή καὶ
αὐτῶν μετ' ἀλλήλων ὡσοις γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ μαθόν εὑροίτε
μᾶλλον ἡμῶν ὑπαρέμενοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

10 'Αλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὅνη, ἐφη, ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης· οἶδε δὲ
ἀπελάπομεν ἑπανέλθωμεν, εἰ σου ἡδομέρια ἔστων.

'Αλλὰ μὴν ἡδομέρια γε' πῶς γὰρ οὐ μελλεῖ;

Καλῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις.

Οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτοι τι, ἢ δ' ὅσ ὁ Ὁσκράτης, δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἀνερέσθαι
ἐαυτούς, τῷ ποιώ τινι ἁρὰ προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν,
τὸ διασκεδάζωσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποιῶν τινὸς δεδιέαν μὴ
πάθῃ αὐτῷ, καὶ τῷ ποιῷ τινι (οὐ)· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐ
ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον [ι] ψυχὴ ἔστων, καὶ ἐκ τοῦτων
διαφεῖλ ὡδ δεδιέαν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς;

10 'Αληθῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις.

'Ἄρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν συνιθέντι τε καὶ συνιθέτω ὅτι τοῦ φύσει

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77e ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

e6 περὶ δὲ μεταπείθεων W: περιφοράθαι B T

e9 ἐξεπάθηται

Vind. 21 T*: ἐξεπάθηται T: ἐξεπάθηται W: ἐξίσασθαι Bycop. W et in

marg. 1 a i ἄγαθον pr. T

2 a 7 ἃν εὐκαιροτέρον T: ἀναγκαιοτέρον

B W yp. T

3 a το ὑπάρξει ἐφη B T W

b i ἀπελάπομεν T W

b 4 ἀνερέσθαι T W Olymp.: ἐρέσθαι B b 6 τῷ T W Olymp.: τοῦ B

b 7 ὁδ add. Heindorf b 8 Ἡ: om. T W
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ 78c

προσήκει τούτο πάσχειν, διαφερόμενες ταύτη ἢπερ συνετέθη; εἰ δὲ τι τυχχάνει ὑνίν ἀσύνθετον, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ
πάσχειν ταύτα, εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ;

Δοκεὶ μοι, ἐφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὁ Κέβης.

Οὐκοῦν ἀπερ ἄει κατὰ ταύτα καὶ ὁσαύτως ἔχει, ταύτα μάλιστα εἰκὼς εἶναι τὰ ἀσύνθετα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλως καὶ
μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα, ταύτα δὲ σύνθετα;

'Εμοιγε δοκεὶ οὕτως.

'Iωμεν δή, ἐφη, ἐπὶ ταύτα ἐφ' ἀπερ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία οὐς λόγον ὀδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρω-
τῶτες καὶ ἀποκριμένους, πότερον ὁσαύτως ἄει ἔχει κατὰ ταύτα ἡ ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ
ἐκαστὸν ὁ ἐστιν, τὸ ὧν, μὴ ποτε μεταβολήν καὶ ἡμιτωνίαν ἐνδέχεται; ἢ ἄει αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸν ὁ ἐστιν, μονοειδῆς οὐν αὐτὸ 5
καθ' αὐτό, ὁσαύτως κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄλλοις οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται;

'Οσαύτως, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταύτα ἔχειν, ὁ
Σώκρατες.

Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν, οἰον ἀνθρώπων ἡ ἢππων ἡ
ἵματιών ἡ ἄλλων ὁμοιωμένων τοιούτων, ἡ ἴσων [ἡ καλῶν] ἡ
pαίτων τῶν ἐκείνων ὁμοιώμων; ἢ ἄρα κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει, ἢ πάν
tοιοιτίων ἐκείνων οὐτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς οὐτε ἄλληλοις οὐδέποτε
ὡς ἐπού εἰπεν οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταύτα;

Οὕτως οὖ, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, ταύτα: οὐδέποτε ὁσαύτως ἔχει. 5

Οὐκοῦν τοίτων μὲν καὶ ἂν ἄφαιρ καὶ οὕοις καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις
ἀνθρώπων αὐστροῦ, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταύτα ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστων
ὁτὲ ἄν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβουν ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἄλλ'
ἐστιν ἄδικα τοιούτω καὶ οὐκ ὀράτα;

c 4 ταύτα B (sed punct. not.): τά αὐτά T c 7 τά B & Heindorf
c 8 δὲ B T: δὲ εἶναι B² W t: δὲ κατὰ ταύτα B² T: κατὰ τά
d 10 καλῶν T: κατὰ B secl. Classen cl. ante
e 1 ἂν om. T f 3 οὕτω B T: καὶ οὕτω B² W om. οὕτω B² W
οὐδεπώτε B² W e 4 ταύτα B: ταύτα ἔστω B² T W e 5 αὗ
e 9 οὕτω B T: κατὰ B² T: om. B e 10 καὶ ἄδικα T: om. B e 11 ἄδικα B: ὀράται T (sed ex emend.) W
plato, vol. i.
5 Παντάπασαν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ λέγειν.
Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δόσιν εἰδὴ τῶν οὖν τῶν, τὸ μὲν ὅρατών, τὸ δὲ αἰώνες;
Θῶμεν, ἔφη. 
Καὶ τὸ μὲν αἰώνες ἂεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὅρατόν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα;
Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν.
10 μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα;

b 
Φέρε δὴ, ἢ δ’ ὦς, ἄλλο τι ήμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σώμα ἐστι, 
τὸ δὲ ψυχῆ;
Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη.
Ποτέρῳ οὖν ὦμοιότερον τῷ εἰδεὶ φαμὲν ἂν εἶναι καὶ

5 συγγενέστερον τὸ σώμα;
Παντί, ἔφη, τούτῳ γε δήλοι, ότι τῷ ὅρατῷ.
Τι δὲ η ψυχῆ; ὅρατον ἡ αἰώνες;
Οὐχ υπ’ ἁνθρώπων γε, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἔφη.
Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὅρατα καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν ἁνθρώπων

10 φύσει ἐλέγομεν· ἡ ἄλλη τινὶ ὦτε;
Τῇ τῶν ἁνθρώπων.
Τι οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὅρατον ἡ ἁόρατον εἶναι;
Οὐχ ὅρατον.
Ἄιώνες ἅρα;

15 Ναι.
Ὁμοιότερον ἅρα ψυχῆ σώματος ἐστὶν τῷ αἰώνει, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὅρατῷ.

5 Ἡσα αὐτάγκη, ὁ Σῶκρατες.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ δέ πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι η ψυχῆ, ὅταν μὲν 
τῷ σώματι προσχρήται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἡ διὰ τοῦ ὅραν ἡ 
ὅπως τοῦ ἄκοιν ἡ ὑπ’ ἄλλης τω μόνοις αἰσθήσεως—τοῦτο γάρ 
5 ἐστὶν τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δὲ αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι—

α 6 βούλει: ΒΤ Στοβ.: εἴ βούλει: Β’ W
β 4 φαμέν Τ Στοβ.: φαμέν B Ευς.
β 9 μὴν Β’ W Ευς. Στοβ.: om. B
β 10 ἐλέγομεν Β’ TW

ante φύσει) Ευς. Στοβ.: λέγομεν B
b 12 λέγομεν Β’ W Ευς. Στοβ.:

ἐλέγομεν Β’ W τῇ ἁόρατον B Ευς. Στοβ.: om. Τ

ε 2 ἐλέ-

γομεν Β’T W Ευς. Στοβ.: λέγομεν Theodoretus
B’T W Στοβ.: αἰσθήσεως

5 αἰσθήσεως

B’T W Στοβ.: αἰσθήσεως B
τότε μὲν ἐλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτῇ πλαγιάται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ εἰλιγγιὰ ὀσπερ μεθύνουσα, ἀτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένης;

Πάνυ γε.

"Ὅταν δὲ γε αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτήν σκοπῆ, ἐκείστε οἴχεται εἰς δὲ τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ ἀδιάστατον καὶ ὁσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενῆς οὖσα αὐτοῦ ἀτε μετ' ἐκεῖνῳ τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτήν γέννηται καὶ ἔξὶ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαιναι τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀτε κατὰ ταύτα ὁσαύτως ἔχει, ἀτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένης καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρο- νήσις κέκληται;

Παιτάσασιν, ἐφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὥ Σῶκρατες.

Ποτέρῳ οὖν αὖ σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἶδει καὶ ΕΚ τῶν πρώσθεν καὶ ΕΚ τῶν τῶν λεγομένων ψυχῆ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι καὶ συγγενέστερον:

Πάς ἂν μοι δοκεῖ, ἢ οὖς, συγχωρήσαι, ὥ Σῶκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὅτι ὅλῳ καὶ παιτὶ ὁμοιότερον ἐστὶ ψυχή τῷ αὖ ὁσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μη.

Τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα;

Τῷ ἐτέρῳ.

"Ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῆς ὁτι ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὅσιν ψυχῆ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχεων καὶ δεσπόζεων καὶ κατὰ ταύτα αὖ πότερον σοι δοκεῖ ὁμοίον τῷ θείῳ εἶναι καὶ πότερον τῷ θυτητῷ; ἡ οὖ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ μὲν θείον οἶον ἄρχεων τε καὶ ἤγεμονεύειν πεφυ- κέται, τὸ δὲ θυμητῶν ἀρχεσθαί τε καὶ δουλεύειν;

'Εμοιγε.

Ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχή ἐοικεν;

Δῆλα δὴ, ὥ Σῶκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχῆ τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θυτῆτοι.
είκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων
καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἄει ὤσαύτως κατὰ ταύτα ἐχομεῖν ἐαυτῷ ὀμοιώτατον εἶναι ψυχή, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θυμῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ ἀνοιτῷ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα ἐχομεῖν ἐαυτῷ ὀμοιώτατον αὐτ ἐναι σώμα. Ἐξομεῖν τι παρὰ ταύτα ἀλλο λέγειν, ὁ φίλε Κέβης, ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;
Οὐκ ἔχομεν.
Τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἐχομεῖν ἢρ' οὔχ σώματε μὲν ταχύ διαλύεσθαι προσηκεὶ, ψυχὴ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ παράπαν ἀδια-
λύτῳ εἶναι ἡ ἐγνύς τι τούτων;

Ἡ οὖρ οὖν:
'Εννοεῖς οὖν, ἐφη, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἀνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ὀρατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ εἰ ὁρατῷ κεῖμενον, ὃ δὴ νεκρῶν καλοῦμεν, ὃ προσηκεὶ διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν καὶ δια-
πεσθαι, οὐκ εὖθεν τούτων οὐδέν πέπονθεν, ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῶς συνήν ἐπιμένει χρόνον, εἰὼ μὲν τις καὶ χαρίεντως ἔχων τὸ
σῶμα τελευτῆτη καὶ εἰν τοιαύτῃ ὃρα, καὶ πάνυ μάλα συμ-
πεσόν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν, ὃσπερ οἱ ἐν Ἀλγύπτῳ
ταριχευθέντες, ὁλίγον ὅλον μὲνει ἀμήκεισεν ὅσον χρόνον,
καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα πάντα, ὡς ὁ ἐποὶ εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατα ἐστων
ἡ οὖ.

Ναι.

Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀιών, τὸ εἰς τοιούτων τόπων ἐτερον
ἀλχόμενον γενναίων καὶ καθαρῶν καὶ ἀιών, εἰς Ἀιώνον ὡς
ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἱ, ἄν θεὸς

b 2 κατὰ Β Ευσ. Στοβ.: καὶ κατὰ Τ
b 4 ἀνοιτῶς καὶ πολυειδεῖ
T W Ευσ. Στοβ.
b 6 Ἡ Σανζ.: Ἡ Β.: Ἡ W.: ὅς T Ευσ. Στοβ.: Ἡ
marg. t.: Ἡ ὅς marg. b
b 2 ἐπειδὰν Β.: ὅτι ἐπειδὰν Β.: Τ W Ευσ. Στοβ.
c 3 αὐτοῦ τὸ Β Ευσ.: αὐτοῦ T Στοβ.
c 4 καὶ διαπειθθαὶ T W b
Ευσ. Στοβ.: om. B
b 7 ὅρα T W b Ευσ. Στοβ.: ἡμέρα B
b 5 ἐτερον τόπον Αρσ.
c 6 τῶν γενναίων Αρσ.
c 7 τῶν ἀγαθῶν
θεῶν (καὶ φρόνιμον) Αρσ. (ut vid.)
oi δὴ Αρσ. (ut vid.)
θέλη, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἵτέου, αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκώς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφίσηται καὶ ἀπόλολειν, ὥσ φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀνθρωποὶ; πολλοὶ γε δὲ, ὁ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Συμμία, εἰλαλὰ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον ὁὔ ἔχειν ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος ὑπεφέλκουσα, ἀτε οὐδὲν κουνωνοῦσα αὐτῷ εἰ τῷ βίῳ ἐκοῦσα εἰναι, ἀλλὰ φεῦγουσα αὐτῷ καὶ συνήθρουσμένη αὐτῇ εἰς ἑαυτήν, ἀτε μελετῶσα ἀεὶ τοῦτо—5 ὁ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἡ ὁρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ οὕτῳ τεθυάναι μελετῶσα λέοντος· ἣ οὖ τοῦτ ἂν εἰ ἡ μελέτη ἑπαρτόν;

Παιτάπασι γε.

Οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἐξουσία εἰς τὸ ὁμοίων αὐτῇ τὸ ἀϊδὲς ἀπερχεῖαι, τὸ θεῖον τε καὶ ἄθανατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἱ 5 ἀφικομένη ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐβαίμοιο εἰναι, πλάνης καὶ ἁρείας καὶ φόβου καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπεῖων ἀπελλαγμένη, ὡσπερ δὲ λέγεις κατὰ τῶν μημημένων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τῶν λοιπῶν χρόνων μετὰ θεῶν διάγονα; οὕτω φῶμεν, ὁ Κέβης, ἡ ἄλλως;

Οὐτῷ νῦν Δία, ἐφή ὁ Κέβης.

Ἐὰν δὲ γε οἴμαι μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτους τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἀτε τῷ σώματι αἰεὶ συνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρώσα καὶ γοητευομένη ὑπὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τέ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἥδονῶν, ὡστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθεῖς ἄλλη ἡ τὸ σώματος ἐκεῖσε, οὗ τίς ἂν ἄψαστι καὶ ἱδοὶ καὶ πίοι 5 καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρῆσατο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὀμίμαι σκοτῶδες καὶ αἰδές, νοητον δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία αἰρετοίν,
τούτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμει καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω

ποτέ ἄριστον ὑπέρ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς,

δὲ αὐτὴ ἡ ὀμωλία καὶ τὰ συνονοσία τῶν σώματος διὰ τὸ άεὶ

συνεύρεται καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλήν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε σύμφωνον;

Πάνω γε,

'Εμμηρίδεσ δὲ γε, ὁ φίλε, τούτῳ οἰεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ

βαρὺ καὶ γεώδες καὶ ὁρατόν· ὁ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τουαύτη

ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἐλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὀρατὸν τόπον

φόβῳ τοῦ αἰώνιον τε καὶ Ἀἰών, ὅσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ

μνήματα τε καὶ τῶν τάφων κυκλῳδομένη, περὶ δὲ δὴ καὶ

ὡφθη ἀπτα ψυχὼν σκιωτείδη φαντάσματα, οία παρέχονται αἱ

τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἰδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλὰ

tοῦ ὀρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὅρωνται.

5  Εἰκὸς γε, ὁ Σώκρατες.

Εἰκὸς μέτοικοι, ὁ Κέβης: καὶ οὐ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν

αὐτῶν εἰναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἰ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα

ἀναγκάζονται πλαγιάσθαι διὸκην τίνος τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς

κακῆς οὕσης. καὶ μέχρι γε τοῦτο πλαγιάται, ἕως ἃν τῇ

tοῦ συνεπακολουθοῦσι, τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ἐπιθυμίᾳ πάλιν

ἐνώσθωσι εἰς σῶμα· ἐνδοῦνται δὲ, ὅσπερ εἰκὸς, εἰς τοιαῦτα

ἡδὴ ὅποι· ἀν' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκύνη τόξωσι εν τῷ βίῳ.

Τὰ ποιὰ δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες;

5  Ὅτι τοὺς μὲν γαστρομαργίας τε καὶ ὑβρεῖς καὶ φιλοποσίας

μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ δομικαβδημένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γείη

καὶ τῶν τουούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδοῦσθαί. ἤ οὐκ οἰει;

Πάνω μὲν οὐν εἰκὸς λέγεις.

c 4 καὶ B : om. B³ T Ars. Stob.  διειλημμένη pr. B  c 5 τε

om. W  c 8 δὲ γε τοῦτο (ἀ ϕίλε) ? Ars.  οἰεσθαὶ γε W  c 9 δὴ

καὶ B T Stob.: δὴ W  d 2 ... χων φαυ ... Ars. et mox w taφ ...}

σθενεί d 5 εἰκότων Ars.  δ Σώκρατες] ἐφὴ Ars.  d 7 αὐτὰς

Ars.: τοιαῦτα B T W Stob.  d 8 τροφῆς B Stob.: τροφῆς T

e 2 τοιαῦτα B T Stob.: τὰ τοιαῦτα W Eus.  ε 6 διευλαβημένους

Τ. sed η punct. not. B : διευλαβουμένους B Stob.
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ 82 a

Τούς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγάς προτετημηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἱκτών γένη: ἢ ποί ἄν ἄλλοσε φαμεῖ τὰς τοιαύτας λέναι; 5

Ἀμέλει, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαύτα.

Οὐκοῦν, ἢ ὀς, ὡὴλα ὡς καὶ τάλλα ἢ ἄν ἐκαστα οὐι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιώτητας τῆς μελέτης;

Δήλον δὴ, ἐφη: πῶσ δ' οὖν;

Οὐκοῦν εἰδαμονεύστατοι, ἐφη, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς βέλτιστων τόπων ἀστείωσί τοι τὴν ὁμοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετημενοῦσας, ἢν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ ὁμαναστικὴν, ἐξ ἑδονῶν τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονοῦσαν ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ;

Πὴ δὴ οὗτοι εἰδαμονεύστατοι;

"Οποι τούτων εἰκός ἦστιν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι 5 πολιτικῶν καὶ ἣμερον γένους, ἢ ποὺ μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμήκων, καὶ εἰς ταύτων γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ γύρνησθαι εἰς αὐτῶν ἄνθρας μετρίους.

Εἰκός.

Εἰς δὲ γε θεῶν γένως μη φιλοσοφήσατε καὶ παντελῶς το παθαρῷ ἀπιόντει οὐ δεμιο ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλοσαθεὶ. c ἀλλὰ τούτων ἔνεκα, ὦ ἑταῖρε Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὅρθως φιλοσοφοῖ ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἑπιθυμιῶν ἀπασών καὶ καρπηροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδίδοσιν αὐτῶς ἑαυτούς, ὦ τι οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβοῦμενοι, ὁσπέρ οἱ 5 πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι: οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὁσπέρ οἱ φιλαρχοὶ τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἐπειτὰ ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν.

Οὐ γὰρ ἄν πρέποι, ἐφη, ὥς Σώκρατες, ὁ Κέβης.

Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ὡς ὀς τουγάρτων τούτων μὲν d

άπασιν, ὃ Κέβης, ἐκεῖνοι οἷς τε μέλει τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ σώματι πλάττοντες ζῶσι, χαϊρεῖν εἰπόντες, οὐ κατὰ ταύτα πορεύονται αυτοῖς ὡς οὐκ εἴδόσων ὑπ' ἑρχονται,
5 αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγούμενοι οὐν δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἑκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθάρμω ταύτῃ δὴ τρέπονται ἑκείνη ἐπόμενοι, ἦ ἑκείνη ὑφηγεῖται.
Πῶς, ὃ Σωκράτες;
'Εγὼ ἐρῶ, ἐφη. γυνιώσκοισίν γάρ, ἢ δ' οὐς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς
e ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀσθενῶς ὑδαθεμένη ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην, ἀναγκαιομένην δὲ ὥσπερ διὰ εἰργοῦ διὰ τούτον σκοπεύσαν τὰ ὅποτε ἂλλα μὴ αὐτὴν δὲ αὐτής, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλων-5 δομείην, καὶ τοῦ εἰργοῦ τῷ δεινότητα κατιδούσα ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος συλλήπτωρ
83 εἰς τοῦ δεδεσθαί,—ὕσπερ οὖν λέγω, γυνιώσκοσκυν οἱ φιλομα-θεῖς ὅτι οὕτω παραλαβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἐχουσαν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡρέμα παραμιθεῖτα καὶ λύσει ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστή ἡ διὰ τῶν ὄμματων σκέψις, 5 ἀπάτης δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὄμμων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πείδουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖ, ὡσον μὴ ἀναγκή αὐτοῖς χρήσθαι, αὐτοῖς δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν συλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀθροίζονται παρακελευσμένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενί ἄλλῳ ἄλλῳ
b ἡ αὐτήν αὐτήν, ὅτι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν αὐτὸ καθ'
αὐτὸ τῶν ὄμμων ὅτι δ' ἂν δ' ἄλλων σκοπητῇ ἐν ἄλλωσ ὃν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἡγεῖται ἀληθεύς· εἶναι δὲ τό μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ὀρατόν, δ' ὅτε αὐτή ὡρὰ νοητόν τε καὶ ὀρατές. 5 ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰομείη ἐδίεν ἑναντιοῦσθαι ὣτι τοῦ ὅς
αλήθως φιλοσόφου ψυχή οὕτως απέχεται τῶν ἀρδοιῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν [καὶ φόβων] καθ'o ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ τις σφόδρα ἴσθη ἢ φοβηθη [ἡ λυπηθη] ἢ ἐπιθυμηθη, οὔδεν τοσοῦτο κακὸν ἐπαθεῖν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὅτι ἂν τίς οὐδείς, οἷον ἡ οὐσίας ἢ τε ἀναλώσας ὑπά τας ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ' ὁ πάντων μέγιστών τε κακῶν καὶ ἔσχατων ἑστι, τούτῳ πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτὸ.

Τί τούτο, ὥ Σωκρατεῖ; ἐφη ὁ Κέβης.

"Οτι ψυχῇ παιτῶσ ἀνθρώποιν ἀναγκάζεται ἁμα τε ἡσθήναι σφόδρα ἢ λυπηθήναι ἡ ἡ γείης καὶ ἡγεύσθαι περί ὅ ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχῃ, τούτῳ ἐπαργέστατον τε εἰναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ἐχον· ταῦτα ὑπὸ μάλιστα ἢ ὅρατα· ἢ οὐ;

Πάνω γε,

Οὐκοὖν ἔν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδείκται ψυχῇ ὑπὸ οὐ σώματος;

Πῶς δή;

"Οτι ἐκάστη ἴδοις καὶ λύπῃ ὅσπερ ἦλοι ἐχουσα προσηλοῦν αὐτήν πρὸ το σῶμα καὶ προσπερον ἡ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματευκή, δοξάζονταν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἰναι ἀπέρ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῆ. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξίων τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν αναγκάζεται ὡμαὶ ὁμότροπος τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐα μηδέποτε εἰς Ἀδῶν καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλὰ αεὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξείναι, ὡστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς ἀλλο σῶμα καὶ ὅσπερ σπειρομένῃ ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀμοιρὸς εἴναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συμιστίας.
'Αληθέστατα, ἐφι, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὁ Σώκρατες.
5 Τούτων τούτων ἐνεκα, ὁ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλοσοφεῖν κόσμῳ εἰςι καὶ ἀνδρείοι, οὐχ ὃν ὦν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐνεκά φασίν· ἤ σὺ οἴεις;

84 Ὡν ὁδήτα ἐγὼγε.

Ὡν γὰρ· ἀλλ’ οὕτω λογίσατ’ ἀν ψυχῇ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσοφοῦν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οὐθεδήν τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφοῦν χρῆναι αὐτὴν λύειν, λυνότης δὲ ἐκεῖνης, αὐτήν παραδίδοναι ταῖς ἱδρυαῖς καὶ
5 λύπας ἐαντίθεν πάλιν αὐ ἐγκαταθεῖν καὶ ἀνήμυτον ἐργὼν πράττειν Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναιτίως ἅστοι μεταχειρίζομένης, ἀλλὰ γαλήνης τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἐπομένη τῷ λογοστῷ καὶ ἄεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὕσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον
b θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ’ ἐκεῖνῶν τρεφομένη, ζήν τε οἴεται οὕτω οὐρὶ ὅσι τῷ ἢ Ἐπι, καὶ ἐπειδὴν τελευτήτην, εἰς τὸ συγγενεῖς καὶ εἰς τὸ τουτούρων ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπῶν κακῶν. ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιούτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν θεῶν μὴ φοβηθῆν.
5 [ταῦτα δ’ ἐπιτηδεύοντα,] ὁ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθείσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνεμων διαφυσιδεῖσα καὶ διαπομενὴ οἰκήται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἢ.

c Συγῇ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολῶν χρόνων, καὶ αὐτὸς τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρήμενῳ λόγῳ ἢν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥς ἢδεὶν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἤμων οἱ πλεῖστοι. Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας σμικρῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλως διελεγέσθην. καὶ ὁ
5 Σωκράτης ἤδον αὐτῶν ἡμετο, Τί; ἐφι, ὡμιν τὰ λεξιθέντα μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεώς λέγεσθαι; πολλάς γὰρ δὴ ἐτί ἐχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβᾶς, εἰ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἴκαρως διεξεῖναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἅλλῳ σκοπεύσον, οὐδὲν λέγω· εἰ δὲ τι περὶ
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tούτων ἀπορεῖτον, μηδὲν ἀποκηκόστητε καὶ αὐτοὶ εἶπείν καὶ διελθεῖν, εἰ πῇ ὡμῶν φαύνεται βέλτιον ἔρευναν, καὶ ἀν καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἰ τι μᾶλλον οὔσθε μετ᾽ ἔμοι εὐπορήσειν.

Καὶ ὁ Σμιμίας ἔφη· Καὶ μήν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, τάληθή σοι ἔρω. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκάτεροι ἀπορόν τὸν ἔτερον προσθεῖ 5 καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπίθυμείν, μὲν ἀκούσαι, ὁκενὶ δὲ ὅχλοι παρέχειν, μή σοι ἀνρές ἤ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν συμφοράν.

Καὶ ὁ ἀκούσας ἐγέλασεν τε ἱρέμα καὶ φήσει· Βαζαί, ὁ Σμιμίας ὑπὸ πον χαλεπῶς ἂν τους ἄλλους αὐθρώπους πείςαμι ὥς οὐ συμφοράν ἡγοῦμαι τὴν παροῦσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μήν ὑμᾶς δυνάμας πείθειν, ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε μὴ δυσκολώτερώς τι νῦν διάκειμαί ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ: καὶ, ὡς ἐοικε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῖ φαυλότερος ὡμῶν εἶναι τὴν μαυτικὴν, οἱ ἑπεδώσαν αὐσθωφροῦντε ν ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποδανεῖν, ἔδοντε καὶ εὐ 5 τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε ὅτι πλείστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἔδωσιν, γεγένητες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπείναι οὕτε ἐνεργείτεροι. οἱ δ᾽ αὐθρώποι διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν δέος τοῦ θανῶτον καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταφεύγονται, καὶ φασὶν αὐτοὺς θηριοῦντας τῶν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξάδει, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται ὅτι οὐδὲν 5 ὀριεῖν ἄδει ὅταν πειρῆν ἢ μιγῶ ἢ ταῦτα ἄλλην λύπην λυπᾶται, οὐδὲ αὐτή ἢ τα ἀρέστα ἐλείδων καὶ χελιδῶν καὶ ὁ ἐποψ, ἢ δὴ φασι διὰ λύπην θηριοῦντα ἔδει. ἀλλὰ οὔτε ταῦτα μοι φαίνεται ἀυτοποίεσθαι ὅσεις οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλὰ ἀτε οὕτας τῷ Ἀπόλλωνος ὡστε, μαυτικὸς τε εἰστι καὶ προειδότες τὰ ἐν Ἀἰδων ἀγαθὰ ἐδοσιν καὶ τέρπονται ἐκεῖνη τὴν ἡμέραν διαφεροῦντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτῶς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμοδουλοῦς τε εἴναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ ὀν εἰρόν ἐκεῖνων τὴν μαυτικὴν ἑχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου,

c 9 τουτών B: τούτω T a1 διελθέων B T: διεξελθείν B W 1

ἐν add. ci. Heindorf e 3 τι om. Stob. a1 καλλιστά W (coniecerat Blomfield) : μάλιστα B T Stob. et s.v. W a6 βίγοι B T W a 7 δ om. W b3 καὶ B: τε καὶ T W b 4 ἡγοῦμαι T b Stob.: που οὐμαί B (ut vid.) W b 5 τε T W Stob.: γε B b 6 χείρον Hermann
οὐδὲ δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τοῦτον γ’ ἐνεκα λέγεω τε χρή καὶ ἑρωτάν ὅτι ἂν βουλήσῃ, ἔως ἂν Ἀθηναίων ἐώς τιν ἀνθρώπες ἐνδεκα.

10 Καλῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὁ Συμμάχος· καὶ ἐγὼ τέ σοι ἐρῶ ὁ ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὐ ὃδε, ἢ οὐκ ἀποδέχεσαι τὰ εἰρημένα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ ἄρχει, ὁ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὅσων ὤσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παρχάλεπον τι, τὸ μὲντοι αὐ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ

5 οὐκ ἐπὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχεις καὶ μὴ προαφύτασθαι πρὶν ἂν παίναξι σκοπών ἀπέπεπτυς, πάντ᾽ Ὑμᾶς μαλθακῶν εἶναι ἀνδρῶν· δειν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐν γε τι τοιοῦτον διαπράξασθαι, ἡ μαθεύν ὅπῃ ἐχει ἡ ἐυρεία ἢ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοὺν βελτιστοῦ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτῷ
dτατοῖς, ἐπὶ τοιοῦτον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας καὶ ὑπονεύοντα διαπλέσθαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύνατο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκωδονότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιωτέρον ὁχήματος, [Ἡ] λόγου θείου τινός, διαπορευθήμενα. καὶ ὅτι καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ γενὸς οὐκ ἔπαισχυν-
5 θήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὅτι ἐμαυτὸν αὐτιώρησαι εἰς υπερφυσε ὁρμών ὅτι νῦν οὐκ ἐπέν ᾧ μοι ὅρκει. ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάντων φαίνεται ἰκανῶς
10 εἰρήσθαι.

e Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἵσως γάρ, ἐφη, ὃ ἐταίρε, ἀληθῆ σοι φαίνεται· ἀλλὰ λέγε ὅπῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἰκανῶς.

Ἔνας τῇ ἐπομονίᾳ ἂν τις καὶ ὄρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τῶν αὐτῶν τοιούτων λόγον ἐπειπο ὅτι 5 μὲν ἀρχον ἀφράτων καὶ ἀσωμάτων καὶ παγκάλων τι καὶ

86 θείων ἐστὶν εἰς τῇ ἑρμοσμενή λύρα, αὐτὴ δ’ ἡ λύρα καὶ

β 9 έως ἂν Τ W: έως B b10 ἐγώ τε Τ W: ἐγωγε B τ ε1 ἐμοὶ γάρ T b: ἐμοίγει B (ut vid.) W c4 μετόι αὐ ἄ τα B: τό μεντοι τά T: τό δὲ τοιαῦτα ex emend. W c5 οὐχι B T: ω W c8 ἢ e1 B t: ei T e9 λόγον W δυσεξελεγκτόταν W d3 ἢ secl. Heindorf d6 α μοι δοκεὶ B T: α μοι εδοκει B2 W e3 γ δη W: ἥδη B T e4 λόγον τοιούτων W e5 ἀφράτων Τ: ἀφράτων
αι χορδαὶ σώματα τε καὶ σωματοειδὴ καὶ σύνθετα καὶ γεωθῆ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦθεν συγγενῆ. ἐπειδὰν οὐν ἢ καταξίας τις τὴν λύραν ἢ διατέμη καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδὰς, εἰ τις δυσχερίας τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὀσπέρ σὺ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι τὴν ἀρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι—οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανῆ ἂν εὑρίσκων τῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θητοειδεῖς οὕσα, τὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν ἀπολωλέναι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὀμοφυή τε καὶ συγγενῆ, προτέραν τοῦ θητοῦ ἀπολομένην—ἀλλὰ φαίνει ἀνάγκη ἔτι ποιεῖ τὴν ἀρμονίαν, καὶ πρὸτερον τὰ ἔλευ καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασταπήσεσθαι πρῶ τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν—καὶ γὰρ οὐν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκέ τι τούτων τιμαίστα ὑπολαμβάνωμεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὀσπέρ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ συνιχαμένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ἔρημοι καὶ ύγροι καὶ τοιούτων τυχῶν, κράσιν εἶναι καὶ ἁρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρῶς κρατῆ ἀπὸ ἀλληλα—εἰ οὐν τυχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὕσα ἁρμονία τις, ἤδην ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπισταθῇ ὑπὸ τόσου καὶ ἀλλοι κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὑθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι, καίπερ οὕσαν 5 θεωστὴν, ὀσπέρ καὶ αἰ ἄλλαι ἁρμονίαι αἱ τ' ἐν τοῖς φθόνοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν ὁμομυρχών ἐργοῖς πάσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἐκάστου πολὺν χρόνον παραμένειν, ἡ̂ sno ἢ ἡ κατακαυνθῇ ἢ κατασταθῇ—ορὰ οὖν πρὸς τοὺς τῶν λόγους τί φήσομεν, ἕαν τις ἄξιοι κράσιν οὕσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ καλομυρχῷ θανάτῳ πρὸς τὴν ἀπολλονίαν. 

Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὀσπέρ τὰ πολλὰ εἰσῴθει, 5

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Note: The text is in ancient Greek and contains a detailed discussion on music and its relation to health and soul. The page number is 86a.
καὶ μειδιάσας, Δίκαια μέντοι, ἐφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμίας. εἰ
οὔ τις ύμών εὐποροῦτερος ἐμοί, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ
οὐ φαύλως ἐοίκειν ἀπομένω τοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι
χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἐτι πρὸτερουν Κέβης ἀκούσαι
e τί αὐ ὄδε ἐγκαλεί τῷ λόγῳ, ἢν χρόνου ἐγγενεμένου βου-
λευστώμεθα τί ἐρώμειν, ἔπειτα [ἡ] ἀκούσατας ἢ συγχωρεῖν
αὐτοῖς εἰώ τι δοκῶσι προσόδειν, εἰώ δὲ μῆ, οὕτως ἦδη
ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἢ ὃ ὃς, ὡς Κέβης, λέγε,
5 τί ἦ; τὸ σὲ αὐθράττων [ἀποστὶαν παρέχει].

λέγω δὴ, ἢ ὃ ὃς ὁ Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἐτι ἐν
τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος ἐἶναι, καὶ, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθες ἐλέγομεν,
87 ταὐτῶν ἐγκλίμα ἔχεω. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ
πρὶν εἰς τότε τὸ εἴδως ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ σωλι τῶν
χαριντες καὶ, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθὲς ἑστων εἶπεν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς
ἀποδεθέκαθω ὅς δὲ καὶ ἀποθανώτων ἡμῶν ἐτι ποῖ ἑστων,
5 οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τῆς. ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἴσχυρότερον καὶ πολυ-
χρονιότερον ψυχὴ σώματος, οὐ συγχωρῶ τῇ Σιμμίαν ἀντι-
λήψει. δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι πάσι τούτων πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν. τί
οὐ, ἂν φαίν ὁ λόγος, ἐτι ἀποστείης, ἐπειδὴ ὅρας ἀποθανώτων
tοῦ ἀνθρώπου τό γε ἀσθενεστέρον ἐτι οὐ; τὸ δὲ πολυ-
b χρονιότερον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαίων ἐἶναι ἐτι σώζεσθαι εἰν
tούτω τῷ χρόνῳ; πρὸς δὴ τούτῳ τότε ἐπίσκεψαι, εἰ τὶ λέγω-
εἰκόνος γὰρ τινος, ὡς ἐοίκει, κἀγὼ ὡσπερ Σιμμίας δέομαι.
ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα ὡςπερ ἀν τοῖς περὶ
5 ἀνθρώπου ὑφάντων πρεσβύτου ἀποθανώτων λέγοι τούτων
tοῦ λόγου, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλουσεν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἀλλ' ἐστι ποι
σῶς, τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοις θουματίων ὃ ἥμπείχετο αὐτὸς
ὑφήρμανεος ὅτι ἐστὶ σῶς καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλουσεν, καὶ εἰ τὸς
c ἀπιστοῖη αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτηφαὶ πότερον πολυχρονιότερον ἐστι
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τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἱματίου ἐν χρείᾳ τε ὑπόσ τοι καὶ φορουμενοῦ, ἀποκριμαμένον δή [τινος] ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὕτω ἀποδεδείχθαι ὅτι παιδὸς ἄρα μάλλον ὁ γε ἀνθρώπος σῶς ἐστιν, ἐπειδή τὸ γε ὅλονχρονωτέρον οὐκ ἀπόλολεν. 

τὸ δ' οὖμαι, ὡ Συμμία, οὔχ οὕτως ἔχειν σκόπει γάρ καὶ σὺ ἂν λέγω. πάς [γάρ] ἂν ὑπολαβόη ὅτι εὐηθὲς λέγει ὅ τοῦτο λέγων: ὁ γὰρ ὑφαίστης οὕτος πολλὰ κατατρίβας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ υφηρέμενος ἐκεῖνων μὲν ὑστερος ἀπόλολεν πολλῶν ὑπότοι, τοῦ δὲ τελευταῖον οὐμαι πρότερος, καὶ οὐδὲν τι πάλιν τοῦτον ἔνεκα ἀνθρώπος ἐστιν ἰματίῳ φανλότερον οὕτο ἀσθενεστέροι. τῆς αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐμαι εἰκόνα δεξαί' ἂν ψυχή πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ τῆς λέγων αὐτᾶ ταύτα περὶ αὐτῶν μετρί' ἂν μοι φαύνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἢ μὲν ψυχῆ 5 πολυχρονίων ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενεστέρον καὶ ὅλογρονωτέρον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίνῃ ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν, ἀλλοις τε καὶ πολλὰ ἐτή βιω-—εἰ γὰρ ἰρέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἐτί ζωιτος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ ᾧ τὸ κατατρηξόμενον ἀνυφαίνου—ἀναγκαίον μενταί εἴη, ὅποτε ἀπολλύοιτο ἡ ψυχή, τὸ τελευταῖον ύφασμα τυχέων αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν καὶ τοῦτον μόνον προτέραι ἀπολ-λυσθαι, ἀπολογείης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότ' ὤχη τῆς φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπιδεικνύοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχὺ σαπεν ὀσιόχυτο. 5 ὥστε τοῦτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὕτως ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα θαρρεῖν ὡς ἐπεδιώκαν ἀποθανόμενεν ἐτί που ἢμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστιν. εἰ γάρ 887 τις καὶ πλέον ἐτί τῷ λέγοιτι ἦ ὁ σὺ λέγεις συγχωρησεις, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ προὶ καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχὰς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνομεν εἰνών ἐτί εἶναι καὶ ἐσεθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενή-5 σεθαι καὶ ἀποθαναίεσθαι αὐθίς—οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει

c3 ἀποκριμαμένου T δῇ om. W τινος seclusi c7 γάρ
ισχυρὸν εἶναι, ὡστε πολλάκις γιγνομένην ψυχήν ἀντέχειν—διός δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροῦ, μὴ οὐ ποιεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσιν καὶ τελευτῶσαν γε ἐν τοῖς τῶν θανάτων παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοῦτον δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ ταῦτα τῷ διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος ἥ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει ὀλέθρου μηδένα φαίνει εἰδέναι—ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὅτροιν αἰσθέσθαι ἡμῶν—εἰ δὲ τούτο οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδεὶς προσήκει θάνατον βαρροῦσιν, μὴ οὐκ ἀνοικτὸς ἀναρρήστως ὁσ ἄν
μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδείξει ὅτι ἐστιν ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον τε καὶ ἀπόλεθρον ἐὰν δὲ μὴ, ἀνάγκην εἶναι ἀεὶ τῶν μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι δεδείναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς μὴ ἐν τῇ γίνον τοῦ σώματος διαζεύξει παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυται.

Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν ἄριστος διετέλθη-μεν, ὅσ ὑστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅτι ἦπτο τοῦ ἐμπροσθῆνεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκοις ἁπαταράξαι καὶ εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαίλειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προερημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ υστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθῆσθαι, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξοι εἴμεν κρυταὶ ἡ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἀπίστα ἦ.

Εἴτε τοὺς θεοὺς, ὅ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἐχὼ ὑμῖν καὶ γὰρ αὐτῶν με νῦν ἀκούσαντι σοι τουοῦτον τι λέγειν δι πρὸς ἐμαυτῶν ἐπέρχεται: "Τίνι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύσομεν λόγῳ; ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὡς, ἄν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν." θαυμαστῶς γὰρ μου ὁ λόγος οὕτως ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ ἄει, το ἀρμονίων

τοῦ ἡμῶν εἶναι τῷ ψυχῇ, καὶ ὅσπερ ὑπεμμησένει με ῥηθεῖς ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προνύεοντο. καὶ πάνν' ἐνομίας πάλιν ὅσπερ ἐξ ἀρχής ἀλλοῦ τῶν λόγων ὡς με πείσει ὡς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποθηκήσει ἡ ψυχή. λέγει οὖν πρὸς

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a 7 τὴν ψυχήν W a 8 μηκέτι ἐκεῖνο T b 1 ἦ TW: ei B b 3 αἰσθάνεσθαι T: αἰσθάνεσθαι B b 4 προσήκεις Stephanus b 6 ανάγκην BW t: ανάγκη T c 3 πάλιν T: παλαί B c 5 υστερον W sed a supra ov e 6 εἴημεν TW: ἢμεν B e 7 αὐτὰ B:тов TW om. B ἦ] εἴη Heindorf d i πιστεύσομεν B: πιστεύσομεν T
Διὸς τὴν ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον κάκεινος, ὡσπερ χὰμας φής, ἐυθελός τι ἐγένετο ἀχόμενος ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πράφως ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ; [ἡ] καὶ ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἢ ἐνδεώς; πάντα ἡμῖν διέλθε ὡς ὀὕρασαι ἀκριβέστατα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μήν, ὁ Ἐχέκρατε, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτην οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἡγασθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος. 5 τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐχειν ὅτι λέγοι ἐκείνος ὅσως οὐδέν ἀτοποῦ ἀλλὰ ἐγώνη μάλιστα ἑθαμάσα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τούτο, ὡς ἴδεος καὶ ἐυμενῶς καὶ ἀγάμενοι τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἐπειστά ἡμῶν ὡς ὡξέως ὤσθετο ὁ ἀποπόθεμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἐπειστά ὡς εὖ ἡμᾶς ἱάσατο καὶ ὡσπερ πεθεγότας 5 καὶ ἱπτημένως ἀγεκαλέσατο καὶ προούρεσαν πρὸς τὸ παρεπεσθαὶ τε καὶ συνσκοπεῖν τῶν λόγων.

Ε.Ν. Ἡδὲ ὅ; 

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἕγὼ ἐρῶ. ἐτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξίᾳ αὐτοῦ καθη- 
μενος παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαίζηλον τινός, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ b ύψηλοτέρου ἢ ἐγώ. καταφήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλήν καὶ συμπιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχέων τρίχας—εἰώθει γὰρ, ὅποτε τύχοι, παίζεις μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας—Ἀὕριον ὅ; ἐφή, ὅσως, ὁ Φαῖδων, τὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας ἀποκερῆν. 5

"Εοικεῖν, ἦν οὔ ἐγώ, ὁ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκ, ἂν γε ἐμοὶ πείθη.

Ἀλλὰ τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Τῇμερον, ἐφή, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, ἐάνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώ- 
σασθαι. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀν', εἰ σὺ ἑνη καὶ μὲ διαφεύγοιο ὁ c λόγος, ἐνορκοῦ ἂν πουσταίμην ὡσπερ Ἀργείοι, μὴ προτέρου 
κομήσειν, πρὺν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίον τε καὶ 
Κέβητος λόγον.

e i τι B; om. T e 2 θ B; θ T; om. al. Heindorf e 5 τότε B:ΤTW: ποτὲ B a 9 καθῆμενος εν δεξια αυτων TW b 1 πολυ B: πολλα Bb b 5 ταυτας B:ΤTW: om. B b 7 γε εμοι BΤ; έμοιγε W b 10 δυνάμεθα B2ΤTW: δυνάμεθα B c 1 διαφυγοι TW c 3 ἀναμαχόμενος in marg. T

PLATO, VOL. I.
5 Ἀλλ', ἢν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς ὧν λέγεται οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἶός τε εἶναι.
    Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἐφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἐως ἔτι φῶς ἐστιν.
    Παρακαλῶ τούν, ἐφη, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆς.
    Οὐδὲν διούσει, ἐφη. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμεν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν.
    Τὸ ποίον; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

d Μή γενώμεθα, ἢ δ' ὡς, μισόλογοι, ὡσπερ οἱ μισάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐφη, ὅτι ἂν τις μεῖζον τοῦτον κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λόγους μισῆσαι. γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἦ τε γὰρ μισαν-
    θρωπία ἐγκύκειται ἐκ τοῦ σφοδρά τών πιστεύσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἡγησάσθαι παυτάπασι γε ἀληθὴ εἶναι καὶ χαῖρῃ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐπειτα ὀλίγους ύστερον εὐρέως τοῦτον πονηρόν τε καὶ ἀπιστον, καὶ αὕθις ἐτέρων καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθη τις καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦτων μάλιστα οὐς ἂν ἡγήσαιτο
    e οἰκειώσατος τε καὶ ἐταίρωσατος, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προσκρούσων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἡγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν υγιὲς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἦ οὐκ ἡγησάσθαι σὑ πω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον;
    Πῶν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

5 Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὡς, αἰσχρῶν, καὶ ὅθεν ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ ταὐτόσείαν ὁ τουτοῦτος χρῆσαι ἐπεξεῖρει τοὺς ἄνθρω-
    ποις; εἰ γὰρ ποι μετὰ τέχνης ἤχρῆτο, ὡσπερ ἐχει οὕτως
    ἄν ἡγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἐκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους.
    Πῶς λέγεις; ἐφην ἐγώ.

"Ωσπερ, ἢ δ' ὡς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων"
οἱ εἰς τὰ σπανιώτερα εὑρεῖ η ἑφοδρα μέγαν ἦ σφόδρα σμικρῶν ἤ
ἐξευρέω ἀνθρώποιν ἦ κύστα ἦ ἄλλο ὅτι οὐκ ἦ ἡ αὐ ταχύν ἦ
βραδύν ἦ αὐ σχρόν ἦ καλὸν ἦ λευκὸν ἦ μέλανα; ἦ οὐχὶ
γόνισι οτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἀκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων
σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἅφθονα καὶ πολλά;
Πάνυ γε, ὅπερ εξογώ.
Οὐκούν οἴει, ἐφη, εἰ ποιηρίας ἀγὼν προτεθείη, πάνω ἀν
ἀλήγους καὶ ἑνταῦθα τους πρότον φαίηναι;
Εἰκὸς γε, ὅπερ εξογώ.
Εἰκὸς γάρ, ἐφη. ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ ὁμοίοι οἱ λόγοι
toις ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νυνὶ προάγους ἐγὼ ἐφεσπόμη,
ἀλλ' ἐκείνη, ἦ, ἐπειδὰν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τωι ἀληθεί
εὑρεῖ ἄνευ τίς περὶ τους λόγους τέχνης, κάπειτα ὀλέγου
ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξη ὕπευγης εὑρεῖ, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁν, ἐνίοτε δὲ
οὐκ ὁν, καὶ αὐθεὶς ἔτερος καὶ ἔτερος—καὶ μάλιστα ὅτι οἱ
περὶ τους ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρήφαντες αἰσθ' ὅτι τελεν-
τώτες οἰονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι καὶ καταπενηκέναι
μόνοι ὅτι οὐτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδέσι οὐδέν οὐγξ οὐδὲ
βέβαιον οὐτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ οὐτα ἀτεχνώς οὔσπερ
ἐν Ἑὐρίπω ἀνω κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνου οὐδένα ἐν 5
οὐδὲν μενεῖ.
5 έαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιτο καὶ ἱδη τῶν λοιπῶν βίων μισῶν τε καὶ λοιπορων τοὺς λόγους διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὅτων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθείη.

Νη τῶν Δία, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οὐκρόν ὅτα.

Πρώτον μὲν τούτων, ἕφη, τούτῳ εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ παρώμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχήν ὡς τῶν λόγων κυδωνεύει οὐδέν ὑγίες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὃτι ἤμεῖς οὕτως ὑγίως ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ αὐθοριστέων καὶ προθυμητέων ὑγίως ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν ὅν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ τὸν ἑπείτα βίου παιτῶς ἐνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ

91 αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα τοῦ θανάτου, ὡς κυδωνεύον ἐγώγεν ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφους ἔχειν ἀλλ’ ὤσπερ οἱ πάντες αὐτοῖς φιλοσίκως. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφιβολήσωμεν, ὅτι μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὅν ὁ λόγος ἢ ὃν φροντι- ζούσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἄ αὐτοὶ ἐθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦσθαι. καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διώκεις· ὡς γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἄ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει αὐτὴ ἐστιν προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἰ ἐν ἑαργον, ἀλλ’ ὅπως αὐτὸν ἐμοὶ ὅτι μᾶλλον δόξει οὕτως

b ἔχειν. λογίζομαι γάρ, ὃ φίλε ἐταίρη—θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικὸς—εἰ μὲν τυχάνει αὐτὴ ὅτα ἡ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθήμα—εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ’ ὅν τοῦτον γε τῶν χρόνων αὐτοῦ τῶν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἤτον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἄρδῃς ἐσομαι ὅφυρόμενος, ἥ δὲ ἀνοιὰ μοι αὐτὴ ὅν συνδιατελεῖ—κακὸν γάρ ἂν ἢ—ἀλλ’ ὅλους ὑστερον ἀπο- λειταί. παρεσκευασμένοι δὴ, ἔφη, ὃ Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὕτως ἐρχομαι ὑπὶ τῶν λόγων ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πεί- θησε, σμικρὰν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μὲν τι ύμίν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομο- λογησάτε, εἰ δὲ μή, παιτὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβούμενοι

d b 6 τοὺς λόγους Β’ Τ’ Ζ: om. B
d 9 εὐλαβηθῶμεν ΒΤ: εὐλε- βητῶν Β’ Ζ (sed θώμεν s. v.)
a 3 φιλοσίκως Βτ: φιλοσίκως Τ
άμφισθησάων Τ’ Ζ a 8-9 δόξει Τ: δόξῃ Β a a 8 προθυμησμοι Τ: προθυμησμοί Β
c 2 λέγειν ἀληθὲς Τ c 3 εὐλαβούμενοι Β’ Ζ: om. B
όπως μή ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἀμα ἐμαυτόν τε καὶ ύμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας, ὦσπερ μέλιτα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλείπων οἰχίσομαι.

'Αλλ' ἰτέον, ἐφη. πρῶτον μὲ ὑπομνήσατέ ἡ ἐλέγετε, ἐὰν μή φαύνωμαι μεμημένος. Σημαίας μὲν γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀποστει τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὡμοι καὶ θείοτερον καὶ κάλλιον ὅν τοῦ σώματος προσπολλύται ἐν ἀρμονίας εἴδει δ εἴστησα: Κέβης δὲ μοι ἐδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρέων, πολυχρονιστῷρον γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλά τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον παντὶ, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρύψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταίον σῶμα καταλιποῦσα νῦν 5 αὐτὴ ἀπολλύται, καὶ ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχὴς ὀλέθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμα γε ἀεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παντεῖ τα. ἄρα ἀλλ' ἡ ταῦτ' εἰστιν, ὁ Σημίμα τε καὶ Κέβης, ἢ δὲι ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι;

Συνωμολογείτην δὴ ταῦτ' εἶναι ἀμφω. e

Πότερον ὅu, ἐφη, πάντας τους ἐμπροσθε λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἡ τους μὲν, τοὺς δ' οὐ;

Τοὺς μὲν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ' οὖ.

Τί οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε ἐν ὧ 5 ἐφαμέν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμμησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἀναγκαίως ἔχεω ἀλλοθὶ πρότερον ἰμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεδήναι;

'Εγὼ μὲν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπείσθην ύπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένοι ὡς οὔδὲν λόγῳ.

Καὶ μήν, ἐφὴ ὁ Σημίμα, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἐχὼ, καὶ πάνω ἃν θαυμάζωμι εἰ μοι περὶ γε τούτου ἄλλο ποτὲ τι δόξειν. 5

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, 'Αλλὰ ἀνάγκη σου, ἐφη, ὦ ἔξεν Θηβαῖε, ἄλλα δόξαι, εάνπερ μείνῃ ὡς ἡ οὕτως, τὸ ἀρμονίας μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πράγμα, ψυχήν δὲ ἀρμονίαν τυχ' ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ

σώμα ἐντεταμένων συγκείσθαι· οὐ γάρ ποὺ ἀποδέξῃ γε
b σαυτοῦ λέγοντος ὡς πρότερον ἢν ἄρμονία συγκειμένη, πρὶν ἐκείνα εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἔδει ἀὐτὴν συντεθῆναι. ἡ ἀποδέξῃ;
θυάμωσ, ἐφη, οὐ· Σώκρατες.

Αἰσθάνη ὡς, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ταῦτά σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν,
5 ὅταν φῆς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπων εἰδός
tε καὶ σώμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτήν συγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν
ουδέπω ὦντων; οὐ γάρ ἡ ἄρμονία γε σοι τοιούτον ἔστιν
ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαί καὶ
5 c οἱ φθόγγοι ἐτί ἀνάρμοστοι οὕτε γίγνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ
πάντων συνώταται ἡ ἄρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται. οὕτος
燠ν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκεῖνῳ πῶς συνάστεται;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφη ὁ Σωμίας.

5 Καὶ μὲν, ἦ δ' ὅς, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῷ ἀλλῷ λόγῳ συνισθῶν
eἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἄρμονίας.

Πρέπει γάρ, ἐφη ὁ Σωμίας.

Οὕτως τοῖνυν, ἐφη, σοὶ οὐ συνισθῶν· ἀλλ' ὧρα πότερον
ἐκεῖνῇ τῶν λόγων, τήν μάθησιν ἀνάμφησιν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ

10 ἄρμονίᾳ;

Πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐφη, ἐκεῖνον, οὐ· Σώκρατες. ὁ δὲ μὲν γάρ

d μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότων τυγός καὶ εὐπρο-
πείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώπους· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς
ὅι τῶν εἰκότων τῶν ἀποδείξεις ποιομέρεος λόγοις σύνοιδα
οὕτω ἀλαζόσω, καὶ ἀν τις αὐτοῦς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὖ μάλα

5 ἐξαιτατῶσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις ἀπασιν.
ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγους δι' ὑποθέσεως
ἀξίων ἀποδείξασθαι εἰρήται. ἕρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως ἕμων
εἶναι ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὡσπερ αὐτῆς
estin ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπιμονήμιαν τὴν τοῦ "ὁ ἐστιν"
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

εγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαντῶν πείθω, ἵκανῶς τε καὶ ὁρθῶς ἀπο-
δέχεμαι. ἀνάγκη οὖν μου, ὡς ἐοίκε, διὰ ταύτα μήτε ἐμαντῶν
μήτε ἀλλον ἀποδέχεσθαί λέγοντος ὡς ψυχή ἔστιν ἀρμονία.
Τί δέ, ἢ ὃς, ὥς Σμμία, τύδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἀρμονία ἢ ἀλλη
τιν συνθέσει προσήκειν ἀλλωσ πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἄν ἐκεῖνα
ἐχθεῖ εἴς ὅν ἂν συγκέπται;
Οὐδαμῶς.
Οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγώμαι, οὐδὲ τι πάσχειν ἀλλο
παρ' ἄν ἐκεῖνα ἢ ποιή ἢ πάσχῃ; Συνέφη.
Οὐκ ἢρα ἡγεῖσθαι γε προσήκει ἀρμονίαν τοῦτον εἴς ὅν ἄν
συντεθῇ, ἀλλ' ἔπεσθαι. Συνεδόκει.
Πολλοῦ ἢρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἀρμονία κυνηγῆναι ἄν ἢ
φθέγξασθαι ἢ τι ἀλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν.
Πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἐφή.
Τί δέ; οὐχ οὔτως ἀρμονία πέφυκεν εἶναι ἐκάστη ἀρμονία
ὡς ἄν ἀρμοσθῇ;
Οὐ μαραθῶν, ἐφή.
"Ἡ οὖν οὐχὶ, ἢ ὃς, ἄν μὲν μάλλον ἀρμοσθῇ καὶ ἔπι πλέον,
εἰπερενθέχεσται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, μάλλον τε ἄν ἀρμονία εἰχα καὶ
πλείων, εἶ δ' ἤττον τε καὶ ἔπ' ἐλαττον, ἤττον τε καὶ ἐλάττων;
Πάνω γε.
"Ἡ οὗν ἑστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχῆς, ὡστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρό-
tatov mállov étérav étérav ψυχῆς ἐπί πλέον καὶ mállov
ἡ ἐπ' ἐλαττον καὶ ἤττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχῆς;
Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἐφή.
Φέρε δὴ, ἐφή, πρὸς Δίως: λέγεται ψυχή ἢ μὲν νοοῦν τε
ἐχειν καὶ ἀρετῆν καὶ εἶναι ἄγαθή, ἢ δὲ ἄνοιαν τε καὶ μοχθηρῶν
cαὶ εἶναι κακή; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται;
"Αληθῶς μέντοι.

a 1 ἂν ἐκεῖνα B Stob.: ἐκεῖνα ἂν T
a 2 εἴ B T: τὰ εἴ W
a 8 ἃν Stob.: om. B T W
a 14 ἰ om. Heusde
b 1 ἁν B Stob.: om. T
b 2 ἦττον B T W Stob.: ἦττον al.
b 4 Ἰ Τ b: ᾃ B ed
s. v. W: εἴ B W
5 μάλλων secl. Heusde
b 6 ἐπ(1) B T Stob.: om. W
b 8 ἐφη B Stob.: om. T
tε B Stob.: om. T
W
Τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταῦτα οὖντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τῷ τε ἄρετῷ καὶ τῷ τὶν
κακίαν; πότερον ἁρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην καὶ ἄναρμοστίαν; καὶ τῷ μὲν ἡμῶσθαι, τῷ ἀγαθῷ, καὶ ἔχεων εὖ αὐτῇ ἁρμονία υNotFoundError: τῇ ἄλλῃ ἁρμονίᾳ, τῷ δὲ ἀνάρμοστον αὐτῷ τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχεων εὖ αὐτῇ ἄλλῃν;
Οὐκ ἔχω ἐγὼγ', ἐφη ὁ Σωμιὰς, εἰπεῖν δήλον ὅ φητι τοιαὐτ' ἀντ' ἂν λέγοι ὁ ἐκεῖνο ὑποθέμενοι.

5 Πάνω γε.
Τῇ δὲ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἢπτον ἁρμονίαν οὐσαν μῆτε μᾶλλον μῆτε ἢπτον ἡμῶσθαι: ἐστών οὕτως;
'Εστων.

10 Ὅτι δὲ μῆτε μᾶλλον μῆτε ἢπτον ἡμωσμενή ἐστών ὅτι πλέου ἡ ἐλαττον ἁρμονίας μετέχει, ῥ το ἐστον;
Τὸ ἵπτον.
Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἢπτον ἄλλῃ ἄλλῃς αὐτῷ τοῦτο, ψυχῇ, ἐστών, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἢπτον ἡμωσται;
Οὕτω.

15 Τότῳ δὲ γε πεπονθεία οὐδέν πλέον ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ ἁρμονίας μετέχοι ἄν;
Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
Τότῳ δ' αὖ πεπονθεία ἅρ' ἄν τι πλέον κακίας ἥ ἄρετῆς μετέχοι ἐτέρα ἐτέρας, εἰπερ ἥ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία, ἥ δὲ ἄρετη ἁρμονία εἰς;

ε 9 έγνώσθη, φησίν Ἐκκ. 12 ἐπειδὴ om. Ἐκκ.
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

Οὐδεὶς πλέον.
Μάλλον δὲ γέ που, ὦ Συμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχή μεθέξει, εἰπερ ἁρμονία ἑστίν ἁρμονία γὰρ ὅπου παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὀῦνα, ἁρμονία, ἀναρμοστίας οὕτως ἄν μετάσχου.

Οὐ μέντοι.
Οὐδεὶς γε ὅπουν ψυχῆ, ὀῦνα παντελῶς ψυχῆ, κακίας.

Πῶς γάρ ἐκ γε τῶν προειρημένων;
Ἐκ τούτου ἥρα τοῦ λόγου ἢμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ἄνων ὀμοίως ἀγαθαὶ ἐσονται, εἰπερ ὀμοίως ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχαί, εἶναι.

Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Ἡ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ᾧ δ' ὃς, οἴτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πᾶσχειν ἃν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος εἰ ὅρθῃ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἢ, τὸ ψυχῆν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι;

Οὐδὲ ὁπωσιών, ἐφη.

Τί δέ; ᾧ δ' ὃς τῶν εἰν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἐσθ' ὅτι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἡ ψυχὴν ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον;

Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Πότερον συγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ᾧ καὶ ἐναντιομνέεις; λέγω δὲ τὸ τουώδες, οἴων καῦματος ἐγώνος καὶ ὄψιν ἐπὶ τοῦντόν ἐλκεω, τὸ μὴ πίεις, καὶ πεῦνης ἐνοῦσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίεις, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία που ὀρῶμεν ἐναντιομνέεις τὴν ψυχήν τοὺς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα; ᾧ οὖ; c

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν αὐ ὁμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μῆποτ' ἂν αὐτῶν, ἁρμονίαν γε ὀῦναν, ἑναντία ἂδειν οὐς ἐπτεύνουτο

5 καὶ χαλῶτο καὶ ψάλλοιτο καὶ ἀλλο ὅτιον πάθος πάσχου ἔκεινα ὡς τυγχάνοι οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἐπεσθαί ἐκεῖνοι καὶ οὐποτ' ἂν ἠγεμονεύειν;

'Ὀμολογήσαμεν, ἐφὶ πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Τὸ οὖν; νῦν οὖ πάν τοῦτον ἢμιν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσα τε ἐκεῖνον πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτήν;

d εἶναι, καὶ ἐναιστιμεῖν ὅλιγον πάντα διὰ παιτῶς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόποις, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ' ἀληθεύων, τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἱατρικὴν, τὰ δὲ πρότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλούσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἀλλὴ οὔσα ἀλλὸ πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οὗν ποῦ καὶ Ὁμήρος ἐν Ὄδυσσείᾳ πεποίηκεν, οὐ λέγει τὸν Ὄδυσσεα;

στήθος δὲ πλήξας κραδύνη ἤριπατε μύθῳ;

e τέτλαθι δή, κραδύνη καὶ κύπτερον ἀλλο ποτ' ἐτλησ.

ἀρ' οἶει αὐτῶν ταῦτα ποιήσας διανοούμενον ὡς ἀρμονίας αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ ὅπας ἀγεσθάν ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων, ἀλλ' οὖν οὕς ἀγεῖν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ 5 οὔσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειστέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἡ καθ' ἀρμονίαν;

Νὴ Δία, ὥ Σῶκρατες, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Ὅκ ἄρα, ὥ ἄριστε, ἢμῖν οὐδαμὴ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχήν ἀρμονίαι τινὰ φάναι εἶναι; οὔτε γαρ ἄν, ὡς οὖκειν, Ὁμήρῳ θεῷ ποιητῇ ὁμολογοῦμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἢμῖν αὐτοῖς.

'Ἐχει οὖτως, ἐφῃ.

Εἰεν δή, ἢ δ' ὦς ὅ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν ἹἈρμονίας ἢμῖν τῆς 95 Ὀθήβαϊκης ἔλεα πῶς, ὡς οὖκε, μετρίως γέγονεν· τὶ δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμον, ἐφῃ, ὥ Κέβης, πῶς ἰλασόμεθα καὶ τὰν λόγῳ;

Σῦ μοι δοκεῖς, ἐφῃ ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρήσειν τουτοί γοῦν.

e 5 ψάλλοιτο pr. T (ut vid.) Stob.: πάλλοιτο B T W e 6 τυγχάνοι T: τυγχάνει B Stob. e 9 νῦν B T Stob.: om. W d 1 ἐναιστιμεύη B T W Stob.: ἐναιστιμεύθην B d 3 τε B T Stob.: δὲ W e 3 παθημάτων B T W Stob.: παθῶν B e 5 πράγματος B: om. T Stob. e 7 ἐμοιγε B Stob.: ἐμοὶ T a 3 ἔχει T W Stob.: ἔχει B T a 7 τουτοί B: τούτων T
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἀρμοδίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι ἐπεσέ ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Συμμίαν γὰρ λέγοιτος ὅτε ἦπαρει, πάνυ ἐθαυμαζομένος εἰ τι ἐξει τις χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ. πάνυ οὖν μοι ἀπόσωσ ἐδοξεῖ εὐθὺς τῷ πρώτῃ ἐφοδίων οὐ δέξασθαι τοῦ σου λόγου. ταῦτα δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσασι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδρου λόγον εἰ πάθοι.

Ωμαθέ, ἐφή ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μὴ τις ἡμῖν 5 βασικαία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μελλοντά ἐσεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὁμηρίκος ἐγγὺς ἑώτερ τε περιμέθεα εἰ ἁρὰ τι λέγεις. ἔστι δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον οὐ ζητεῖς: ἀξίως ἐπιδειχθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνώλεθρον τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὕσαν, εἰ φιλοσοφὸς ἀνήρ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀποθανόν ἐκεὶ εὐ πράξεων διαφερόντως ὅ ἐλ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοὺς ἐτελεύτα, μὴ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ ἡμῶν θάρρος θαρρήσει. τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν ὅτι ἰσχυρόν τι ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοειδές καὶ ἦν ἐτί 5 πρότερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύειν φῆς πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν μή, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρώμων τὰ ἐστὶν ψυχὴ καὶ ἦν πον πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον καὶ ἤρει τε καὶ ἐπράπτει πολλὰ ἄττα: ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρόπων σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἀρχὴ ἦν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὃστερ νόσος· καὶ ταλαιπωρομείη τε ὅτι τοῦτον τῶν βίων ζῷη καὶ τελευτῶσα γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο. διαφέρειν δὲ δὴ φῆς οὐδὲν εἶτε ἀπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἰτε πολλάκις, πρὸς 5 γε τὸ ἐκαστὸν ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι: προσήκει τῷ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνήρει τῷ, τῷ μή εἰδοτε μηδὲ ἐχοὺτι λόγον διδόναι ὃς ἀθάνατὸν ἐστὶ. τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα ἐστὶν, οἴμαι, ὁ Κέβης, ἃ e

λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπτύθης πολλάκις ἄναλαμβάνω, ὅνα μὴ τι διαφύγη ἡμᾶς, εἰ τέ τι βούλει, προσθήσῃ ἢ ἀφέλησ.

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης, Ἀλλ᾽ οὔδεν ἐγώοιεν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἐφη, 5 οὔτε ἀφελείων οὔτε προσθείναι δέομαι· ἐστὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἀ λέγω.

'Ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνῶν χρόνων ἐπισχὼν καὶ πρὸς ἐαυτὸν τι σκεφάμενος, Ὡν φαῦλον πράγμα, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ἤπειρος ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθοράς τήν αἰτίαν δια-
πραγματεύσασθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίεμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐάν
βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη· ἐπείτα ἃν τί σοι χρήσιμον
φαίνηται δὲν ἀν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθάν περὶ δὲν δὴ λέγεις
χρήσι.

5 Ἀλλὰ μή, ἐφῇ ὁ Κέβης, βοῶλομαι γε.

'Ακονε τούτων ὡς ἑρώτησο. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης,
νέος ὅν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢν
δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν· ὑπερήφανος γὰρ μοι
ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τὸ γίγνεται
ἐκαστὸν καὶ διὰ τὶ ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τὶ ἐστὶ. καὶ πολλάκις

5 ἐρμαυτὸν άνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρὸτον τὰ τοιάδε·

"Ἀρ' ἐπείδαισ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ
λάζῃ, ὅς τινες ἐλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῶα συντρέφεται; καὶ
πότερον τὸ αὖμα ἐστὶν ὃ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀγρ. ἢ τὸ πῦρ; ἢ

τούτων μὲν οὐδεν, ὃ τ' ἐγκέφαλος ἐστιν ὃ τὰς αἰσθήσεις
παρέχων τοῦ ἄκουες καὶ ὃρας καὶ ὁσφρείσθαι, ἐκ τούτων
δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λα-
βούσης τὸ ἥρμειν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην; καὶ
athlon τῶν φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν

95 e

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

96

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ 96 c
tε καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὖτως ἐμαυτῷ ἐδοξά πρὸς c
tαῦτην τὴν σκέψιν ἄφνης εἶναι ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα. τεκμή-
ριον δὲ σοι ἐρῶ ἰκανοῦ· ἔγω γὰρ ἃ καὶ πρώτερον σαφῶς
ηπιστάμην, ὡς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐδόκουν, τότε
ὕπο ταῦτης τῆς σκέψεως οὖτω σφόδρα ἐνυφιὼς, ὡστε 5
ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸ τοῦ φημὶ εἰδέναι, περὶ ἄλλων τε
πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τὶ ἄνθρωπος ἀξίαντα. τούτῳ γὰρ ἦμη
πρὸ τοῦ πατη ὅηλον εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθένει καὶ πίνειν,
ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν συτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρξί σάρκες προσ-
γένωται, τοῖς δὲ ὅστοις ὅστα, καὶ οὖτω κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν
λόγου καὶ τῶν ἄλλως τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεῖα ἐκάστως προσγένηται,
tότε ὅτι τὸν ὄλγον ὤγκον ὄντα ὀστερον πολὺν γεγονέναι,
καὶ οὖτω γίγνεσθαι τῶν σμικρῶν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν. οὖτως 5
tότε ὦμην ὡ δοκώ σοι μετρίως;

'Ἐμοιγε, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης.

Σκέφσαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἐτι. ὦμην γὰρ ἰκανὸς µου δοκεῖν,
ὅποτε τὸς φαίνεσθαι ἀνθρώπος παραστὰς μέγας σμικρῶν µεῖζων
εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ὕππος ὕππου καὶ ἐτι γε τούτων e
ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα µοι ἐδοκεῖ τῶν ὄκτω πλέονα εἶναι διὰ
τὸ δύο αὐτῶς προσεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου µεῖζον
εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἤµίσει αὐτῶν ὑπερέχειν.

Νῦν δὲ δὴ, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, τὰ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν;

Πόρρω πον, ἐφη, νὴ Δία ἐµε εἶναι τοῦ οἰσθαί περὶ
tούτων τοῦ τῶν αἰτήσαι εἰδέναι, ὡς γε οὖκ ἀποδέχοµαι ἐµαυτοῦ
οὐδὲ ὡς ἐπειδὴν εὖ τὶς προσθῆ εὖ, ἥ τὸ ἐν ὧ προστέθη
δύο γέγοιν, ἥν τὸ προστεθέν, ἥ τὸ προστεθέν καὶ ὧ προσ-
τεθέθη διὰ τῆς προσθεσών τοῦ ἐτέρου τῷ ἐτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο:
θαυμάζω γὰρ ἐὰν ὅτε ἡκέτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλῆλων
ἡ, ἐν ὅρα ἐκάτερον ἤν καὶ οὐκ ἄστητι τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ' 5

επλησίασαν ἄλληλοις, αὐτὴ ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοὺς ἐγένετο τοῦ δύο
5 γενέσθαι, ἡ σύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἄλληλων τεθήμα. οὖν
γέ γε ἡς εάν τις ἐν διασχίσῃ, δύναμαι ἐτι πεῖθεσθαι ὃς αὐτὴ
αὐ αἰτίᾳ γέγονεν, ἡ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι: ἐναντία γάρ
γίγνεται ἡ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι. τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι
συνήγετο πλησίον ἄλληλων καὶ προσετέθετο ἐτέρων ἐτέρω,
γὰρ ὃτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἐτέρων ἀφ' ἐτέρων. οὖν
γέ γε δι' ὃτι ἐν γίγνεται ὃς ἐπίσταμαι, ἐτὶ πείθω ἐμαυτοῖν,
5 οὖν ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐνὶ λόγῳ δι' ὃτι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπολλυται ἢ
ἐστὶ, κατὰ τούτον τῶν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄλλῳ
τρόπων αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω, τούτων δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσέλθαι.
'Αλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτὲ ἐκ βυζλίων τινός, ὡς ἔφη, 'Ἀναξ-
cαγόρου ἀναγεγρώσκοιτο, καὶ λέγοντο ὃς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ
διακοσμῶν τέ καὶ πάντων αὐτῶν, ταύτη δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἡσθήν τε
καὶ ἑδοξέ μοι τρόπων τινὰ ἐν ἑκέων τῷ τὸν νοῦν ἐναι πάντων
αὐτῶν, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὖτως ἔσχε, τὸν το γοῦν
5 κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἐκαστὸν τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπι
ἀν βέλτιστα ἑκῆ: εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν
περὶ ἐκαστον ὅπι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἐστὶ, τοῦτο δει
περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅπι βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστὶ ἢ εὑρεῖν ἢ
ἀλλ' ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν: ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου
οὐδὲν ἀλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκεις αὐθρόπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖ-
nου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον;
ἀναγκαίοι δὲ εὑραι τὸν αὐτὸν τούτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδεῖαι.
5 τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εὑρεῖ ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ
λογιζόμενος ἄσμενος ἡμήρκειν ὑμῖν διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας
περὶ τῶν οὐτων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, τῶν 'Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ
μοι φράσεων πρῶτων μὲν πότερον ἡ γῆ πλατεία ἐστιν ἢ
προγγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσεων, ἐπεκδηνήσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν

a 4 αὐτοῖς αἰτία T τοῦ δύο W: δύο B: δυοίν T a 6 διχάσθη W
a 7 αὖ om. T b 1 ἡ W: ἡ BT μὲν om. W b 2 τὸ πλησιον
c τὸ mox τὸ ἐτέρω W b 3 ὑπ' W b 5 εἰν λόγῳ B: εἰν
d 3 τῶν B2TW Eus.: αὐτῶν B d 2 προσήκειν B2TW Eus.: αὐ-
e 1 ἐπεκδηνηγήσασθαι W (et mox e 4 , 2 b 3)
καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἀμειων καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἀμειων ἦν τουατην εἶναι καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτήν, ἐπεκδηγηγήσεθαι ὥς ἀμειων ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι καὶ εἰ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοι, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἴδος. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἥλιου οὗτω παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρῶν, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ προτὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πὴ ποτε ταῦτ' ἀμειων ἑστιν ἕκαστοι 5 καὶ ποιεὶν καὶ πάσχειν ἄ πάσχειν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτῶν ψυμὴν, φάσκοντα γε ὑπὸ ὅνοι αὐτὰ κεκοσμηθαί, ἄλλην των αὐτῶν αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκείν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτά οὕτως ἔχειν ἐστιν ὅσπερ ἔχειν ἐκάστω ὧν αὐτῶν ἀποδιώμητα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πάσι τὸ ἐκάστῳ βέλτιστον ψιμὴν καὶ τὸ κοινὸς πάσιν ἐπεκδηγηγήσεθαι ἁγαθῶς καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοὶ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνω σπουδὴ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλοις ὡς τάχυστα οἴος τ' ἢ ἀνεγίγνωσκον, ἐν' ὡς τάχυστα εἰδεῖν τὸ 5 βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον.

Ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστὴς ἐλπίδος, ὁ ἔταιρε, ἀχόμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προϊόν καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων ὀρῷ ἀνόρα τῷ μὲν νῦν ὡσὺν χρώμενον οὐδὲ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιῶμεν εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας ὑπὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ θάδατα ἀιτιῶμεν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα. καὶ μοι ἐδοξὲν ὁμοιῶταιν πεπονθὲναι ὅσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει νῦν πράττει, κάπετα ἐπικερήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστων ὅν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ 5 ταῦτα γὰρ ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι σύγκειται μοι τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὅστων καὶ νέφων, καὶ τα μὲν ὅστα ἑστιν στερεὰ καὶ διαφυῖα ἔχει χωρίς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεφρὰ οία ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίεσθαι, περιμαμπέχουτα τὰ ὅστα μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὁ συνέχει αὐτή· αἰωρομένου ὤν τῶν ὅστων ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν συμβολαῖς χαλωντα καὶ συντείνοντα

α 1 ἀποφαίνοιν T b : ἀποφαίνοιτο B παρεσκευάσμην W (et mox) παρεσκευάσμην T Eus : ὑπόθεσιν B c τρ. T : ὑποθεσίμου W a 8 αἰτίων αὐτῶν B2 W βέλτιστον W b 1 αὐτῶν B Eus : αὐτῶν T b 7 ὁ ἔταιρε ἐλπίδος TW Eus. e 3 λέγοι pr. W
τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαι ποὺ ποιεῖ οἷῶν τ' ἔιναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ
5 μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταῦτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμφθεῖς ἐνθάδε κα-
θημαί: καὶ ἂν περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὡμών ἐτέρας τοιαύτας
αἰτίας λέγου, φωνᾶς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἀλλα μυρία
e τοιαύτα αἰτιώμενοι, ἁμελητὰς τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν,
ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίων ἐδοξεί βέλτιστων ἔιναι ἐμου καταψη-
φίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιστον αὐ ἅδοκται ἐνθάδε
καθῆσαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παράμενοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δύκην
5 ἢν ἂν κελεύσωσι: ἐπεὶ η'/ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγόωμαι, πάλαι ἂν
99 ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ ὅστα ἡ περὶ Μέγαρα ἡ Βουῳτοῦ ἡ,
ὑπὸ δοξῆς φερόμενα τοῦ βέλτιστον, εἰ μὴ δικαιώτερον ὕμην
cαὶ κάλλιον ἔιναι πρὸ τοῦ φεῦγεν τε καὶ ἀτοδιδράσκειν
ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δύκην ἢμιν ἃν τάττη, ἀλλ' αἰτία μὲν
tά τοιαύτα καλέων λιῶν ἀποπον ε' δὲ τις λέγω οτὶ ἂνευ
τοῦ τά τοιαύτα ἐχειν καὶ ὅστα καὶ νεῦρα καὶ οὖσα ἄλλα ἐχο
οὐκ ἂν οἶον τ' ἡ ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντα μοι, ἀλήθη ἂν λέγον ὡς
μείνοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ, καὶ ταῦτα ν' ἀπαντῶ, ἀλλ' οὐ
b τῇ τοῦ βέλτιστον αἱρέσει, πολλή ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ρᾷθυμία ἐἳ
τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἰον τ' ἔιναι οτὶ ἂλλο μέν
tὶ ἐστι τὸ αἰτίων τῷ οὖντι, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἂνευ ὡς τὸ
αιτίων οὐκ ἂν ποτ' ἔιν αἰτίων: ὁ δὴ μοι φαύνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ
tολλοὶ ὀσπερ ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι προσχρόμενοι,
ὡς αἰτίων αὐτὸ προσαγορευέων. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μὲν τὶς ὀνή
περιτείθεις τῇ γῇ ὡς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένεις δὴ ποιεὶ τὴν γῇ
, ὁ δὲ ὀσπερ καρδόσῳ πλατεῖα βάθρου τῶν ἄερα ὑπερεῖδεν
tὴν δὲ τὸς ὡς οἰον τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθήναι ὅμως ὀντω
νῦν κείσαν, ταῦτα οὔτε ἄρτοισιν οὔτε τωὰ οἷοντα δαι-
μονίαν ἐσχύν ἐχειν, ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τοῦτον Ἀτλαντα ἂν
ποτέ ἐσχύρετοι καὶ ἀθανατότεροι καὶ μᾶλλον ἄπαντα

d 4 που om. W e 1 ὠς om. pr. T e 5 κελεύσωσι T a i ka
T W Eus.: te καὶ B a 6 ἀλλα ὡσ W a 7 ἁληθῇ ἂν λέγοι om. T
a 8 ποι ὡ & B 3 T W Eus.: ποιών & B τράτων Heindorf: τράτω
B T W Eus.: b 1 ἑν T W Eus.: om. B (post ῥθωνία recce.)
b 7 ἐστιν T ἐκεῖνο B T Simpl. Stob.: ἐκεῖνο δ B 3 W'μοματι T Simpl. Stob.: ῥματι B W
b 8 ἀερα B T Simpl. Eus. Stob.: ἀερα κατ' W e 1 βελτιστα αὐτὰ T Simpl. Eus.
Stob.: αὐτα βελτιστα B 3 W: βελτιστον αὐτὰ B
C 3 ἐφ ποιē
ațlanta T W Eus. Stob.
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

συνέχοντα ἐξευρέων, καὶ ὡς ἄλληδος τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον 5
συνέχεια καὶ συνέχεια οὔδεν οἴονται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς
τουατίας αἰτίας ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει μαθητής ὅτονοι ἵδοιτ' ἀν
γενούμην ἔπειθόθ χαῦτης ἐστερήθησαν καὶ οὔτ' αὐτῶς εὑρέων
οὔτε παρ' ἀλλοι ἀκεδων οὐδός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον
πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζύλησιν ἦ πεπραγμάτευμαι ζουλεῖ d
σοι, ἐφῇ ἐπιδείξων ποιήσομαι, ὃ Κέβης;

Ὑπερφυώς μὲν οὖν, ἐφῇ, ὡς βούλομαι.

'Εδοξε τούτων μοι, ἢ ὅ' ὅς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδή ἀπειρήκη
τὰ οὐτα σκοπῶν, ἕως εὐλαξηθῆσαι μή πάθομι ὅπερ οἱ τῶν
ἴλιων ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦσατ καὶ σκοπούμενοι πᾶσχονσιν' διαφθείρονται γὰρ πον ἐνοι τὰ ἁμματα, εἰδ' ἐν ὑδαίτη ἢ
τινι τουλών σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτῶν. τουτῶν τι καὶ
ἐγὼ διευθείηκα, καὶ ἔδεισα μή παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλω-
θείνα βλέπον πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὁμματι καὶ ἐκάστη
τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἀπέτευκαν αὐτῶν. ἐδοξε ἡ μοι
χρήμα έλε τούτων λόγους καταφυγόντα εἰκενέωσι σκοπεῖς 5
τῶν οὔτων τὴν ἁλῆθειαν. ἢς μὲν οὖν ὃν ἐικάδω τρόπων
τιν' ὃν ἐοικεν' ὡς γὰρ πάνω συγχωρῶ τῶν ἐν [τοῖς] λόγους
σκοπούμενον τὰ οὔτα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖς ἡ τῶν ἐν
[τοῖς] ἔργοις. ἀλλ' οὖν ὃ οὐτα γε ὠρμησα, καὶ ἴποδεμένοι
ἐκάστοτε λόγου ὃν ἀν κρίνω ερρομεγέστατον εἰμαι, ἀ μὲν
ἀν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἁληθὴ οὔτα, καὶ 100
περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων [οὔτων], ὃ ὃ ἂν
μή, ὡς οὐκ ἁληθῇ. βούλομαι δε σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν
ἀ λέγων' οἴμαι γὰρ σε γίνῃ οὖν μανθάνειν.

Οὐ μὰ τῶν Δία, ἐφή ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα.

'Αλλ', ἢ ὅ' ὅς, ὅδε λέγων, οὔδεν καίουν, ἀλλ' ἀπερ ἀεὶ b

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te ἀλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρελημνθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαιμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι [γὰρ] δὴ ἐπιχειρόω σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὁ πεπραγμάτευμα, καὶ ἐμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα
5 τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἑκεῖνων, ὑποθέμενοι εἰναι τι kalon αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τάλλα πάντα: ᾧ εἰ μοι δίδωσ τε καὶ συγχωρεῖσ εἰναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξεων καὶ αἰνερήσεως ὁς ἀδιάστατον [ἡ] ψυχῇ.

c Ἀλλὰ μή, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὥς διδότος σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνουσ περαίων.

Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη, τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνοις εἀν σοι συνδοκῇ ὡσπερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἰ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ
5 τὸ καλὸν, οὐδὲ δὴ ἐν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἡ διότι μετέχει ἑκεῖνον τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῇ τούθε αἰτία συγχωρεῖσ; 

Συγχωρώ, ἔφη.

Ως τοῖνυν, ἢ δ' ὦς, ἐτι μαυθαίων οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας
10 αἰτίας τὰς σοφίας ταύτας γινομάσκευν: ἄλλ' εὰν τίς μοι λέγῃ d ὥς ὑπὲρ  ἄλο  ἐρωτ  ὁμ. τοις ἀλλοις πασί—τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ὑποθῆς ἑχων παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι
5 ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἑκεῖνον τοῦ καλοῦ ἑτὲς παρουσία ἑτε κομηνία ἑτὲ ὑπὲρ ἰδ' ᾧ καὶ ὑπὸς ἐπιστευομένην: οὐ γὰρ ἑτε τοῦτο ἰδιοφυημας, ἄλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ

γίνεται καλά. τοῦτο γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλω, καὶ τούτῳ ἐχόμενος e ἤγουμαι οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοί καὶ ὑπερ keyPressed. ἄλλο ἀποκρίνασθαι ὁτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ [γίνεται] καλά: ὥς οὐ καὶ σοι δοκεῖ.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

100 e

Δοκεί.
Καὶ μεγέθει ἁρὰ τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεῖζοι μεῖζοι, 5 καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω;
Ναί.
Οὐδὲ σὺ ἂρ’ ἂν ἀποδέχουσι εἰ τίς τινα φαίη ἑτερον ἑτέρον τῇ κεφαλῇ μεῖζοι εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐλάττῳ, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτυροῦ ἂν ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μεῖζον τὰν ἑτερον ἑτέρον οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μεῖζον ἐστὶν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τὸῦτο μεῖζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεδος, τὸ δὲ ἐλάττου οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἐλάττου ἢ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐλάττου, διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβοῦμενος οἴμαι μὴ τίς σοι ἐναπόθεος λόγον ἀπαίτησης, εἰς τῇ κεφαλῇ μεῖζον ταῦτα φής εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μεῖζον μεῖζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐλάττου ἐλάττου, ἔπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρᾷ οὐσίᾳ τὸν μεῖζον μεῖζον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ τινι b μέγαν τινα εἶναι ἢ οὐκ ἂν φοβοῦκα ταῦτα;
Καὶ ὁ Κέβης γελάσας, "Ἑγώγε, ἔφη.
Οὐκοῦν, ἢ ὃς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ ὄνομα πλεῖόν εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῦο ἂν λέγει, ἀλλὰ 5 μὴ πληθεὶς καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος; καὶ τὸ ὑπόπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαῖον ἡμέει μεῖζον εἶναι ἀλλ' οὐ μεγέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ ποὺ φοβοῦσ.
Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.
Τὸ δὲ; ἐνὶ ἐνὸς προστεθέντος τῷ πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τῷ σχῆσιν οὐκ εὐλαβεῖος c ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοήσῃ ὅτι οὐκ οἴσθα ἄλλος πῶς ἐκαστὸν γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχημόν πῆς ὑόιας ὑόσιας ἐκάστου ὅ ἂν μετάσχηκα, καὶ ἐν τοῦτοι οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην ταὐτά ᾧ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ τῆς ὑόιας ὑόσιας ἐκάστου ὅ ἂν μετάσχηκα, καὶ ἐν τοῦτοι μετασχηματίζεται τῷ μέλλοντι δύο ἐστεθῇτα, καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν ἔλλη ἐν ἐστεθῇτα, τάς δὲ σχῆδες ταὐτάς καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἔφης ἂν χάρεϊς, παρεἳς

**e 6 ἐλάττω alterum in marg. t**  
**e 8 ἁρὰ ἃν T W: ἅρα B**

**a 2 τὸ B Γ: τὸ μὲν W**  
**a 4 ἐλάττων 'ante ἢ om. T**  
**b 2 εἶναι**

**B: εἰδέναι T**  
**c 2 μυγα B: T W: μεγάλα B**

**οἶδεθα B: οἰδίωθα W**  
**c 4 μετάσχη T et ης. v. W: μετάσχη B W**

10+
πλατώνος

ἀποκρύψαθαι τοῖς σεαυτῷ σοφωτέροις· σὺ δὲ δεδιως ἂν, τὸ

d ἠγομένοι, τὴν σαυτῷ σκίᾶν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἔχομενος

ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοὺς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρύσαν αὐν.

εἰ δὲ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοντα, χαίρεων ἔφης ἃν καὶ

οὐκ ἀποκρύσαν ἔως ἃν τὰ ἄτρεύκην ὀρμηθέντα σκέψαι

5 εἰσο διὰμερος συμφωνεῖν ἡ διαφωνεῖ· ἐπειδῆ δὲ ἐκείνης

αὐτῆς δέοι στὶς διδῶνα λόγου, ὡςαῦτως ἂν διδώνης, ἀλλην αὐν

ὑπόθεσαν ὑποθέσεως ἤτες τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαύνοιτο,

ε ἔσον επὶ τι ἰκανον ἐλθον, ἀμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύρουο ὁσπερ ὁι

ἀντιλογοικοι περι τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενοι καὶ τῶν ἔξ

ἐκείνης ὀρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλουο τι τῶν ὑπον εὐρείων;

ἐκείνοις μεν γὰρ ὅσων οὐδὲ εἰς περὶ τούτων λόγοι οὐδὲ

5 φροντίς· ἰκανον γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὡμοί πάντα κυκώντες ὡμοι

ὁμολαμβάναν αὐτοι ἀυτοσ ἀρέσκειν· σὺ δ', εἴπερ εἰ τῶν φιλοσόφων,

102 οὔμαι ἂν ὅς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφή, λέγεις, ὦ τε Σιμμίας ἀμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.

EX. Νη Δια, ὁ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε, θαυμαστῶς γὰρ

μοι δοκεῖ ὅση ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι εἰπεῖν

5 ἐκείνοις ταῦτα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Πάνω μεν οὖν, ὁ 'Εχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς

παροίστων ἔδοξεν.

EX. Καὶ γὰρ ἣμων τοῖς ἀπούσι, τινι δὲ ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλὰ

τῶν ἐντὸς ὃν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεξθέντα;

10 ΦΑΙΔ. 'Ως μὲν ἐγὼ οὔμαι, εἴπει αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη,

καὶ ὀρμολογεῖτο εἰγαί τι ἐκαστοῦ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων

τάλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τῶν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν,

τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἥρωτα, Εἴ δή, ὃ δ' ὦς, ταῦτα οὕτως λέγεις,

οὗ ὡμοί, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φής μείζω εἰναι, Φαίδωνος

5 δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τὸτ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμία ἄρφοτερα, καὶ

μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα;
Εγώγε.

'Αλλὰ γὰρ, ἢ δ' ὡς, ὀμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὖν ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὐτός καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν; οὐ γὰρ ποιν πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τοῦτο, τῷ c Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὁ τυχόντω τοίς. οὐδ' αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἑστὶν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖνον μέγεθος;

Ἀληθῆ.

Οὐδὲ γε αὖ ὑπὸ Φαῖδον οὐπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι Φαῖδον ὁ Φαῖδον ἑστὶν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαῖδον πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίαν σμικρότητα;

Ἑστὶ ταῦτα.

Οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπωινυμίαν ἔχει σμικρὸς τε καὶ 1ο μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὧν ἁμφοτέρων, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τῷ μέγεθος τῆς d σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχοι. Καὶ ἀμα μειωμάσας, "Εὐσκα, ἕφη, καὶ συγγραφικὸς ἑρείν, ἀλλ' ὦν ἔχει γε ποι ὡς λέγω. Συνίσκηπ.

Λέγω δὴ τοῦτ' ἐνεκα, βουλόμενοι δοῦξαι σοι ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ. 5 ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὐτῷ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτ' ἐθέλειν ἀμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὔτ' ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ὧν οὗτο τὸ ἐτερον, ἡ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν ὅταν αὐτῷ προσήγῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρὸν, ἢ προσεδιόντως ἐκεῖνον e ἀπολυόμεναν ὑπομείνου dε καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἐτερον ἢ ὑπὲρ ἢν οὕσπερ ἐγὼ δεξαμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὧν ὦσπερ εἰμὶ, οὕτως ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρὸς εἰμι: ἐκεῖνο δε οὐ πετῶμεν μέγα ὅν 5 σμικρὸν εἶναι: ὧς ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν

εναντίων, ἐτι δὲν ὅπερ ἢν, ἀμα τοὐναντίων γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ ἔναι, ἀλλ' ἦτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπάλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι.

Παντάπασιν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, οὗτο φαῖνεται μοι.

Καὶ τις ἐίπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὅστις δ' ἦν, οὐ
5 σαφῶς μέμημαι—Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τούς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις αὐτῷ τοὺς ἐναντίους τῶν ὑπὶ λεγομένων ἀμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττωνος τὸ μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἐλάττων, καὶ ἀπεχρώς αὐτῇ ἔιναι ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; ἦν δὲ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τούτῳ οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλῶν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας,
b ἄνθρωπος, ἐφη, ἀπεμημονώνουσα, οὕτω μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε ὑπὶ λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πράγμα γίγνεσθαι, ἦν δὲ, ὅτι αὐτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο, οὕτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὕτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει.
5 τότε μὲν γὰρ, ὁ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχοῦντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ἄν ἐνοίκων ἕχει τῷ ἐπωνυμίᾳ τὰ ὁνομαζόμενα· αὐτὰ δ' ἐκεῖνα οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ φαμέν ἐθελήσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι. Καὶ ἀμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα ἐίπει, Ἄρα μή πον, ὃ Κέβης, ἐφη, καὶ σὲ τί τούτων ἐτιμαξίες ἢν ὁδὲ εἶπει;

c 5 Οὐδ' αὖ, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, οὗτος ἐχώ· καίτοι οὗτι λέγω ὡς οὐ πολλά με ταράττει.

Συνωμολογήσας ἀρα, ἦ δ' ὡς, ἀπλῶς τούτο, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεσθαι.

Παντάπασιν, ἐφη.
'Ετι δή μοι καὶ τόδε σκέψαι, ἐφη, εἰ ἄρα συνομολογήσεις. το θερμῶν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρῶν;

'Εγώγε.

'Αρ' ὀπέρ χιώνα καὶ πῦρ;
Μά Δι' οὖκ ἐγώγε.

'Αλλ' ἑτερῶν τι πυρῶς τὸ θερμῶν καὶ ἑτερῶν τι χιώνος τὸ ψυχρῶν;

Ναὶ.

'Αλλὰ τόδε γ' οἴμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιώνα γ' οὖσαν 5 δεξαμένην τὸ θερμῶν, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἐτί ἐσεσθαί ὀπέρ ἦν, χιώνα καὶ θερμῶν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἦ ὑπεκχωρήσειν αὐτῷ ἦ ἀπολείηθαί.

Πάνω γε.

Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἦ 10 ὑπεξείναι ἦ ἀπολείηθαί, οὐ μὲντοι ποτὲ τολμήσειν δεξαμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἐτί εἶναι ὀπέρ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρῶν.

'Αληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις.

'Εστων ἄρα, ἢ δ' ὃς, περὶ ἐνα τῶν τοιούτων, ὡστε μή μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἴδος ἀξιούσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὅνοματος εἰς τὸν ἁεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἁεὶ, ὡσταὶπερ ἦ. ἐτί δὲ ἐν τῷ ἑδὲ 5 ὅσως ἐσται σαφέστερον ὁ λέγω· τὸ γὰρ περιττῶν ἁεὶ ποι ἐτὶ τούτου τοῦ ὅνοματος τυγχάνειν ὀπέρ ἄνω λέγομεν· ἦ οὖ;

Πάνω γε.

'Αρα μόνον τῶν ὁντῶν—τούτῳ γὰρ ἐρωτῶ—ἡ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὖν ὀπέρ τὸ περιττῶν, ὅμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτῷ 104 μετὰ τοῦ έαυτοῦ ὅνοματος καὶ τούτῳ καλεῖν ἁεὶ διὰ τὸ οὖτω πεφυκέναι ὡστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείηπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτῷ εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλο καὶ ἡ τριάς πέπουθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος. ἄρα οὖ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὕτης 5
οὖν ὑμεῖς ἂν προσαγορευτέα ἐσίναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὅτις
οὐχ ὅπερ τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλ' ὀμοιος οὗτος πέφυκε καὶ ἡ
tριάς καὶ ἡ περπτας καὶ ὁ ἥμισυς τοῦ ἁριμθοῦ ἄπαν, ὡστε

b οὐκ ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν ἂν ἐκαστός αὐτῶν ἐστὶ περιττός·
καὶ αὐ τὰ δύο καὶ [τὰ] τέτταρα καὶ ἄπαν ὁ ἐτερος αὖ στίχος
τοῦ ἁριμθοῦ οὐκ ἄν ὅπερ τὸ ἁρτιον ὀμοιο ἐκαστος αὐτῶν
ἀρτιος ἐστιν ἂν· συγχωρεῖς ἡ οὐ;

5 Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἐφη.

'Ὁ τοίνυν, ἐφη, Βούλωμαι δηλώσαι, ἀδρει. ἐστιν δὲ
tόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία ἄλληλα οὐ
dεχόμεναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὤυτ' ἄλληλοι ἐναντία ἔχει ἂν
tάναντια, οὖδὲ ταύτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν ἱδέαν ἥ

10 ἃν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐσία ἐναντία ἥ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἤτοι
c ἀπολλύμενα ἡ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἡ οὐ φύσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ
ἀπολείποντα πρότερον καὶ ἀλλο ὁμοιο πείσεσθαι, πρῶν ὑπο-
μείναι ἐτὶ τρία ὅντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης.

5 Οὐδὲ μὴν, ἡ δ' ὃς, ἐναντίον γέ ἐστι οὖνας τριάδι.
Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
Οὐκ ἀρα μόνον τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιοῦντα
ἀλληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλ' ἀτα τὰ ἐναντία οὖχ ὑπομένει
eπιοῦντα.

10 'Αληθεστατα, ἐφη, λέγεις.
Βούλει οὖν, ἡ δ' ὃς, ἔων οἰοὶ τ' ὁμεν, ὑρισώμεθα ὑποῖα
ταύτα ἐστιν;
Πάνυ γε.

d ἄρ' οὖν, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, τάδε εἰη ἂν, ᾧ ὅτι ἂν κατάσχει
μὴ μόνον ἀναγκαζει τὴν αὐτοῦ ἱδεαν αὐτῷ ὑσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
ἐναντίον αὐτῷ ἂν ἂν τινος;

α 7 οὔπερ Heindorf οὔτως Τ: οὔτα πῶς Β τ b 2 τὰ om. Τ
b 4 ἂν om. Τ  b 8 ἂν ἐφει Τ b 10 αὐτοῖς recce.: αὐτῇ B TW
c 2 πρὶν T W: πρὶν ἥ B c 5 οὐδὲ B2 TW: οὐ δὴ B et ἥ s. v. W
c 8 τὰ om. Τ c 11 ἡ δ' ὃς ἐφη W d 1 & B: W: om. B T
d 2 ἀναγκάζει B2 TW: ἀναγκάζει B αὐτῷ B T: αὐτοῖς W ἃχειν
t w: σχειν B d 3 αὐτῷ ἂν τινος B: ἂν τινος αὐτῇ W: δὲι
αὐτῷ τινος Τ
Πῶς λέγεις;
"Ωσπέρ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, οὖσθα γὰρ ὅπως ὅτι ἀν ἡ τῶν 5 τριῶν ἱδέα κατάσχη, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς.

Πάντως γε.
'Επὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὅ, φαμέν, ἡ ἐναρτία ἱδέα ἐκεῖνη ἵπτῃ μορφῇ ἢ ἀν τούτῳ ἀπεργάζηται οὖν ἐπετοῦ ἢν ἐλθοῦν.
Οὐ γὰρ.
Εἰργάζετο δὲ γε ἡ περιττή;
Ναὶ.
'Εναρτία δὲ ταύτη ἡ τῶν ἄρτιον;
Ναὶ.
'Επὶ τὰ τρία ἄρα ἡ τῶν ἄρτιον ἱδέα οὐδέποτε ἤξει.
Οὐ δήτα.
'Αμωφα δὴ τῶν ἄρτιον τὰ τρία.
'Αμωφα.
'Ανάρτιος ἄρα ἡ τριάς.
Ναὶ.
'Ὁ τούτων ἐλεγὼν ὀρίσασθαι, ποῦα οὐκ ἐναρτία τωλί ὅντα ὄμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτό, τὸ ἐναρτίον—οἷον νῦν ἡ τριása τῷ ἄρτιῳ οὐκ οὕ στα ἐναρτία οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναρτίον ἀεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ οὖν τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τῷ πῖρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα—ἀλλ' ὃρα δὴ εἰ ὅτως ὁρίζῃ, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναρτίον τὸ ἐναρτίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἄλλα καὶ ἐκεῖνα, ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναρτίον ἐκεῖνο, ἐφ' ὅτι ἂν αὐτὸ ἢ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τῷ τῷ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναρτιώτητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀναμμηγήσκον οὐ 5 γὰρ χείρων πολλάκις ἄκουες. τὰ πέιτε τῷ τῶν ἄρτιον οὐ δέχεσται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τῶν τῶν περιττοῖ, τὸ διπλάσιον. τούτῳ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ ἐναρτίον, ὄμως δὲ τῷ
b τοῦ περίττοῦ οὐ δέξεται: οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τὰλλα τὰ τοιαύτα, τὸ ἣμισυ, τὴν τοῦ ὅλον, καὶ τριτημόριον αὖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα, εἴπερ ἐπη τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως.

Πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἐφη, καὶ ἐπομαί.

5 Πάλυν ὤθη μοι, ἐφη, ἐκ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μὴ μοι ὃ ἄν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ. λέγω ὦθη παρ’ ἦν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἑκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὅρων ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔροιο με ὃ ἄν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται θερμοὺς ἔσται, οὐ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἑκείνην τὴν ἁμαθή, ὅτι ὃ ἄν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ὃ ἄν πῦρ οὐδὲ ἄν ἐρή ὃ ἄν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται νοσήσει, οὐκ ἔρω ὅτι ὃ ἄν νοσός, ἀλλὰ ὃ ἄν πυρέτος· οὐδ’ ὃ ἄν ἅρμιθρὸ τί ἐγγένηται περίττος ἔσται, οὐκ ἔρω ὃ ἄν περιττότης, ἀλλ’ ὃ ἄν μονάς, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ’ ὃρα εἰ ἡδὴ ἰκανῶς ὰσθ’ ὅτι βουλομαι.

’Ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἰκανῶς, ἐφη.

’Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ὃ ἄν τί ἐγγένηται σῶματι ζών ἔσται;

’Ὡς ἄν ψυχή, ἐφη.

d Οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ τούτῳ οὕτως ἔχει;

Πῶς γὰρ ωὐχί; ἦ δ’ ὅς.

Ψυχή ἀρα ὅτι ἄν αὐτῇ κατάσχη, ἀεὶ ἰκεῖ ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνο φέρωσα ζώην;

5 ’Ὅκει μείνοι, ἐφη.

Πότερον δ’ ἔστι τι ζωῆ ἐναντίον ὃ οὐδέν;

’Εστιν, ἐφη.

Τί;

Θάνατος.
Οὐκοῦν ὑπή τὸ ἐναπτίον ὁ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὐ μή 10
ποτὲ δέξηται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὁμολόγηται;
Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης.
Τι οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἱδέαιν τι γυνὴν
ὅνομάζομεν;

Ἀνάρτιον, ἐφη. 15
Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὁ ἁυ μονοτικὸν μὴ δέχηται;
Ἀμονσον, ἐφη, τὸ δὲ ἁδικον.
Εἰεν ὁ ὁ ἁυ θάνατον μὴ δέχηται τί καλοῦμεν;
Ἀθάνατον, ἐφη.
Οὐκοῦν ψυχή οὐ δέχεται θάνατον;
Οὐ. 5
Ἀθάνατον ἀρα ψυχή.
Ἀθάνατον.
Εἰεν, ἐφη, τοῦτο μὲν ὅ ἂποδεδείξθαι φῶμεν; ἦ πῶς δοκεῖ;
Καὶ μάλα γε ἵκαρὼς, ὁ Σώκρατες.
Τι οὖν, ἦ δὲ ὁς, ὁ Κέβης; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαίον ἦν
ἀνωλέθρῳ εἶναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἦ ἀνωλέθρᾳ ἄν ἦν; 10
Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;
Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνωλέθρῳ εἶναι,
ὅποτε τις ἐπὶ χιόνια θερμῶν ἐπάγοι, ὑπεξῆξεν ἂν ἢ χιόνι ὁδικα
σῶς καὶ ἀποκτόως; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετο γε, οὐδ' αὐ ὑπο- 5
μένουσα ἐδεέωτο ἂν τὶν θερμότητα.
Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις.

"Ως δ' αὐτῶς οἴμαι κἂν εἰ τὸ ἅψυκτον ἄνωλέθρῳ ἦν',
ὅποτε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπίθει, οὐποτ' ἂν ἀπεσβένυτο
οὐδ' ἀπώλευτο, ἀλλὰ σῶν ἂν ἀπελθοῦν ὁχετο. 10

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ 105 d
'Αγάγκη, ἐφή.

b Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὠδε, ἐφη, ἀγάγκη περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου εἰπεῖν; εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἔστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ, ὅταν θάνατος ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἦ, ἀπόλλυσθαι θάνατον μὲν γὰρ ὁὐ ἐκ τῶν προερημέρων οὐ δέχεται οὐδ' ἔσται τεθνηκῶς.

5 ὥσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται, ἐφαμείν, ἄρτιον, οὐδὲ γ' αὖ τὸ περιττός, οὐδὲ δὴ τῷ ἐνωρ ψυχρῷ, οὐδὲ γε ἢ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης. "Ἀλλὰ τι κοιλύει," φαίη ἂν τις, "ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν χῦ γένεσθαι ἐπιώωτος τοῦ ἄρτιον, ὥσπερ όμολογηταῖ, ἀπολογεῖν τό ναυτ' ἐκεῖνον ἄρτιον γεγονέναι;" τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν διαμαχέσασθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι τὸ γὰρ ἄγαρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρον ἔστιν. ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτο όμολογητο ἠμῖν, ῥαδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελθώντως τοῦ ἄρτιον τὸ περιττόν καὶ τὰ τρία οὐχέσται ἀπιόντας καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα. ἢ οὖν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τυόν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὀμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχῇ ἂν εἰῆ πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατον εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος εἰ ὡς μή, ἄλλοιν ἂν δέοι λόγου.

'Αλλ' οὐδὲν οἴει, ἐφη, τούτων γε ἐνεκεί: σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν τῷ ἄλλῳ φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἰ τό γε ἄθανατον ἀδίδον ὅν φθορὰν δέχεται.

5 'Ο δὲ γε θεῶς οἴμαι, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ὑής εἶδος καὶ εἰ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀθανάτων ἔστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὀμολογηθεὶν μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι.

Παρὰ πάντων μέριτοι τῇ Δι', ἐφη, ἀνθρώπων τε γε καὶ ἐπὶ μάλλον, ὡς ἐγώμαι, παρὰ θεῶν.

e 'Οπότε ὅτι τὸ ἀθανάτον καὶ ἀνώδιθρον ἔστιν, ἄλλο

τι ψυχή ἦ, εἰ ἄθανατος τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ ἄνώλεθρος ἄν εἰη;
Πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ.
'Επιώντος ἀρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν τὸ μὲν θνητὸν, 5 ὡς ἐοικεί, αὐτοῦ ἀποθησκεῖ, τὸ δ' ἄθανατον σὸν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οὐχεῖται ἀπὶ ὑπεκχωρήσαν τὸν θανάτῳ.
Φαίνεται.
Παιτὸς μάλλον ἀρα, ἐφη, ὥς Κέβης, ψυχή ἄθανατον καὶ ἄνωλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἑστοται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ εἰὶ Ἀιδοῦν. 107
Οὐκοιν ἔγινε, ὥς Σωκράτες, ἐφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδὲ πη ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τι Σωμμίας οὗτ ἦ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ καταστηγῆσαι ὃς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὄντων τοίς ἄλλοις καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο 5 ἢ τῶν εὐν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἢ τι εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι.
'Αλλὰ μὴν, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωμμίας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ἔτι ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἐκ γε τῶν λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μὲντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὅν οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητάν ψευδέσεις ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστῶν ἐτί ἔχειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων.
Οὐ μόνον γ', ἐφη, ὥς Σωμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα τε εὖ λέγεις καὶ τάς γε υποθέσεις τὰς πρῶτας, καὶ εἰ 5 πισταὶ ὅμως εἰσίν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι συφιστικὸν· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἰκανῶς διέλθητε, ὥς ἐγὼμαι, ἀκολούθησε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' ὅσον ὑμνατὸν μάλιστ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολούθησαν· κἀν τοῦτο αὐτό σαφὲς γείνηται, οὖν ἐξήτισε περαιτέρω.
'Αληθὴ, ἐφη, λέγεις.
'Αλλὰ τόδε γ', ἐφη, ὥς ὑμνατος, δίκαιων διαγοηθήματι, ὅτι, c εἰπέρ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄθανατος, επιμελείασ ὅτι δεῖται οὖν ὑπέρ τοῦ

**Note:** The text appears to be a fragment of a Greek philosophical dialogue, possibly from Socrates and a student, discussing the nature of the soul and immortality. The script is partially legible, and the Greek text is presented in a way that requires transcription and translation for full comprehension. The page number 107 indicates it is from a printed edition. The transcription provided is a rough approximation of the Greek text based on the visible parts of the page.
χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ὧν καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παινός, καὶ ὁ κύριονος ἔν ὡς ἐκαὶ ὁ δέξειν ἄν δεινὸς εἶναι,
5 εἰ τις αὐτὴς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἢν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παινός ἀπαλλαγῆ, ἐρμαίων ἄν ἢν τοὺς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἢ ἀπηλλάξωσι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς. ἐν ὧν ὅ ἑπειδή ἦθανατος φαίνεται ὑστά, οὐδεμία ἄν
d εἰ ἄντ' ἀλλ' ἀποφυγῇ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὧς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἀιδών ἡ ψυχή ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἀ ὡς καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὁφελεῖν ἡ βλάπτειν τῶν
5 τελευτησάντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείσης πορείας. λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτασάντα ἐκαστὸν ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων, ὁσπερ ζῶντα εἰλίξει, οὕτως ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς ὧν τῷ τόπῳ, οἱ οἱ τοὺς συλλεγόντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς Ἀιδών
e πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνοις ἐκείνου ὅ ὧς ἐπιστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθεύον ἐκείσης πορευόταν τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὡς ὡν τις τρεξειν καὶ μείναται ὡν χρὴ χρόνου ἄλλος δεύρο πάλιν ἡγεμονος κομίζει ἐν πολλαίς χρόνοι καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις. ἐστὶ δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὃ Ἀισχύλου Τήλεφος λέγεις ἐκείσθιν
108 μέν γὰρ ἀπλὴν ṿἱμὸν φησιν εἰς Ἀιδών φέρειν ἡ ὃ οὕτε ἀπλὴν οὕτε μία φαίνεται μοι ἐφαίναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμονος ἐδει, οὐ γὰρ ποῦ τις ὄλα διαμάρτοι οὐδαμόνοι χάρα οὐδενος
5 ἐν ὧν δὲ εἰσικε σχιστες τε καὶ τριάδοις πολλοῖς ἐχεινεν
5 ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαρώμενοι
λέγει. ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχή ἐπεται τε καὶ οὐκ ἄγνοει τα παροίμα. ἡ ὃ ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν ἐλπίν, περὶ ἐκεῖνο πολὺν

χρόνου ἐπτομενή καὶ περὶ τῶν ὀρατῶν τόπων, πολλὰ δὲ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βία καὶ μόγις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οὐχεταῖ ἀγομενή. ἀφικομενή δὲ ὀθιπερ αἱ ἄλλαι, τῷ μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τῷ πεποιηκιαίῳ τοιοῦτοι, ἡ φονίων ἀδίκων ἤμμενην ἡ ἄλλ' ἀττα τοιαῦτα ἵνα γραψόμενη, ὁ τούτων ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα τυγχάναι ᾠτα, ταύτην μὲν ἄπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὔτε συνεμπορος οὔτε ἥγεμων ἐθέλει γέγνεσθαι, αυτὴ δὲ πλαιάται ἐν τάση ἐχομενή ἀπορία εἰς ἂν ὅθε τινας χρόνοι δέχονται, ὡς ἐλθόντων ὑπ' ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτή πρέπουσαι οἴκησιν. ἡ δὲ καθαρώς τε καὶ μετρίως τῶν βίων διεξελθοῦσα, καὶ συνεμπόρων καὶ ἥγεμων θεῶν τυχώσα, φύκησεν τὸν αὐτῆς ἐκάστη τῶν τοπῶν προσήκουτα. εἰσιν 5 δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ μαμοστοὶ τῆς γῆς τόπου, καὶ αὐτὴ οὔτε οία οὔτε ὅση δοξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν, ὅς ἐγὼ ὑπὸ τινὸς πέπεισμαι.

Καὶ ὁ Συμίας, Ἡώς ταῦτα, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες; δὲ περὶ γάρ τοι γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἄκικνοι, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἃ σε πείθει: ἥδεως οὐν ἂν ἀκούσαιμι.

'Αλλὰ μέντοι, ὁ Συμίας, οὐχ ἢ Γλαύκουν τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασαι αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, ὁ χαλεπώτερον μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκουν τέχνην, καὶ ἀμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ' ἂν οἶδα τε εἶην, ἀμα δὲ, εἰ καὶ ἰησοῦς, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἔμος, ὁ Συμίας, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν. τὴν μέντοι ἴδεαν τῆς γῆς οὐαν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδὲν με κωλύει οἱ λέγειν.

'Αλλ', ἐφη ὁ Συμίας, καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ.
Πέπευσαί τοίνυν, ἢ ὅσοι, ἐγὼ ὅσ πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ ἑστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερής οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δειν μῆτε ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μῆ πεσεῖν μῆτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμίας τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἰκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἵσχεων τῆς ὀμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐαυτῷ πάντη καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τῆς ἱσορροπίας ἱσορροποῦν γὰρ πράγμα ὀμοίων τῶν ἐν μέσῳ τεθεῖν οὐχ ἔξει μάλλον οὐδ᾽ ἦττον οὐδαμῶς κληθῆται, ὀμοίως ὃ ἐχον ἀκλινεῖς μενεί. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἢ ὅσ, τούτῳ πέπευσμαι.

Καὶ ὁρθῶς γε, ἐφη ὁ Συμμίας.

"Ετι τοίνυν, ἐφη, πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμῶς οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι Πρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος εἰς ημικρό τινι μορίῳ, ὥσπερ περὶ τέλμα μῦρμηκας ἢ βατράχως περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦτας, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖς τοιούτοις τόποις οἰκεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῇ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοιλὰ καὶ παινοῦσαν καὶ τὰς ἱδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς ὅ συνερρυχόταί τοῖς ὑδαῖς καὶ τὴν ὀμίχλην καὶ τοῦ ἁέρας αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς γῆς καθαρῆν εἰς καθαρῷ κεῦται τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐν ὕπερ ἑστὶ τὰ ἄστρα, ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα οὐνομάζειν τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα εἰσθάτων λέγεις; οὐ δὴ ὑποστάθηται τοῦτα εἶναι καὶ συνερρυχέναι εἰς τὰ κοιλα τῆς γῆς. ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας εἰς τοῖς κοιλοῖς αὐτῆς λεληθέναι καὶ οὐέσθαι ἁμως ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὶς εἰς ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οἰοιτὸ τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκείν καὶ διὰ τοῦ θάτος ὀρὼν τῶν ἥλιων καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα τῆν θάλατταν ἱγοῦτο οὐρανοῦ εἶναι, διὰ ἄρα βραδυτήτα τε καὶ ἀστέρειαν μηδεπώπωποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἁκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφιγμένος μηδὲ ἐωρακὼς εἰ, ἐκδοὺς καὶ ἀνακύψας ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τῶν εὐθαδὲ τόποιν, ὃς θαραχώτερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει οὖν τοῦ παρὰ σφῖσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου

ἀκηκοῶς εὖ τοῦ ἐξωρακότος. ταῦταν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς 5 πεποιθέναι οἰκοῦνται γὰρ ἐὰν τινὶ κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς οἷς ἐσθαί ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἄερα οὐρανοῦ καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανὸς ὅτι τὰ ἀστρα χωροῦνται τὸ δὲ εὕροι ταῖς, ὕπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδύτητος οὐχ οἷος τε ἐναι ἡμᾶς e διεξελθεῖν ἐπ' ἐσχατὸν τὸν ἄερα· ἔπει, εἰ τις αὐτοῦ ἐπ' ἀκρα ἔλθοι ὁ πτηνὸς γειτόνειος ἀνάπτυστο, κατιδείν <ἀν> ἀνακύψαι, ὦσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἱχθύες ἀνακύ- πτοτες ὄροι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ἂν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν, 5 καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ικανῇ εἰς ἀνασχέσθαι θεωροῦσα, γνώσαι ἃν ὃτι ἐκεῖνος ἔστιν ὁ ἄληθῶς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἄληθινὸν φῶς καὶ ἢ ὡς ἄληθῶς γῆ. ἤδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἀπασο ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα ἐστὶ καὶ καταβεβρω- μένα, ὦσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλμης, καὶ οὔτε φύτει άξιον λόγου οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὔτε τέλεοι ὃς ἔπος εἰπέων ὄνος ἐστὶ, σήμαργες δὲ καὶ ἄμμος καὶ πηλὸς 5 ἀμήχανος καὶ βρόμβοροι εἰσιν, ὅποι ἂν καὶ [ἡ] γῆ ᾗ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν κάλλη κρίνεσθαι οὐδ' ὀπωστοιν ἄξια. ἐκείνα δὲ αὐτὶ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν πολὺ ἂν ἔτι πλεόν φανεῖν δια- φέρειν· εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ μίθοι λέγεων καλόν, ἄξιον ἀκούσα, ὁ b Ἀρρῆμία, οἷα τυγχάνει τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὀντα. 110 Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἑφθ' ὁ Σμίμιας, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε τούτου τοῦ μίθου ἤδεως ἂν ἀκούσαμεν.

Λέγεται τούτων, ἑφθ', ὁ ἐταιρεί, πρῶτον μὲν εἰναὶ τουατὶ 5 ἡ γῆ αὐτῆ ἱδεῖν, εἰ τις ἄνωθεν θέωτο, ὦσπερ αἱ δωδεκάκυκ- τοι σφαιραῖ, ποικίλῃ, χρώμασιν διευθημένη, ὃν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἰναι χρώματα ὦσπερ δείγματα, οἷς ὥθει οἱ γραφῆς
καταχρώνται. ἐκεὶ δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων ἔδω, καὶ πολὺ ἐτὶ ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων τούτων, τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀλουργὴν ἔδω [καὶ] θαυμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδή, τὴν δὲ ὀσὴ λευκή γύψουν ἢ χιώνας λευκοτέραιν, καὶ ὑπὲρ πλεῶνος καὶ καλλιών όντα ἡμεῖς ἔσφακαμεν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτά τὰ κοιλα αὐτῆς, οὕτως τε καὶ ἀέρος ἐκπλεα ἄντι, χρωμάτως τι εἴδος παρέχεσθαι στίλβοιτα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀλλων χρωμάτων ποικιλία, ὥστε ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς εἴδος συνεχές ποικίλουν παντάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐσθῃ τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φυσικα ὑφέσθαι, δεύνα τε καὶ ἀνθή καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς καὶ αὐτὰ ἡ όρη ὅσπατως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγον τῇ τῆς ἱεροτῆτα καὶ τῇ διαφάνειαι καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλώς. δὲν καὶ δὲ ένθάδε λυθώδει εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδια τε καὶ ιάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα. ἐκεὶ δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ τοιοῦτον ἔδω, καὶ τούτῳ καλλώς. τὸ δ' αὐτίνων τοῦτον ἔδω, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι ὅι λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεξηγησμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ στηθεδύνος καὶ ἁλμης ὑπὸ τῶν ἀει δεύρο συνερφήκτων, καὶ λίθως καὶ γῆς τοῖς ἀλλοίς ὕψοις τε καὶ φυτῶς αἰσχρὰ τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει, τῇ δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοιμήσθαι τοιοῦτοι τε ἁπαστὶ καὶ ἐτὶ χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἄργυρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοίς αὐτὸς τοῖς τοιοῦτοις. ἐκφαίνῃ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ἀντὶ πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πανταχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐτὴν ιδέων ἔδω θέαμα εὐθαμίαν θεατῶν. ζῶο τέρα ἀνθή ἐναλλα τοιαύτης πλαταικα καὶ αὐθροποὺς, τοὺς μὲν ἐν 5 μεσογαίᾳ οἰκουτὰς, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀερὰ ὁσπερ ἡμεῖς

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, τοὺς ὥς ἐν νησίς οὐσίοις περιπρεπών τὸν ἀέρα. πρὸς τῇ ἡπείρῳ οὐσίοις: καὶ εἰς λόγοι, ὅπερ ἤμων τὸ ὑθύρι τε καὶ η ἀδάπταται ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἠμέτεραν χρώμαν, τούτῳ ἐκ τὸν ἀέρα, ὁ ὥς ἤμων ἄγρι, ἐκεῖνος τὸν αἰθέρα. τὰς ὅρος ἀυτοῖς κράσιν ἐχεις τοιοῦτην ὁστε ἐκείνοις ἀρίστους εἶναι καὶ χρῶνον τε ὡς πολὺ πλεοῦν τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὅπως καὶ ἀκούσι καὶ ἀφορμῆσαι καὶ πατὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει ἢπερ ἄημ τε ὡς τοῦτος αφεστάνει καὶ ἀδήμων ἀέρων ἐπὶ καθαρότητα. καὶ ὅπῃ καὶ θεῶν ἁλθῇ τε καὶ ἱππα ἀυτοῖς εἴναι, εἰς ὥς τῷ ὅτι οἰκήτας θεῶν εἴναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αὐστηρῶς τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιοῦτας συναντῶς γένεσθαι ἀυτοῖς πρὸς ἀυτούς: καὶ τῶν ὡς ἡμῶν καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄιστρα ὀρώσθαι ὡς τοῖς γαϊδαρίαις ὄντα, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐνδαμοσκόμαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἴναι.

Καὶ ὅλην μὲν ὅπῃ τὴν γῆν ὡς ὡτὼ πεφικέναι καὶ τα περὶ τὴν γῆν τῶν τόπων ὥς ἐν αὐτῇ εἴναι κατὰ τα ἐγκολοι αὐτῆς: κύκλῳ περὶ ὅλην πολλοὺς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναβαθμίζοντες μάλλον ὡς ἡ ὥς ἡμέως ἀκούσι, τοὺς οἷς βαθυτέρους ὡστε τὸ χάσμα αὐτοὺς ἐλαττων ἐχεις τῷ πορεύμα τῷ ἢμῶς τῶν, ἔστιν ὥς ὅτι καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βαθεῖ του ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ πλατητέρους. τούτους οἷς παντᾶς ὅπω γίνῃ εἰς ἀλλήλους συντετριμοῦναι τε πολλαχί καὶ κατὰ στενοτέρα καὶ εὐρύτερα καὶ οἰκεῖον ἐχεις, ὥς πολὺ μὲν ἱππα μὲν ἐκ ἀλλήλων εἰς ἀλλήλους ὡστερε εἰς κρατήρας, καὶ ἀναγόμεθα: ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ θερμῶν ωὐστον καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ ὧς πορεύον τῶν μεγάλων ποταμῶν, πολλοὺς ὡς υγρόν πηλοῦ καὶ καθαρωτέρου καὶ βορραφωδεστέρου, ὡστερε εὖ Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τῶν μύσκων πηλοῦ ρεύματι καὶ ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁ ρύαξ: ὅπῃ ὅτι καὶ ἐκάστοις τοὺς τόπους

a 7 te om. Stob. b 2 w αὐτοῖς T Stob.: αὐτῆς B b 6 ἀλογη
B Stob.: ἐφ' Ἕτ T et ut vid. Timaeus c 2 ἀράτθαι B T: θεαρέσθαι
πληροφόρθαι, ὡς ἄν ἐκάστοις τούχῃ ἐκάστοτε ἡ περιρροή γιγνο-
μένη. ταύτα δὲ πάντα κατείχαν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡσπερ αὐθάρων
5 των ἐνοῦσιν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐστὶ δὲ ἄρα αὐτὴ ἡ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν
τουάδε των. ἐν τι τῶν χασμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε
112 μέγιστων τυγχάνει ὃ καὶ ὀδιαμπερὲς τετριμένων ὃδ' ὀλίγης τῆς
γῆς, τούτῳ ὁπερ Ὄμηρος ἔπει, λέγων αὐτὸ

τήλε μᾶλ', ἢξι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονὸς ἐστὶ βέρεθρον.

Ὅ καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκείνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρ-
ταρον κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τούτῳ τὸ χάσμα συνρέουσι τε
πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦτον πάλιν ἐκρέοσουσι· γίγνονται
δὲ ἐκαστοὶ τουαίτοι ὃ δ' οἷς ἂν καὶ τῆς γῆς μέωσιν. ἢ δὲ

ὅ ἑστὶν τοῦ ἐκείνου τε ἐντεύθεν καὶ ἐστρεφὲν πάντα τὰ
μεῦματα, ὅτι πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ύγρὸν τοῦτο.
αἰφερεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἄγρ καὶ τὸ
πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖ· συντεύγεται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ

ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἔπ' ἐκείνα τῆς γῆς ὀρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ
tῶς, καὶ ὡσπερ τῶν ἀναπνευστῶν οἷο ἐκπιεῖ τε καὶ ἀναπνεῖ

νέων τὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖ συγκεκυκλώμενον τὸ ύγρὸ τὸ

πνεῦμα ἅπασος τούτων ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ

ὅταν εἰς τὸν ὑποχώρησθ' τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν

τόπον τῶν ὧν κάτῳ καλούμενοι, τοῖς κατ' ἑκεῖνα τὰ ὦματα
ὅταν τῆς γῆς εἰσφεῖ τε καὶ πληροὶ αὐτὰ ὡσπερ οἱ ἐπαν-

τλοῦσι. ὅταν τε αὐτ ἐκείσθη μὲν ἀπολίπῃ, δεύορ δὲ ὀρμήσῃ,

5 τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροὶ αὕθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα μείω διὰ τῶν

ὁχέτων καὶ ὧν τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἐκαστὰ ἄφικτο-

μενα, εἰς οὖς ἐκάστοις ὡδοποιηται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας

καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήμνας ποιεῖ· ἐντεύθεν δὲ πάλιν ὑνώμενα

c κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόταν καὶ

πλείονα, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς τὸν

e 3 ὃς Stob.: ὃς B T
a 5 τε B T Stob.: om. W b 4 αὐτὸ
Heindorf: αὐτῶν B T Stob.: c 1 οὖν B T Stob.: οὖν ὄρμησαν
B: W e 3 διὰ B T: om. Stob. c 4 ἀπολέισθ᾽ W c 6 καὶ
ὁ: om. W e 7 ἐκάστοις T Stob.: ἐκάστους B
Stob.: ὡδοποιεῖται B T: ἐδοποιεῖται W (sed ὸ s. v.) d 2 ἐλάττω B
βραχυτέρους B Stob.: βραδυτέρους T

Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἰδί ἀλλὰ πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδιάπαν ρέματα ἐστιν τυγχάνει δ' ἀρα ὡντα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς 5 τέτταρ' ἅτα ρέματα, ὃν τὸ μὲν μέγαστον καὶ ἐξωτάτω ρέον περὶ κύκλῳ ὁ καλουμένος Ὁμοιοῦς ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ καταντικρὺ καὶ ἐναντίως ρέων Ἀχέρων, ὁς δὲ ἐρήμων τοῖς τόποις μεὶς ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ρέον εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχεροσκίνδα, ὃν ἀι τῶν τετελευτηκῶν ψυχῶν τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦται καὶ τινας εἰμαρμέρους χρόνους μείνατο, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκπεμποῦται εἰς τάς τῶν ὑδάτων γεινέσεις. τρίτος δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ 5 μέσου ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγχύσι τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόποι μεγαν πυρί πολλῷ καυμένου, καὶ λίμνη ποιεῖ μεῖζω τῆς παρ' ἡμῶν θαλάτης, ζουσαν υδατος καὶ πηλῶν: εἴπεθεν ὁ χωρεῖ κύκλῳ θολερός καὶ πηλώδης, περιελιπόμενος δὲ τῇ b γῆ ἀλλοσέ τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ' ἐσχατα τῆς Ἀχεροσκινίδος λίμνης, οὐ συμμεγανύμενος τῷ ύδατι, περιέλιχθεις δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου οὕτως δ' ἐστιν ὅν ἐπομομάζοσιν Πυρηφλεγύωστα, οὐ καὶ οἱ ῥύκακες ἀπο- 5

d 3 ἓ 5 BT: ἓ W d 5 ἓ 5 ἓ B TW εἰσρεῖ om. Stob. e 5 γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις T Stob.: γὰρ πρὸς ἀμφοτέροις B: πρὸς γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις B: τὸς γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων B: γὰρ πρὸς ἀμφότερα in marg. W error ortus e v. l. πρόσαντες e 5 τυγχάνειν W e 6 ἄτα B: om. T Stob.: ὡντα in marg. B: e 7 πηλὶ κύκλῳ T: περικύκλῳ B: τὰ περὶ κύκλῳ Stob. e 8 ἐναντίως T Stob.: ἐναντίως B a 2 οὐ, οἱ Schanz a 5 τούτων B T Eus. Stob.: διὰ τούτων W a 7 μέγα T b 1 T ὑ T γῆ BY B TW Stob.: om. Theodoretus habet Eus, b 5 ἐπομομάζοσι T W Eus. Stob.: οἱ ῥύκακες ἀπο-
σπάσματα ἀναφυσώσων ὅπη ἂν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς. τούτου ὁ ἰδικατηγορεῖ ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπουν πρῶτον δεινόν τε καὶ ἄγριον, ὥς λέγεται, χρώμα δ' ἔχοντα ὅλων οἰνον ὁ κνησός, ὃν ὃς ἐποιομάζοντος Στύγιον, καὶ τὴν λύμην ἢν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμφάλλων, Στύγια. ὁ δ' ἐμπεσόν ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινός δυσάμενος λαβὼν ἐν τῷ ὑδάτι, ὅπου κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελπισμένοις χωρεῖ ἐναντίος τῷ Πυρυμπλεγέντοι καὶ ἀπαντᾷ ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀχέρουσιάδι λύμην ἢ ἐναντίος· καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ τούτου ὅπωρ οοῦσι μεζίνως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτου κύκλῳ περιελπισμένῳ ἐμφάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίος τῷ Πυρυμπλεγέντοι οὐραμά ὁ τούτῳ ἐστὶν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγοντος, κωκυτός.

Τούτων ὁ οὕτως περικότων, ἐπειδὰν ἀφίκωνται οἱ πετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον ὁ ὁ δαίμων ἐκαστῶν κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαςται οὐ τέ καλῶς καὶ ὅσιος βιώσαιτε καὶ οἱ μή, καὶ οὐ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέας, πορευθεὶς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέρουστα, ἀναβάται ὁ δ' ἄυτος ὠχήματα ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφίκνοῦνται εἰς τὴν λύμην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦντες καὶ καθαρώμενοι τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων διδοῖτε ὀίκας ἀπολύονται, εἰ τίς τι ἠδίκηκεν, τῶν τε ἐνεργεσίων τιμῶσι φέρονται κατὰ τὴν ἄξιαν ἐκαστος· οὗ ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνάμιστος ἔχειν ὥσ τα μεγεθή τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυναλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους ἄδικους καὶ παραγόμενος πολλοὺς ἐξεργασμένοι ἢ ἀλλα ὁσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὁντα, τούτων ὁ δ' ἡ προσηκονισα μοῦρα ῥύπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐξβαίνουσιν. ὁ δ' ἂν ἔσταμα μὲν μεγάλα σὲ ἀφίκωσιν ἀμαρτηκέας ἀμαρτημάτα, ὅπου πρὸς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὁπ' ὄργης βίαιοι τι πράξαντες, καὶ μεταμέλου αὐτῶς τῶν ἄλλων βίων βιωσόν, ἢ ἀνδροφόνων τοιούτω τω ἂλλω τρόπῳ γένονται, τούτους ὁ δ' ἐμπεσείν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον.
ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖ γενομένους ἐκβάλλει τὸ κῆμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτῶν, 5 τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν Πυρφλεγ-έθοντα· ἐπειδὰν δὲ φερόμενοι γένονται κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερονισάδα, ἐνταῦθα βοῶσι τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὖσ ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οὖς ὑβρισταν, καλέσαντες δὲ ἱκετεύοντι καὶ δέονται ἐὰν σφᾶς ἐκβιῆναι εἰς τήν λίμνην καὶ ἐξαισθαί, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πείσωσι, ἐκβαίνουσι τε καὶ λήγοντι τῶν κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, φέρονται αὕτως εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον καὶ ἐκείθεν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ποταμοὺς, καὶ ταῦτα πᾶσχοιτε οὐ πρότερον παῦντες πρὶν ἄν πείσωσι οὖς ἡδίκησαν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ ὄικη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοὺς ἑτάχθη. οὐ δὲ ὅτι ἂν ὄδωσι διαφεβοῦντος πρὸς τὸ ὄσιον βιωναι, οὔτοι εἰσιν οἱ τῶν δὲ μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθεροῦμενοι τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττό-μενοι ὀσπερ δεσμοτηρίων, ἀνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν 

αὐφυκνύομενοι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκιζόμενοι. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ἰκαγώς καθηράμενοι ὕπει τοῖς σωμάτων ζωσὶ τὸ πάραπαν εἰς τὸν ἐπείτην χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἐτι τούτων καλλίων ἀφικνύονται, αἰς οὔτε μάρσων ὁμαλῶσι αὕτε ὁ χρόνος 5 ικαγώς εἰς τὸ παρόντει. ἀλλα τούτων ὁ ἐνεκα χρή ὧν διεληλυθαμεν, ὁ Σιμμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν ὅστε ἀρετὴς καὶ φρονήσεως εἰς τῷ βίῳ μετασχέιν καλῶν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐπὶς μεγάλη.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δισχευρύσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ ἰδεληλύθα, οὐ πρέπει γαῖαν ἐχοντι ἀναρί· ὅτι μετέντο ἡ ταῦτ ἐστίν· ἡ τοιαύτ' ἅττα περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκήσεως, ἐπείπερ αὐθανατὸν γε ἡ ψυχή φαινεται οὕτα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄζων κινδυνεύσει οὐμενὸς οὕτως 5 ἔχεω· καλῶς γὰρ ὁ κύριος—καὶ χρή τὰ τοιαύτα ὀσπερ ἐπίμοοε ἔατι το, ὅτι ἡ ἐγωγε καὶ πάλαι ιμηκύνω τὸν μέθον.

καί τα ταύτα παρόντα καὶ σφόδρα, ουδὲν πλέον πούστετε.

Ταύτα μὲν τούτων προθυμησόμεθα, ἐφή, οὕτω ποιεῖν
θάπτομεν ὅσε σε τήν τρόπον;

"Οποῖος ἄρα, ἐφη, βούλησθε, ἐάνπερ γε λάβῃτε μὲ καὶ
5 μὴ ἐκφύγων ύμᾶς. Γελάσας δὲ ἀμα ἵστερη καὶ πρὸς ἴσας
ἀποθέλησα ἐπειδ' ὦ πείθω, ὦ ἀνδρέας, Κρίτωγα, ὦς

αλλὰ τούτων ὥς ἐνεκα θαρρεῖν χρῆ περὶ τῇ ἐαυτοῦ ψυχῇ

αὐτῶν ὡς εἰν τῷ βἶω τάς μὲν ἀλλὰς ἡδονᾶς τᾶς περὶ τὸ
σῶμα καὶ τῶν κόσμων εἰσαχτε ποίεως, ὡς ἀλλοτρίως τε ὡς
πλέον διάπερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζοντα, τᾶς δὲ περὶ τὸ μαρτυράνει ἐσπουδάζεται τε καὶ κοσμήσεις τῇ ἐν

5 οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνῃ τε καὶ
δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, οὕτω
περιμένει τῷ εἰς ἀλλότριον πορείαν [ὡς πορευσόμενος οὖν ἢ
εἰμαρμένη καλῇ], ἤμειν μὲν οὖν, ἐφή, ὦ Σιμμιά τε καὶ
Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰς ἀνθίν ἐν τοῖς χρόνιοι ἐκατόον πορεύ-

5 σετε. ἐμὲ δὲ τῶν ἡμῶν καλεῖ, φαίνει ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ή
εἰμαρμένη, καὶ σχεδοῦ τί μοι ὄρα τραπέζησαι πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν
δοκεὶ γὰρ ὡς δέλτων εἴναι λουσάμενος πιὸς τὸ φάρμακον
καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶ παρέχειν τεκρόν λούσει.

b Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπὼν οὗτοι ὁ Κρίτων, ἔδει, ἐφη, ὁ
Σωκρατευ. τι δὲ τούτως ἢ ἤμοι ἐπιστελλεὶς ἢ περὶ τῶν
παιδῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τοῦ, ὅτι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἤμεῖς ἐν
χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῦμεν;

5 "Ἀπερ ἄει λέγω, ἐφη, ὁ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν καυτότερον ὅτι
ήμων αὐτῶν ἐπιμελουμένοι ἴμεῖς καὶ ἤμοι καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς
καὶ ἴμων αὐτῶν ἐν χάριτι πούστετε ἀττ' ἂν πούστε, καὶ μὴ
τῶν ὀμολογήστε. ἀκνα ὡς ὑμῶν [μὲν] αὐτῶν ἀμελήτε καὶ
μὴ ἐκλέπτε ὁππερ καὶ ίχνη κατὰ τὰ τῶν τε εἰρημένα
καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἐς, οὐδὲ ἂν πολλὰ ὀμολο-
c γίνετε ἐν τῷ παρώντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον πούστετε.

Ταῦτα μὲν τούτων προθυμησόμεθα, ἐφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν
θάπτομεν ὅσε σε τήν τρόπον;

"Οποῖος ἄρα, ἐφή, βούλησθε, ἐάνπερ γε λάβῃτε μὲ καὶ
5 μὴ ἐκφύγων ύμᾶς. Γελάσας δὲ ἀμα ἵστερη καὶ πρὸς ἴσας
ἀποθέλησα ἐπειδ' ὦ πείθω, ὦ ἀνδρέας, Κρίτωγα, ὦς
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

115c

ἐγώ εἰμι οὕτος Σωκράτης, ὁ τυπὴ διαλεγόμενος καὶ διατάττων ἔκαστον τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ' οὕτει μὲ ἐκείνων εἶναι ὃν ὄψεται ὦλών ὑπεροῦ πειραματικόν, καὶ ἐρωτά ὅθ' πῶς μὲ θάπτη. ὅτι δὲ ἐγώ πάλαι πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὅσι, ἐπειδῶν πίω τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ἡμῖν παραμένω, ἀλλ' οἰχύσσομαι ἀπίων εἰς μακάρων ὃς τιμᾶς εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτα μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ἐγω ἐλέγειν, παραμυθοῦμεν ἀμα μὲν 5 ἡμᾶς, ἀμα' ἐμαυτόν. ἐγγυνήσασθε οὖν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἐφ' ὅτι ἐναντίων ἐγγύην ἢ ἢν οὕτος πρὸς τοὺς δυκαστὰς ἡγυνατό. οὕτως μὲν γὰρ ἢ μή παραμείνῃς ἢμεῖς δὲ ἢ μή μή παραμείνῃς ἐγγυνήσασθε ἐπειδῶν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ οἰχύ- σσεθαι ἀπίων, ὡς Κρίτων ῥᾷξο φέρη, καὶ μὴ ὅρων μον τὸ σώμα ἢ καόμενον ἢ κατορινττόμενον ἀγανακτῇ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ὃς δεινὰ πάσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγη ἐν τῇ ταφῇ ὅς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτη ἢ ἐκφέρεις ἢ καταρύπτει. εὐ γὰρ ὑσθι, ἢ ὅ, ὃ ἄριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο 5 πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακὸν τὶ ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ θαρρεῖς τε χρή καὶ φάγαι τοῦμον σώμα θάπτεις, καὶ θάπτεις οὕτως ὅπως ἢν σου φιλὸν ἢ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγῆ νύμμον εἶναι.

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Ταῦτ' εὐπὸν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνώτατο εἰς οὐκήμα τι ὡς λουσώμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εὕπετο αὐτῷ, ἠμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευεν περιμενεῖν. περιμένεμοι οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περί τῶν εὑρημένων καὶ ἀγασκοπούντες, τοτε δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς συμφοράς 5 διεξόντες ὡς ἡμῖν γεγονόντο ἢ, ἀπεχθώ ἡγούμενου ὡς περὶ πατρὸς στερηθέντες διάρρεων ὁρφανοῦ τοῦ ἐπειτα ῥῖον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλούσατο καὶ ἡρέχθη παρ' αὐτὸν τὰ παιδία—ὅνο γὰρ αὐτῷ ἔνας συμφραλλός—καὶ αἰ ὅθεν ἀκριβίστει ἀφίκοντο ἐκεῖναι, ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεκτοῦν τοὶ καὶ ἐπιστελάς ἄπα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παιδία

c 7 οὕτος B: οὕτος ὁ Τ W
d 2 θάπτη B: θάπτει T W: θάψει fecit W (φ. s. v.)
d 8 ἡγ γύνατο B T ct γρ. W: ἡγ γύνατο B W
d 9 οὖν post ἐγγυνήσασθε add. t e 1 ῥᾶων T: ῥάδιων B e 3 δεινὰ πάσχοντος B T: δεινὰ ἄπα σχόντος T
e 7 θάπτει T καὶ om. pr. T
f 3 εκεῖναι εναντίον Τ W: ἐναντίον ἐκεῖναι B (ἐκεῖναις fecit B4)
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

5 ἀπείναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἢν ἦδη ἐγγύς ἦλιον ὡσμῶν χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἐνδο. ἐλθὼν δὲ ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος καὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἄττα μετὰ ταῦτα διελεῖχθη, καὶ ἦκεν ὃ τῶν ἑνδεκά ὑπηρέτης καὶ στάς

c παρ’ αὐτῷ, ὦ Σῶκρατε, ἐφη, ὡς καταγγώσομαι γε σοῦ ὁπερ ἄλλων καταγγεύσκω, ὅτι μου χαλεπαίνουσι καὶ καταρμώται ἐπειδὰν αὐτοῖς παραγγείλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχώτων. σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως

5 ἐγώσκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναίοτατον καὶ πρωτάτον καὶ ἀριστόν ἄνδρα ἄντα τῶν πάποτε δείφυ αφικομένωι, καὶ ὅτι καὶ ἵνα ευ ὑδῇ ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γυγώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἄλλα ἐκείνους. ἵνα οὖν, οὕτα γὰρ ἢ ἠλθὼν
d ἄγγελλων, χαίρε τε καὶ πειρὸ νὸς ὅτα τέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαία.

Καὶ ἀμα ὀπτρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῆει.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβάλεψας πρὸς αὐτόν, Καὶ σὺ, ἐφη, χαίρε, καὶ ἴμείς ταῦτα ποιήσωμεν. Καὶ ἀμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς,

5 ὦς ἀστείως, ἐφη, ὁ ἀνθρώπος καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τοῦ χρόνον προσήκει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνώστε καὶ ἢν ἀνθρώπων ἁρστος, καὶ ἵνα ὡς γενναίως με ἀποδεικνύει. ἄλλη ἀγε ὃῃ, ὁ Κρίτων, πειθόμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν τετριπτῶν εἰ δὲ μῆ, τρυπάτω ὁ ἀνθρώπος.

e Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, Ἀλλὰ οἴμαι, ἐφη, ἐγώγη, ὦ Σῶκρατε, ἐτὶ ἡλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁρέσι καὶ οὕῳ δευκέναι. καὶ ἀμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλων πάντων ὡς ἕπνυντας, ἐπειδὰν παραγγελθῇ αὐτοῖς, δειπνησίας τε καὶ πίνοντας εὐ μάλα, καὶ συγγενο-

5 μένους γ’ ἐνίους ὃν ἂν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἄλλα μηδὲν ἐπείγουν ἐτὶ γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἐλκότως γε, ἐφη, ὅ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοι τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὕς σὺ λέγεις—οἴμοι τὰς κερδαίνεις ταῦτα ποιήσαιτε—καὶ ἐγώ γαρ ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω· οὐδὲν γὰρ

9 ἂν Τ ὁμ. Β
οἵμαι κερδανεῖν ὁλίγον ὑπερον πιὸν ἄλλο γε ἡ γέλωτα ὧν ὄφλησεν παρ᾽ ἐμαυτῷ, γλυχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὖ- 
δεῖν ἐτε ἐνύτος. ἀλλ᾽ ἵππη, ἐφη, πείθων καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

Καὶ ὁ Κρῖτων ἀκουότας ἐνευσε τῷ παΐδι πλησίων ἐστῶτι.
καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συχνὸν χρόνον διατρίβαζε ἦκεν ἁγῶν 5 
tῶν μέλλοντα δῶσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροιτα τετραμ-
μένον. ἵδων δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἀνθρώπον, ἔλεγ, ἐφη, ὁ 
βέλτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστῆμων, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν;

Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἐφη, ἡ πιὸντα περιεμέναι, ἔως ἂν σου βάρος 
ev tois skέleste géntaTai, épetta katakeústhain kai ouτwos autò 
poișei. Kαi āma òrēxe tìn kúlika tòv Σωκράτει.

Kai ὁς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ᾗλεως, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν 
πρέσας οὐδὲ διαιφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσ-
ώπου, ἀλλ᾽ ὀσπερ εἰώθει ταυρηθὲν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν 5 
ἀνθρώπον, Τί λέγεις, ἐφη, περὶ τούτω τοῦ πόματος πρὸς τὸ 
ἀποστείαται τιν; ἐξεστιν ἢ οὐ;

Τοσοῦτοι, ἐφη, ὁ Σωκράτες, τρίβουμεν ὅσον οἰόμεθα 
μέτριων εἶναι πιεῖν.

Μαρτάνω, ἢ ὅ ὦς ἀλλ᾽ εὐχεσθαί γε ποὺ τοῖς θεοῖς ἐξεστὶ 10 
tε καὶ χρή, τῷ μετοίκησιν τῷ ἐνθένδε ἐκείστε εὐτυχῆ γενέ-
σθαι. ἢ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχοραίοι τε καὶ γένοιτο ταῦτῃ. Καὶ ἄρ᾽ 
eipw ταῦτα ἐπισυχόμενοι καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως 
ἐξεσέλει. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπεικισκός οἱ οὔ 
te ἱσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύσει, ὡς δὲ εἰδομεν πίνακα 
tε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτα, ἀλλ᾽ ἔμοι γε βία καὶ αὐτών ἀστακτέ 
ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὡστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλασαν ἐμαυτῶν—οὐ 
γὰρ δὴ ἐκείσων γε, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐμαυτῷ τῆς χήρας, οὔου ἀνδρὸς 
ἐταίρον ἐστερμεύδεις εἴην. ὁ δὲ Κρῖτων ἐτὶ πρότερος ἐμοῦ, 

ὁ δὲ καὶ τότε ἀναβραχησάμενος κλάων καὶ 

α 1 κερδανεῖν Β': κερδανεῖν Β Π 3 πιὸν Β' t: ποίων Β T: ἀπιῶν W 
a 3 πείθου Τ W: πείθου B a 6 δῶσειν Β' TW: διδόναι B a 8 τί 
BT: εἰπε τί W b 4 post διαφθείρας add. οὔτε τοῦ σῶματος W 
c 3 ὁμα λέγων W c 7 γε βία καὶ αὐτῶ B: αὐτοῦ βία καὶ T: τε κα 
αυτῶ βία W ástakτ (e) B T: ἀσταλακτ W: γρ. καὶ ἀβαστακτ) 
καὶ βία W d 1 πρότερον pr. W ἐμοῦ B: μοῦ T
κατεκλασε τῶν παρόντων πλήν γε αυτοῦ Σωκράτους.

'Εκείνος δέ, Οία, ἐφη, ποιεῖτε, ὃ θαυμάσιον. ἔγω μέντοι οὖν ἡκιστα τούτου ἔνεκα τᾶς γυναίκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἦν μὴ τοιαύτα πλημμελοῦνε· καὶ γὰρ ἀκῆκοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρὴ τελευτᾶν. ἀλλ’ ἤσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρπερεῖτε.

Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσατες ἁσχύνθημεν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύεως. ὦ δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἐφη τὰ σκέλη, κατεκλύθη ὑπτίοιο—οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἀγαθός—καὶ ἀμα ἐφαπτόμενοι αυτοῦ οὕτως ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον, διαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κατείπεται σφόδρα πιέσας αυτοῦ τῶν πόδα ἤρετο εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο, ὁ δ’ οὐκ ἐφη. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐθέν τὰς κινήμας· καὶ ἐπαινών οὕτως ἦμιν ἐπεδείκνυτο ὅτι ψύχωτό τε καὶ πῆγιντο· καὶ αὐτῶς ἦπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἐπειδὴν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχύσεται.

'Ἡδ’ οὖν σχεδὸν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἤτροιον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενοι—ἐνεκεκάλεσε πάλι—εἶπεν· ὁ δ’ ἔρχεται ἐφθέγξατο—Ω Κρίτων, ἐφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπείῳ ὁφείλομεν ἀλεξτρυώνα· ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε.

Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἐφή, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλ’ ὥρα εἰ τι ἄλλο λέγεισιν.

Ταῦτα ἐρωμεῖν αὐτοῦ οὐδέν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ’ ὅλος ὁ χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἀθρώπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτῶν, καὶ ὅτι τὰ ὤματα ἐστησεν· ὧν ὅ-ever ὁ Κρίτων συνελάβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς.

'Ἡδ’ ἡ τελευτή, ὡς Ἐχέκρατεν, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἦμιν ἐγένετο, ἀνήδρος, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὅν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

d 5 κατεκλασε T: κατεκλασε B  e 3 τε B T: γε W  eπ-έχομεν pr. T  e 5 κατεκλύθη B T W  a 2 οὕτως ἦμιν B : ἦμιν οὕτως ἦμιν T: οὕτως ἦμιν αὐτοῖς B W  πήγιντο B T W  a 8 διαμελήσητε W  a 9 ταῦτα ἔσται ἐφη T  a 14 καὶ B: τε καὶ T
NOTES

Introductory dialogue in dramatic form, 57a 1—59c 7.

The scene is the Pythagorean συνέδριον at Phlius. The only Pythagorean who speaks is Echecrates, but the presence of the others is implied (cp. especially 58d 7 and 102a 8). The time is not long after the death of Socrates; for the Pythagoreans have not yet heard any details. As Geddes first pointed out, it would be natural for Phaedo to visit the Pythagoreans of Phlius on his way home from Athens to Elis. It is not far off the road.

For the Pythagoreans of Phlius, cp. Diog. Laert. viii. 46 τελευταίοι γὰρ ἐγένοντο τῶν Πυθαγορείων, οὐς καὶ Ἀριστόδενος εἶδε, Ξενόφιλός τε ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς ἀπὸ Ὀρθής καὶ Φάντων ὁ Φλιάσιος καὶ Ἐχεκράτης καὶ Διοκλῆς καὶ Πολυμνιστός, Φλιάσιοι καὶ αὐτοί. ήσαν δ’ ἀκρωταὶ Φιλολάον καὶ Εὔριτον τῶν Ταραττίων (cp. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 320).

Phlius lay in the upper valley of the Asopus (893 ft. above sea-level), where Argolis, Arcadia, and the territory of Sicyon meet. It was surrounded by mountains 4,000 to 5,000 feet high, ‘under whose immemorial shadow’ (διακίνεις Φλεισώντος ἐν ὄνυγγοις ὄρεσιν, Pind. Nem. vi. 45) ‘the high discourse is supposed to be held’ (Geddes). The territory of Phlius, which was only a few miles square, consisted of a triangular valley with its apex to the north. The town was on the eastern side of the valley and built in the form of an amphitheatre. A few ruins are still left. The people were Dorians and faithful allies of Sparta.

Tradition connected Pythagoras himself with the place (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 94, n. 1), and he is said to have assumed the name of φιλόσοφος for the first time there or in the neighbouring Sicyon (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 321, n. 2).

Phaedo of Elis is said (Diog. Laert. ii. 105) to have been a prisoner of war brought as a slave to Athens, where he attracted the notice of Socrates, who secured his liberation. At the time of
this dialogue he is quite a youth and still wears his hair long (89 b 5). At a later date he founded the school of Elis. We know nothing of his teaching; but, as the school of Eretria was an offshoot from that of Elis, and as both are commonly mentioned along with that of Megara, it is probable that he busied himself chiefly with the difficulties which beset early Logic. For us, as Wilamowitz says, he chiefly represents the conquest of the most unlikely parts of the Peloponnese by Athenian culture, which is the distinguishing feature of the fourth century B.C.

57 a 1 Αὐτὸς κτλ. We seem to be breaking in on a conversation already begun; for ἐκονεσας has no expressed object. Perhaps Phaedo has already spoken of something Socrates said or did on the day of his death.

παρεγίνου: the verbs παρείναι and παραγίνεσθαι are specially used of being at hand to support any one in times of trouble or rejoicing. So in Lat. adesse aliqui. We should say, 'Were you with Socrates?' Cp. also παρακαλέων, adnvoare.

a 2 τὸ φάρμακον, sc. τὸ κόνειον. It is nowhere expressly stated in the Phaedo that it was hemlock; but that was the drug commonly employed, and the symptoms described at the end of the dialogue (117 e sqq.) correspond to those elsewhere ascribed to it. It has been doubted whether hemlock-juice would really produce these symptoms, but see Appendix I.

a 5 Τί... ἐστιν ἄττα: this is the regular construction (cp. 58 c 6), though in 102 a 9 we have τίνα... ἢν... τὰ... λεχθέντα.

ὁ ἀνήρ is an emphatic αὐτὸς or ἐκεῖνος. Cp. 85 c 8; 61 c 3, and note on 58 e 3 ἀνήρ.

a 7 [τῶν πολιτῶν] Φιλιασίων: Riddell (Dig. § 36) defends this by making Φιλιασίων depend on οὐδεὶς τῶν πολιτῶν, 'for neither of the Phliasians does any citizen, which seems unnatural. Most editors bracket Φιλιασίων, but I think v. Bamberg is right in suspecting rather τῶν πολιτῶν. In Stephanus of Byzantium and elsewhere we regularly find notices like ὁδος οἱ πολιται, ὁδοι καὶ τὸ ἐθνικὸν ὁμοῖος, and we can understand how, in the absence of capital letters, such an explanation might seem desirable. Further, the form Φιλιασίων is exceptional (cp. however Αναγωγάσιων), and Cicero tells us (ad Att. vi. 2) that he himself wrote Philiantii by mistake. A similar case
is possibly *Menon* 70 b 2 οὐ τῶν σοῦ ἐταίρον [πολίται] Δαμοσίου. The absence of the article with the ἔθνικῶν is normal, and the form Φλειάσιοι (Φλειάσιοι MSS.) is guaranteed by inscriptions and coins.

οὐδεὶς πάνυ τι, 'no one to speak of.' The phrase does not necessarily mean 'no one at all', though it tends to acquire that sense. Cp. οὐ πάνυ (Riddell, Dig. § 139) and the English 'not very'. It is unnecessary to discuss, as most editors do, why communications between Athens and Phlius were interrupted. There is no statement that they were, and it must often have happened that no Phliasian had business in Athens and no Athenian at Phlius. There was, however, at least one such (58 a 3).

ἐπιχωρίαζει . . . Ἀθήνας: there seems to be no other instance of ἐπιχωρίαζειν in this sense. It usually means 'to be native', and is used of local dialects, customs, &c. Here apparently it is equivalent to ἐπιθημεύειν and takes the construction of that verb. Cp. *Paus.* 126 b 3 ἐπεδήμησον δεύρο ἐκ Κλαξομενῶν.

ὁ σαφής τι: in such expressions σαφής means 'sure', 'trustworthy' (not 'clear'). So σαφής φίλος, σαφής μάντις.

ciçex, sc. ὁ ἀγγελιας. He has not been mentioned, but he has been implied.

tὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης: the normal construction would be τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης (cp. 58 c 6 τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν δίκαιων), but the prepositional phrase is influenced by ἐπιθεμεύειν. Heindorf compares Xen. *Cyne* v. 3. 26 ἐπὶ πίθουτο τὰ περὶ τοῦ φρουρίου, *Anab.* ii. 5. 37 ὅπως μάθαι τὰ περὶ Προξένου.


Τύχη has always the implication of *coincidence*, which is here made explicit by the cognate verb ἔτυχεν. In most of its uses, the meaning of τυχάνειν is best brought out in English by using the adverb 'just'.

ἔτυχεν . . . ἐστεμμένη, 'had just been crowned.' The Ionic στέφει is only used in a ritual sense in Attic prose. So, with mock solemnity, in *Rep.* 398 a 7 ἐρῶ στέϕανες. The common word is στεφανοῖν.

πέμπουσιν. In the Bodleian (Clarke) MS. (B) Bishop Arethas, for whom the MS. was written, has added κατὰ ἐτός in his own hand (B²). These words are also found in the Vienna MS. (W). The corre
tions of B² were taken throughout from a MS. very closely resembling W. The additional words may well be an ancient variant.

a 10  **τὸ πλοῖον:** i.e. the **θεωρίς.** For the Delian **θεωρία,** cp. Aristotle, Λθ., πολ. 56 καθίστησι δὲ καὶ (ὁ ἄρχων) εἰς Δήλου χορηγοὺς καὶ ἄρχειν-ρουν τῷ τριακοντορίῳ τῷ τῶν ἱδέων ἁγουτὶ. The seven youths and seven maids were technically called the ἱδεοι (masc. and comm. of παρθένοι). The story is told in Bacchylides xvi (xvii), a dithyramb entitled 'Ἡδεοι.' Cp. also Plut. Ἄθες. 23 τὸ δὲ πλοῖον ἐν ὧν μετὰ τῶν ἱδέων ἐπέλευσε καὶ πάλιν ἑσάῳ, τὴν τριακόνταρα, ἄχρι τοῦ Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέου χρόνου διεφύλαττον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. Of course none of the original timbers were left, and Plutarch tells us the philosophers took it as their stock example in discussing the question of identity. Was it the same ship or not?

a 11  **τοὺς “δῖς ἐπτὰ” ἐκεῖνους:** this was also a traditional name. Cp. Bacchyl. xvi. (xvii.) 1 Κυανότροφρα μὲν ναῖς μενέκτησον | Θησέα δὶς ἐπτὰ | τ’ ἐγλασῶς ἁγουτὶ | κούρους Παῖδων | Κρητικὸν τάμη τελαγός. In the **Laws (706 b 7)** Plato says it would have been better for the Athenians to lose πλεονάκες ἐπτὰ... πάνδος than to become ναυτικοί.

b 2  **θεωρίαν,** 'pilgrimage,' 'mission.' A **θεωρός** is simply a 'spectator' (θεατόρος, Dor. θεαρός), but the word was specialized in the meaning of an envoy sent by the State to the Great Games, to Delphi or to Deios. The **θεωρίαι** were λητουργίαι (cp. Dict. Ant., s. v. Θεωρία).

b 3  **ἀπάξειν:** the ἄπο- has the same force as in ἀποδίδοναι and ἀποφέρειν, that of rendering what is due. Cp. the technical ἀπάγειν τὸν φόρον, φόρον ἀπαγωγή, and Ditt. Syll. p. 43 τὴν ἀπαρχὴν ἀπήγαγον.


b 7  **δεύορο,** 'to Athens.' It is true that Phaedo is speaking at Phlius, but he is quoting the Athenian νόμος.

b 8  **ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται,** 'takes a long time.' This meaning of ἐν, which is not clearly explained in most grammars, is well brought out by an anecdote Plutarch tells of Zeuxis (Περὶ πολυφιλίας 94 f): ὁ Ζεύς οἰτιωμένου αὐτὸν τινος ὤτι ὑγραφεῖ βραδέως, Ὄμολογό, εἴπεν, ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γράφειν, καὶ γὰρ εἶς πολὺν.
NOTES

δὲν τὺχωσιν . . . ἀπολαβόντες, 'at times when the winds detain them' (synchronous aor. pcp.). The regular term for 'cut off', 'intercept', is ἀπολαμβάνειν, especially of ships 'detained' by contrary winds. Cp. Hdt. ii. 115 ὑπ' ἄνεμον ἤδη ἀπολαμβάνέτες, Thuc. vi. 22 ἦν ποὺ ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας ἀπολαμβανόμεθα, Dem. Chers. 35 νόσῳ καὶ χειμώνι καὶ πολέμοις ἀποληφθέντων, Plato, Menex. 243 c 2 ἀπειλημμένων ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ τοῖς νεῶν.

αὐτοῖς: the Greek thinks of the crew rather than the ship. In Thucydides and elsewhere a plural pronoun often stands for πόλις, ταῖς, and the like.

'ἐτυχεν . . . γεγονός, 'had just been done.' Cp. a 6 n.

τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον: cp. a 1 n.

τὶ ἦν: cp. 57 a 5 n. W has τίνα here also, and B² corrects accordingly.

οἱ παραγενόμενοι: cp. 57 a 1 n. So παρείναι just below.

οὐκ εἰσών, 'would they not allow?' 'Did they not allow?' is οὐκ εἶσαν. The difference between a negativised imperfect and a negativised aorist may generally be brought out in some such way as this.

οἱ ἄρχοντες. οἱ ἐπέκει, as we shall see.

καὶ πολλοὶ γε, 'quite a number in fact.' There is something to be said, however, for the division indicated in some MSS., ΦΑΙ. Οὐδὲν. E.X. 'Αλλὰ παρῆσαν τινες; ΦΑΙ. Καὶ πολλοὶ γε. Cp. Εὐθυγράφο, 2 b ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΕΥΘ. 'Αλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος; ΣΩ. Πάντα γε.

'εἰ μή . . . τυχάχανει οὕσα, 'unless you are engaged just now.'

τὸ μεμνήθαι Σωκράτους: cp. Xen. Mem. iv. 1. 1 ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖνον μεμνήθαι μὴ παρώτοις οὐ μικρὶ ὁφθέλει (a characteristic Xenophonian touch) τοῖς εἰσθότοις τε αὐτῷ αὐτεῖναι καὶ ἀποδεχαμένοντες ἐκεῖνον.

τοιούτους ἑτέρους, 'just such others' (pred.), cp. 80 d 5, 'Well, you will find your hearers of the same mind.' The enthusiasm of the Pythagoreans for Socrates can hardly be an invention of Plato's.

ὡς . . . ἀκριβέστατα, 'as minutely as you can.'

παραγενόμενος (synchronous aor. pcp.), cp. 57 a 1 n. and παρῶντα just below.

'οὔτε: the second οὔτε does not occur till 59 a 3 after this sentence has been resumed by διὰ δὴ ταῦτα κτλ.

με . . . εἰσήγη: we can say δέος, ἔλεος, ἐλπὶς εἰσέρχεται με, as here, or εἰσέρχεται μοι, as at 59 a 1.

'ἄνηρ: cp. 57 a 5 n. The MSS. have nowhere preserved this form.
but write either ἀνήρ or ὁ ἀνήρ, though we see from examples in the oblique cases (e.g. 58 c 8; 61 c 3) that the article is required. The existence of the crisis is proved by the metre in Aristophanes.

καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ‘both in his bearing and his words’ (Church). Here εὐδαίμων ἐφαίνετο takes the construction of εὐδαιμονίζειν, for which see Crilo 43 b 6 quoted in the next note. (The reading τῶν λόγων (TW) is better attested than τοῦ λόγου, which is a mere slip in B corrected by Arethas.)

ὡς ἐδεώς ... ἐτελεύτα, ‘so fearlessly and nobly did he pass away.’ Such clauses are best regarded as dependent exclamations. Cp. Crilo 43 b 6 πολλάκις ... σὺ ... ἑυδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, ... ὡς βασίλει τεῖν (sc. τὴν παρεστῶσαν συμφοριν) φέρεις. Cp. below 89 a 2; 117 c 9.

ἐπέτε μοι ... παρίστασθαι, ‘so that I was made to feel’, ‘so that I realized’. In the act, παρεσταναι τί τινι is ‘to impress a thing on some one’s mind’. Cp. Dem. Cor. 1 τούτο παρεστίσαι τοὺς θεοὺς υμῖν, ‘that the gods may put it into your hearts,’ Mid. 72 το δεινῶν παρεστίσαι τοῖς ἀκούσαν, ‘to make the audience realize the outrage.’ In the mid. we can say δόξα μοι παρίστασαι, ‘the belief impresses itself upon me,’ ‘the thought comes home to me’ (cp. 66 b 1), or the verb may be used impersonally as here and Ale.² 143 c 8 εἴ σοι αὐτίκα μᾶλα παρεσταίη, ‘if it should come into your head.’

ἀνεν θέλας μοίρας, lit. ‘without a divine dispensation’. The meaning is that ‘Providence’ would watch over him on his way. The phrase θέλα μοίρα is common in Plato and Xenophon as the religious equivalent of τύχη. Hdt. iii. 139 says θείη τύχη. Cp. Xen. Apol. 32 ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ θεοφιλοὺς μοίρας τετυχηκέναι (Σωκράτης).

59 a 2 παρόντι πένθει, ‘one who takes part in a scene of mourning.’ The meaning of παρείναι was so fixed in this connexion (57 a 1 π.) that no Greek would be tempted to take it as neuter in agreement with πένθει. It is dependent on εἰσιέναι to be supplied from εἰσῆλθε, and governs πένθει.

3 οὐτε αὖ: the first οὐτε is at 58 c 2.

ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἐντων, ‘occupied with philosophy.’ Heindorf compares Xen. Cypr. iii. 1. ὁ μὲν δὴ Κῆρος ἐν τούτοις ἤν, iv. 3. 23 οἱ μὲν δὴ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις ἤσσαν. See below 84 a 8 ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ (τῷ λόγῳ ἀμωμοῦ) οὐσα.

a 4 τοιοῦτοι τίνες, i.e. philosophical.
4 ἄτεχνως, 'just.' The phrase is equivalent to ἄτεχνως ἄποτὸν τι ἑπαθον, for which cp. *Symip.* 198 c 2 ὡστε ἄτεχνως τὸ του Ἄριστου ἐπεσόνθη, Arist. *Clouds* 408 ντ Ἀστρογγωλία ὡστε ἄτεχνως ἑπαθον τούτῳ τοῖς Διανικαίσων. In this connexion the adverb means that the description of the πᾶδος is to be taken 'literally', as we say.

8 γελώντες... διακριόντες: the participies explain ὄτω, and are not dependent on διεκείμεθα.

ἐνιότε δέ: a variation of the usual τοτὲ δέ. Cp. *Theas*. 150 a 9 ἐνιότε μὲν... ἐστι δ' ὅτε..., *Soph*. 242 δ᾿ ἐνιότε... τοτὲ δέ... Plato avoids formal symmetry with μὲν and δέ.


'Απολλόδωρος is mentioned as a disciple in *Apol*. 34 a 2, and Plato has chosen him as the narrator of the *Symposium*. In that dialogue, the friend to whom he narrates it says (173 d 4) Ἀκε ἰδίωμασ εἰ, ὁ 'Απολλόδωρος ἂν γὰρ συντόν τε κακηγορείς καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις καὶ δοκεῖς μοι ἄτεχνως πάντας ἀθλίους ἥρεισθαι πλὴν Σωκράτους, ἀπὸ σαντοῦ ἄρξιμανος. Xenophon mentions him along with Antisthenes (*Mem*. iii. 11. 17) Ἀπολλόδωρον τε τόνδε καὶ Ἀντισθένην οὐδέποτε μοι ἀπολέιπεισθαι, so he seems to have belonged to the Cynic section of the Socratic circle, which agrees very well with the tendency to κακηγορία and with other traits mentioned in the *Symposium*. In the Xenophontean *Apolology* 28 we are told that he was ἐπιθυμητὴς μὲν ἐνθερμὸς αὐτοῦ (Σωκράτου), ἀλλὰς δ᾿ εὐθῆς (παίσ, 'silly'). In most editions of the *Symposium* we read that he had the nickname (ἐπωνυμία) of μανικός (173 d 8), but μαλακός has better MS. authority and suits the context better. His friend says he does not know how Apollodorus got the name of 'soft'; for he is always savage with himself and every one but Socrates. Certainly his conduct here and at 117 d 3 is μαλακία rather than μανία.

6 τῶν ἐπιχωρίων, 'of native Athenians.' Cp. *Prot*. 315 b 2 ἣμαν δὲ τινες καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χο,φ (as opposed to the ἔνω, whom Protagoras brought in his train). *Rep*. 327 a 4 ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χο,φ (as opposed to the Thracian procession).

7 Κριτσάβουλος, son of Crito, was chiefly known for his beauty. In Xenophon's *Symposium* Socrates undertakes to prove himself to be more beautiful than Critobulus.

ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ: W adds the name Κρίτων, and so B²; but he was
so well known that this is unnecessary. Crito was of the same age and deme ('Αλωτεκίθεν) as Socrates (Αφολ. 33 d 9 ἡλικióτης καὶ δημύτης), and Plato has drawn a touching picture of his devotion here and in the Crito. We gather that he watched over his friend and master's worldly interests without fully understanding his philosophy.

b 7 Εμμογίνης, brother of Callias son of Hipponicus, who had spent more money on 'sophists' than any man of his time (Αφολ. 20 a 4), and in whose house the scene of the Protagoras is laid. Hermogenes is one of the speakers in the Cratylus, where the poverty into which he had fallen is alluded to (Crat. 384 c 5), and he is included in Xenophon's list of the inner Socratic circle (Mem. i. 2. 48). In Mem. ii. 10 Socrates persuades his friend Diodorus to assist him, and in iv. 8. 4 he is quoted as the authority for the trial of Socrates, which took place after Xenophon left Athens.

b 8 Επιγίνης: cp. Αφολ. 33 e 2 Άντιφών ὁ Κηφίσιες οὐτού, 'Επιγένους πατήρ. This Antiphon must not be confused with the orator, who was τῶν δήμων Ῥαμούσιος. There is a conversation with Epigenes in Xen. Mem. iii. 12, where Socrates says to him ὡς ἄδιοτικῶς ('in bad training') τὸ σῶμα ἔχεις, ἦ 'Επίγενες, and urges him to take more exercise.

Αἰσχίνης: i.e. Aeschines Socraticus, so called to distinguish him from the orator. Cp. Αφολ. 33 e 1 Λυσαίας ὁ Σφήττιος, Λυσχίων τοῦδε πατήρ. After the death of Socrates, he appears to have fallen into great poverty, but was given some place at the court of Dionysius II on the recommendation of Plato (or Aristippus). He was one of the most highly appreciated writers of Socratic dialogues. The Axtiochus, the Eryxias, and the Περὶ ἀρετῆς were at one time ascribed to him and have been edited under his name, but are certainly of later date.

'Αντισθένης is the well-known founder of the Cynic school. The date of his birth is uncertain, but he certainly belonged to the generation before Plato. He is probably the source of a good many things in Xenophon's account of Socrates. It has been held in recent times that many of Plato's dialogues were directed against Antisthenes, and references to him have been discovered in a great many places. It is well, however, to be sceptical regarding these. We really know very little about Antisthenes, and it is not safe to
reconstruct him from doubtful allusions. So far as the *Phaedo* is concerned, we may be sure there are no attacks upon him in it, seeing that he is supposed to be present.

8 ἤν, "there was also." Though it is true that compound verbs are repeated by the simple (60 b 3 u.), it is not necessary to take ἤν here as equivalent to παρῆν. Cp. *Prot.* 315 e 3 τούτο τ’ ἤν τῷ μετ’ αυτοῖν, καὶ τῷ Ἀδεμάντῳ ἀμφότεροι, *Rep.* 615 d 7 ἢσαν δὲ καὶ ἠδύταται τοις.

9 Κτήσιππος: in the *Euthydemus* he is called (273 a 7) νεανίσκος τις Παναθέος, μᾶλα καλός τε καγαθός τήν φύσιν, ὅσον μὴ ὑβριστῇ διὰ τὸ νέος ἐἶναι. He also appears in the *Lysis*.

Μενέξενος: the same after whom the *Menexenus* is called. He was son of Demopho and cousin of the Ctesippus just mentioned, as we learn from the *Lysis* (206 d 3), in which dialogue he plays a leading part as the young friend of Lysis. He must not be confused with his namesake, the son of Socrates (60 a 2 u.).

10 Πλάτων δὲ οὐμαὶ ἵσθινει. Many strange things have been written about this simple statement. Of course, it is an advantage from a dramatic point of view for Plato to keep himself out of his dialogues; and, as a matter of fact, he only mentions his own name in two other places ( *Apol.* 34 a 1 and 38 b 6). At the same time, it is hardly credible that he should represent himself as absent on this occasion unless he had actually been so. It has been said that, had Plato really been ill, he would have had no occasion to make the reservation implied by οὐμαί. He must have known whether he was ill or not. That is so; but it does not follow that Phaedo was equally well informed, and he is the speaker, not Plato.

1 Συμμίας... καὶ Κέβης. These are the chief interlocutors in the *Phaedo*. We shall see presently that they were disciples of Philolaus at Thebes, which, like Iblius, was a city of refuge for the Pythagoreans (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 99). From the *Crito* (45 b 3) we learn that they had brought a sum of money from Thebes to aid the escape of Socrates, another case of Pythagorean devotion to him. It is all the more important to observe that Xenophon confirms this by including Simmias and Cebes in his list of true Socrates ( *Mem.* i. 2. 48). Cp. also *Mem.* iii. 11. 17 (immediately after the mention of Antisthenes and Apollodorus) δει τι δὲ (οὐεὶ) καὶ Κέβητα καὶ Συμμίαν Ὑβηθεν παραγίνεσθαι; It is probable that Συμμίας is the
correct form of the name (from συμός), but I have not ventured to introduce it.

C 2 Φαίδωνδης: the MSS. vary between this form and Φαίδωνιδης. Xenophon (Mem. i. 2. 48) mentions him along with Simmias and Cebes as a true Socratic, giving the correct Boeotian form of his name, Φαίδωνδας.

Εὐκλείδης: Euclides was the head of a philosophical school at Megara, which held a form of the Eleatic doctrine. He is also represented in the Theae tetus as devoted to the memory of Socrates.

Τερψίων. All we know of Terpsion is that he is associated with Euclides in the dramatic introduction to the Theae tetus, which serves to dedicate that dialogue to the Megarians just as the Phaedo is dedicated to the Pythagoreans.

C 3 Ἀριστιππός. Many anecdotes are told of Aristippus of Cyrene, which may be apocryphal, but agree in representing him as a versatile cosmopolitan (omnis Aristipum decuit color et status et res, Horace, Ep. i. 17. 23). Many allusions to his doctrine have been found in Plato’s writings; but the same caution applies here (cp. b 8 n.) as in the case of Antisthenes.

Κλεόμβροτος: Callimachus has an epigram (24) on Cleombrotus of Ambracia who threw himself into the sea after reading the Phaedo, and he has often been identified with the Cleombrotus mentioned here. Nothing, however, is known of him.

C 4 ἰν Αἰγίνη γὰρ κτλ. In antiquity this was supposed to be an innuendo. Demetrius says (Περὶ ἔρωνείος 288) that Socrates had been in prison for a number of days and they did not take the trouble to sail across, though they were not 200 stades from Athens. To make this more pointed, Cobet inserted οὐ before παρεγένωτο, and took the clause as a question, which only proves that the innuendo is not very apparent in the text as it stands. We must be very careful in reading such covert meanings into Plato’s words. Athenaeus (504 f) makes it a grievance that he does not mention Xenophon here, though Xenophon had left Athens two years before. If the words Πλατών δὲ ὑμιν ἦσθεν had been used of any one else, that would have been set down to malice. As we shall see, it had only become known the day before that the ship had returned from Delos, and we learn from the Crito (43 d 3) that the news came from
Sunium where she had touched. Aristippus and Cleombrotus could hardly have heard this in time, if they were in Aegina. There is no evidence that they had been there during the whole of the thirty days, as Demetrius suggests.

Introductory Narrative.—The attitude of Socrates towards death (59 c 8—70 c 3).

(1) Preliminary Narrative (59 c 8—63 e 8).

τῆ...προτεραία: Attic usage seems to require either τῇ προτεραία ἡμέρα or τῇ προτεραία. I have therefore followed Hermann in bracketing ἡμέρα.

ὑπακούειν, 'to answer the door?' Cp. Crito 43 a 5 θαυμάζω ὅπως ἠθέλησε σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαυ.

εἴπεν περιμένειν, 'told us to wait.' Τ has ἑπιμένειν, which seems less suitable. It would mean 'to stay as we were' (Riddell, Dig. § 127).

τῶς ἄν: we should expect πρὶν ἄν after πρότερον, but καί μὴ πρότερον παρέναι is merely a 'polar' antithesis placed διὰ μέσον and does not affect the construction.

οἱ ἔνδεκα: on the Eleven and their functions, see Arist. ΑΘ. πολ. 52, where we are told that the people elected them inter alia ἐπι-μελημονένους τῶν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ.

ὁπως ἄν...τελευτᾶ, 'are giving instructions for his death to-day.' For this rare construction after verbs of commanding, where the dependent clause contains the substance of the order, cp. Gorg. 523 d 7 τοῦτο μὲν ὅν καί δὴ εἴρηται ('instructions have been given') τῷ Προμηθεί δῶς ἄν παίσῃ, Isa. 7. 27 διεκαλείσθ' ὅπως ἄν, εἴ τι πάθοι πρότερον, ἐγγράφωσι με. The present τελευτᾶ (T) is more likely to have been altered to τελευτήσῃ (B) than vice versa.

οὐ πολίν...χρόνον ἐπισχέω, lit. 'after waiting (ἐπέχω intrans.) no long time'. Cf. 95 e 7 συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχώ. Similarly 117 c 7 διαλιπῶν χρόνον, 118 11 ὁλίγον χρόνον διαλιπῶν, 'after a short interval.'

ἐκέλευεν: W has ἐκέλευσεν (and so, accordingly, B⁰), but this is less idiomatic. The English verbs 'send' and 'bid' refer to the starting of the action, but πέμπειν and κέλευειν operate throughout the action. 'The thought follows the motion' (Gildersleeve). The imperfect is therefore natural where we should expect the aorist.
It is for the same reason that πέμπειν can mean 'convey', 'escort', and κελεύειν, 'urge on', 'incite'.

e 8 εἰσιόντες: W has εἰσελθόντες (and so B²), but the present pcp. goes better with κατελαμβάνομεν. There were a number of them, so the action is resolved into successive parts ('as we entered, we found ...').

κατελαμβάνομεν, 'we found.' When καταλαμβάνειν is used in this sense, it takes the construction of verbs of knowing.

There is no hint in the Phaedo, or anywhere else in Plato, that Xanthippe was a shrew. Xenophon makes her son Lamprocles say of her (Mem. ii. 2. 7) ὀδεῖς ἄν δύνατο αὐτής ἰνασχέσθι τήν χαλεπότητα, and in Xen. Symph. 2. 10 Antisthenes says she was the most 'difficult' (χαλεπωτάτη) of all wives, past, present, or future. The traditional stories about her appear to be of Cynic origin.

The child here mentioned must accordingly be Menexenus (not to be confused with Menexenus, son of Demopho, cp. 59 b 9 n.). It is worthy of note that the names Xanthippe and Lamprocles suggest aristocratic connexions, and possibly Lamprocles was called after his maternal grandfather (cp. Arist. Clouds 62 sqq.). Socrates was not always a poor man; for he had served as a hoplite, and in Aριμ. 23 b 9 he ascribes his poverty to his service of Apollo (ἐν πεινί μυρία εἰμί διὰ τήν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν). This may explain the χαλεπότητας of Xanthippe, if such there was.

a 3 ἀνηψυφημησε ought to mean 'raised a cry of εἰφημείτε' (bona verba, faute linguis), and that gives a perfectly good sense. The rule was ἐν εἰφημία χρῆ τελευτᾶν (117 e 1), and εἰφημείτε was therefore a natural address to people approaching a scene of death. That she should use it and then break the εἰφημία herself is only human—and feminine. Byzantine scholars took, however, another view. In the recently discovered portion of the Lexicon of the Patriarch Photius (ninth cent. A.D.) we read ἀνεψυφημησεν ἄντι τοῦ ἐθρήνησεν (Reitzenstein, Anf. des Phot. p. 135), and the rest follow suit. It was explained κατ’ ἀντίφρασι, i.e. by a curious figure of
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speech which consisted in saying the opposite of what you meant (lucus a non lucento). Very similar is Soph. Trach. 783 ἀπας δ' ἀνηφήμησεν οἰμωγῇ λέως (where G. Hermann took the word in its natural sense) and Eur. Or. 1335 ἐπ' ἀξίωσι τὰρ ἀνευφημεῖ δόμοις. In both these cases death is imminent. It may be said that the οἰμωγῇ itself is δύσφημον, but that is not necessarily so; at any rate εὐφήμως γόοις is quoted from Aeschylus (fr. 40 Sidgwick).

οῖα δή: these words might have been used even without εἰώθασιν, in the sense of 'just like'. Cp. Xen. Cyr. i. 3. 2 οἰα δή παίς ('just like a boy'), Thuc. viii. 84. 3 οἰα δή ναῖται.

ὑστατον δή, 'so this is the last time that...'. Cp. 89 b 4 αὐριν δή.

ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτήν κτλ. With this reading (that of B: TW have ταύτην) the words are kindly and considerate. Xanthippe had apparently passed the night with Socrates and their child (at any rate she was found there when the doors were opened), and it was only right she should go home and rest. She is sent for again just before the end to say farewell. I do not see any ground for the remarks which some editors take occasion to make here on the Athenians' treatment of their wives. Would it have been right to keep Xanthippe there all day, in her overwrought condition, and allow her to witness the actual agony? Some women would have insisted on staying, but we can find no fault with the behaviour of Socrates in the matter.

τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος, 'some of Crito's people.'

κοπτομένην: the original meaning of κόπτεσθαι was 'to beat the breasts', but it came to mean simply 'to lament' (cp. the κορμίν in tragedy). The history of the Lat. plano (whence planctus, 'plaint') is similar.

ἀνακαθίζομενος: the use of this verb in the medical writers shows that the meaning is 'sitting up'. Cp. Hippocrates, Progn. 37 ἀνακαθίζων βούλεσθαι τὸν νοσέντα τῆς νόσου ἀκμαζουσιν πολλῶν. We might expect ἐν τῇ κλίνῃ, but (ἰζεσθαι) καθίζεσθαι sometimes retain the construction of (ἰῶ) καθίζω, which are verbs of motion. The variant ἐπὶ τῷ κλίνῃ (W and B) may be due to the idea that the verb means resedens, 'sitting down.' Wohlrab argues that Socrates must have got up to welcome his friends, and adopts ἐπὶ accordingly; but this would spoil the picture. We are led to understand that he put his feet on the ground for the first time at 61 c 10. The
fetters had just been struck off, and at first he would be too stiff to get up.

b 2 συνέκάμψε: this verb is specially used of bending the joints. Cp. Arist. Hist. An. 502 b i1 πίθηκος πόδας συνγκάμπτει, ἕσπερ χείρας. It is opposed to ἐκτείνω.

ἐξίτρυψε, ‘rubbed down,’ as with a towel. Athenaeus (409 e) quotes Philoxenos for ἐκτριμμα in the sense of χειρόμακτρον.

b 3 τρίβων: the compound verb is regularly repeated by the simple. Cp. 71 ε 8 ἀνταποδώσομεν ... ἀποδόιναι, 84 c 7 διεξέναι ... διελθεῖν, 104 d 10 ἀπεργαίηται ... εἰργαίητο.

ὅς ἄτοπον ... τι: the unemphatic τι is often postponed by hyperbaton (Riddell, Dig. § 290 c).

b 4 ὅς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρός, ‘how strangely it is related to —.’ Relation is expressed by πεφυκέναι πρός ..., design or adaptation by πεφυκέναι ἐπί ...

b 5 τὸ ἁμα μὲν κτλ., ‘to think that they will not —.’ The exclamatory infinitive is often used after some expression of feeling (in the present case ὅς θαυμασίως) which it serves to justify. Cp. Eur. A1c. 832 ἄλλα σοῦ, τῷ μὴ φράσας, ‘Out on thee! to think thou didst not tell!’, Med. 1051 ἄλλα τὴς ἑπὶ κάκης, τὸ καὶ περιέχθηκε κτλ., Arist. Clouds 819 τὰς μορίας, τὸ Δία νομίζειν ὀντα τηλικοτόνι. This explanation, which is due to Riddell (Dig. § 85), makes it unnecessary to read ἃ with inferior MS. authority and Stobaeus.

b 6 μὴ ἥξελεν: editors speak of personification and ‘the lively fancy of the Greeks’ here, but even we say ‘won’t’ in such cases.

b 7 σχέδον τι ... ἄει, ‘in almost every case.’ The omission of ἄει in B is probably accidental. The relativity of pain and pleasure is a Heraclitean doctrine, cp. fr. 104 Bywater νοϊσος ύπειρη ἐποίησεν ἥδι, κακῶν ἀγαθῶν, λυμὸς κόρον, κάματος ἀνάπαυσιν, and it is not, perhaps, fanciful to suppose that this is intended to prepare us for the Heraclitean arguments as to the relativity of life and death below (70 d 7 sqq.).

b 8 ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς ἦμμένω, ‘fastened to (Greek says ‘fastened from’) a single head,’ a grotesque imagination like those of Empedocles and of Aristophanes in the Symposium. B has συνήμμενω, but that seems to be an anticipation of c 3 συνήψεν.

C i Αἰσώτως: Aesop was a Phrygian slave of whom many odd tales were told (cp. Wilamowitz-Marchant, Greek Reader, ii, p. 1), and
the Athenians attributed to him the beast-fables which play so large a part in all popular literature. The prose collection which has come down to us under the title of Αἰσώτης μυθοί is of Byzantine date; but many of the fables were well known from popular verses and Archilochus.

αὐτοῖς: this is rather neater than the variant αἰτῶν. ‘He fastened their heads together for them.’

αὐτῷ μοι ἐοικεῖ, sc. ἐπακολουθεῖν. The clause ἐπείδὴ κτλ. is in apposition (asyneton explicatiónum), and the original statement is, as usual, restated more fully after the explanation (a b a).

ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ: cp. ὑπὸ τοῦ δέους, πραε metu.

ὑπολαβὼν... ἐφη, ‘rejoined’ (synchronous aor. pcp.). The meaning of ὑπολαμβάνειν is not ‘to interrupt’, but ‘to rejoin’ or ‘retort’. Cp. Lat. suscipere (Aen. vi. 723 suscitit Anchises) and contrast paraλαμβάνειν (τὸν λόγον) excipere.


ἐντείνας, ‘setting to music.’ Cp. Prot. 326 b 1 ποίματα... εἰς τὰ καθαρύσματα ἐντείνοντες. This seems to come from the geometrical use of the term which we find in Meno 87 a 1 εἰ οἶν τε εἰς τὸν κύκλον τὸν χαρῶν... ἐνταθίναι, where it refers to the ‘inscription’ of rectangular figures in a circle (for which Euclid uses ἕγγραφειν). That in turn, like many geometrical terms (e. g. arc, chord, subtend, hypotenuse, cp. E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 116 n. 1), comes from the use of ropes or strings in geometrical constructions. The Pythagoreans were much concerned with the inscription of polygons in circles and polyhedra in spheres (cp. 110 b 6 n.), and it was natural that the same word should be used of making words fit into a musical scheme. Cp. also Phileb. 38 e 2 ἐντείνας εἰς φωνήν of putting thought into words.

λόγους, ‘tales.’ This was the usual name (cp. Ar. Birds 651 ἐν Λασώπου λόγοις, Herodotus ii. 134 Λασώπου τοῦ λογοποιοῦ); but, when it is important to mark their fictitious character, they are called μύθοι and opposed to λόγοι (61 b 4). In Ionic μύθος means the same as λόγος in Attic; the Ionic for ‘fable’ is αἴνος (cp. Archil. fr. 96 ἐρέω τιν’ ὑμῖν αἴνῳ, ὦ Κηρυκίδη).
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d2 τὸ εἶς τὸν Ἀπόλλωνιον: Thucydides (iii. 104) gives this name to the Homeric 'Hymn' to Apollo. Properly speaking, προοίμιον are 'preludes' intended to attach the rhapsode's epic recitations to the praise of the god at whose πανήγυρισ they were delivered. This instance shows that ἐντείνα is 'setting to music', not merely 'versifying'; for no προοίμιον could have been in prose. In the Phaedo, Socrates is represented throughout as the servant of Apollo (cp. esp. 85b4 sqq.). Apollo Hyperboreus of Delos was in a special sense the god of the Pythagoreans (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 97 n. 3), and there would be no difficulty in identifying him with the Pythian Apollo who had given the famous oracle, and to whose service, as we know from the Apology, Socrates regarded himself as consecrated. They were identified in the public religion of Athens (Farnell, Cults of the Greek States, iv, p. 110). Geddes's suggestions about 'the God of Day' must be rejected. Apollo was not a sun-god at this date (Farnell, ib., p. 136 sq.).

καὶ ὀλλοὶ τινὲς ... ἀτάρ καὶ ... So we find ἄει μὲν ... ἀτάρ καὶ νῦν (τότε) ... In these uses ἀτάρ καὶ ... is equivalent to καὶ δὴ καὶ ...

d3 Εὔηνος: from Apol. 20 b 8 we learn that Evenus was a Parian who taught 'human goodness' for 5 minae. In Phaedr. 267 a 3 we are told that he invented certain rhetorical devices such as ὑποδήλωσις and παρίστασις. Some said he even composed παράφυγοι in metre μήμης χάρων. He was also an elegiac poet.

πρώτην, 'the other day.' We know from the Apology 20 a 3 that Evenus was at Athens about the time of the trial of Socrates.

d9 ἀντίτεχνος, 'competitor', 'rival'. So in Ar. Frogs 816 Euripides is the ἀντίτεχνος of Aeschylus.


ἀφοσιούμενος: the verb ἀφοσιοῦμαι means facio aliquid animi religione solvendi causa. Tr. 'to satisfy my conscience'.

e3 εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις, 'on the chance that,' si forte. This use of πολλάκις is fairly common after εἰ (εἴν) ἄρα and μή. Cp. 61 a 6.

tαύτην τὴν μουσικήν, 'music in the ordinary sense.' The pronoun οὕτος is often depreciatory like iste.

e7 καὶ ἐργάζου, sc. μουσικήν. As distinguished from ποιεῖν, 'compose,'
means 'to make a business of', 'practise', and is regularly used of arts and trades (L. S., s. v. II. 5, 6).

παρακελεύονθαι hortari aequum ut aliquia faciat: εἰπικελεύοντι incitare facientem (Fischer). Comparatio autem auta est ex pro-verbio currentem incitare (Wyttenbach). Cf. Xen. Cyr. vi. 3. 27 τοι... το δέον ποιάνων εἰπικελεύοντι.

ωσπερ... καὶ ἐμοὶ σύτω: the simile brings out the meaning of εἰπικελεύοντι and is therefore added appositively (asyneton explicatīvum), after which the original fact is more fully restated (a b a). For this regular Platonic structure, cp. 109 e 4 (Riddell, Dig. § 209).

διακελεύομενον: the proper meaning of διακελεύονθαι is 'to exhort one another'. Cp. Hdt. ix. 5 διακελευσαμένη δὲ γωνή γυναικί, but Plato often uses the word as equivalent to παρακελεύονθαι. Here I think, it is merely employed for variety; it could hardly refer to the partisans of different runners exhorting their favourites.

πλοσσοφίας... ὤντος μεγίστης μονικῆς: this is a distinctively Pythagorean doctrine. We have the authority of Aristoxenus for saying that the Pythagoreans used medicine to purge the body and music to purge the soul (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 107), and Aristotle's doctrine of the tragic καθαρσίς seems to be ultimately derived from this source. We shall see that philosophy is the true soul-purge. Strabo, who had access to Italiote and Siceliote historians now lost, says, in discussing the orgiastic dances of the Curetes (x. 468) καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μονικῆν ἐκιλέσας ὁ Πλάτων, καὶ ἐπὶ πρώτερον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, τὴν πλοσσοφίαν. Cp. also Rep. 548 b 8 τῆς ἀληθείας Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ πλοσσοφίας, Laws 689 d 6 ἡ καλλίστη καὶ μεγίστη τῶν συμφωνίων ('harmonies') μεγίστη δικαίωτα τὸν λέγοντο σοφία. This is quite different from the metaphor put into the mouth of Laches in Lach. 188 d 3. There the μονικῆς ἀνίρ is he whose character is tuned in a noble key. Any educated Athenian might have said that; but here we have a definite doctrine, which is further developed in the sequel.

εἰ ὧνα πολλάκις: cp. 60 e 3 n.

πιθῶμενον: this was originally the reading of Τ and should, I think, be preferred to πειθῶμενον if καὶ is deleted and the participle made dependent on ποιήσαντα. Tr. 'by composing poems in obedience to the dream'. We often find καὶ interpolated between two
participles, one of which is subordinated to the other. It is omitted here by W, and Schanz had bracketed it without knowing this.

b 4 μῦθους ἀλλ᾽ οὖ λόγους: cp. 60 d i n. Cp. Gorg. 523 a 1 ἄκονε
... λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ... ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον, Prot. 324 d 6
go ... πέρι ... οὐκέτι μῦθον οὐ δὲ ἄλλα λόγον, Tim. 26 e 4 μὴ
πλασθέντα μῦθον ἀλλ᾽ ἀλήθων λόγον. The distinction is almost the
same as ours between ‘fiction’ and ‘fact’.

b 5 καὶ αὐτὸς οὖκ ἦ: the construction ceases to be indirect, as if
ἐπειδή, not ἐννοήσας ὦτι had preceded.

b 6 ἡμιστάμην, ‘knew off by heart.’ Cp. Prot. 339 b 4 τοῦτο ἐπίστασαι
tὸ ἄσμα ; Gorg. 484 b 10 τὸ γὰρ ἄσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι.

τοὺς Ἀἰσώτον: the antecedent is incorporated in the relative clause
(Riddell, Dig. § 218).

b 7 οῖς πρῶτοις ἐνέτυχον: the clause οῖς προχείρους εἶχον is restated after
the explanation (i b a) (Riddell, Dig. § 218).

b 8 ἕρρωσθαι, sc. φράζε. ‘Bid him farewell from me.’ The regular
word for delivering messages is φράζεων, and ἕρρωσθ (perf. imper.
mid. of ρώννωμαι) means ‘farewell’ and was regularly used in ending
letters, whence Lat. vale.

ἀν σωφρονῆ, ‘if he is wise,’ the regular phrase in this sense,
sωφρονεῖν being used in its originally sense of sapere, ‘to be in one’s
right mind.’ The more common meaning of σωφρονεῖν is an exten-
sion of the idea of ‘sanity’ to a wider sphere.

ὁς τάχιστα: the omission of these words in T spoils the sense.
Cp. Theaet. 176 a 8 πειράσθαι χρη ἐνβένθε ἐκείσε (‘from this world to
the other’) φεύγειν ὦτι τάχιστα.

c 2 οἶνον: an exclamation, not a question. Cf. 117 d 7 οἶα ... ποιεῖτε.

c 3 πολλὰ ... ἐντετύχηκα, ‘I have had many dealings with him.’
Cp. Lach. 197 d 3 ο ὁ Ἁμών τῷ Προδίκῳ πολλὰ πλησιάζει, Crat. 396
d 5 ἐωθέν ... πολλὰ αὐτῷ συνή, Parm. 126 b 9 Πυθοδώρῳ ... πολλὰ
ἐντετύχηκε.

c 4 σχεδόν: used as in the phrase σχεδόν (τι) οἶδα. Tr. ‘I am pretty
sure that —’.

ἐκὼν εῖναι: always with a negative, ‘if he can (could) help it.’

c 6 οὐ φιλόσοφος: as addressed to Pythagoreans, the word has a
special sense (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 321), that of a man who follows a cer-
tain ‘way of life’. It is much as if we should ask: ‘Is he not
a religious man?’
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ἐθελήσει, ‘will be willing’, ‘will be ready’, not ‘will wish’.

τούτον τοῦ πράγματος, sc. φιλοσοφίας, regarded as an occupation. Cp. Ἀρολ. 20 c 5 τὸ σῶν τί ἐστι πράγμα; The term is natural if we remember that ‘philosophy’ is a life.

Φιλολάφος: Philolaus was one of the most distinguished of the later Pythagoreans, and had taken refuge at Thebes when the community was expelled from Magna Graecia (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 99). There seems to have been a regular συνεδρίαν at Thebes as well as at Phlius. The Pythagorean Lysis was the teacher of Epaminondas.

οὐδέν... σαφές, ‘nothing certain’ rather than ‘nothing clear’ (cp. 57 b 1 n.). We shall see that there were good reasons for the teaching of Philolaus about the soul being doubtful (86 b 6 n.). I do not think there is any reference to the Pythagoreans’ custom of speaking δὲ αἰνιγμάτων, as Olympiodorus fancies.

φθένοις οὐδεὶς λίγειν, ‘I don’t mind telling you.’
καὶ μάλιστα, vel maxime. Cp. 59 a 9 n.

ἐκείσε... τῆς ἐκεῖ: the adverbs ἐνθάδε and ἐκεῖ are regularly used of ‘this life and the next’, ‘this world and the other’. Cp. 64 a 1; 117 c 2. So Thucet. 176 a 8 quoted in 61 b 8 n., and Aristophanes, Frogs 82 ó ἐκόλος μὲν ἐνθάδε ἐκόλος δ’ ἐκεῖ. There is no need to read τῆς ἐκείσε for τῆς ἐκεῖ, for ἀποδημία means a residence abroad as well as a journey abroad. Tr. ‘our sojourn in the other world’.

μυθολογεῖν, ‘to tell tales.’ Socrates regards all definite statements with regard to the next life as μίθοι. Cp. Ἀρολ. 39 e 4 where he introduces what he has to say about it by οὐδέν γὰρ κωλέει διαμυθολογήσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. The immortality of the soul is capable of scientific proof; the details of the ἀποδημία are not. Cp. below 110 b 1 n. and 114 d 1.

μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν: executions could not take place till sunset. Cp. 89 c 7 ἔως ἐκ τῶν ἑστιν, 116 e 1 ἐτε ἡλίου εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀρέων καὶ ὀψῶν δεδυκέναι.

νυνῆ, ‘just now,’ i.e. ‘a little ago’ (ἄλλην πρῶσθεν). In this sense, the grammarians accent as in the text, to distinguish the adverb from νῦν δῆ, ‘now indeed’, ‘now at last’ (cp. 107 c 4). As a rule the MSS. have νῦν δῆ in both senses.

οτε παρ’ ἡμῖν δητάτο: it appears from these words that Philolaus had left Thebes some time before 399 B.C. We hear of him at Tarantum (Taras), which was the chief seat of scientific Pythagoreanism
in the fourth century B.C. The leading man then was Archytas (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 319).

62 a 2 ἵσως μὲντο κτλ. As the construction of this sentence has been much disputed, I will first give what I take to be the right translation. This will be justified in the following notes, from which it will also appear how it differs from other interpretations. I render: 'I dare say, however, it will strike you as strange if this is the solitary case of a thing which admits of no distinctions—

I mean, if it never turns out, as in other cases, that for man (that is at certain times and for certain men) it is better to die than to live—and, in such cases, I dare say it further strikes you as strange that it is not lawful for those for whom it is better to die to do this good office for themselves, but that they have to wait for some one else to do it for them.' This comes nearest to Bonitz's interpretation (Plat. Stud., ed. 3 (1886), pp. 315 sqq.), and I shall note specially the points in which it differs.

eἰ τοῦτο . . . ἀπλοῦν ἵστιν: I take this clause as the expression in a positive form of what is stated negatively in the next. If we must say what τοῦτο means, it will be τὸ βελτιων εἶναι ζην ἢ τεθνάναι, but the pronoun is really anticipatory and only acquires a definite meaning as the sentence proceeds. Bonitz once took τοῦτο as meaning τὸ τεθνάναι, but in his latest discussion of the passage he substitutes τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτεινόναι. I do not think it necessary to look backwards for a definite reference, and I think Bonitz does not do justice to the clearly marked antithesis of μόνον τὸν ἄλλων ἀπάντων and ὄσπερ καὶ τὰλλα. The ἄλλα must surely be the same in both clauses, and if so these must be positive and negative expressions of the same thought. I hold, with Bonitz, that the interpretation of most recent editors (τοῦτο = τὸ μὴ βεμτον εἶναι αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀποκτεινόναι) is untenable, if only because it gives an impossible meaning to ἀπλοῦν. Further, no one has suggested that the lawlessness of suicide is the only rule which is absolute, and the suggestion would be absurd. On the other hand, many people would say that life is always better than death. It may be added that τοῦτο is the proper anticipatory pronoun; it is constantly used praetarative, as the older grammars say.

a 3 τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων: Riddell, Dig. § 172.

ἀπλοῦν: that is ἀπλοῦν which has no διαφοράι (cp. Polit. 306 c 3

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πότερον ἄπλοῦν ἔστι τοῦτο, ἢ ... ἔχει διαφοράν. It is what admits of no distinctions such as ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς. Crp. Sympr. 183 d 4 οὐχ ἄπλοῦν ἔστιν ... οὐτε καλὸν εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ οὐτε αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ καλὸς μὲν πραττόμενον καλὸν, αἰσχρὸς δὲ αἰσχρὸν, Phaedr. 244 a 5 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἄπλοῦν τὸ μαρτίαν κακὸν εἶναι (where Socrates immediately proceeds to enumerate the different kinds of madness), Prot. 331 b 8 οὐ πάνω μοι δοκεῖ ... οὖν ἄπλοῦν εἶναι ... ἀλλὰ τι μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι. This is the origin of the Aristotelian use of ἄπλος. Bonitz has shown once for all that ἄπλοῦν does not mean simpliciter verum, as many editors say after Heindorf.

οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει ... βέλτιον ὅν: these words must be taken together, whether we add ὅν, as suggested by Heindorf, or not. It is, I think, safer to add it; for the certain instances of the poetical use of τυγχάνω without a participle come from later dialogues where poetical idioms are commoner.

τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, 'for man' generally. The dative is governed by βέλτιον, not by τυγχάνει, as some editors suppose.

ὡσπερ καὶ τάλλα, 'as other things do.' Olympiodorus rightly says: ἐπαμφιστερίζοντων τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν δυναμένων εἶναι (the rest of his interpretation is wrong). The phrase is an abbreviation of some such clause as this: ὡσπερ εἰσίτε εἰνόις βέλτιον ὅν τυγχάνει μοσεῖν, πένεθαι κτλ., ἡ ἕγιναιν, πλονεῖν κτλ.

ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς: i.e. ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ ἔστιν οἷς, ἔσποτε καὶ ἔνοικος. Bonitz's proposal to delete the comma at τάλλα and take ὡσπερ καὶ τάλλα ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς together is at first sight attractive. It gets rid of the pleonasm of ἔστιν ὅτε after οὐδέποτε and the change from singular to plural involved in taking ἔστιν οἵς with τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. These are not, however, insuperable difficulties, and I feel that the ellipse involved in ὡσπερ καὶ τάλλα is easier if it is total than if it is partial.

5 τεθνάναι: in such phrases τεθνάναι may properly be translated 'to die'; for ἀποδυσκέων lays stress on the process of dying, of which τεθνάναι is the completion. The translation 'to be dead' is clearly inadmissible in such common phrases as πολλάκις, μυριάκις τεθνάναι. Crp. also Crít. 43 d 1 οὗ δεῖ ἀφικομένου (sc. τοῦ πλοίου) τεθνάναι με, 52 c 6 οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν εἶ δεόντες τεθνάναι σε, Ἀφοι. 30 c 1 οὔδ' εἶ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι, 38 e 4 πολὺ μᾶλλον αὑρόίμαι ὡς ἄπολογη-σάμενος τεθνάναι ἦ ἐκείνος ζῆν, 39 e 3 οὕτω ἔρχομαι οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ.
τεθνάναι, 41a 8 πολλάκις ἑθέλω τεθνάναι εἰ ταῦτ' ἑστιν ἀληθή. So below 62 c 3 ὅτι βούλει αὐτῷ τεθνάναι, 64 a 6; c 5, 67 e 2; 81 a 1. Cp. the similar use of ἀπολωλέναι and that of τεθνάτω in criminal law, and see Vahlen, Ὀπυσκυλα, ii. 211 on the whole subject.

a 8 ἵπτω Ζεύς: Schol. τὸ ἵπτω ἐπιχωρμιζοντός ἑστὶ. In Ar. Ach. 911 the Boeotian says ἵπτω Δείς, 'let Zeus know' (ἵπτω = ἕδτω = Att. ἢτω), 'Zeus be my witness.' The meaning is much attenuated, and the French Parbleu! comes nearest to it. Epist. vii. 345 a 3 ἵπτω Ζεύς, φησίν ὁ Θηβαῖος may or may not be a reminiscence of this passage. It is more likely that the phrase struck Athenian ears as a quaint one. The expletives of a language generally strike foreigners in this way.

a 9 φωνῇ, 'dialect.' Cp. Apol. 17 d 5 and Crat. 398 d 8 ἐν τῇ 'Ἀττικῇ φωνῇ. So we say βοϊωτίζειν, δωρίζειν, ἑλληνίζειν, ξενίζειν τῇ φωνῇ. In classical Greek διάλεκτος means 'conversation,' 'manner of speech.' Aristotle uses it (Poet. 1458 b 32) for 'everyday language' as opposed to the diction of poetry. It only acquires the meaning of 'dialect' at a later date.

b 1 οὐτω γ', 'put in that way.'

b 2 ἔχει τινὰ λόγον: lit. 'it admits of something being said for it,' i.e. 'is justifiable' or 'intelligible' (opp. ἁλογὸν ἑστὶν, 'it is unjustifiable,' 'inexplicable,' syn. εὐλογὸν ἑστὶν). For the sense of ἔχειν cp. συγγρώμην ἔχει, excusationem habet, 'it admits of excuse,' 'is excusable.' The phrase is sometimes personal as in Apol. 31 b 7 ἔχον ἀν τινὰ λόγον, 'my conduct would be intelligible,' 34 b 1 τάχ' ἄν λόγον ἔχουσιν βοηθοῦντες, 'their conduct would be explicable.' That λόγον does not mean 'reason' in this phrase is shown by the words which immediately follow in the last of these passages: τίνα ἁλλὸν ἔχουσιν λόγον . . . ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ ὀρθὸν τε καὶ δίκαιον; 'what explanation can be given except the straight and honest one?'

b 3 ἐν ἀπορρήτοις, 'in a mystery.' Cp. Eur. Rhes. 943 μυστηριών τε τῶν ἀπορρήτων φανᾶς | ἐδείξεν Ὀρφεῖς. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is Orphic in origin (cp. 70 c 5 n.). There is not the slightest reason for doubting that Socrates held it, or that he derived it from this source (cp. Introd. XIII). At the same time, he always refers to the details of Orphic theology with a touch of ironical deference as here. Cp. below 69 c 4 n.

ἐν τινὶ φρουρα, 'in ward.' This is Archer-Hind's translation, and
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conveniently retains the ambiguity of the original, which was sometimes understood to mean (1) 'watch', and sometimes (2) 'prison'. Cicero took it in the first sense.  
Cp. de Senectute 20, vetatque Pythagoras iniussum imperatoris, id est dei, de praesidio et statione vitae decedere. In the Somnium Scipionis (3. 10) he uses the word custodia, clearly a translation of φρονώρα: πίσ αιμίκοις retinendus est animus in custodia corporis, nec iniussum eius a quo ille est nobis datus ex hominum vita migrandum est. Antiphon the Sophist, a contemporary of Socrates, says τὸ θῆν έσκε φρονώρα εφημέρῳ, but that may be merely a simile like the Psalmist's 'watch in the night'. The Stoic formula that we must live ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς σημήνῃ τὸ ἀνακλητικὸν (dum receptui canat) seems to be derived from an interpretation of this kind, and we must remember that φρονώρα is the Peloponnesian word for στρατεία. The other view, however, that φρονώρα means 'prison', is strongly supported by the Axiocbus, an Academic dialogue of the third century B.C., where we read (365 e 6) ήμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐσμεν ψυχῆ, ζῷον ἁθύνατον ἐν θυτῷ καθεργ-μένον φρονώρῳ. There is no doubt that the Orphics did speak of the body as the prison of the soul. The Christian apologist Athenagoras says (Diels, Vors.² p. 245. 19) καὶ Φιλόλαος δὲ ὠσπερ ἐν φρονώρᾳ πάντα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περιμεθφαί λέγων, with which we may compare Plato, 
Crat. 400 c 4 δοκοῦν μέντοι μοι μάλιστα δέονται οἱ ὁμφί 'Ορφεία τούτο τὸ ὄνομα (σώμα), ὡς δίκην διδότης τῆς ψυχῆς ὁν δὴ ἔνεκα δίδωσιν, τοῦτον δὲ περισσολον ἕχειν, ἵνα σφεντα, δεσμομερίου εἰκόνα. Cp. also the use of ἐνδείσθαι 'to be imprisoned' below 81 e 1 (ἐνως ἄν) πιλίν ἐνδεδωσιν εἰς σώμα, 92 a 1 πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεδηγαι. So too Tim. 43 a 5 ἐνδεάω εἰς ἐπάρδον τῷ σώμα καὶ ἀπάρδον, 44 b 1 ὅταν (ψυχῆ) εἰς σώμα ἐνδεδηγηθηθεῖν. Cp. also ἐνδεδείσθαι in the fragment of Euxitheus quoted in the next note. The φρονώρα in Gorg. 525 a 7 is the 'prison-house' of the other world, not the body.

καὶ οὐ δεὶ δὴ κτλ. The genuinely Pythagorean origin of this is vouched for by a passage from an unknown Pythagorean called Euxitheus, quoted by Athenaeus from the Peripatetic Carcharus (Diels, Vors.² p. 245. 8), Εὐξιθεος ο Πυθαγορικός, ο Νίκιον, ὡς φησι Κλέαρχος ο Περιπατητικός εν δευτέρω Βίων, ἔλεγεν ἐνδεδείσθαι (cp. preceding note) τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ δεύρῳ βίο τὰς ἀπάντων ψυχικα τιμωρίας χάριν καὶ διείπασθαι τὸν θεὸν ὡς, εἰ μὴ μενοῦσιν επί τοῖς, ἐως ἄν ἐκὼν αυτοῦς λύσῃ, πλείσθη καὶ μείζονεν ἐμπεσούσται τοῖς λύμασι· διὸ πάντα
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εὐλαβομένουσιν τὴν κυρίων (i.e. δεσποτῶν, ἐπιστατῶν) ἀνάτασιν ('threat') φοβείσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἐκόντας ἐκβιάναι, μένων τε τῶν ἐν τῷ γύρῳ βίωσιν ἀσπασίως προσείδει, πεπεισμένοις τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῆς τῶν κυρίων γίγνεσθαι γνώμης. As Cleanthes of Soli wrote about 300 B.C., this fragment is almost certainly genuine.

b 5 μείγας, 'high.' Cp. Gorg. 493 c 3, where Socrates says of the most characteristic of the Orphic doctrines ταῦτ' ἐπιείκος μὲν ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τι ἀτόπα ('rather queer').

b 8 κτημάτων, 'chattels.' The word is often used of flocks and herds, in which sense it is opposed to χρήματα. This doctrine of the divine herdsmen appears more than once in Plato's later dialogues. Cp. esp. Laws 906 a 6 σύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοὶ τε ἅμα καὶ δαιμόνες, ἥμεις δ' αὐτοὶ κτήμα (ὑπ. τ. κτήματα) θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων. In describing the Saturnia regna he says (Polit. 271 e 5) θεὸς ἐνεμέν αὐτοὺς αὐτὸς ἐπιστατῶν, 'God was their shepherd and tended them himself.' Again, in Laws 902 b 8 we have θεῶν γε μὴν κτήματά φαινεν εἶναι πάντα ὑπόσα βυντα ζώα, ὅσπερ καὶ τῶν οὐράνων ὄλων.—Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;—'Ἡδη τοῖνυν εμικράν ἡ μεγάλα τις φάτω ταύτα εἴναι τοῖς θεοῖς' οὐδετέρως γὰρ τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἡμῖν (i.e. τοῖς δειπτόταις ἡμῶν) ἀμελεῖν ἄν εἰς προσήκον, ἐπιμελεστάτοις γε οὖσι καὶ θρίστοις. The similarity of phrase here points to a common Orphic-Pythagorean origin for the two passages. Cp. also Crílias 109 b 6 κατοικίσαντες, οίνων νομῆς ποίμνα, κτήματα καὶ βρέματα ἑαυτῶν ἡμῖν ἐτρέβουν.

c 3 τεθνάναι: cp. 62 a 5 n.

c 7 πρῶν . . . ἐπιπέμψα: it is easy to insert ἄν before ἀνάγκην with Heindorf, but it is more likely that this archaic and poetical construction is used to give solemnity to the sentence. Unless we are prepared to emend a large number of passages, we must admit that Plato sometimes used it to produce a particular effect. It is especially common in the solemn, formal diction of the Laws, cp. 872 c 10 οὐδὲ ἐκπλυτον ἐθέλειν γίγνεσθαι τῷ μιανθὲν πρὶν φόνον φώς ὀμοίω ὀμοίων ἡ δράσισα ψυχῇ τείσῃ.

c 10 ῥάδιος, 'lightly', 'without complaining', as in ῥάδιος φέρειν. Cp. 63 a 7.

d 2 εὐλόγως ἔχει: a frequent equivalent of εὐλογοῦ ἔστι (cf. supra b 2). That which it is easy to explain or justify is εὐλογοῦ.

θεῶν: the transition from the popular θεοὺς to the philosophic θεῶν seems quite unconscious.
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In Plato ἐφιστατός and σοφός mean exactly the same thing. Aristotle distinguished ἐφιστατός from σοφία as practical from theoretical wisdom, a distinction which he shows to be in conformity with popular usage. See my edition of the Ethics, p. 261 sq.

ἐπιστατός . . . ἐπιστάς: these are the regular terms in this connexion. Cp. Polit. 271e 5 θέως ἐνεμεν αὐτοῦς αὐτὸς ἐπιστατῶν.

οὐκ ἐχει λόγον, i.e. ἀλογον ἐστι, οὐκ εὔλόγως ἔχει (cp. b 2; d 2).

αὐτός: the shift from plural to singular is not uncommon. Cp. esp. 104 d 1 n.

παραμένειν, 'not to run away,' the regular opposite of ἀποδιδομέσκειν.

οὔτως, 'putting it that way,' more often οὔτω γ' as above b 1.

tουνανίον . . . ἦ: we say 'opposite to'. We cannot always render ἦ by 'or' or 'than'; for its meaning is wider than either. Cp. especially the common διαφέρειν ἦ . . .

ἄφρονας: as ἐφιστατός = σοφός, so ἄφρων = ἄμαθής (ἄσοφος is not in ordinary use).

πραγματεία, 'diligence', 'pains-taking', the noun of πράγματευόμαι, which is equivalent to πράγματα ἔχω, 'take pains', 'take trouble'. In late Greek πολυπραγμοσύνη is 'curiosity' in a good sense, and the meaning here is similar.

[6] Κήθης: it is Plato's almost uniform practice to insert the article with proper names in the narrative (cp. τοῦ Κήθης just above) and to omit it in the dialogue when directly reported (cp. Κήθης twice in the next speech, introduced by καὶ ὁ Συμμεῖας). See Beare in Hermathena, 1895, vol. ix, pp. 197 sqq. As ὥ was omitted by the first hand of T, I have ventured to bracket it.

λόγος πινᾶς ἄνερευνα, 'is always on the track of some argument.'

Metaphors from hunting are often used by Socrates in speaking of arguments, and the λόγος is regularly the game which is hunted. Cp. μετείνα τὸν λόγον (88 d 9 n.) and μέθοδος (79 e 3 n.). This metaphor has survived in the word 'investigation'. (Cp. κατ' ἔχων 11.5 b 9 n.)

οὐ πάνυ . . . ἔθελεν, 'is not very ready to believe at once.' Note the interlaced order (a b a b); οὐ πάνυ belongs to ἔθελεν and εὐθεώς to πείθοσθα.

'Αλλὰ μὴν . . . γε: the emphasis is on νῦν. 'Even I think that this time ('for once') there is something in what Cebes says.'
NOTES

a 6 ὡς ἀληθῶς belongs to σοφοῖ.

a 7 ὑδίως, 'lightly.' Cp. 62 c 10.

eis σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, 'to be aiming his words at you.' For an elaboration of the same metaphor, cp. Symp. 219 b 3 ταῦτα...

eἰσών καὶ ἄφεις ὡσπερ βέλη, τετράβαιναι αἰτῶν φίλην.

b 6 παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους, sc. τοὺς χθονίους. Archer-Hind compares Laius 959 b 4 παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους ἀπείναν δώσοντα λόγον. Geddes refers to Aesch. Σύμπ. 230 κάκει δικάζει τάμπλακίμαθ', ὁς λόγος, | Ζεὺς ἄλλος ἐν καμόσεων ὑστάτας δίκας.

b 7 παρ' ἀνθρώπους: who these were, appears from Αφόλ. 41 a 6, where Socrates mentions Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, and Homer (in that order) as persons whom one would give anything to meet after death.

c 1 οὐκ ἂν πάνω... δισχυρισάμην: another touch of the Socratic irony which Plato has reproduced elsewhere. Cp. above 62 b 5 n., 114 d 1 n., and Μενο. 86 b 6, where, after explaining the doctrine of ἀνίμηνης, Socrates says: καὶ τὰ μὲν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνω ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου δισχυρισάμην, ὅτι δὲ κτλ.

C 2 ὅτι... ἡσεὶν: the sentence begins as if it were to end ἡσεὶν ἐλπίζω (ἐλπίς is Orphic for 'faith' and quite in place here) εὖ ὑστε. Instead of that, it takes a fresh start at εὖ ὑστε, and the remainder of it is accommodated to the parenthesis καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνω δισχυρισάμην. In T and Stobaeus the construction is regularized by writing τὸ for ὅτι, but this looks suspiciously like an 'emendation'.

C 4 οὐχ ὤμοιος, non perinde (Heindorf), 'not to the same extent,' as if I were without this hope.

C 5 εἶναι τί: cp. 91 b 3 εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι.

C 6 πάλαι λέγεται: we must interpret this in the light of the πάλαις λόγος at 70 c 5, where the reference is certainly to Orphic doctrine. Such a belief as is here mentioned formed no part of ordinary Greek religion. According to that, only a few great sinners (Sisyphus, Tantalus, Ixion) were punished in the other world, while only a few favourites of heaven (Menelaus, Diomedes, Achilles, and, in Athenian belief, Harmodius and Aristogiton) were carried off to the Isles of the Blessed.

C 8 αὐτὸς ἄχον, 'keeping to yourself' (ἀὐτὸς h. l. est solus; Heindorf).

d 1 κοινόν, 'to be shared' (as in κοινὸς 'Ερμῆς). Cp. Phaedr. 279 c 6 κοινὰ γὰρ τὰ τῶν φίλων, which is a Pythagorean rule.
NOTES

63

ἡ ἀπολογία, ‘the defence’ (of which you spoke a little ago, 63 b). The article should be kept, though omitted in B.

πρῶτον δὲ κτλ. This interlude marks the end of the preliminary narrative.

πάλαι, ‘for some time past.’ The adverb does not necessarily refer to a long time.

Τι δὲ... ἄλλο γε ἢ... ‘Why, simply that...’ The first hand of B omits δὲ, but the weight of MS. authority is in its favour. Cp. Hipp. ma. 281 c 9 Τι δ' οἶει, ὁ Ἔφαρμαχος, ἄλλο γε ἢ... προσφέρειν τῷ φάρμακῳ: as προσφέρειν means ‘to apply’, especially in a medical sense, as seen in Charm.

157 c 4 προσσοίσω τὸ φάρμακον τῇ κεφαλῇ.

ἐνίστε ἀνάγκαξθαί κτλ. In Plut. Phocion 36 we have this story: Πεπωκότον δ' ἦδη πάντων, τὸ φάρμακον ἐπέλυσε, καὶ ὁ δημόσιος οὐκ ἔφη τρίψειν ἔτερον εἰ μὴ λάβων δώδεκα δραχμάς, ὡσον τὴν ὀλίγην ὄνειται, χρόνον δὲ διαγενομένου καὶ διατριβῆς, ὁ Φωκίων καλέσας των τῶν φίλων καὶ εἰπὼν Ἄθηνας ἠδρέαν ἔστιν, ἐκέλευσε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δοῦναι τὸ κερμάτιον. The suggestion has accordingly been made that the ὅρμαςος or δήμος here was thinking less of Socrates than his own pocket.

τα... χαίρειν αὑτον, ‘never mind him.’ The phrases χαίρειν εἶν, and χαίρειν εἰπεῖν (‘to bid farewell to’) are used of dismissing anything from one’s mind. Cp. 64 c 1; 65 c 7.

σχέδον μὲν τι ἤδη: σχέδον τι go together and μὲν is solitarium. Cp. Lach. 192 c 5 σχέδον γὰρ τι οἶδα.

(2) The ἀπολογία of Socrates. The philosopher will not fear death; for his whole life has been a rehearsal of death. 63 e 8—69 e 5.

δὴ marks these words as a reference to 63 b 2 sqq.

τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ‘to render my account’ (rationem reddere) to the persons who are entitled to demand it (λόγον ἀπαίτειν) and to get it (λόγον λαμβάνειν, ἀπολαμβάνειν) from me (παρ’ ἐμοῦ). For the article τὸν cp. ἡ ἀπολογία above d 2.

ἀνὴρ... διατρίψας, ‘a man who has spent,’ quite general, and only a more emphatic form of ὁ διατρίψας.

τῷ ὄντι: in his earlier dialogues Plato uses only τῷ ὄντι, in his latest only ὄντως. The dialogues in which both occur are Rep., Phaedr., Theaet. In Soph. there are twenty-one cases of ὄντως to
one of τὸ ὤντι. The absence of ὤντως from the Phaedo is one reason among others for dating it before the Republic.

e 10 ὑποτείνει, 'not to fear', 'to have no fear of' (opp. δειέναι and φοβεῖσθαι). We have no single word for this in English. See 88 b 4 n.

64 a 1 εἴκι: cp. 61 e 1 n.

64 a 4 ὅσοι τυγχάνουσι... ἀπτομένοι, 'all who really engage in'. So commonly ἀπτεσθαι γεωμετρίας, μουσικής, γυμναστικῆς, 'to go in for', 'to study'. For ὄρθως 'in the true sense of the word', cp. below 67 b 4 n.

64 a 5 λαθηθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι..., 'it looks as if men did not know that —'. As the negative of verbs of knowing, λανθάνειν may take ὅτι as well as a participial complement.

αὐτόι, 'of themselves', 'of their own accord'.

64 a 6 ἐπιτεθείσοντι, 'practise.' Cp. Cicero, Tusc. i. 30 tota enim philosophorum vita, ut ait idem (sc. Socrates), commentatio mortis est, ib. 31 secernere autem a corpore animum ecquid aliud est quam mori discere? Seneca, Ep. xxvi egregia res est mortem condiscere... meditare mortem. The phrase meditatio mortis means the 'practising' or 'rehearsal' of death; for meditatio is a translation of μελέτημα, 67 d 8.

ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι, 'dying' (the process) 'and death' (its completion). Cp. 62 a 5 n.

64 a 9 ὅ... προθυμοῦντο: Plato often restates the first member of a period with emphasis at the end (Palindromia of the period, Schanz, Nov. Comm., p. 10). A good instance is Ἀριστ. 27 d οὐκοῦν εἶπερ διάμονας ἠγοῦμαι... ἐπειδῆτερ γε διάμονας ἠγοῦμαι. As the first member here is προθυμεῖσθαι... μὴ δὲν ἄλλο ἦ τοῦτο, ὅ must be the object of προθυμοῦντο, and not of ἀγανακτεῖν.

64 b 1 οὐ πάνυ... γελασείοντα, 'not very inclined to laugh', 'in no laughing mood'. In prose only the participle of desideratives in -σεῖω is used, though Sophocles says τί δ' ἐργασείεσ; (Philoct. 1001) and Euripides φευξείω (Herc. 628). Aristophanes has δρασείες in parody (Wasps 168).

64 b 2 ἄν... δοκεῖν, 'would think.'

64 b 3 εἰρήσθαι goes closely with 64 b 5 ὅτι. That the words καὶ συμφάνω... καὶ πάνυ are parenthetical is clear; for φημὶ and its compounds do not take ὅτι.
toûs . . . παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους: i.e. the Thebans (not the Athenians, as Schleiermacher held). Olympiodorus says εἰκότως Θηβαῖος γὰρ ἦν ὁ Σιμμίας, παρ' οῖς καὶ ἡ Βοιωτία ἦσ. That, however, is hardly adequate; for Simmias was not likely to share Athenian prejudice on this subject. More probably we have here a reflexion of the impression made by the Pythagorean refugees on the ὄντα vivants of Thebes. The φιλόσοφοι would not appreciate Copaic eels and ducks. In any case, it is distinctly implied that the word φιλόσοφος in its technical sense was well known at Thebes before the end of the fifth century, and this confirms the view that it was originally Pythagorean (E. Gr. Ph. p. 321 n. 2).

θανατῶσαί, 'are moribund', 'are ripe for death'. The scholium is θανάτωσα ἐπιθυμοῦσαί, and late writers certainly use the word (or θανάτων) in this sense. But it is not the meaning required here, and a glance at the list in Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 153, will show that verbs in -ώς (-ώω) express morbid states of body or mind, and are only occasionally and secondarily desiderative. Thus ματιῶν is not 'to long to go to sea', but 'to have passengersickness', i.e. 'to be sea-sick'. For the real meaning of οἱ πολλοὶ cp. below ἐγγὺς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι (65 a 6 n.). They think philosophers 'as good as dead', and look upon them as 'living corpses' (cp. Sophocles quoted l. c.). They do not trouble about their desires. 'The picture of the pale-faced students in the φροντιστήριον of the Clouds is the best commentary on this popular impression' (Geddes). Cp. v. 103 τοῦς ἄχριστας, τοὺς ἀνυποδητοὺς λέγεις, 504 ἡμεθὺς γενησομαι (if I become like Chaerephon).

σφᾶς, sc. τοὺς πολλοὺς. 5 τοῦτο πάσχειν, sc. τεθνάναι. Tr. 'It would serve them right'.

χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκεῖνος, 'dismissing them from our thoughts.' Tr. 'Never mind them, but let us discuss among ourselves'. Cp. 63 e 3 n.

ἡγούμεθα τι τὸν θανάτον εἶναι: Socrates regularly begins a dialectical argument by asking whether we attach a definite meaning to the name of the thing under discussion. Cp. Gorg. 464 a 1 σῶμα ποὺ καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχῆν, Prot. 358 d 5 καλεῖτε τι δέος καὶ φόβον; Meno, 75 e 1 τελειτὴν καλεῖς τι; 76 a 1 ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι; so below 103 c 11 θερμῶν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχῶν;

ἀλλο τι ἡ, 'anything else than.' Here the words have their full
sense; but, if we suppress the ἀρα μή which introduces them, we see how ἄλλο τι ἦ came to be used as an interrogative = nonne.

c 5 τούτο: pred. ‘that death is this’, which is further explained by χωρίς μὲν κτλ. The same definition is given in Gorg. 524 b 2 ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὡν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οἱδέν ἄλλο ἦ δυσῶν πραγμάτων διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. For τὸ τεθνάναι cp. 62 a 5.

c 6 αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ‘alone by itself.’ The emphatic αὐτός often acquires a shade of meaning which we can only render by ‘alone’. So εἰν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν εἰρήσθαι, αὑτοὶ γὰρ ἐσμεν. Observe especially the substitution of μόνην καθ' αὑτίν, 67 d 1.

c 8 ἀρα μή ... ἤ; ‘surely it can be nothing else than this, can it?’ The interrogative form of the idiomatic ἀρα μή in cautious assertions’ is very rare, and occurs only four times in Plato (Goodwin, M. T., § 268).

c 10 Σκέψαι δὴ κτλ. Three arguments are given (1) the philosopher holds bodily pleasures cheap, (2) the body impedes the search for truth, (3) the things which the philosopher seeks to know cannot be perceived by the bodily senses.


d 3 οἶνον has become purely adverbial and always stands outside the construction of the sentence. Cp. 73 d 3; 78 d 10; 83 c 1.

d 6 Τί δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀφροῦσιν; ‘what of the pleasures of love?’ Riddell (Dig. § 21) seems to be right in regarding this as a case where τί δὲ stands for a sentence, or part of a sentence, unexpressed, but hinted at in a following interrogation (here δοκεῖ σοι κτλ., d 8). Cp. e.g. Phileb. 27 e 1 τί δὲ ὁ σῶς (βιός); ἐν τίνι γένει ... ὅρθως ἐν ποτὲ λέγωτο; and below 78 d 10.

d 8 τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας, cultus corporis. We see here how περὶ c. acc. comes to be used as equivalent to a genitive. So just below, d 11.

d 9 ἐντίμους ἠγείροντοι, i.e. τιμῶ, ‘to value’, ‘esteem’, ‘appreciate’ (τιμῆ, ‘price’), opp. ἀτιμάζειν, ‘to hold cheap.’

diaφερόντοι, ‘better than other people’s.’

c 4 πραγματεία, ‘business’, ‘concern’, rather different from 63 a 1 above.

65 a 5 ὃ μηδὲν ... μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν, ‘that, for the man to whom none
of these things is pleasant, and who takes no part in them.' The rule is that, when the second relative would be in a different case from the first, it is either omitted (cp. 81 b 5; 82 d 2) or replaced by a demonstrative. Not understanding the construction BTW give μετέχεων, but the true reading is preserved by Lamblichus (fourth cent. A.D.).

ἐγγὺς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι, 'that he runs death hard.' Cp. Rep. 548 d 8 ἐγγύς τι αὔτῶν Ἑλάκτων τοιοῦτοι τείνειν ἐνεκί γε φιλονικίας, Θεατ. 169 a 9 σι δέ μοι δοκεῖ πρῶς τὸν Σκίρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. It seems to me that this 'objectless' use of τείνειν is derived from racing (τείνειν δρόμον, cursum tendere), and that the meaning is 'to run hard', 'to run close'. This view is confirmed by a comparison of Cret. 402 c 2 (ταῦτα) πρὸς τὰ τῶν Ὑπακειτὸν πάντα τείνειν with ἰβ. 409 a 7 τοῦτο... φαίνεται τὸν Ἀναβαγόραν πιέζειν, where πιέζειν may very well mean πρεμερε, 'to press hard.' The use of τείνειν in this sense, 'to hold one's course' in a certain direction, 'to be bound for,' 'tend' points to the same interpretation. So also ἐγγύς, ὁμοῦ τι ἐλαύνειν. For the thought, cp. Soph. Ant. 1165 τῶς γὰρ ἡδονᾶς | ὅταν προβάδισω ἄνδρες, αὐ τίθημι ἐγώ | ζην τοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἐμψυχον ἥγούμαι νεκρῶν. This is a good commentary on 64 b 6 βανιτῶσι.

Τὶ δὲ κτλ. The second argument. The body impedes the search for truth.

καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ: this cannot, I think, refer to Parmenides and Empedocles, as Olympiodorus suggests and most editors repeat. They would hardly be spoken of as 'even the poets'. Epicharmus, whom he also mentions, is more possible (cp.fr. 249 νοῦς ὁρὴ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τάλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά). More likely still, the reference is, as Olympiodorus also suggests, to Hom. II. v. 127 ἀχλῆν ὅ αὖ τοι ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἐλον, ἢ πρὶν ἐπῆλεν, | ὃφρ' εὖ γιγνώσκεις ἥμεν θεῶν ἥδε καὶ ἄνδρα.

At any rate, the ἀχλῆς of this passage is often referred to by later Platonists as an allegory of the infirmity of sense-perception, and such allegorizing interpretation was already common in the fifth cent. B.C.

περὶ τὸ σῶμα, i. e. τοῦ σῶματος. Cp. 64 d 8 n.
σαφεῖς, 'trustworthy.' Cp. 57 b 1 n.
σχολῆς, νῦν'. Cp. our phrase 'It will take him all his time'.
ἐν τῷ λογιζομέναι, 'in mathematical reasoning.' The primary sense 31
of the word is arithmetical 'calculation' (ψηφοις λογιζεσθαι), from which it was extended to geometrical demonstration, and finally to all exact and scientific reasoning. It is no paradox, but an obvious fact, that in mathematics the sense of sight only misleads, and yet we are sure that there we reach the truth. The sense of hearing is mentioned with reference to the science of 'harmonics', which was just the mathematical treatment of the octave, and is more exact than tuning 'by ear' can ever be. To take the stock instance, 'the ear' does not reveal to us the impossibility of dividing a tone into two equal semitones; we only discover that by means of τὸ λογιζεσθαι.

C 3 τῶν ὄντων: the term τὰ ὄντα is used very vaguely in Plato, and may generally be rendered 'things'. Here, however, it is equivalent to τῶν ἀληθῶν. The verb ἐναι often means 'to be true', especially in Herodotus and Thucydides (cp. L. S., s. v. εἰμί A. III).

C 6 παραλυπῆ, 'annoys', 'irritates'. For the force of παρα-, cp. παρενοχλεῖν.

μηδὲ τὸς ἡδονῆ, 'nor any pleasure either.' This is preferable to the μήτε τὸς ἡδονῆ of ΤΠ.

C 7 αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτήν, 'alone by itself.' Cp. 64 c 6 n.

ἐῶσα χαίρειν, cp. 63 e 3 n.

C 9 τοῦ ὄντος, i. e. τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. Cp. above c 3 n.

C 11 καὶ ἐνταῦθα, 'in this case too,' i. e. ἐν τῇ τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσει (65 a 9). The καὶ refers to πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις (64 e 8).

D 4 Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιᾶδε κτλ. The third argument. The things the philosopher seeks to know are not perceptible by the bodily senses, but can only be apprehended by thought.

The present passage introduces us to what is generally called the 'Theory of Ideas'. The name is unfortunate; for in English 'idea' means something which is 'in the mind', and an 'idea' is often opposed to a 'reality', whereas the 'forms' (μορφαί, εἴδη, ἰδεῖα) are more real than anything else.

On the other hand, the 'forms' are not 'things' in time or space.

If we will only translate literally, and avoid loose 'philosophical' terminology, there is nothing in the doctrine here set forth which should be unintelligible to any one who understands a few propositions of Euclid and recognizes a standard of right conduct.
Let us begin with a mathematical instance. The geometer makes a number of statements about 'the triangle', as, for instance, that its interior angles are equal to two right angles, and we know that his statements are true. Of what is he speaking? Certainly not of any triangle which we can perceive by our senses (for all these are only approximately triangles), nor even of any we can imagine. He is speaking of what is 'just a triangle' (αυτό τριγώνων) and nothing more. Now, if geometry is true, that triangle must be the true triangle. It is from this consideration that the theory seems to have arisen.

The next step is to extend it to such things as 'right' (δίκαιον) and 'beautiful' (καλόν). We seem to be able to make true statements about these too; and, if so, it follows that τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ καλὸν must be real in the same sense as 'the triangle'. We have never had experience of a perfectly right action or a perfectly beautiful thing, yet we judge actions and things by their greater or less conformity to what is 'just right' (αυτὸ δίκαιον) and 'just beautiful' (αυτὸ καλὸν).

The 'forms', then, are what we really mean by 'triangle', 'right', 'beautiful', and it will be found helpful to think of them in the first place as meanings. There are, of course, further difficulties, but these can be dealt with as they arise. On the whole subject see A. E. Taylor, *Plato*, Chap. II.

φαίνει τι εἶναι ... ἡ οὐδὲν; 'Do we say there is such a thing ... or not?' It is to be noticed that, in introducing the doctrine, Socrates says 'we', and Simmias, to whom it is apparently familiar, accepts it enthusiastically, also using the first person plural. The suggestion clearly is that Socrates and Simmias are using the language of a school to which both belong. The same phenomenon recurs whenever the doctrine is mentioned. Cp. E. Gr. Ph.
Φαμεν μένται νη Δία, 'I should think we do!' The particle μένται is used when the emphatic word of a question is repeated in an affirmative answer (cp. 81d 6; 93c 2), and may be further strengthened by νη Δία (cp. 68b 7; 73d 11). Olympiodorus gives us the orthodox Platonist interpretation of this remark: ό Συμμίας ἐτοιμος συγκαταστήσει ('assents') τῷ περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν λόγῳ ως συνήθης ('familiar') Πυθαγορείας.

ψιλειάς, ἵσχυσι: the addition of medical ἐίδη like health and strength is significant. It has quite recently become known that Philolaus played an important part in the history of medicine (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 322). If medicine is a true science, its objects must be real like those of geometry.

καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν κτλ. The construction is καὶ ἐνι λόγῳ περὶ τῆς ὀντίας τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων, i.e. τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων is governed by ὀντίας, which is governed by περὶ understood. Tr. 'And, to sum up, I am speaking of the reality of all the rest, i.e. of what each of them really is'.

ἐνι λόγῳ: this phrase is not quite accurately rendered by 'in one word'; for λόγος does not mean 'a word', nor is there any Greek word for 'a word'. A λόγος is always a statement, and in the great majority of cases consists of several 'words'.

τῆς ὀντίας, 'the reality.' In this sense the term ὀντία was not familiar at Athens (where it meant 'property', 'estate'), and it is explained by σ γυγχάνει ἐκαστον ὄν, 'what a given thing really is' (cp. Meno 72b 1 μελίτης περὶ ὀντίας ὅτι ποτ' ἑστῖν). It was not, however, invented by Socrates, and still less by Plato. In Crat. 401c 3 we read ὁ ἢμεῖς "ὀντίαν" καλοῦμεν, εἰτέν οyclerview "ἐσσίαν" καλοῦσιν, οἵ δ' ἀν "ὠσίαν", and we see from 401d 3 that Socrates there means τὴν πάντων ὀντίαν, just as he does here. We could hardly be told more plainly that the term is Pythagorean. The fem. pcp. ἔσσα = ὀντία is genuine Doric, and ἔσσα is therefore a correct Doric form, while ὀντία, though only found now in pseudo-Pythagorean writings, may be justified by the Boeotian ἔσσα.

αὐτὸ ἐκαστον, 'any given thing by itself,' generalizing αὐτὸ δίκαιον, αὐτὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ μέγεθος, &c. If we wish to know a thing, we must think 'just that', e.g. 'just the triangle', leaving out of account its material, colour, &c., and even its particular shape (equilateral, isosceles, or scalene).
καθαρώτατα, 'most cleanly.' To the mathematical mind irrelev-
ancy suggests dirt. Later mathematicians speak of the 'elegance'
of a demonstration in a similar sense.

αὐτῷ τῇ διανοίᾳ, 'with thought alone.'

μήτε . . . παρατιθέμενος, 'without taking into account.' As τιθέναι
is used of 'setting down' an item in an account, it is probable that
παρατιθέναι is here equivalent to apponere (cp. Hor. Carm. i. 9. 15 lucrō
appaone), though I can find no exact parallel. The middle, as often,
would give the sense 'setting down to his own account'. If this is
correct, we must understand τῇ λογομοφο from the context.

τῷ ὀφνι: I have written τῷ for τῷ as being more idiomatic, and
because B has a superfluous τῷ in the next line, which I take to be
a correction of τῷ added after the wrong μήτε.

ἐφιλκων, 'trailing after him.'

αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ . . . αὐτό καθ' αὐτό: thought 'alone by itself'
apprehends its object 'alone by itself'. Cp. 64 c 6 n.

eἰλικρίνει . . . εἰλικρίνει: Cicero (Off. i. 4) translates sincerum,
Tertullian (de An. 41) germanum. The etymology is uncertain,
but the meaning is 'unmixed', 'unadulterated'. Valckenaer (quoted
by Stallbaum) says: proprie significat volvendo s. volubili agitatione
secretum, atque ad infra cribro purgatum, and 'sifted clean' would
certainly suit very well.

θηρεύειν: the favourite metaphor of Socrates. Cp. above 63 a 2 n.,
and 66 c 2 τῷ του ὀντως θήραν, 115 b 9 ὥσπερ κατ' ἵχνη.

tῶν ὁντων, 'things,' apparently, but at a 8 τοῦ ὀντος is 'the truth'.

ικ πάντων τούτων, as a conclusion from the three arguments just
given.

παριστασθαὶ δόξαν, 'that a belief like this should be brought home
to —.' Cp. 58 e 5 n.

γνησίως, 'genuinely,' much the same as ὀρθῶς (64 a 4; 67 e 4) and
ὁκενός (83 e 5).

ὧσπερ ἄτραπτος [τις], 'it looks as if a sort of by-way', 'a short cut
as it were'. The weight of evidence is slightly against the addition
of τις (W omits it in the text, and adds it in the margin); but,
whether it is added or not, the phrase is the subject of κυνωνειε (cp. Menu 70 c 4 ὥσπερ αὐχμος τις, 'a sort of drought'), and there is
no reason for inserting ὁ δύνατος after it with Tournier. Further,
the short cut is not death—the γνησίως φιλόσοφοι know there is no
thoroughfare that way—but the μελέτη θανάτου or philosophy itself. An ἀτραπός is properly a ‘track’ over hills or through woods (semita, sentier), which does not follow the turnings of the high road. The mountain-path taken by the Persians at Thermopylae is so called (Hdt. vii. 215, Thuc. iv. 36). There was a Pythagorean precept τὰς λεωφάριους μη βαδίζειν, ‘not to walk on highways,’ and Olympiodorus supposes a reference to this here. Though no doubt originally a mere taboo, it may quite possibly have received some such application as this by the end of the fifth century B.C. (E. Gr. Ph. p. 105). The Pythagorean idea of the ‘Way’ (ὁδὸς βίου) would naturally suggest the idea of the Narrow Path.

b 4 ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς: as the metaphor of hunting dominates the whole passage (cp. 66a3n. and c2 τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν), the meaning is really settled by Soph. Ai. 7 ἐὰν δὲ σ’ ἐκφέρει | κινῶς λακαίνης ὡς τις εὐριπος βάσις. ‘The by-way brings us on to the trail in our hunt after truth.’ It will be seen that the metaphor of the ἀτραπός gains very much when we bring it into close connexion with the hunt.

μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκίψει: these words have been variously interpreted. There is no difficulty about ἐν τῇ σκίψει except that the phrase is superfluous. As to μετὰ τοῦ λόγου it must mean the same thing as μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ above (66a1). Schleiermacher transposed the words, placing them after ἐχωμεν, where they make excellent sense; but, on the whole, it seems more likely that they are a marginal note on ἐχωμεν which has got into the wrong place.

b 5 ὅτι, ‘because.’

συμπεφυρμίνῃ: the word suggests the opposite of καθαρώτατα (65c6).

b 7 μωρίας... ὑσχολίας, ‘countless distractions.’

b 2 τοῦ ὄντος: i.e. τοῦ ἄληθοῦ (cp. b7).

b 3 εἰδώλων, ‘imagination.’

b 4 τὸ λεγόμενον, ‘as the saying is.’ This must refer to the phrase οὐδὲ φρουρήσα ἐγγίζεται, ‘we don’t even get a chance of thinking for it.’ We do not know what quotation or proverb Socrates refers to.

ὁς ἄληθῶς τὸ ὄντι, ‘in very truth.’ The two phrases are placed ἐκ παραλλήλου, as the grammarians say, and their effect is cumulative. Both (and in later dialogues ὄντως) are used to emphasize the
appositeness of quotations. We also find δέχεσθε in the same sense. 
Cp. 90 c 4.

διὰ γὰρ κτλ. The same account of the origin of war is put into the mouth of Socrates in Rep. 373 c 6. The dialogue of the Republic is supposed to take place during the Peloponnesian War, and that of the Phaedo while the memory of it was still fresh, and it was clearly recognized, especially by opponents of the war like Aristophanes, that commercial interests had a great deal to do with it. (Cp. the Acharnians on the Megarian decree.)

to δ' ἐσχατον, 'and the worst of all is that —.' Cp. τι δε μέγιστοι ὤτι (followed also by γάρ).


αὐτά τὰ πράγματα, 'things by themselves', 'just the things themselves'. There is no distinction between πράγματα and ὄντα.

φρονίσεως is assimilated in case to the preceding relative (Riddell, Dig. § 192). The phrase φρονίσεως ἐραστοί is an explication of the name φιλόσοφοι.

ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, 'as the argument signifies.' This is the only rendering which will suit all the passages where this phrase occurs, so we must not think of the ἐροῦς λόγον here.

διοῦν θάτερον: the regular way of introducing a dilemma.

δι᾽ ἕκαστα ἀνάγκη: cp. 64 e 1 καθ᾽ ὁσον μὴ πολλῆ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν, 83 a 6 ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι.

μηδὲ ἀναπαύμεθα, 'nor suffer the contagion of.' Cp. Thuc. ii. 51 (in the description of the Plague) ἔτερος ἂφ᾽ ἐτέρου θεραπείας ἀναπαύμενοι ('one catching the infection from tending another') ὥσπερ πρόβατα ἐθνηκόν. So also 83 d 10 τὸν σώματος ἀναπλάεια.

μετὰ τοιούτων: sc. καθαρῶν (Riddell, Dig. § 54). Some suppose this to be neuter and refer it to αὐτά τὰ πράγματα or ὄντα, but it is far better to take it of the 'great company' of which Socrates speaks above (63 b 8). The καθαροὶ are in Orphic language 'the saints'.

δι᾽ ἵμας αὐτῶν: no longer 'through a glass darkly'.

τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἰσως τὸ ἀληθὲς, 'and that, I take it, is the truth.' Cp. 66 b 7 φαμέν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθὲς. No real doubt is expressed by ἰσως. Cp. opinor.

μὴ οὐ ... ἢ, 'I fear it is not.' For this characteristically
Flatonic idiom (he has it thirty-five times) see Goodwin, M. T., § 265.

b 4 τοῖς ὀφθαλοφοῖς φιλομαθεῖς, equivalent to τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφους (cp. 66 b 2); for φιλομαθῆς is freely used as an equivalent of φιλόσοφος, and ὀφθαλόφος refers to the ὀρθότης ὑμωματω. It means those who are φιλόσοφοι ‘in the true sense of the word’, those who ‘have a right to the name’. So in 82 c 2 οἱ ὀφθαλοφοὶ φιλόσοφοι are the same as οἱ ὑμωματω φιλομαθεῖς 83 e 5. For this sense of ὀφθαλόφος cp. Eur. Alc. 636 οὐκ ἥσθ’ ἄρ’ ὀφθαλόφος τοῦτε σώματος πατήρ; Ἡππ. 1169 ὥς ἄρ’ ἥσθ’ ἤμως πατήρ ὀφθαλόφος, Ἀνδρων. 376 οὕτως φιλῶν ὀφθαλόφος πεφύκασθαι.

b 8 ἔλπις ... κτῆσασθαι: the aor. inf. is preferred after ἔλπις ἔστω (cp. 68 a 1 ἔλπις ἔστω τοι ... τυχεῖν).

b 10 πραγματεία: cp. 64 c 4.

η σὲ: i.e. the Socratic circle.

c 2 ἄλλῳ ὑποτι, ‘for any one else’, a more emphatic ἄλλῳ τιν.”

c 5 Κάθαρσις: this is the central idea of Orphicism (cp. 61 a 3 n.). The Pythagoreans seem to have added the practice of κάθαρσις by science to the original κάθαρσις by abstinence and the like (E. Gr. Ph. p. 107).

τοῦτο is the predicate, and is used πραέπαρατε. Cp. 62 a 2 n.

συμβαίνει is here personal. For the other construction cp. 74 a 2.

ὦσπερ πάλαι ... λέγεται: this has not been said in the course of the present argument, and must, I think, be understood in the light of 63 c 6 ὦσπερ ... πάλαι λέγεται and the πάλαις λόγος of 70 c 5. Cp. also 69 c 5 πάλαι αὕτης σθαν. It seems to be the regular way of referring to the Orphic ἔρως λόγος, ‘as is said by those of old in the Word’ (cp. E. Gr. Ph. p. 146, n. 3).

c 6 τὸ χωρίζειν κτλ. As Wohlrab justly remarked, this is to be understood in the light of the account given in Symp. 174 c and 220 c of Socrates standing still and silent for hours at a time. The religious term for this was ἐκκατασθε, ‘stepping outside’ the body.

d 1 μόνην καθ’ αὐτήν: syn. αὐτήν καθ’ αὐτήν. Cp. 64 c 6 n.

ὦσπερ [ἐκ] δεσμῶν κτλ. There is considerable uncertainty about the reading. The commonest idiom is ὦσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν τοῦ σώματος, but sometimes the preposition is repeated (cp. 82 c 3; 115 b 9). In Tim. 79 a 3 we have ὦσπερ αὐλῶνος διὰ τοῦ σώματος.

d 8 ὀφθαλόφος: cp. 67 b 4 n.
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Γελοιον' πῶς δ' οὖ; The MSS. have οὗ γελοιον; and give the words to Socrates, but we should then expect ἦ οὗ γελοιον; The Petrie papyrus has only room for seven letters, so I have deleted οὗ and given γελοιον to Simmias.

ei ... διαβιβληται, 'if they are at variance with', 'estranged from' the body. The original sense of διαβιβληται is 'to set at variance', εἰς ἐχθραν καθιστάναι.

ei φοβοῖντο: T omits ei, but its repetition is natural in a binary protasis like this, especially as there is a change of mood, and ei has a slightly different meaning in the two clauses.

ei μη ... ίοιεν: this simply repeats ei φοβοῖντο in a negative form (a b a). Cp. Afol. 20c σοῦ γε οὗδεν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον παραμισθευμένον ... ei μη τι ἐπραττες ἄλλοιον ή οἱ πολλοί.

ἡ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν κτλ. A good instance of the disjunctive question, in which two statements are bound together in a single interrogation to signify that they cannot or should not both be true at once. In such questions ἀρα (a 7) is regular in the second clause. We must subordinate the first to the second ('Can it be that, where-as . . .?') or use two sentences. In Symp. 179 b sqq. Alcestis, Eurydice, and Patroclus are given as examples of 'human loves' whom men have gone to seek beyond the grave. Such loves are contrasted with the 'divine beloved' of which Socrates speaks in the Gorgias (482 a 4 φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικὰ).

μετελθεῖν, 'to go in quest of.' The MS. authority is in favour of ἐλθεῖν, but the μετελθεῖν of T is too good for a mere error.

φρονήσεως . . . ἐρών: syn. φιλοσοφος. Cp. 66 e 3 n.

οἴσθαί γε χρή, 'I should think so!'

μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοι κτλ. It is noteworthy that the reading which the original scribe (B, not B²) has added in the margin (with the mono- gram for γραφηται) is that of the Petrie papyrus, which was written within a hundred years of Plato's death. This shows how old some of those variants are.

διπερ ἄρτη ἔλεγον, sc. 67 e 9. The antecedent to the relative is the following question.

μέντοι νὴ Δία: cp. 65 d 6 n.

to to is used praeparative (cp. 62 a 2 n.) and refers to the relative clause δν ἦν ἐδῆς κτλ. This construction is as old as Homer (II. xiv. 81 βέλτερον δς φεύγων προφύγη κακών ἥ ἄλωγ). Cp. Thuc. vi.
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14 το καλῶς ἀρξαί τούτ' εἶναι ὅσ ἀν τὴν πατρίδα ὀφελήσῃ, Xen. Oec. 4.
19 ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἤγοιμαι μέγα τεκμήριων ἀρχοῦτος ἁρετής εἶναι, φάν ἂν ἐκόντες ἔπουνται.

b 9 οὐκ ἂρ' ἦν: the use of the imperfect of something just realized was first explained by Heindorf in his note on this passage. With this imperfect ἂρα represents our 'So!' of surprise. 'So he isn't a philosopher after all!'

c 2 φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος: the tripartite division of the soul which plays so great a part in the Republic is here implied; for χρήματα are the object of ἐπιθυμία and τιμή of θυμός. We find φιλοχρήματος as a synonym of ἐπιθυμητικός in Rep. 436a1; 549b2.
580 c 2 ἐπιθυμητικόν γὰρ αὐτὸ κεκλικαμεν . . . καὶ φιλοχρήματον δὴ, ὅτι διὰ χρημάτων μάλιστα ἀποτελοῦνται αἱ τουαντα ἐπιθυμία, 581 a 5 τούτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος . . . καλοῦντες φιλοχρήματο καὶ φιλοκερδές ὅρθως ἂν καλοῖμεν.
So φιλότιμος is a regular synonym of θυμοειδής, e.g. 551 a 7 ἀντὶ δὴ φιλονίκων καὶ φιλοτιμῶν ἀνθρώπων φιλοχρήματισται καὶ φιλοχρήματο τελευτῶντος ἐγένοντο. This somewhat primitive psychology is doubtless older than Socrates; for it stands in close relation to the Pythagorean doctrine of the 'Three Lives' (E. Gr. Ph. 2 pp. 108, 109, n. 1). To Plato the soul is really one and indivisible, in spite of the use he makes of the older view. Cp. Galen, de Hipp. et Plat., p. 425 ὡς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος φησιν ἐκεῖνον (Πυθαγόρου) πρώτων μὲν εἶναι λέγον τὸ δύσμα, ΠΛάτωνα δὲ ἔτεργάσασθαι καὶ κατασκεύασαι τελεώτερον αὐτόν, ἵκ. 478 Ποσειδώνιος δὲ καὶ Πυθαγόραν φησίν, αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ Πυθαγόραν συγγρήμαμας συνθένως εἰς ἡμᾶς διασφοδρόμενου, τεκμηρόμενον δὲ ἐκ ὧν ἐνοίᾳ τῶν μνημών αὐτοῦ γεγράφασαν. Iamblichus, ap. Stob. Ecl. i, p. 369 (Wachsmuth) Οἱ δὲ περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀρχίτας καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ Πυθαγόρειοι τῆν ψυχὴν τριμερῆ ἀποφαινόνται, διαφορώντες εἰς λογισμὸν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. Posidonius is not likely to have been mistaken on such a point.

τὰ ἄτερα . . . ἀμφάτερα: for the plural pronouns referring to a single fact see Riddell, Dig. § 42.

c 5 καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζομένη: this is more clearly expressed at c 8 ἵν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομαζομένη.

c 6 τοῖς οὖν διακεκλαμένοις: this is made more explicit below, c 11.

c 8 Οὐκοῦν is repeated by c 10 ἂρα οὐ.

ἵν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ κτλ. This is best explained by Laws 710 a 5 τὴν ἀνακώφη γε (σωφροσύνη) . . . καὶ ὃς ἵν τις σεμνύνων ἂν λέγοι, φρόνησιν
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προσαναγκάζων εἶναι τὸ σωφρονεῖν. We are not speaking here of courage and σωφροσύνη in the high Socratic sense in which they are identical with knowledge.

ἐπτούσθαι, 'to be excited.' This verb suggests primarily the quickened heartbeat of fear or desire. Cp. Hom. Od. xxii. 298 φρένες ἐπτούθεν, Sappho 2. 6 τῷ μοι μίαν | καρδίαν ἐν στήθεσιν ἐπτόωσεν.

ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν: Philosophy is a life. Cp. Theaet. 174 b 1 ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγνωσε and 61 a 3 ἦν.

εἰ ... ἔθελες, 'if you care.' Cp. Prot. 324 a 3; 342 d 6. Meno 71 a 1.

τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν: it is unnecessary to add εἶναι to the partitive genitive, but there was evidently an ancient variant τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν εἶναι which is hardly consistent with μεγίστων κακῶν just below, by which phrase such things as dishonour and slavery are intended.

ὁταν ὑπομίνωσιν: the addition of such phrases is almost a mannerism. There is no emphasis, and the meaning is merely ἐκάστοτε, ὡσταν τύχῃ, 'on occasion.' Cp. Euthyphro 7 d 4 ἐχθροὶ ἄλληλοι γεγόμεθα, ὡσταν γεγόμεθα.

ἄλογον: cp. 62 b 2 ἦν.

οἱ κόσμοι: syn. οἱ σωφρονεῖ. Cp. 83 e 6. Attic tends to substitute less emphatic words for adjectives implying praise. So ἄγαθός is represented by στουδάιος, ἑπεικίς, χρηστός, μέτριος, and σοφός by χαρίεις, καμψίς, &c. There is the same tendency in English; cp. 'decent,' 'respectable' as substitutes for 'good'.

ἀκολασία τινὶ κτλ., 'it is immorality that makes them moral.' The appositive structure is regular after τούτῳ τάχειοι. Cp. below 73 d 7 (Riddell, Dig. § 207). The regular opposite of σωφροσύνη (the virtue of moral sanity, for which English has no name) is ἀκολασία. The literal meaning of ἀκόλαστος is 'unchastened'.

καὶ τόι φαρέων γε ... ἄλλο ἄμως ... , 'we say, indeed ... but yet ...' For this combination of particles, which marks a concession afterwards partially retracted, cp. below e 7 and Euthyphro 3 c 2 καὶ τόι οὐδεὶς ὥστε αὐξήθησαι καὶ προειπον, ἄλλο ἄμως ...

συμβαινεῖ ... ἄροιον, 'turns out in their case to be like this.' TW add εἶναι, but cp. Gorg. 479 e 8 συμβαινεῖ μέγιστον κακῶν ἡ ἀδικία.

τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ κτλ., 'the condition of —' (περὶ, c. acc. as a genitive equivalent).
5 \tau\upsilon\nu\nu, istam.
\varepsilon\upsilon\nu\theta\eta, 'naive', 'unsophisticated', 'artless'. The Petrie papyrus reads \delta\nu\delta\rho\alpha\pi\omicron\delta\omega\nu\theta\eta, but that seems to be an anticipatory recollection of 69 b 8.

69 a 6 \mu\eta...\omicron\alpha\upsilon\nu\upsilon\nu, 'perhaps this is not —.' Cp. 67 b 2 n.
\pi\rho\omicron\dot{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\eta\nu, 'judged by the standard of goodness.' Cp. Isocr. 4. 76 ω\omicron\dot{\alpha}\pi\rho\omicron\dot{\alpha}\nu\tau\omicron 46 \varepsilon\upsilon\delta\alpha\mu\omicron\nu\nu\alpha\nu\tau\omicron \dot{\epsilon}\kappa\rho\iota\mu\omicron\nu (Riddell, Dig. § 128). We can hardly give \pi\rho\omicron\dot{\alpha}s the same sense as in the next line; for there is no question of exchanging pleasures and pains for goodness. Goodness is the standard of value, and wisdom (\phi\rho\alpha\nu\nu\sigma\iota\nu) is the only currency in which it can be rightly estimated. Nor can \pi\rho\omicron\dot{\alpha}s mean 'towards', 'in the direction of'. That interpretation is a survival from the time of the vulgate text, which omitted \alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha\gamma\eta and had to be understood as \eta \dot{\alpha}r\theta\eta \pi\rho\omicron\dot{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\eta\nu (sc. \dot{\omicron}\omicron\omicron\delta\omicron\omicron). The disappearance of \alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha\gamma\eta from the text is an interesting study in corruption. B has \alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha, and T must have had the same; for it presents us with an erasure of four letters. The vulgate text came from a copy of T. W and Iamblichus preserve the word.

a 7 \pi\rho\omicron\dot{\alpha}s \eta\delta\omicron\nu\nu\nu, 'for pleasures,' contra voluptates.

a 8 \mu\epsilon\zeta\omicron\dot{\omega} \pi\rho\omicron\dot{\alpha}s \epsilon\lambda\acute{\alpha}\tau\pi\omicron\omicron, i.e. greater pains and fears for less, and lesser pleasures for greater, e.g. the fear of slavery for the fear of death, the pleasures of the table for the pleasures of health.

a 9 \alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha \upsilon, i.e. \alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha \mu\eta \upsilon, the construction being carried on from a 6. Pleasures and pains are to be exchanged for wisdom, which alone makes goodness truly good. If we give up the pleasures of the table, not merely to enjoy the pleasures of health, but because they stand in the way of the acquisition of wisdom, we may be said to exchange them for wisdom, and that is true \sigma\omicron\nu\phi\rho\omicron\omicron\sigma\omicron\omicron\upsilon. So, if we only face death to escape slavery, that is mere popular courage. To put the thing in a modern way, this is a sort of ethical mono-metallism, wisdom being the gold standard of value.

b 1 καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα κτλ. I think it certain that this sentence is interpolated. The words τούτου μὲν πάντα clearly belong to ω\nu\omicron\nu\-\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha\nu \tau\epsilon \kappaα\omicron\alpha\kappa\omicron\omicron\epsilon\upsilon\alpha, and their meaning must be 'all things bought and sold for wisdom', but it is hardly credible that Plato should use ω\nu\omicron\nu\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha as a passive, or that he should use πι\tau\pi\rho\a\sigma\kappa\omicron\alpha\kappa\omicron\omicron\epsilon\upsilon\alpha at all. For \omicron\nu\epsilon\iota\sigma\theta\omicron\iota\nu in a passive sense, the grammars can only quote Xen. Eg. 8. 2 ο\ς\nu\mu \gamma\upsilon \epsilon\nu\nu\epsilon\iota\upsilon\omicron\omicron\upsilon, πειρά\omicron\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon \epsilon\kappa\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\upsilon\omicron\omicron\upsilon \epsilon\iota \delta\omicron\nu\nu\iota\omicron\upsilon\omicron.
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ο ἵππος ταίτα ποιείν, but there it is clearly active, 'at the time he was buying it.' As to πιπρακτίμενα, Cobet's remark is true: Neque Iones neque Attici ea forma utuntur, sed apud sequiores protrita est (Nov. Lect. p. 158). It occurs only in one other place (Soph. 224 a 3), where also it seems to be interpolated. I believe, then, that τούτου μὲν πάντα ὀνομένα καὶ πιπρακτίμενα is a scholium on καὶ μετὰ τοῦτου. The interpretation is wrong, as Wytenbach saw; for we are not supposed to buy and sell goodness for wisdom, but to buy wisdom with pleasures, &c. If we take the sentence thus, the simile does not break down, as Geddes and Archer-Hind say it does.

μετὰ τοῦτου τῷ ὄντι ἃ ἐπίτημα, 'when accompanied by this (i.e. wisdom) our goodness really is goodness.' The words μετὰ τοῦτου are explained by b 4 μετὰ φρονῆσεως and opposed to b 6 χωριζόμενα δὴ φρονήσεως. I should like to read μετὰ μὲν τοῦτου. If I am right about the interpolation, it implies this reading.

καὶ ἀνδρεία κτλ. In the Protagoras Socrates shows that true courage only belongs to those who are ὑπραδελφοί μετ’ ἐπιστήμης. This is the way in which he interpreted the doctrine, which was common to him and to the 'Sophists', that Goodness is Knowledge. The distinction between 'philosophic' and 'popular' goodness came to be of great importance. Cp. my edition of Aristotle's Ethics, pp. 65 sqq. (where, however, I have ascribed to Plato what I now see belongs to Socrates).

καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ὑπογιγνομένων, 'whether they be added or not.' The verbs are virtual passives of προστιθέναι and ἀφαιρεῖν, 'to add' and 'to subtract.' Cp. προσέιναι, προσκείσθαι.

χωριζόμενα δὴ κτλ. As the participle agrees with πάντα παύτα (b 1), i.e. pleasures, pains, &c., there is a slight anacoluthia in μὴ ... ἥ τοιαύτη ἀρετή. Socrates means 'the goodness which depends upon the exchange of fears, pleasures, &c., for one another apart from wisdom'.

καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα: as καὶ is omitted in B, it is probably an interpolation arising from failure to see that χωριζόμενα is dependent on ἀλλαττόμενα (cp. 61 b 2 n.). The meaning will then be 'exchanged for one another apart from wisdom' (opp. μετὰ τοῦτου).

σκιαγραφία τις, 'a sort of scene-painting' (Cope). Cp. Photius σκιαγράφου ὁ νῦν σκηνογράφος. The term does not mean 'a rough
sketch', but implies the use of painted shadows to produce the impression of solid relief on a flat surface. This art has two chief characteristics: (1) it is deceptive, cp. Critias 107 d ο��αγραφία ... αἰσθαεῖ καὶ ἀπαθηλῳ, (2) it only produces its effect from a distance. Cp. Theaet. 208 e 7 ἐπειδὴ ἔγγυς ὁπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, συνήμισυ οὐδὲ σμικρῶν ἔως δὲ ἀφειστική πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνετο τί μοι λέγεσθαι. The most instructive passage is Rep. 365 c 3 πρᾶθημα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλω περὶ ἐμαυτῶν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετής περιγραφτέν, where the idea is that of a 'painted façade', on which columns, &c., are made to appear solid by skillful shading. Cp. also Rep. 583 b 5 and Parm. 165 c 7. When Aristotle (Rhet. 1414 a 8) compares the diction of the public speaker (δημογορικὴ λέξεως) to σκιαγραφία, he does not mean that it is 'sketchy', but that it requires the light and shade to be 'laid on thick'.

b 7 ἀνδραπόδωδης: so in Rep. 430 b 7 Socrates opposes true courage to τὴν ... θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραπόδωδη, and in Phaedr. 258 c 5 he says of bodily pleasures δικαίως ἀνδραπόδωδες κέκληται, just because they imply preceding pain (τὸ προλυπηθημένον).

b 8 οὐδὲν ἔγνοις ... ἐξῆν, 'has nothing sound about it.' The word ἔγνοις is used of earthen or metal vessels which have no crack or flaw (opp. σαθρός). The old variant ἔχωνα for ἔχεισ gives a smoother construction, but we may easily understand ἔθη after τε in b 8. See Vahlen, Opusc. ii. 361.

c 1 καθαροίς, 'purification.' Cp. 61 a 3 n. In Xen. Symp. 1. 4 Callias son of Hipponicus uses the phrase ἀνδράσι τῆς ψυχῆς ὁπερ ἵμαν in addressing Socrates, Critobulus, Hermogenes, Antisthenes, and Charmides. He seems to have heard something of Socrates' teaching on this point, unless he is merely drawing on the Phaedo.

c 2 καθαρμός: this is the specifically religious term for the initiatory ceremony of 'purification'. The religious poem of Empedocles was entitled καθαρμοῖ (E. Gr. Ph. 2 pp. 256 sqq.).

c 3 τὰς τελετὰς: the mystic 'initiations'. The context shows that the people referred to are the ὘ρφεοτελεσταῖ.

c 4 οὖν, istringstream. The touch of ironical condescension is characteristically Socratic (cp. 62 b 5 n.). It is plain that Socrates did not
think much of the actual 'Orphoeotelestaι of his time, who are described in the Republic (364 e 3 sqq.) in terms which suggest the itinerant friars, pardoners, and traffickers in indulgences of the later Middle Ages.


αἰνίττεθαί, 'to speak in riddles' (αινίγματα). The word is regularly used of allegorical statements. It comes from Ion. αἰνός, 'fable', 'riddle' (cp. 61 b 4 n.). For πάλαι cp. 67 c 5 n.

ἐν βορβύρῳ κείσται, 'will lie in the Slough.' Cp. Rep. 363 d 5 (of the Orpheotelestaei) τοὺς δὲ ἀνοσίους αὐτῷ καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλὸν τινα καταράστουσιν ἐν "Ἄιδον. The βορβύρῳ is also referred to in Ar. Fraggs 145 εἶτα βόρβυρον πολὺν | και σκόριει αἰείνων ἐν δὲ τούτῳ κειμένων | εἰ που ξένων τις ἡδυκε σκλ., and Olympiodorus is doubtless right in saying παροδεῖ ἐπον 'Ορφικῶν. Heindorf quotes a saying of the Cynic Diogenes (Diog. Laert. vi. 39) γελοιον εἰ 'Ἀγγάλαιος μὲν καὶ Ἐπαμεινόνδας ἐν τῷ βορβύρῳ διάξωσιν, εὐτελεῖς δὲ τινὲς μεμημένου | εἰ ταῖς μακάρων νόσσως ἐξονται. We must interpret Rep. 533 d 1 τῷ ὄντι ἐν βορβύρῳ βιβραίρικῷ τινὶ τῷ θυσίας ὄμμα καταραφριγμένον in the light of this.

ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοὶ: Plato often adapts the beginning of a verse to his own prose, preferring to slip into the verse rather than give a formal quotation. The original must have been πολλοὶ μὲν ναρθηκοφόροι. The νάρθηξ (fertula communis) was the plant of which the Dionysiac thyrsus was made.

βάκχοι: the true worshippers were so called (cp. the βάκχαι of Euripides). Schol. Ar. Knights 406 Βάκχοι οὐ τὸν Διόνυσον ἐκάλον μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντας τοὺς τελεύτας τὰ ὀργα. See Farnell, Cults of the Greek States, vol. v, p. 151.

ὁρθῶς, 'in the true sense of the word.' Cp. 67 b 4 n.

ὤν ... γενίσθαι, 'to become one of whom', 'to join whose number'.

οὐδὲν ἀπέλλειπον, 'I have left nothing undone.' The phrase states negatively what is positively stated by παντὶ τρόπῳ προυθυμήθην (cp. Meno 77 a 3 προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω), 'I have done my best in every way.'

καὶ τι ἡμύσαμεν: i. e. 'I and the rest of the band'. The shift from singular to plural is quite natural. To read ἡμύσαμεν with Heindorf
would make the plurals which follow (ἐλθόντες ... εἰσόμεθα) very awkward.

d 5 τὸ σαφές, 'for certain.'  Cp. 57 b i n.

d 7 ταύτ', .. ἀπολογοῦμαι ὦς ..., 'this is the defence I make to show that —.'  Cp. 63 e 8.

d 8 τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας:  cp. 62 e 1 ; 63 a 6 sqq.

e 1 κάκει:  cp. 64 a 1 n.

e 3 τοῖς δὲ ... παρέχει: these words seem to have been interpolated here from 70 a 1.  They break the sentence awkwardly and spoil the effect of the phrase when it comes in its proper place.  Such things do not often happen in the text of Plato, but they happen sometimes.

(3) Cebes points out that all this implies the immortality of the soul, and asks that this should be established (69 e 6—70 c 3).

e 6 ὑπολαβῶν:  cp. 60 c 8 n.

70 a 4 εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη κτλ.  Riddell (Dig. § 207) takes these words down to οὐδαμοῦ ἓα as explanatory of the preceding clause ('binary structure').  I have punctuated after a 4 σώματος with Heindorf.  Then καὶ will co-ordinate διαφθείρηται καὶ ἀπολλύσῃ ταῖς οἰχήται, and ἐκβάλουσα will belong only to the second clause.  It is easy to 'understand' σώματος with it.

a 5 ἡσπερ πνεῦμα ἡ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα: this is the belief assumed throughout the Homeric poems.  The ψυχή is the 'ghost' which a man 'gives up', the breath which he 'expires' at death.  For the καπνὸς cp. II. xxiii. 100 ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἥπε ταὐτὲς καπνὸς | ὀχέτο τετριγύνα, a verse selected for special reprobation by Socrates in the Republic (387 a 1).

a 6 οὐδὲν ἐτι οὐδαμοῦ ἡ: Homer does not go so far as this; for even in the House of Hades there is a ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον.  But it might just as well be nothing and nowhere; for it is witless (ἀπὸ φρένες υἷκ ἐν πάμπνων, II. xxiii. 104).

αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν συνηθροισμένη:  cp. 67 c 8.

b 2 παραμυθῆς, 'persuasion', 'reassurance'.  Cp. Laws 720 a 1 παραμυθῆς ... καὶ πειθός.  The original sense of παραμυθείσθαι is 'to talk over' (cp. παράφημι, παρέπιπτον, παραπτείθω) as in 83 a 3.  The meanings 'encourage', 'console', as in 115 d 5, are secondary.  πίστεως, 'proof,' not 'belief'.

46
there seems to be no rule for the addition or omission of
the article with ψυχή. Where MSS. differ, the less commonplace
use without the article is to be preferred.

δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν: even Homer allows that souls ‘are
somewhere’ after death, but Cebes wishes to be assured that they
are not merely ἀμενηνά κάρηνα (this is the point of δύναμιν ἔχει), of
whom it can be said φρένες οὐκ ἐν πάμπαν. Here, then, φρόνησις is
not equivalent to σοφία, but is used in its popular sense, answering
to the Homeric φρένες.

'Αληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης: for the interlaced order (a b a b)
cp. 77 c 1 ; 78 a 10 ; 78 c 5 ; 82 c 9 ; 83 e 4 (Riddell, Dig. § 288).

διαμιμολογώμεν: cp. μυθολογεῖν, 61 e 2 n. The word is specially
appropriate as introducing εἴτε εἰκὸς κτλ.

κωμιδοποιῶ: Aristophanes was not the only comic poet who made
fun of Socrates. Eupolis said (fr. 352) Μισῶ δὲ καὶ (τῶν) Σωκράτης, τῶν
πτωχῶν ἀδολεσχίν, ὧς τὰλλα μὲν πεφρόντικεν, ὧς ὥθησεν δὲ κατασφαγεῖν
ἐχομεν τοῦτο κατημέληκεν, a fragment preserved by Olympiodorus in
his commentary on this passage. The charge of ἀδολεσχία (‘gar-
rulity’) was commonly brought against all men of science by the
practical Athenians and the comic poets who wrote to please
them.

οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων, ‘about things which do not concern me’.
‘things I have nothing to do with’. For the position of the pre-
position see Riddell, Dig. § 298 and cp. 110 c 2.

First Proof of Immortality (70 c 4 – 77 d 5).

This proof is based upon two considerations (1) the doctrine of
παλιγγενεσία, (2) the doctrine of ἀνάμμησις. Neither of these taken
by itself furnishes a proof, though taken together they may be said
to do so (77 c 7).

With regard to the proofs of immortality, it should be observed
that the first two are successively abandoned as inadequate, while
even the third is said to require further examination (107 b 5). The
proof which satisfied Plato himself is not one of them (cp. 94 b 4 n.).
Nevertheless each contributes something to our knowledge of the
subject.
(1) The ancient doctrine of παλιγγενεσία is shown to rest on the
law of ἀνταπόδωσις (70 C 4—72 e 1).

c 4 αὐτό, 'the matter.'
c 5 παλαιός ... λόγος: cp. the way in which the same Orphic doctrine
is introduced in Μένος 81 a 5 ἀκήκοα γὰρ ἀνήρ τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν
περὶ τὰ θεία πράγματα... a 10 Οἱ μὲν λέγοντες εἰσὶ τῶν ἱερεῶν τε καὶ τῶν
ἱερεῖων δοσις μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν μεταχειρίζονταί λόγου ὦ οἷς τ' εἶναι διδάσκειν
λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλω πολλοί τῶν ποιητῶν ὄσον θείον εἰσιν. ἀ δὲ
λέγουσιν, ταυτὶ ἐστιν'... φασὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον,
καὶ τοτὲ μὲν τελευτῶν—ὅ δ' ἄποθενσαν καλοῦσι—τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι,
ἀπώλλυσθαι δ' οὐδέποτε. So Ἑρωδ. vii. 335 a 2 πείθεσθαι δ' ἄνωτος ὡς
χρή τοῖς παλαιοῖς τε καὶ ἱερεῖσι λόγοις; οἱ δ' οὕτως ὡς ἢμῖν ἀθάνατον
ψυχὴν εἶναι κτλ. For παλαιός cp. 67 c 5 n. Herodotus (ii. 123) is
mistaken in assigning an Egyptian origin to this doctrine (E. Gr. Ph. 2
p. 95).
c 6 ὡς εἰσίν ἐνθένθε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, 'that they are in the other world,
having come there from this.' There is no parallel to justify us in
taking εἰσίν ἀφικόμεναι together as if it were εἰσίν ἀφιγμέναι. Note
the interlaced order (a b a b).
c 8 πάλιν γίγνεσθαι: the regular name for this doctrine in later writers
is παλιγγενεσία. The word μετεμψύχωσις, though it has found its
way into all modern languages, is quite inaccurate, and is not used
before Graeco-Roman times, and then very seldom (Diodorus, Galen).
Cp. Servius on Αἰν. iii. 68 non μετεμψυχώσων sed παλιγγε-
νεσίαν esse dicit (Pythagoras). Hippolytus, Clement, and other
Christian writers say μετενσωμάτωσις ('reincarnation'), which is
accurate but cumbrous.
d 2 τοῦ ταύτ' εἶναι, 'of the truth of this.' For the neuter plural cp.
Riddell, Dig. § 41.
d 7 κατ' ἀνθρώπων: cp. Μένος 76 a 5 κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς χάριτας τοῦτο λέγω
(Riddell, Dig. § 121). Originally κατά, c. gen., is quite neutral in
meaning, especially in the phrase κατὰ πάντων (Iscor. 15. 189 ταῦτα...
κατὰ πασῶν λέγομεν τῶν τεχνῶν). From this use comes the Aristotelian
κατηγορεῖν τι κατὰ τινος, 'to predicate something of anything,' and
κατὰ ὅλου (Μένος 77 a 6), καθ' ὅλου, καθάλου.
e 1 ἄρ': indirect questions are not infrequently introduced by ἄρα.
Cp. Lach. 185 d 9 σκοπεῖν ἄρα..., Μενο 93 b 2 τάδε σκοποῦμεν, ἄρα..., Rep. 526 c 9 σκεφώμεθα ἄρα..., and just below e 4.

1 οὖτωσι: this is explained by οὐκ ἄλλοθεν κτλ. Cp. 71 a 9. Socrates generalizes the Orphic doctrine that the living are born from the dead, and treats it as a case of the principle, maintained by Heraclitus, of the generation of opposites from opposites (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 186).

2 ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὅν τοιούτον τι, 'everything, that is, which has an opposite,' equivalent to ε 5 ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἕναντίον.

3 καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία κτλ. For this way of breaking off an enumeration cp. 73 d 10; 94 b 10 (Riddell, Dig. § 257).

5 ὅσοις... αὐτῷ: for the singular pronoun referring to the plural ὅσοις cp. 104 d 2 (αὐτῷ referring to ἄ).

3 δύο γενέσεις: if opposites arise from one another, it follows that between every pair of opposites (μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἕναντίων) there must be two processes (γενέσεις), one by which A arises from B, another by which B arises from A.

3 αὐξησι καὶ φθοράς, 'increase and decrease.' We see from this passage that much attention had already been given to accuracy of terminology.

6 διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, 'decomposing and combining.' These terms were used by the early natural philosophers to denote the analysis of compound bodies into their constituents, and the formation of compound bodies out of something more primitive, such as what were called at a later date elements (στοιχεῖα).

7 κάν εἰ μή κτλ. The attempt to construct an accurate terminology in any language is sure to reveal gaps. In the Ethics Aristotle often has to say that the mean, or one or other of the extremes, is ἀνώνυμον. Cp. Bywater on Poet. 1447 b 9.

9 συγγαίνων, 'pair' (originally of oxen or horses). The word may be applied, however, to a larger number of things than two. In grammar it is a 'conjugation,' i.e. a class of verbs similarly inflected.

éγώ σοι, ἕφι, ἔρω, ὅ Σωκράτησ: for the interlaced order (a b a b) cp. 70 b 5 μ.

4 τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα, i. e. τοῖν ταύτων (περὶ c. acc. = gen.).

8 οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν; 'shall we not assign it an opposite process to balance it?'
NOTES

71

e 9 χωλή, 'halt', 'lame in one foot'. Cp. the advice of Cimon μήτε τίν 'Ελλάδα χωλίν, μήτε τίν πόλιν ἑτεροξυγια περιδειν γεγενημένην (Plut. Cim. 16).

e 13 ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, 'to come to life again.' Sometimes the verb is transitive, 'to bring to life again' (e.g. Crit. 48 c 5); but in that case the aorist is ἀναβιώσασθαι (not ἀναβιώναι), as below 89 b 10.

72 a 6 ἔδοκεί: 70 d 2.

a 11 ὅτι οἷς ἀδίκους κτλ., 'that we were not wrong either —'. Cp. 63 b 8 ἥδικουν ἄν, 'I should be wrong.

a 12 εἰ ... μὴ ... ἀνταποδίδοιτι, 'unless there were a constant correspondence.' The verb is here intransitive, as below b 8. Cp. L. S. s. v. ἀποδίδωμι 11.

b 1 κύκλῳ περιέντα: the κύκλος τῆς γενέσεως is Orphic. It was just from the Wheel of Birth that redemption (λύσις) was sought by means of purgatory observances (καθαρμοί). On one of the gold plates from Thuri (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 58) the ransomed soul says κύκλον ὑ ἐξέπταν βαρυπενθέος ἀργαλέως. Here, of course, the reference is to cyclical processes generally, but that is characteristic of the way in which a scientific sense is given to religious ideas throughout the passage.

b 2 εὐθείᾳ τις, 'in a straight line.' A rectilinear process is only in one direction, a circular has two.

b 3 καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι κτλ. The metaphor is taken from the δίανυσος, in which the runners turned round the καμπτὴρ and came back to the starting-point (Dict. Ant. s. v. Stadion, ii. 693 b). Cp. Aesch. Ag. 344 καρψαι διανύσων δάσερον κόλον πάλιν.

b 9 τελευτῶντα ... ἀποδείξεως, 'would end by making Endymion seem a thing of naught (a 'bagatelle') by comparison.' This use of ἀποδείκνυσι is fully illustrated in Wyttenbach's note. Cp. e. g. Plato, Phaedr. 278 c 6 λέγων αὐτός ... τά γεγραμμένα φαύλα ἀποδείξι, Epist. vii. 324 d 7 χρυσον ἀποδείξατο τῆν ἐμπροσθεν πολυτείαν, 'making the previous constitution seem like gold by comparison.' Plut. C. Gracch. i ἀπέδειξε τοὺς ἄκλους ῥήμαρα πσίδων μηδὲν διαφέροντας, Plato, Epist. iv. 320 d 6 παρασκευάζοι τὸν τε λυκοῦργον ἑκείνων ἀρχαίων ἀποδείξων καὶ τὸν Κύρον, 'to make them seem out of date by comparison.' Wyttenbach shows too that λήρος is regularly used in such comparisons. Cp. e. g. Arist. Lys. 860 λήρος ἐστι τάλλα πρὸς Κινήσιαν, Antiphanes fr. 232 ἄρ' ἐστὶ λήρος πάντα πρὸς τὸ χρυσίον; Xen. 50.
NOTES

An. vii. 7. 41 'Ἡρακλείδη λήρος πάντα ἐδόκει εἶναι πρὸς τὸ ἄργυριον ἕχειν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπον. The meaning is not 'to make the story of Endymion appear an idle tale', as most editors say. On the contrary, it would be all the more credible.

1 οὐδαμοῦ ἀν φάνοντο, 'he (note change of subject) would be nowhere,' an expression taken, like its English equivalent, from the race-course. Cp. Gorg. 456 b 8 οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανήμα τὸν ἰατρὸν, 'the doctor would come in nowhere.' Dem. de Cor. 310 ἐν οἷς οὐδαμὸν σὺ φανήμα γεγονός, οὐ πρῶτος, οὐ δεύτερος, οὐ τρίτος, οὐ τέταρτος, οὐ πέμπτος, οὐχ ἐκτος, οὐχ ὀποστοσοίν.

3 καθεύθεν: just as τοῦτο πάσχει &c. are regularly followed by a clause in apposition (cp. 68 e 2 n.), so τοῦτο πάσχειν (πεπαθέναι) is regularly followed by an infinitive in apposition. Cp. 73 b 7; 74 a 6; 78 c 2. There is, therefore, no reason for deleting the word with Dobree.

4 τὸ τοῦ Ἄναξαγόρου: cp. Anaxagoras fr. 1 ad init. Ὀμοῦ πάντα χρῆματα ἤν (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 299). There is a similar jesting use of the phrase in Gorg. 465 d 3 τὸ τοῦ Ἄναξαγόρου ἂν πολύ ἤν..., ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρῆματα ἐφφημεν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ.

5 ἐκ... τῶν ἄλλων, i.e. from some other source than the dead who were once alive.

8 ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων κτλ. It is important to observe that in this passage οἱ τεθνεῶτες are simply souls existing in the other world. They are certainly not dead bodies. All through this argument γένεσις means the union of soul to body and θάνατος their separation.

1 καὶ ταῖς μεν γε κτλ. These words appear to repeat 63 c 6, where the statement is in place.

(2) The doctrine of ἀνὰμνησις is shown to rest on the theory of Forms (72 e 3—77 a 5).

3 ὑπολαβῶν: cp. 60 c 8 n.
καὶ κατ' ἐκείνον... c 6 καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον: the καὶ means 'as well as' according to the παλαιὸς λόγος of 70 c 5.

4 ὃν οὐ εἰσθαν θαμὰ λέγειν: it is surely very difficult to regard this definite statement as a fiction. The doctrine is also ascribed to Socrates in the Meno and the Phaedrus. It is to be noted, further, that Cebes speaks of it as one peculiar to Socrates, while Simmias

51 E 2
knows very little about it. It did not, therefore, belong to fifth-century Pythagoreanism, though there can be little doubt of its Orphic and Pythagorean origin. The legend of Pythagoras makes a point of his remembering his earlier incarnations, and Empedocles professed to remember his (E. Gr. Ph.\(^2\) p. 259, n. 1). The apparent contradiction is to be explained as follows. The scientific Pythagoreans of the fifth century had to some extent dropped the religious doctrines of their founder (E. Gr. Ph.\(^2\) pp. 319 sqq.), and their teaching was really inconsistent with a belief in the soul's immortality (E. Gr. Ph.\(^2\) p. 343). The originality of Socrates seems to have consisted just in this, that he applied the old religious doctrine of ἀνάμνησις to science, and especially to mathematical science.

**e 5** ὅτι ἡμῖν κτλ., 'that our learning is really nothing else than reminiscence,' i.e. that it is simply the process of being reminded of what we once knew. It is important to bear in mind that the process is one of being reminded, not merely one of remembering or recollection.

**e 6** καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον repeats and emphasizes κατ᾽ εἰκείνων ... τὸν λόγον above (e 3).

**e 7** αὐτὸν ἀναμμηνησκόμεθα, 'what we are now reminded of.' Cp. Meno 81c 7 οὐδενθα διαμαστὸν ... οὗν τ᾽ εἶναι αὐτὴν (sc. τίν ψυχήν) ἀναμμηνησθῆναι ἃ γε καὶ πρῶτον ἡπίστατο, d 2 ἐν μόνῳ ἀναμμηνησθέντα—ὁ δὲ μάθησιν καλοὶσίν ἄνθρωποι—τάλλια πάντα αὐτῶν ἀνευρεῖν.

**73 a i** πρὶν ... γενίσθαι, 'before entering into this human frame.' Here εἴδος is practically equivalent to σῶμα. Cp. 77b 7 πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειαν σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι. So Symp. 210b 2 τὸ ἐπ᾽ εἶδος καλὸν, Phaedr. 249 a 8 ἀξίως οὗ ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδος εἴθισαν βίον, Rep. 402d 1 ἐν τῇ ἐν τῷ εἴδει.

**a 7** ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ (sc. ἀποδείκνυται) ... ἀ 10 ἑπείτα ... We regularly find ἑπείτα (usually without δὲ) in the sense of 'secondly' after πρῶτον μὲν ... 'firstly'. This fixes the meaning of ἐνὶ λόγῳ here. It does not mean 'to sum up', as it does above 65d 13, but 'by one argument'. I think Mr. R. G. Bury is right in holding (Class. Rev. xx, p. 13) that the process ἐπὶ τῷ διαγράμματα ἄγειν is opposed to, rather than included in, the process καλὸς ἐρωτάν, and I would illustrate his point further from Theaet. 165a 1 ήμεῖς δὲ πῶς θάττον ἐκ τῶν ψυλὸν λόγων (arguments without diagrams) πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν.
ἀπενεύσαμην. I am also inclined to accept his reading πρῶτος for ἔνι, though it is not absolutely necessary. The use of α', β', γ' as numerals has certainly affected the reading in several passages of Plato. In any case this is better than altering ἔπειτα to ἔπει τοι with Heindorf.

8 αὐτοὶ, ‘of themselves.’ Cp. 64 a 5.

10 ὁρθὸς λόγος, ‘a right account of the matter.’ An ὀνόμα is ὁρθὸν when applied to something which we are justified in applying it to (cp. 69 d 2 π.). In the same way a λόγος or statement is ὁρθὸς when it expresses the truth. The rendering ‘right reason’ is misleading; for it suggests that λόγος is a mental ‘faculty’.

1 ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα: this seems a fairly certain reference to Meno 82 b 9 sqq., where Socrates questions a slave about a geometrical diagram, in order to prove that μάθης is ἀνάμνησις. No doubt, if we hold this doctrine and its proof to be genuinely Socratic, the reference to the Meno is less certain; but, on the whole, Plato seems to indicate that, as he has already treated it elsewhere, he need not repeat the proof here.

2 κατηγορεῖ, ‘it is proof positive’ (Riddell, Dig. § 97), ‘it is manifest’ (velut passim occurrent ἐδίκως, προσημαίνει, δείκει et id genus alia, Heindorf). The verb κατηγορεῖν is used just like the Latin arguerē (L. S. s. v. II) and might very well take the impersonal construction of δῆλον, for which cp. Gorg. 483 d 2 δῆλοι δὲ ταύτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει. If the verb is personal we must supply ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα, which is not satisfactory.

6 αὐτὸ ... τοῦτο ... παθεῖν ... ἀναμνησθῆναι, ‘to have done to me the very thing we are speaking of, namely, to be reminded.’ The MSS. have μαθεῖν, and παθεῖν is a conjecture of Heindorf’s (not of Serranus, as Stallbaum says). The words are constantly confused; for in uncial writing Μ is very like II, both being written without lifting the pen. This is one of the comparatively few corrections in the text of the Phaedo which may be called certain, though it is not adopted in the most recent edition (Wohlrab, 1908). Cp. Gorg. 505 c 3 αὐτὸς τοῦτο πᾶσαν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ, κολαζόμενος.

7 ἀναμνησθῆναι: in apposition to τοῦτο παθεῖν. Cp. 72 c 3 π.

8 ἐπιχείρησε λέγειν, ‘attacked the proof.’ We see here the beginnings of the use of ἐπιχειρεῖν as a technical term of dialectic. Cp. also ἐπιχείρημα.
c 1  εἰ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, 'if a man is to be reminded of a thing.'  
Cp. 72 e 7 n.

C 5  τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, 'in such a way as this.'  Here τοιούτως refers forward, and the explanation of it is introduced by the question and answer 'What way do I mean? This.'  For similar rhetorical interrogations see Riddell, Dig. § 325.

C 6  ἐάν τίς τι ἔτερον κτλ.  Here we have a careful psychological analysis of what is meant by 'being reminded.'  A modern treatise would say 'If a man, having seen A (τι ἔτερον) ... also thinks of B.'  The reading τι ἔτερον is sufficiently well attested (T), and the double ἄλλο is used in the same way below 74 c 13, while the other reading, πρότερον (B), is easily accounted for and yields no satisfactory sense.  Recent editors mostly adopt πρότερον and then enclose it in square brackets.

ὴ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθήσειν λαβὼν, equivalent to ἡ τινι ἄλλην αἰσθήσειν αἰσθθόμενος, but Plato avoids the juxtaposition of cognate words.  The same phrase is used below 76 a 2.

c 7  μὴ μόνον ἐκείνο γνέφο κτλ., 'not only apprehends A, but also thinks of B.'

C 8  οὐ μὴ ἡ αὐτῇ ἐπιστήμη: this is an important reservation.  Certain things, notably opposites, must be known together or not at all (τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη).  It proves nothing that odd reminds us of even, or that darkness reminds us of light; for in this case the knowledge of the one is ἰπσο ἡμιτ knowledge of the other.

C 9  τοῦτο: internal object of ἀνεμφίησθη (cp. 72 e 7 n.) and antecedent of φι, 'that he was reminded of that which he thought of (B).'  The words οὐ τὴν ἐννοίαν ἐλάβε refer to ἄλλα καὶ ἔτερον ἐννοιάθη above.

δικαίως is used much like ὁρθος.  Cp. 72 a 11 n.

d 6  πάσχουσιν τοῦτο: followed as usual by a clause in apposition.  
Cp. 68 e 3 n.

D 7  ἐγγνωσαν: empirical ('gnomic') aorist.  Cp. 113 d 3.

ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐλάβον: equivalent to ἐννοήσαν, but with more emphasis on the ingressive force of the aorist.

tο εἶδος, 'the bodily form.'  Cp. 73 a 1 n.

D 8  τοῦτο: pred. 'and reminiscence is just this.'  Cp. 75 d 10.

D 9  πολλάκις ... ἀνεμφίησθη: empirical aorist with temporal adverb.

Gildersleeve, S. C. G. § 259.

D 10  καὶ ἄλλα ποι ὑπήρ χ κτλ.  Cp. 70 e 3 n.
1. μίντοι νη Δία: cp. 68 b 7 n.
2. ἐπον γεγραμμένον, 'a painted horse.' This is a more complex case.
3. We are reminded of B not by A, but by an image of A, which we may call a.
4. αὐτοῦ Σιμμίον: Simmias as opposed to the picture of Simmias. In this case we are reminded of A by a, or of B by b. This is the case described just below as ἄφ' ἀρμοῖον, the two first being ἀπὸ ἀνομοῖον. It is for the sake of this distinction that the point is elaborated.
5. ἔννοεῖν: in apposition to προσπάσχειν, cp. 72 c 3 n. When a man is reminded of A by a or of B by b, an additional thought necessarily presents itself to his mind, the thought of the presence or absence of any deficiency in the likeness of a or b to A or B. This thought is only forced upon us when we are reminded ἄφ' ἀρμοῖον.
6. εἰτε τι ἐλλειπεὶ τοῦτο... ἐκεῖνο... 'whether this (a or b) falls short in any respect of that of which he has been reminded by it (A or B)'! The intransitive use of ἐλλειπεῖν was familiar in Pythagorean geometry. Cp. Proclus, in Eucl. I, p. 419 (Friedlein) "Εστι μὲν ἄρχαια, φασίν οἱ περὶ τῶν Εὐθημον, καὶ τῆς τῶν Πυθαγορείων Μοίσεως εὕρηματα ταύτα, ἣ τε παραβολὴ τῶν χωρίων καὶ ἡ ὑπερβολή καὶ ἡ ἐλλειψις. The use of the words parabola, hyperbola, and ellipse in Conic Sections comes from this, but Conics are post-Platonic.
7. φαμέν ποιν κτλ. Cp. 65 d 4 n.
8. We have seen already that the 'forms' (what we really mean when we speak of 'triangle', 'right', 'beautiful', &c.) are not perceptible by the senses, but can only be apprehended by thought.
9. We are now introduced to a second point in the theory. The 'forms' are types (παραδείγματα) to which particular sensible things approximate more or less closely. A given triangle is never what we really mean by 'triangle', nor a right action what we really mean by right.

According to this view, particular sensible things are μιμήματα or εἰκόνες of the 'forms'. There is ample evidence that a doctrine like this was held by the later Pythagoreans (E. Gr. Ph.2 pp. 353 sqq.).

τι εἶναι ἴσον... αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον: we speak of sticks and stones being 'equal', but this is not the equality with which arithmetic and geometry deal. We only call them equal at all because they remind us of what we really mean by 'equal'. This is something
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different (ἐτερόν τι), 'over and above' all these things (παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα), which is 'just the equal' (αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον).

b 1 μέντοι νὴ Δι(α) : cp. 65 d 6 n. Simmias was not familiar with the doctrine of Reminiscence, but now he feels at home once more.

b 2 αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστιν : W adds ἴσον and so do the margins of B and T. It is, perhaps, unnecessary, but gives the full technical expression for this kind of reality, 'the what it is by itself', 'the just what it is'.

b 4 εἴξ ἐν νυνὖ ἔλγομεν : we certainly have an exact scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of equality, but we have seen (65 d 9) that equality cannot be perceived by the senses. These, then, are not the source of our knowledge. Sensible objects only remind us of equality. But we cannot be reminded of a knowledge which we never possessed.

b 8 τῷ μὲν ... τῷ δ' ὁ∶ there is an ancient variant τότε (i.e. τοτε) μὲν ... τότε (i.e. τοτε) δ' ὁ. Either reading gives a good sense. Sticks and stones sometimes seem equal and sometimes unequal to the same persons, and they appear equal to one person, unequal to another. This shows that the 'really equal' (αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστιν ἴσον) is something different.

c 1 αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα : things that are 'just equal'. There is no difficulty about the plural. When Euclid says (Ax. i) Τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἴσα καὶ ἀλλὰ ἔστιν ἴσα, he is not speaking of sticks or stones, but of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα. Cp. αὐτὰ τὰ ὄμοια, Parm. 129 b 1. The two angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are an instance of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα.

c 4 ταῦτα ... τὰ ἴσα : the sticks and stones mentioned above, not αὐτὸ τὰ ἴσα.

c 11 ὁκοῦν ... d 3 Πάνυ μὲν ὁ∶ this step in the argument is not, perhaps, strictly necessary, and some critics would bracket the words. It must be observed, however, that they serve to make the proof that our knowledge of the equal is reminiscence clearer, by reminding us of the preceding discussion. The equality of sticks and stones must either be like or unlike real equality, but in either case it is different from it, and our conception of real equality therefore corresponds to the account already given of reminiscence. Socrates does not assume at this stage that the equality of sticks and stones is 'like' real equality. That is the next step in the argument.
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3 εώς ἀν...: dummodo, 'so long as'...

4 αὐτό, 'the process in question.'

5 τι τοιοῦτον refers forward. The fact here noted indicates that we have to do with ἀνάμνησις ἑφ' ὁμοίων. Cp. 74 a 5.

6 ἢ ἐνδείξεις τι εἰκόνιον... ἢ οὔδέν; 'do they fall short of it at all... or not?'

7 τῷ τοιούτου εἶναι οὐκ τῷ ἴσον, 'in being such as the equal.' For the dative of that in which one is deficient cp. Thuc. ii. 87. 1 τῇ...

8 φανότερον, 'inferior.'

9 εἰκόνιον, 'aims at being.' The phrase is often used to express a tendency, especially by Aristotle.

10 [ἱσον]: this seems a clear case of an 'adscript' which has crept into the text. Though it is in W it is not translated in the version of Aristippus, who has simply ἀλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλο... 

11 ταὐτόν δὲ κτλ., 'I count all these as the same thing' (for the purposes of the present argument, as appears from the reply). Cp. Μένο 75 ε 2 πάντα ταὐτά ταὐτόν τι λέγω ἵσος δ' ἐν ἡμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέρωστο.

12 Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ κτλ. It can only be from the senses that our judgement of the inferiority of sensible objects originates, and yet that judgement implies previous knowledge of the standard by which we judge them and find them inadequate.
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b 1  τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, sc. ἴσα. The phrase is modelled on the common ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς.

ἐκεῖνον ... τοῦ ὀ ἐστὶν ἴσον: for the terminology cp. 74 b 2 n. and below d 2 n.

b 4 Πρὸ τοῦ ἀρα ἀρξασθαί κτλ. The reasoning is quite sound, as we shall see if we remember that we should never call sticks or stones equal at all, unless we knew clearly what we meant by equality.

τάλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι, 'make use of our other senses'; for τάλλα is internal accusative (Riddell, Dig. § 2).

b 6 τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων is substituted for τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν under the influence of ἀνοίσεων. This is simply a case of the 'attraction' of prepositions with the article by verbs of motion. Cp. 76 d 9; 109 e 4.

b 7 ἀνοίσεων, 'to refer.' Reference to a standard is regularly expressed by ἀναφέρειν πρὸς ... 'referre ad ... Cp. 76 d 9.

ὁράσειν seems to be used as if ἀναφέρωντες ἐννοήσεων had preceded instead of ἀνοίσεων. Vahlen (i. 489) proposes to insert καὶ ἐννοήσεων before ὡράσεως.

πρὸθυμεῖται, 'do their best,' a still more picturesque way of expressing tendency than ἑυλεταί or ὅργανοι above.

πάντα, sc. τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἴσα.

b 10 γενόμενοι εὐθύς, 'immediately upon birth.'

c 7 εἰ ... ἐχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, sc. αὐτήμ, 'if we were born with it,' i.e. the knowledge of the equal.

c 9 τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἐλάττον: the knowledge of τὸ ἴσον implies these; for together they make up its opposite, τὸ ἄνωθεν, and τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη.

c 11 περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ κτλ. We see here how the theory originated in mathematics, and was thence transferred to what we call morals and aesthetics. The beautiful and the good resemble the equal in this, that they are nowhere perfectly realized.

d 2 οἰς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα κτλ., 'on which we set the seal of αὐτὸ ὀ ἐστι.' Here again we have 'we' in connexion with a technical term, and this implies the work of a school. Cp. 65 d 4 n. For the metaphor cp. Polit. 258 c 5 (τῇ πολιτικῇ) μίαν (ἰδεάν) ἐπισφραγίσασθαι, Phileb. 26 d 1 ἐπισφραγισθέντα τῷ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐναντίου γένει.

τὸ 'ἀυτὸ ὀ ἐστι', 'the just what it is': so I have ventured to
write for the τοῦτο of the MSS. Lamblichus has simply τὸ δ ἦστι, and it seems to me that τὸ must be right. The reading which I have given accounts sufficiently for the others. Most editors write τοῦτο, δ ἦστι.

2 καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν κτλ.: i.e. διαλεγόμενοι, for question and answer are the two sides of the Socratic dialectic. We see from 78 d 1 that this phrase also was technical in the Socratic school. Cp. Crito 50 c 8 ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἰσόδους χρησθαι τῷ ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Rep. 534 d 9 (διαλεκτική) ἓξ ἢς ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι οἴοι τ ἐσονται.

7 Εἰ ... ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλεξησμέθα, ‘unless we forget them on each occasion’ of our birth. The doctrine of παλιγγενεσία seems to be implied by ἐκάστοτε and ἔτι γίγνεσθαι (‘to be born on each occasion’) below. There would be no room for reminiscence unless birth involved forgetting. Heindorf proposed to insert γιγνόμενοι after ἐκάστοτε to make this clear; but we may easily ‘understand’ it.

9 λαβόντα κτλ., ‘having acquired knowledge of a thing, to have it and not to have lost it.’ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολογεκέναι is an instance of ‘polar expression’. Cp. 86 a 5 ἐτε ἐνα ... καὶ μὴ ἀπολογεκέναι.

10 ἐπιστήμης ἀποβαλήν, ‘loss of knowledge’ (ἀπόλλυμι and ἀποβάλλω are synonyms in this sense). For other definitions of λήθη cp. Symh. 208 a 4 λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξωδος, Philod. 33 c 3 ἐστι γὰρ λήθη μνήμης ἔξωδος.

2 Ἐἰ ... γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ‘if we lost it in the process of birth.’

3 περὶ αὐτὰ: here αὐτὰ means simply ‘the things in question’. Cp. 60 c 1; 76 c 2. There is no need to read ταὐτα with W; for the reference is plain.

4 πρίν: the use of πρίν as an adverb almost unexampled in prose (except with the article).

5 οἰκεῖαν ... ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν, ‘to recover knowledge which is our own.’ This is the real meaning of the whole doctrine, which can only be adequately expressed in a mystical form. The mystery of knowledge is the same as the mystery of love. It is a ‘mystical union’ with what at first seems alien (ἀλλότριος), but is in time recognized to be our very own.

7 ὀρθῶς: cp. 62 b 2 n.
These participles are subordinate to *alēthōmenov*, ‘whether by sight or hearing or any other sense.’

*πάντες* is opposed to *ǒς φαμεν μανθάνειν* and repeated below *b 8.* We must not, therefore, read *παντός.*

*οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἃ,* ‘nothing but?’ The phrase ἀλλ’ ἃ is used after negatives and treated as a single word (cp. *68 b 4*). It is wrong to write ἀλλ’ (for ἀλλο) as is shown by *81 b 4* 

We must not, therefore, read *ΤΤΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤΟΤΤO
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2 taūta, sc. tā ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεωι.
οὔτως ὡσπερ καί, ‘in just the same way that’, ‘just as surely as’.

3 taυτα, sc. καλὸν τέ τι κτλ. There is no real difficulty in the fact that taυτα here and in the next line has a different reference from taυτα in e 2. The reference is quite plain in all three cases.


8 ἵππos, ‘in the same way’, ‘just as surely’, equivalent to οὔτως ὡσπερ καί ... ὡσπερ καί above (76 e 2).

5 ἀποδεικτα, ‘the demonstration is adequate.’ The words ἐμοίγη δοκεῖ are parenthetical, and do not affect the construction. Cp. 108 d 8. The omission of δοκεῖ in TW is an attempt to normalize the construction. The answer shows that δοκεῖ is right; for it is the only word that can be supplied after Τι δὲ δὴ Κέσητι;

3 The doctrines of παλιγγενεσία and ἀνάμμησις afford an incomplete demonstration until they are combined (77 a 6—77 d 3).

8 Ἰκανῶς, sc. ἀποδεικτα. Simmias and Cebes point out, however, that the argument from ἀνάμμησις only proves the antenatal existence of the soul, not its survival after death. Socrates replies that we must take the argument from ἀνταπόδοσις and that from ἀνάμμησις together. At the same time, he admits that a more thorough discussion is required.
b 3 ἐνίστηκεν, 'there is still the objection.' This is originally an agonistic metaphor; for ἐνιστήματι is 'to stand up to'. Cp. Lysias, 3. 8 εὐθὺς μὲ τῆς ἐπεχείρησεν ἐπέειδή δὲ αὐτῶν Ἦμων ἡμείν ἐνιστήματι . . . . Isocr. 5. 39 ἐνιστήματοί τοῖς εἰρημένοις. Hence comes the technical use of ἐνιστήματι (instantia) in dialectics of an 'objection' to an argument (ἐπιχείρημα). Plutarch uses the word for the tribunes' intercessio.

b 4 ὑπὲρ μὴ . . . διασκεδάζωνται κτλ. For the use of ὑπὲρ μὴ after verbs of fearing instead of μὴ cp. below 84 b 5. There are four or five instances of this construction in Plato. The verb is subjunctive and has long υ, but the termination should not be accented -εται as if it were contracted from -εται. It is really an older form of the subjunctive (Kühner-Blass, § 281.3). So διασκεδάζωνται, 77 e 1, and the opt. πίθυνε, 118 a 2.

b 6 ἄλλοθεν ποθεν, 'from some other source' than from the souls in the other world which have come there from this (the ἐνβέβηκε ἀφικόμενα of 70 c 6). I formerly read ἀμόθεν ποθεν with Bekker; but, apart from the fact that the regular phrase is ἀμόθεν γε ποθεν, I now think the meaning is settled by 72 d 1 ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, where see note.

c 1 Εἰ δύνεσκαί κτλ. For the interlaced order cp. 70 b 5 n.

c 5 τέλος . . . ἔξων, i. e. τελείῳ ἔσεσθαι, 'to be complete.' Cp. τέλος λαμβάνων, τέλος ἐπιθείκαι, &c. In Greek philosophy the word τέλος always implies the idea of completion or full growth. An animal or plant ἔξων ἔχει when its growth is complete, when it is full grown. B has ἔχειν for ἔξων, which would be equally correct. It is impossible to draw any distinction between the two constructions. For the fut. inf. in this use cp. e. g. Ῥέφ. 567 b 8 εἶ μέλλει οὕρχειν.

c 7 καὶ νῦν, 'even as it is.' The sense of νῦν is the same as in the common νῦν δι· . . . , nunc vero . . . , 'but, as it is.'

συνθείκαται . . . εἰς ταῦτάν, 'to combine the present argument (viz. that the soul exists and is conscious before our birth) with the argument we assented to before it.'

d 5 ὅπερ λέγετε, 'the point you mention.' This reading comes from a late MS. and is probably due to conjecture alone. It gives, however, a much better sense than the ὅπερ λέγεται of the oldest MSS., which is supposed to mean 'as is said', i. e. 'as I say'. We should
certainly expect ὅπερ λέγω in that sense, and the confusion of -τε and -τα is common; both being pronounced alike.

(4) Practical Application.—We must rid ourselves of the fear of death at all costs (77 d 5—78 b 4).

This digression (cp. 78 a 10) marks the end of the First Argument and leads up to the Second.

1 διασκεδάζων is probably subjunctive and to be pronounced with long υ (cp. 77 b 4 n.). The indicative would not be so appropriate; for the fear refers to the future. If the verbs were indicative, we should have to render 'lest the wind puffs it away and scatters it' on each occasion when it issues from the body.

2 ἐν μεγάλῳ τοῖς πνεύματι, 'in a high wind,' the regular phrase. So μέγας πνεῖ ὁ ἁνέμοι. This clause is, of course, a humorous addition to the theory.

3 ὡς δεδιήτων, sc. ἵμωρ, in spite of the fact that strict grammar would require δεδιήτως in agreement with ἵμως, the unexpressed object of ἀναείθεν. The genitive absolute is often used in this way. Cp. Riddell, Dig. § 274.

4 μᾶλλον δεί, vel potius, 'or rather,' the regular phrase in introducing a correction.

5 ῥεί belongs to δεδιήτων, but is anticipated for emphasis. A striking instance of this is Crito 47 d 9 πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαινῶν δόγμῃ.

6 ἐν ἡμῖν, 'in us.' It is necessary to state this, as it has been suggested that the words mean 'among us' and refer to Apollodorus! This makes nonsense of the passage. The 'child in us' is often referred to by later Platonist writers like Porphyry, Themistius, and Simplicius (cp. Wyttenbach's note).

7 ὁστις differs from ὅς as qui with the subjunctive from qui with the indicative. Its use here is justified by the preceding τοις.

8 πειρῶ μεταπείθειν was conjectured by Heindorf, and is now known
to be the reading of W. It is far better than the πειρόμεθα πείθειν of BT; for it resumes πειρῷ ἀναπείθειν above with a slight variation which is quite in Plato’s manner.

e 7 τὰ μορμολύκεια, ‘bugbears.’ Μορμώ (whose full name was Μορμολυκή) was a she-goblin used, like Ἄκκω, Ἐμπουσα, and Λάμια to frighten naughty children. Cp. Theocritus xv. 40 οὐκ ἦξὼ τυ, τέκνων, Μορμώ, δάκρω ττπος, Xen. Hell. iv. 4. 17 φοβείσθαι τοὺς πεταστάσας, ὡσπέρ μορμώνας παιδάμια, Lucian, Philoprs. 2 παῖδων ζτι τήν Μορμώ καὶ τήν Λάμιαν δεδώτων. According to the Platonic Lexicon of Timaeus, μορμολύκεια were masks, τὰ φοβερὰ τοὺς παιῶν προσώπεία. The verb μορμολύττεσθαι is used in Crito 46c4 and Gorg. 473 d 3.

e 8 ἐπάδεῳν, ἱεραρχὴν, ‘to sing charms’ (καρμίνα, ἐπιφάνη). Socrates makes an elaborate use of this idea in Charm. 155 esqq., cp. esp. 157 a 3 θερπατείσθαι δέ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφή (Σάλμοξις), ὅ μικάριε, ἐπιφάνης τισιν, τὸς δ' ἐπαθῶς ταῖτας τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς καλοὺς· ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιού- των λόγων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σαφροσύνην ἐγγύγνωσθαι, ἢς ἐγγενομένης καὶ παρούσῃς ράðιον ὃδ' εἶναι τὴν θύειν καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι πορίζειν. The ascription of this to the Thracian Zalmonoxis shows it to be Pythagorean; for Herodotus tells us (iv. 95) that Zalmonoxis (or Zamolxis) had been a slave of Pythagoras (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 93), and it goes well with what we know of the Pythagorean musical καθαρσις (cp. 61 a 3 n.). Socrates also used the term in connexion with his μεταφή (Theaet. 149 d 1).

e 9 ἐως ἄν ἐξεπάσῃτε, ‘till you have charmed it out of him.’ This is another conjecture of Heindorf’s which has been confirmed by fuller knowledge of the MSS.; for it is actually found in a Vienna MS. and virtually in TW. The reading of B is ἐξεπάσηται, and it appears from the margin of W that this was an ancient variant. It cannot, of course, be passive; but we might supply τίς as its subject. ‘One must sing charms ... till one has healed him.’

78 a 3 Πολλή ... ἡ Ἑλλάς, wide enough, for instance, to include Southern Italy, where the Pythagoreans were once more becoming powerful. For this use of πολλός cp. the Homeric πολλή γαία, πολλή χώρη (II. xxiii. 520), Thuc. vii. 13. 3 πολλή δ' ἡ Σικελία, Theocr. xxii. 156 πολλή τοις Σιπάρτιν, πολλή δ' ἵππηλατος Ἡλίας.

a 4 τὰ τῶν μαρβδῶν γίνη: Socrates is no doubt thinking primarily of Thracians and Phrygians. The Orphic ‘orgia’ came from the
former, the Corybantic ‘purifications’ from the latter. Plato regarded the distinction between Hellenes and barbarians as an unscientific division of mankind (Polit. 262 d i sqq.), but it was revived by Aristotle.

5 eis στὶ ἀν εὐκαρπότερον: this is the reading of Τ and seems far better than the variant eis στὶ ἄνεαγκαρέτερον. The corruption is an extremely easy one, and the omission of ἀν in the variant is, to say the least of it, hard to justify, while the insertion of ἀν after στὶ would spoil the rhythm. Of course εὐκαρπότερον is the comparative adverb, not the adjective.

7 καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ’ ἄλληλων, ‘by yourselves too’ (as well as by questioning Hellenes and barbarians), ‘along with one another’ (for joint search is the true Socratic method). We cannot take μετ’ ἄλληλων to mean ‘among yourselves’ as some do. Apart from the unheard-of sense thus given to μετὰ c. gen., the pronoun ἄλληλων excludes such a rendering. We should have had ἐν ἵμιν αὐτοῖς.

8 ἵπως γὰρ ἂν κτλ. The usual hint that Orpheeotelestae and Corybantic καθαρτι are not to be taken too seriously. Cp. 69 c 4 n.
  
  σαῦτα ... ὑπάρξει, ‘that shall be done’, ‘you may count on that’. For the interlaced order cp. 70 b 5 n.

Second Proof of Immortality (78 b 4–84 b 8).

This proof is based, not upon ancient doctrines, but on a consideration of the soul’s own nature, which is shown to resemble that of the eternal forms. From this we may infer that, like them, it is indissoluble.

5 έαυτοὺς is an emphatic ἄλληλων.

6 τὸ διασκεδάννυσθαι is better attested than the τοῦ διασκεδάννυσθα. of Β. We have seen (72 c 3 n.) that τοῦτο πᾶσχεω takes an infinitive in apposition. The article is added in this case because τὸ πᾶθος precedes.

7 καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ (οὔ): some of the early editors deleted καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ as a tautology; but the pronoun πότερον in b 8 shows that two kinds of things have been distinguished. We must therefore add οὔ with Heindorf, though it appears in no MS. and Olympiodorus did not read it; for he tries to get rid of the tautology by taking the first τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ of things and the second of persons.
b 8 ἰπότερον, 'which of the two,' not 'whether'.
b 9 θαρπεῖν ἦ δεδύναι, 'to fear or not to fear.' Cp. 63 e 10 π.

(1) Only that is dissoluble which is composite, and the things which are constant and invariable are not composite. Further, the things which are constant and invariable are invisible. We have to ask, then, whether the soul belongs to the class of invisible, constant and invariable, non-composite things, or to that of visible, variable, composite, and therefore dissoluble things (78 c 1—80 c 1).

c 1 τῷ . . . συνθίτω ὑπὲρ φύσει: if we take these words together with Wytenbach, they add a fresh touch to τῷ συντεθνιτι. That suggests an artificial combination; this refers to what is essentially and from the nature of the case composite. The addition of the participle ὑπέρ indicates that this is the construction and makes it very unnatural to take φύσει προσήκει together, as many editors do.

c 2 τοῦτο τά σχεῖν, διαιρέθαι: cp. 72 c 3 π. The verbs συντεθέναι, 'compound,' διαιρέω, 'divide,' are the regular opposites.

ταῦτῃ ὑπὲρ συντεθή: e.g., if it is a compound of the four 'elements', it will be divided into these.

c 6 κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὁματώτως, 'constant and invariable.' We see that this is the sense from the ἄλλον ἄλλως, which is the opposite of ὁματώτος, and μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα, which is opposed to κατὰ ταῦτα. Cp. d 2; 80 b 2.

c 7 τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ᾽ ἄλλως: the familiarity of the term may excuse the ellipse of ἔχοντα and make it unnecessary to read ἄ for τὰ with Heindorf.

c 8 ταῦτα δὲ σύνθετα: for the resumptive demonstrative with δὲ cp. e.g. Lach. 194 d 2 ἃ δὲ ἀμαθῆς, ταῦτα δὲ κακῶς. So below 80 d 8; 81 b 8; πι 3 e 5.

d 1 ἦ οὐσία ὅς λόγον διδομέν τοῦ εἶναι, 'the reality the being of which we give account of.' The hyperbaton of διδομέν has misled the commentators here. We must take λόγον τοῦ εἶναι together as equivalent to λόγον τῆς οὐσίας or 'definition', and as governing the genitive ἦν. For λόγος τῆς οὐσίας cp. Rep. 534 b 3 ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; The meaning, then, is simply 'the reality which we define'. When we define 'triangle',

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it is not this or that triangle, but αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστι τρίγωνον, 'just what is triangle,' that finds expression in our definition.

1 καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, ἰ. ἡ. διαλεγόμενοι, cp. 75 d 2 n. In the dialectic process it is by question and answer that definitions are reached. When we ask τί ἐστι; the answer is a λόγος τῆς ὁμολογίας.

2 αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἐστιν, 'what any given thing itself is' or 'is by itself,' 'just what a given thing is.' Cp. 74 b 2 n.

3 τὸ ὁν, 'the real,' is added to suggest the opposition of ἐννν and γίγνεσθαι.

4 μενοεῖδες ὃν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, 'being uniform if taken alone by itself.' I regard αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό as a reservation here. The triangle, for instance, has more than one ἐννν. There are equilateral, isosceles, and scalene triangles. But none of these ἐννν enter into the definition of the triangle simply as such.

5 Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν κτλ. (Riddell, Dig. § 27), 'what of the many beautiful things?' as opposed to τὸ αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστι καλῶν. It is clear that we cannot retain both καλῶν here and ἡ καλῶν in e 1, and most editors bracket the former. This, however, commits us to the view that there are ἐννν of men, horses, and clothes, which is a point that has not been referred to, and which raises certain difficulties which do not concern us here. It is hard to believe that Ἴματι would have been mentioned at all except as an instance of τὰ πολλὰ καλὰ. I therefore take Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . ἡ ἰδὼν together, and regard 'people, horses, and clothes' as examples of the first, just as 'sticks and stones' might be given as examples of the second. It is only as instances of καλὰ that people, horses, and clothes can be said to be ὁμονύμια τῷ καλῷ (cp. e 2 n.).

1 τοιοῦτοι: i. e. καλῶν. This, I take it, has caused the interpolation of ἡ καλῶν.

2 πάντων τῶν ἐκείνων ὁμονύμων, 'all the (other) things (besides καλὰ and ἰδα) which bear the same name as those,' i. e. as αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἐστι. For this way of expressing the relationship between τὰ πολλὰ ἕκαστα and αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστιν ἕκαστον cp. Pain. 133 d 2 τὰ . . . παρ' ἡμῖν ταύτα ὁμονύμα ὄντα ἐκείνως. Observe the tendency to use ταύτα of the 'many' and ἐκείνα of the 'ideas'.

3 πάν τούναντιον ἐκείνως, 'just the opposite to these,' i. e. to αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, &c. What we call 'beautiful things' or 'equal things' are
constant neither to themselves nor to one another. As we have seen (74 b 8), they do not appear beautiful or equal to different people, or even to the same person at different times.

79 a 3 τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, 'by thinking.' There is no distinction here between διάνοια and νοῦς. The phrase means thinking generally as opposed to sense-perception.

a 4 άιδὴν, 'invisible.' The correct form was first made known by the Flinders Petrie papyrus, and has since been found to be the reading of the first hand of T and of W. Cp. the Homeric άίδηλος, ἄωτος, άιδνός. The reading of B, followed by nearly all MSS. and editions, is ἄειδης, which could only mean 'formless', 'unsightly', and is quite inappropriate.

a 6 Θέμεν οὖν βούλει κτλ. Olympiodorus distinguishes three ἐπιχειρήματα intended to prove that the soul is more like the indissoluble than the body: (1) ἐκ τοῦ ἀφοράτου αὐτῆς, (2) ἐκ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ αὐτῆς, (3) ἐκ τοῦ δειπνοῦν τοῦ σώματος. The first ἐπιχειρήμα begins here.

δύο εἰδὴ τῶν ὄντων, 'two types of things.' It is important to observe that the word ὄντα is used of both. It means 'things' in the widest and vaguest sense. Of course, strictly speaking, visible things are not ὄντως ὄντα and the things invisible are not 'things' at all.

b 1 ἀλλο τι, nonne, just like ἀλλο τι ἢ ... above (70 c 9). The words have become phraseological, but their original sense ('anything else') is so far felt that the affirmative answer is given by Οὐδὲν ἀλλο.

b 4 φαμεν ἄν εἴναι: this seems better than the equally well attested φαίμεν ἄν εἴναι. In the direct speech ὁμοιότερον ἄν εἴη would be quite natural.

b 9 τῇ τῶν ἐνθρώπων φύσει, sc. ὅρατὰ καὶ μή. It is left open for us to say that in some sense we may 'see' these things πρὶν ἐν ἄνθρωπειῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι or after the soul has left its human body. Such a beatific vision is described in the Phaedrus, but belongs to another aspect of the theory than that dwelt upon in the Phaedrus.

b 13 Οὐχ ὅρατον. 'Αἰδές ἄρα; cp. 105 d 15 'Ἀνάρτιον. The inference from 'not visible' to 'invisible' seemed more necessary to the Greeks than to us.

C 2 Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε κτλ. The second ἐπιχειρήμα (cp. a 6 n.). The soul can apprehend the invariable best apart from the body.
2 πάλαι, 'some time ago,' i.e. 65 b 1 sqq. For the meaning of πάλαι cp. 63 d 5 n.
8 τοιοῦτων, sc. πλανωμένων καὶ ἐν ταραχῇ ὄντων (Riddell, Dig. § 54).
The soul fluctuates and is confused because it is in contact with objects which are fluctuating and confused.
3 συγγενής οὐσα: we have seen already that reality is ὀδεῖον to the soul (75 e 5), and this has been reinforced by the consideration that it is more alike to the invisible than the visible.
4 καὶ ἐξεῖν αὐτή, sc. μετ᾽ ἐκείνου γίγνεσθαι.
5 καὶ περὶ ἐκείνα... ἐκεί, 'and remains ever constant in relation to them.'
6 τοιοῦτων: i.e. κατὰ ταύτα ὀφθαλμῶς ἐξώντων.
τούτο... τὸ πάθημα, 'this condition,' i.e. a constant relation to constant objects.
3 παύσις τῆς μεθέζου, 'this line of argument.' The verb μετέρχομαι (88 d 9) and its substantive μέθοδος furnish another illustration of the metaphor from hunting.
The literal sense of μετάνωμι is 'to go after', 'to follow up', especially of going in pursuit of game. As the λόγος is the game in the ἡμέρα τοῦ ὄντος, the phrase μετάνωμι τῶν λόγων is natural.
3 ὀλοκαί καὶ παντί: the usual phrase is ὀλοκαί καὶ παντί διαφέρειν, 'to be totally different.' Here it is used of likeness.
8 ὡρα δὴ καὶ τῆς κτῆ. The third ἐπικείμην (a 6 n.). The soul rules over the body. This is the argument which comes nearest to Plato's own proof of immortality.
4 ὀῖον ἐρχεῖν... πεφυκίναι, 'to be by nature such as to rule and lead', 'to be naturally adapted for rule and leadership'. For this use of ὀῖον cp. 83 d 9; 94 e 4; 98 c 8. We must 'understand' ὀῖον again with ἀρχεῖσθαι.
0 εἰ... τάδε ἡμῖν συμβαίνειν, 'whether this is our conclusion.' The results of a dialectical discussion are technically called τὰ συμβαίνοντα, and it is in the light of these that the ὑπόθεσις with which it starts must be examined. If an impossibility συμβαίνει, the ὑπόθεσις must be given up.
3 ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχῇ, sc. συμβαίνει. The verb συμβαίνει in this sense is generally used personally; cp. 67 c 5 κὼσαρισ δὲ εἶναι ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο συμβαίνει...; so there is no need to read ψυχῇ. The impersonal construction also occurs: cp. 74 a 2 ἄρ' ὢν οὐ... συμβαίνει
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τήν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι κτλ. There is no anacolouthon; for the prospective τίδε above is merely shorthand for τῷ θείῳ ὑμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχή, τῷ ἀδανάτῳ ὑμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχή, &c.

b 4 ἀνόητο: a play on words is involved in making this the opposite of νοητός, for ἀνόητος properly means 'senseless', 'foolish'. The true opposite of νοητός, 'intelligible', 'object of thought', is αἰσθητός, 'sensible', 'object of sense'.

b 6 ἦ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, 'to show that it is not so.' This meaning would be equally well expressed by ὡς which is an ancient variant and well attested. Schanz's ἦ, however, has the advantage of explaining the readings of B (ἡ) and W (η). Cp. Theaet. 184 c 4 εἰπεὶ λάξεσθαι τής ἀποκρίσεως ... ἦ οὐκ ὁρθή.

b 10 ἐγγὺς τι τούτου: a hint that this argument is not quite conclusive. The soul has only been shown to resemble the indissoluble.

(2) Practical Application. — We must purify our souls and purge it of the corporeal (86 c 2 — 84 b 8).

c 3 ἐν ὀρατῷ κέιμενον, 'situated in the visible region.' Ast quaintly interprets: 'lying in a visible thing,' i.e. a coffin or tomb.

c 4 καὶ διαπνείσθαι is so well attested that its omission in B must be a slip. I cannot see that it is an inappropriate word to use of a dead body.

c 5 ἐπεικῶς σφυνῦν ... χρόνον, 'a fairly long time.' Cp. Crito 43 a 10 ἐπεικῶς πάλαι.

c 6 ἑπιμένει, 'remains as it is' (dist. περιμένει, 'waits'). Cp. 59 e 4 n. ἐὰν μὲν τις καὶ ... 'indeed, even if a man ...'. For the hyperbaton of καὶ Schmidt compares Prot. 323 b 3 ἐὰν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὦτι ἀδικός ἐστιν. The μὲν ('indeed') is solitariurn as in Prot. 361 e 3 τῶν μὲν τῇλικότων καὶ πάνω (however it may be with others). The meaning, then, is that even if a man dies with his body in good condition, it lasts quite a long time. Of course a healthy body decomposes more rapidly than an old and withered one.

χαριέντως ἐχων, equivalent to καλῶς or εὖ ἐχων. We find μετρίως and ἐπεικῶς used in the same sense. Cp. 68 e 2 n. There is no suggestion of 'gracefulness', but only of εὐεξία or 'good condition'.

C 7 ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὡρᾳ, 'at a fine season of the year' (τοιαύτῃ standing for καλῇ implied in χαριέντως, Riddell, Dig. § 54). Decomposition is more rapid in summer than in winter. Most recent editors understand the phrase to mean 'in the bloom of youth'; but (1) ἐν
δορα without τοιαύτη would be sufficient for this. Cp. *Meno* 76 b 8; *Phaedr.* 240 d 7; *Rep.* 474 d 4; and (2) when δορα is mentioned in connexion with death, it means not ‘youthful bloom’, but ‘a ripe old age’. Cp. e.g. *Phoen.* 968 αίτις δ’, ἐν δοραῖ γὰρ ἱσταμαι βλοῦ, ἐν θήσειν ἐστοιμος. On the other hand, one who dies in early youth (and in that sense ἐν δορα) is said to die πιθὸ δορις or δορο. The latter word is common in sepulchral inscriptions.

7 καὶ πάνυ μάλα, sc. συμφόνον χρόνον, 'for quite a long time.'

συμφεσόν, 'reduced to bones and muscle', 'emaciated'. This clause justifies the preceding ἐὰν μὲν τὶς κτλ. An emaciated body remains almost entire for an inconceivable time, and even a body in good condition lasts quite a long time. For συμπιπτεῖν cp. *Hdt.* iii. 52 ἀσιτίμητι συμπεπτωκότα. In the medical writers σύμπτωςις is technical for emaciation.

8 καὶ ταριξευθέν: there is nothing unnatural in Socrates' frequent references to Egypt, which was always an object of interest to the Greeks. Socrates must have known many men who had fought there in 460 B.C. This passage has strangely been supposed to prove Plato's Egyptian journey.

9 δλίγου δλον μίνει, sc. τὸ σώμα, 'remains all but entire.'

 νεῦρα, 'sinews.' Cp. below 98 c 7 n.

5 ἀρα, seilicel. The particle indicates that we have to do with an *argumentum ex contrario* (cp. 68 a 3 n.) put in the form of a question. 'Are we to say, then, that the soul...?'

ταὐτόνων... ἐστερον, 'just like itself' (cp. 58 d 8 n.), not equivalent to ἀλλη, for that is expressly mentioned besides. The meaning is that expressed throughout the preceding argument by ὀμοίων.

5 eis 'Αιδοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς, 'to the House of Hades in the true sense of the word.' This refers to the commonly accepted etymology of the word, for which cp. *Crit.* 404 b 1 καὶ τὸ γε ὁνομα ὡς 'Αιδης... πολλοῦ δὲ ἀπὸ τὸν ἄλφος (sic BT) ἐπωνομάσθη. The denial of the etymology here shows that (rightly or wrongly) it was commonly accepted.

7 τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν: in the mystic theology Hades or Zeus Chthonios is called Eubouleus, and Eubouleus is also found (e.g. at Eleusis and on the Orphic gold plates of Southern Italy) as an independent god. I suspect that Socrates is here alluding to this sacred name.
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8a 1 τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ραδίως. 'practising death without complaining.' Most editors emend or delete ῥαδίως, which is found not only in all MSS. and citations, but also in the Petrie papyrus. The use of the perfect infinitive need cause no difficulty; for it is often used of the moment of death which completes the process of τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν (62a 5 n.). Vahlen (Opusc. ii. 213) proposes to construe ῥαδίως with μελετῶσα, but there has been no question of complaining about the practice of death, while we have had ῥαδίως ἀν ἐθέλεω ἀποθνῄσκειν (62c 10) and ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττωσα αὐτῶν (63a 7) explained just below by οὐτω ῥαδίως φέρεις. The opposite is ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνῄσκειν- τος (62e 6). All these passages are quoted by Vahlen himself.

8a 8 κατὰ τῶν μεμυημένων, 'of the initiated.' Cp. 70d 7n. This resembles the fairly common use of κατὰ c. gen. with ἔπαινος, ἐγκώμιον, and the like.

8a 9 διάγονοσα: after ἀποθλαγμένη we expect διαγόνος, which Heindorf proposed to read. It would be easier to write ἀποθλαγμένη, for there is no reason why the grammatical construction of ἔπαρχει should be kept up. The general sense of the sentence suggests the nominative.

b 3 ἀράσα, sc. αὐτοῦ. ἀνετευμένη is read by T as well as by the papyrus. It is not easy to decide between it and the equally well attested γεγονετευμένη.

τε is connective here. This is a poetical usage, and becomes increasingly frequent in Plato's later style. For a striking instance from his middle period cp. Ρραείδρ. 267a 6 Τεειαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε.

b 4 δοκεῖν, 'to think': cp. 64b 2.

b 5 ἄλλα ἦ...: cp. 68b 4 n.; 76a 6 n.
5: the relative cannot be repeated in a different case (cp. 65a 5n.), so the δ and ϕ which are logically required as the sentence proceeds, are simply omitted.

7: Stallbaum compares Tim. 29 a 6 λόγοι καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτόν.

8: διειλημμένη, 'broken up by', 'patched with the corporeal'. The meaning of διαλυμβάνειν is best seen from 110 b 7. As applied to colours, it means 'to pick out', distinguere, as in a quilt or tartan. Cp. Milton, Comus 453-75.

6: σύμφωνος: though σύμφωνος and συμφωνίς usually mean 'congenital', that sense is excluded by εἰσεπώνης. We also find both words in the sense of 'grown together' (from συμφιέναι, 'to coalesce'), and this must be the meaning here. We also find σύμφωνος as a medical term, especially of bones.

1: θεραμένη, 'haunting.' I have not ventured to write καλλιδουμένη, though Cobet says (N. L. p. 637) 'Platonica sunt καλλιδεία ταί εν ἀμαβία, εν πάση ἀμαβία, et ὥσπερ εν δικαιοπριός καλλιδεία, quern-admodum quis proprius εν πηλοφ αυτ εν βορβόρῳ dicitur καλλιδεία'. Very like the present use of the word is Rep. 479 d 4 μεταξύ τοῦ καλλιδεῖα τοῦ μή ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰκορινῶς. The suggestion is that of a restless spirit which cannot tear itself away from the body. Cicero, Somn. Scip. 9 says circum terram ipsam volantur of such souls.

4: διῶ καὶ ὑπάντηται, 'which is just why they are visible.' There is a touch of Socratic playfulness in this theory. If the soul is invisible, we must give some such account of ghosts as this.

6: Εἰκός μέντοι: cp. 65 d 6 n.

8: τροφίς, practically identical here to διαιτής, 'way of life.' Cp. 84 b 4; 107 d 4.

7: εἰδοῦνται: cp. 82 e 2 n. For similar doctrine see Phaedr. 249, Rep. 618 a, 620 sq., Tim. 42 b, 91 sq.

3: ἡθος: we can say 'bad characters' for people who have bad characters, though we should hardly use the word of the lower animals. Very similar to the English use are Rep. 496 b 2 γειναίον καὶ εὖ τεθραμμένον ἡθος, 503 c 9 τὰ βέβαια ταῖτα ἡθος quoted by Bywater on Ar. Poet. 1454 a 23.
81 NOTES

6 καὶ μή διηναβεθημένους: an instance of ‘polar expression’; for διηναβεθήσατα means ‘to avoid carefully’ or ‘scrupulously’ (εἰλαβῶς).

82 a 7 ἦν ... ἓοι, ‘the way they would take,’ a variation for σι, which some late MSS. unnecessarily read.

εκαστα, ‘each class’ Note how the gender is varied (1) τούς ... προτειμηριάτας, (2) τὰς τοιαύτας (sc. ψυχάς), (3) εκαστα.

a 10 καὶ τούτων: i.e. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. There are degrees of happiness even among souls which are not wholly purified.

a 11 τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἥρετήν, ‘popular goodness, the goodness of the good citizen.’ This is related to philosophical goodness just as true belief is related to science. Socrates admits the relative value of both. For the phraseology cp. Rep. 619 c 7 ἔθει ἰῶνυ φιλοσοφίας ἥρετης μεταληφότα. Here πολιτικὴ means ‘belonging to citizens’ (cp. Gorg. 452 e 4), not ‘political’.

b 5 τοιοῦτον κτλ., ‘a race civilized and tame like themselves.’ The regular opposite of ἡμερός is ἄγριος, and both words are used of men, animals, and plants. They mean ‘civilized,’ ‘tame,’ ‘cultivated,’ as opposed to ‘savage,’ ‘wild’.

b 8 ἄνδρας μετρίους, ‘good men,’ though of course only in the popular sense. We might have had ἐπιεικεῖς or σπουδαίοις with the same meaning. Cp. 68 e 2 n.

b 10 μὴ φιλοσοφήσατι ... ἄλλῃ ἦ τῇ φιλομαθῇ: the tendency to ‘polar expression’ here asserts itself at the expense of logic. The sentence ends as if οὕδει had preceded. We must remember that φιλόσοφος and φιλομαθῆς are synonyms (Rep. 376 b 8 ἀλλὰ μέντοι ... τὸ γὲ φιλομαθῆς καὶ φιλόσοφον τοῖς ...). For ἄλλῃ ἦ cp. 68 b 4 n.

c 3 οἷς ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφῶ: cp. 67 b 4 n.

c 5 οἰκοφθορίαν, ‘waste of substance.’

οἱ ... φιλοχρήματι are contrasted with οἱ φίλαρχοι τε καὶ φιλότιμοι just below. Here once more we have the Pythagorean doctrine of the tripartite soul and the ‘Three Lives’. Cp. 68 c 1 n.

c 8 ἐπειτα emphasizes the preceding participles.

d 1 μέντοι μὰ Δία: cp. 65 d 6 n.

d 3 σώματι πλάττοντες ξώσι: most editors suspect πλάττοντες, and it has been emended in various ways. The true interpretation, however, was given by Vahlen long ago (cp. Opusc. i. 83). He pointed out that πλάττειν is used much in the same sense as θεραπεύειν in
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64 d 8 and 81 b 2, and compared Rep. 377 e 3 καὶ πλάττειν τῶς ψυχῶς αὐτῶν τοῖς μέθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερεῖς, to which passage may be added Tim. 88 c 3 τῶν τε αὐ τὰ σῶμα ἐπιμελῶν πλάττομαι. Cp. also Plut. Ei διδακτῶν ἢ ἄρετή 439 f ὡς περ αἱ τίθει ταῖς χερεῖς τὸ σῶμα πλάττοσθαι καὶ Contra Apionis 32. Vahlen holds further that σώματι is governed by καὶ, and that the meaning is 'live for the body, moulding it into shape', though the only example of καὶ c. dat. in this sense which he quotes is in [Dem.] 7. 17 Φιλάππων ζώντες καὶ οὐ ὅτι ἐμπών πατρίδι. Perhaps Eur. Ion 646 εἰ δ' ἐμπῶν σῶν με may be added. If this is not accepted, I would rather read σώματι with TW than have recourse to conjecture. The σώματι of B is, however, the difficilior lectio, and I believe Vahlen's interpretation to be right. His discussion (loc. cit.) of the use of participles with an object to be understood from the context should be read.

3 χαίρειν εἰπόντες, 'dismissing from their thoughts.' Cp. 63 e 3 n.

6 τῇ ἐκείνης λύσει: this, as well as καθαρμός, is Orphic. Olympiodorus quotes some Orphic verses, which at least contain some old ideas: "Οργαί ἐκτελέσωσι, λύσιν προγόνων ἀθεϊστῶν, μανόμενη" στὸ δὲ τοῖσιν ἐχῶν κράτος ὦσ κ' ἐθέλησθα | λύσεις ἐκ τε πάνων χαλεπῶν καὶ ἀπελρονών ὀλστρον.

1 παραλαβοῦσα, 'taking in hand,' as a doctor takes his patient in hand for treatment. The vb. παραλαμβάνειν is technical in this sense, especially of teachers taking pupils. Cp. Rep. 541 a 1 τοῖς δὲ παίδας αὐτῶν παραλαμβάνεις.

2 διαδεδημένη: cp. 62 b 3 n. It is noteworthy that Socrates now adopts and expounds the very doctrine which he had put aside as 'too high'; for the εἰργήμος is clearly the φρονεῖ. The reason is that he is now able to give a more scientific account of it.

2 κυλινδομένην: cp. 81 d 1 n. Here the word means simply 'wallowing'. Cp. Polit. 309 a 5 τοῖς ... ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ ... καὶ ταπεινώστι τολὴν κυλινδομένους, Theaet. 172 c 8 οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις ... κυλινδομένους.

5 την δεινότητα, 'the cleverness', 'the ingenuity'. So far as I can see, none of the editors take the word in this sense; but surely the point is just that the prison-house is ingeniously contrived so as to make the prisoner co-operate in his own imprisonment.

ὅτι δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ἔστιν, sc. ὁ εἰργήμος, 'that it is effected by means

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of desire,' i.e. 'that it has desire as its instrument.' As we shall see, pleasures and pains, with which ἐπιθυμία is concerned, are the agents by which the soul is imprisoned (83 d 4; 84 a 4).

e 6 ὡς ἄν ... ἕη. This is an extremely rare construction in Attic prose, the nearest parallel being Xen. Cyr. i. 3. 8 καὶ διδόμεν τοῖς τρεῖς δακτύλιοις ὄχοντες τὴν φυλήν καὶ προσφέρονσιν, ὡς ἄν εὑροῦν τὸ ἐκπώμα εἰληπτότατα τῷ μέλλοντι πίνειν. It is equivalent in sense to ὅπως c. fil. ind. after verbs of 'ways and means' (the idea of contrivance being implied in δεινώτητα). In other words, ὡς is a relative adverb of manner, and ἄν is to be taken closely with the optative. Tr. 'so as best to secure the prisoner's co-operation in his own imprisonment'.

83 a 1 τοῦ δεδέσθαι: the MSS. have τῷ, but Heindorf's τοῦ restores the normal construction of συλλαμβάνειν, 'to co-operate' (dat. of the person with whom, gen. of the thing in which). Cp. Eur, Med. 946 συλλαμβάνοι δὲ τοῦδε σοι κάγῳ πόνων, Xen. Mem. ii. 2. 12 ἡνα ... ἐγιθοῦν σοι γίγνεται συλλήπτωρ, ib. 7. 32 ἀγαθὴ συλλήπτηρα τῶν ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόνων.

a 2 οὐτῶ ... ἔχουσαν go together, 'in this state.'

a 3 παραμυθεῖται: cp. 70 b 2 n.

b 1 ὅτι ἄν ... τῶν ὄντων: here it is once more implied that both the objects of sense and the objects of thought are ὄντα. Cp. 79 a 6.

b 2 δι’ ἄλλων, opp. αὐτή καθ’ αὐτίν, and virtually equivalent to διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων.

ἐν ἄλλοις ὃν ἄλλο, opp. αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό, 'that which varies in varying conditions,' as opposed to τὸ ἅπτ᾽ ὅσαιτος ἔχον.

b 6 οὕτως emphasizes the preceding participles. Tr. 'It is just because she does not think it right to ... that she ...'

b 7 καὶ φόβον is omitted by T, the Petrie papyrus, and Iamblichus. It looks as if it had been inserted to make this clause symmetrical with the next, in which ἦ λυπηθῆ has to be inserted for a similar reason. Plato avoids exact symmetry of this sort, though his editors, ancient and modern, often foist it on him.

b 9 τοσοῦτον, here practically 'so small'.

c 1 ὃν: Iamblichus has ὡς, which would be more regular, but is to be rejected for that very reason. The participial genitive is used as if only οὕδεν, not οὐδέν τοσοῦτον, preceded.

c 3 καὶ οὗ λογίζεται αὐτό, 'and does not take it into account.'

c 5 ἀναγκάζεται ἀμα τε ... καὶ ...: the emphasis falls on ἀμα. A
belief in the reality of its object must arise simultaneously with any strong feeling of pleasure or pain. We have really to deal, therefore, with a wrong view as to what is real, which is another way of saying that goodness is knowledge.

8 \( \text{τά} \) seems necessary and could easily have been dropped by haplography after \( \text{μάλιστα} \).

4 ὠσπερ ἣλων ἔχουσα, 'with a rivet,' like \( \text{Κράτος} \) and \( \text{Βία} \) in the \text{Prometheus}, as Geddes suggests. It is pleasure and pain that rivet the fetters of the bodily prison-house.

9 \( \text{οία} \): cp. 80 a 4 n.

\text{kαθαρός}: Heindorf conjectured \text{kαθαρός}, comparing 67 a 7; 80 e 2; 82 c 1; but the Petrie papyrus confirms the adverb.

10 ἀναπλία, 'contaminated', 'tainted'. Cf. 67 a 5 n., and \text{Symph. 211 e 1} εὐλογιεῖς, \text{kαθαρὸν}, ὤμεικτον, ἄλλα μὴ ἀναπλεοῦ σαρκῶν τε ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ χρωμάτων. The feminine form is Ionic.

1 \( \text{ἐμφύσεσθαι} \): cp. \text{Tim. 42 a 3} ὅποτε δὴ σώματι ἐμφυτεύειν ἐξ ἀνίγκης (\( \psiυχαί \)).

5 \( \text{οἱ δικαῖοι} \) \text{φιλομάθεις}, synonymous with \( \text{οἱ ὕρθος} \) \text{φιλόσοφοι}, 'those who deserve the name of philosophers.' Cp. 67 b 4 n.

6 \( \κόσμιος \), equivalent to \( \text{σώφρονες} \). Cp. 68 e 2 n.

\( \text{oὐχ ὄν} \ldots ἐνεκά ψάσιν, 'not for the reason given by the mass of men' (cp. 82 c 5 sqq.). It is not necessary to discuss the precise nature of the ellipse here; for the meaning is plain. The Petrie papyrus omits \( \text{ψάσιν} \), as Hermann originally proposed to do. This is the only case where it confirms a modern conjecture.

2 \( \text{οὔ γάρ}, \) 'No, indeed.' It is better to punctuate after \( γάρ \) than to take \( \text{oὐ γάρ} \) ἄλλα together with the older editors and Riddell (Dig. § 156).

3 \( \text{τὴν μὲν} \) \text{φιλοσοφίαν κτλ.} We must subordinate and say 'that, while it is philosophy's business to release the soul, the soul should hand itself over to pleasures and pains to fasten its chains once more'.

4 \( \text{αὐτήν}, 'of itself', 'of its own accord' \). Cp. 64 a 5.

\( \text{παραδίδοναι} \) (cp. 82 c 4) is the correlative of \( \text{παραλαμβάνω} \) (82 e 1 n.). Once more pleasures and pains are represented as the agents of the soul's imprisonment. The \( \text{ἐἰργύμως} \) is \( \text{ὁ} \) \text{ἐπιθυμίας} (82 e 5).

5 \( \text{ἐγκαταστεῖν}, \) sc. \( \text{τῷ} \) \text{σώματι.} Cp. 62 b 3 n.

\( \text{ἀνήμονον ἐργόν} \ldots \) \text{μεταχειρίζομίνης, 'to engage in the endless task}\).
of a Penelope handling her web in the opposite way.’ The vulgate μεταχειριζόμενη is a late conjecture and has nothing to commend it. I formerly read μεταχειριζόμην with Peipers, which is certainly better (cp. R. G. Bury in Class. Rev. xx, p. 13). But μεταχειριζόμενη is the reading of BTW, attested by the Petrie papyrus and Iamblichus, and would not be a natural mistake. It would be safer to write τινός for τινά if any change were required; but the web is the real point of the metaphor, and the indefinite pronoun may attach itself to ἵστον for that reason.

a 7 τοῦτων, sc. τῶν ἐπιθυμῶν.

a 8 ἐν τούτῳ οὐσα: cp. 59 a 3 n.

τῷ ἄδεξαστον, ‘what is not the object of belief (ἀξία),’ but of knowledge. The word is found only here in this sense. Cp. the similar use of ἄνωτον above 80 b 4.

b 3 ἀπηλλάχθαι, sc. οἴεται, not οἴεται δεῖν, as is shown by the nominative ἀφικομένη. The soul believes that after death she is done with all human ills.

b 4 οὐδὲν δεινόν μὴ φοβηθη, ‘there is no danger of her fearing.’ Cp. Ἀρ. 28 b 1 οὐδὲν δὲ δεινόν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ, ‘there is no fear of my being the last’, Gorg. 520 d 5 οὐδὲν δεινόν αὐτῷ μὴ ποτε ἀδικηθη, Rep. 465 b 8 οὐδὲν δεινόν μὴ ποτε ... διοικεστάσην.

b 5 [ταύτα δ’ ἐπιτηδεύσασα]: I take this to be an explanation of, or more probably an ancient variant for, ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς. To change δ’ into γ’ with Stephanus and most editors is to hide the wound, not to heal it.

οπος μὴ ...: cp. 77 b 4 n.

b 6 ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος: i. e. ἐπειδὴν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος (70 a 2). The whole clause refers back to what Cebes said at 70 a.

Narrative interlude. Socrates is as ready as ever to hear objections to what he says (84 c 1—85 b 9).

This long interlude marks off the first part of the dialogue from the second, in which more serious objections have to be faced than those of οἱ πολλοὶ. There are scientific objections too.

c 2 πρὸς τῷ ... λόγῳ ἢν, ‘was absorbed in the foregoing argument.’ Cp. Phaedr. 249 c 5 πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνους αἱ ἐστίν, δ I πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γνῷ μενός, Rep. 567 a 1 ἵνα ... πρὸς τῷ καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀναγκάζονται εἶναι, Dem. 19. 127 ὅλος πρὸς τῷ λήμματι.
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3 ως ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, lit. 'as he appeared to look at', 'to judge from his appearance'. In this usage the epexegetic ἰδεῖν means much the same as τὴν ὁψίν. Cp. Tim. 52 ε 1 παντοδιαπήν ἰδεῖν φαίνεσθαι, Eur. Her. 1002 εἰκών, ὡς ὄραν ἐφαίνετο, Παλλάς.

4 σμικρὸν... διελεγέσθην, 'went on talking in a low voice' (not 'for a little'). The opposite of (σ)μικρὸν λέγειν, &c., is μέγα λέγειν, &c. 'to speak loud.'

5 ἐξελευποίασ καὶ ἀντιλαβάς: 'it admits of, suggests, gives room for many misgivings and is open to many forms of attack' (ἀντιλαβή, like ἀντίληψις, 87 a 6, is a metaphor from wrestling, 'the opponent's grip').

6 εὐπορήσειν, 'that you will find a way out of your difficulty,' εἰπορία being the opposite of ἀπορία.

7 τάλαι, 'for some time.' Cp. 63 d 5 n.

2 μή... διάκειμαι of fear for something in the present, whereas d 7 μή... ἃ refers to the future, 'lest it should prove to be'. It is incorrect to say that the present indicative implies certainty.


1 κάλλιστα: this is Blomfield's correction of the MS. μάλιστα, and is now known to be the reading of W, though the first hand has written καὶ μάλιστα above the line. We cannot defend μάλιστα by interpreting it as 'loudest'. That would be μέγιστον, which I had conjectured before the reading of W was known.

2 τὸν θεόν: Apollo, as we presently learn, and, in particular, Apollo Hyperboreus who, as I have shown in E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 97, n. 3, was the chief god of the Pythagoreans (cp. 60 d 2 n.). Aristophanes too was aware that the swans sang to Apollo. Cp. Birds 769 τοῦδε κύκνοι... συμμιγή βοὴν, ὅμως πτεροὶς κρέκοντες, ἅικχου 'Απόλλω... ὁχθὼ ἐφεξώμενοι παρ' Ἐβρων ποταμῶν.

3 τὸ αὐτῶν δίος τοῦ θανάτου, 'their own fear of death.' (Some editors wrongly take τοῦ θανάτου with καταψείδονται.)

5 ἐξάδειν, 'to sing a song of departure.' There is some reason to
believe that the last song of the chorus was spoken of as τὰ ἐξοδικά as well as τὸ ἐξίδιον. The scholiast on Ar. Wasps 270 says so, though the text is generally emended to τὰ ἐξοδικά, and Plotinus, Enn. 6. 9. 8 (p. 1404. 10) says οἷον χορὸς ἐξάδων. Cp. Polyb. xxxi. 20. Ἡ μάτην ἐξάσις τὸ κύκνειον, Plut. Symp. 161 c (of Arion) ἐξάσις δὲ καὶ τῶν βίων τελευτῶν, καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι κατὰ τοῦτο τῶν κύκνων ἀγεννέστερος.

a 7 Ἡ τε ἄηδὼν καὶ χελιδὼν καὶ δ ἐποψ (note how Plato avoids the formalism of the article, Riddell, Dig. § 237). These are the three birds of Attic legend, Procne, Philomela, and Tereus. Procne, not 'Philomel', is the nightingale in Athenian legend.

b 3 διαφερέντως Ἡ, 'in a higher degree than,' cp. below 95 c 3. The construction διαφέρειν Ἡ is as regular as διαφέρειν c. gen.

b 5 τερός τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ: we know from the Apology that Socrates regarded himself as consecrated to Apollo by the answer given to Chaerephon at Delphi. The view that Plato invented this does not merit discussion. With the expression ὁμόθωνος cp. Ἀρ. 23 c 1 διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

b 6 οὐ χείρον . . . ἔχειν, 'that I possess the art in no inferior degree', 'that I am not worse provided than they are with the gift of prophecy at my Master's hands'. Cp. Hdt. iii. 130 φλαυρὸς ἔχειν τὴν τέχνην.

b 8 τοῦτον γ' ἔνεκα, 'so far as that is concerned.' Cp. 106 d 2.

b 9 Ἀθναίαν: the absence of the article is normal, and the position of the word suggests the official style.

The Objections of Simmias and Cebes (85 b 10—95 e 6).

(1) The Objection of Simmias (85 b 10—86 d 4).

C 3 τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδίναι, 'sure knowledge.' As we have seen (62 b 5), Plato represents Socrates as speaking with a certain reserve as to the details of the doctrine.

C 4 μὴ οὐχὶ . . . καὶ μὴ . . .: the negatives are not co-ordinate. The first is dependent on μακθακοῦ εἴναι ἄνδρός (which implies a negative and therefore takes μὴ οὐ). The second merely introduces a negative statement of παντὶ τρῶσῃ εἴγχειν. Tr. 'To fail to test them in every way without desisting till one is utterly exhausted by examining them on every side, shows a very poor spirit.'
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7 ή μαθείν ... ή εὑρείν, 'either to learn (from another) or find out (for oneself).' This contrast had an almost proverbial currency. Cp. Soph. fr. 731 τὰ μεν διδακτὰ μανθάνω, τὰ δ' εὐρετὰ | ζητω' τὰ δ' εὐκτὰ παρὰ θεῶν ητησάμην. So below 99 c 8.

8 ei ταῦτα ἀδύνατον: cp. Parm. 160 a 2 ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατον εὕφανη.


3 λόγος θείου τινός: this must refer to the Orphic and Pythagorean doctrine of the soul. It is quite in keeping with all we can make out as to the history of Pythagoreanism that Simmias and Cebes should feel regretfully that they can no longer accept the λόγος of their society. We are just about to learn that they had adopted a view of the soul which was wholly inconsistent with it. I assume that Heindorf is right in deleting ἢ; for otherwise the whole phrase must go. The conjunction ἢ is never used to introduce an explanation. Even, however, if ἢ λόγος θείου τινός is an adscript, or a question asked by some reader, it gives a perfectly correct explanation of the meaning, as is shown by c 9 τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων.

7 πρὸς ἐμαυτόν: cp. 95 e 7 πρὸς ἐμαυτόν τι σκέψαμενος.

3 ἐμοιγε, sc. οὐ φαίνεται ίκανῶς εὑρεῖσθαι.

περὶ ἄρμονίας, 'with regard to the tuning of a lyre and its strings.' It is important to remember here that ἄρμονία does not mean what we call 'harmony.' It has its literal sense of 'tuning' in a certain key or mode, from which its other senses, 'scale' and 'octave', are easily derived. What we call 'harmony' is in Greek συμφωνία. Cp. 86 a 1 ἐν τῇ ἄρμοσμενῃ λύρᾳ, 'in the tuned lyre.'

3 κατάξεῖ refers to the framework of the lyre, διατίμη and διαρρήξη ('cut and break') to the strings. Schanz (Stud. p. 36) regards διατέμη as an adscript to διαρρήξη. It is true that in a 7 we have only διερρωγωνίων and not διατετμομένων, but that is just Plato's way of avoiding formal symmetry.

6 οὐδεμία ... ἂν εἰῇ: Bekker brackets ἂν, which restores the normal construction on the assumption that εἰῇ is indirect speech for εἰστί. But the direct speech might very well be ἂν εἰῇ, which would remain unchanged in oratio obliqua.

2 ἀλλὰ φαίν ἀνάγκη ... εἶναι: the original protasis εἰ τις δισχευρίζοιτο

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... ὡς κτλ. is resumed, but in oratio recta, as is natural after the parenthesis. Of course, φαίη still depends upon εἰ in a 4, but has no effect upon the construction. It is the parenthetical φησίν, inquit, adapted to the construction of the long protasis. We might write ἄλλα (φαίη) ἄναγκη κτέ.

b 5 καὶ γὰρ οὖν κτλ.: Simmias here interrupts himself. He thinks he may as well drop the imaginary τις and state plainly that the comparison of the soul to a ἄρμονία is their own doctrine. The hesitation with which he does so is responsible for the cumbrousness of the sentence, and is the natural consequence of the feelings which he expressed in the interlude.

καὶ οὗτὸν σὲ κτλ.: it is assumed that Socrates is familiar with the recent developments of Pythagoreanism, though he may not accept them.

b 6 ὑπολαμβάνομεν: who are ‘we’ this time? Most editors suppose that no particular school is meant, and that the theory under discussion was simply a popular belief. This is most improbable. It has all the marks of being a medical theory, and we now know that Philolaus was a medical writer (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 322). Further, the doctrine was held at a later date by Aristoxenus, who was acquainted with the last of the Pythagoreans (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 320), who were disciples of Philolaus like Simmias. We shall see below (88 d 3) that Echecrates, another disciple of Philolaus, had accepted it too. I have pointed out elsewhere (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 339 sqq.) how such a doctrine would naturally arise from the attempt to adapt Pythagoreanism to the views of the Sicilian school of medicine, which were based on the Empedoclean doctrine of the four ‘elements’ identified with the ‘opposites’ hot and cold, wet and dry (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 235). Further confirmation of this view will be found in the following notes. Aristotle says (De An. A. 4. 407 b 27 καὶ ἄλλη δὲ τις δάξα παραδέδοται περὶ ψυχῆς, πιθανὴ μὲν πολλοὶς οὐδεμιᾶς ἣττον τῶν λεγομένων, λόγοις δ’ ὀσπερ εἰδύνας δεδοκιμάς καὶ τοῖς ἐν κοινῷ γνωμένοις λόγοις (i.e. dialectical discussions)’ ἄρμονίαν γὰρ τινα αὐτὴν λέγουσιν’ καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἄρμονίαν κρύσιν καὶ σύνδεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκείσθαι ἐξ ἑναντίων.

b 7 ὀσπερ ἐντεταμίνου κτλ. The body is thought of as an instrument tuned to a certain pitch, the opposites hot and cold, wet and dry taking the place of high and low (ὀξύ καὶ βαρύ) in music.
καὶ συνεχόμενον, 'and held together.' It is the presence of the opposites hot and cold, wet and dry which keeps the body together, so long as neither opposite prevails unduly over the other (cp. Zeno, ap. Diog. Laert. ix. 29 καὶ ψυχῆν κράμα έπάργειν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων (the four opposites) κατά μηδενὸς τούτων ἐπικράτησιν).

υπὸ θερμοῦ κτλ. This was the characteristic doctrine of the Sicilian school. Cp. Anon. Lond. xx. 25 (from Meno's διαρμικά) Φιλοσοφίων δ' οίτει ἐκ τεττάρων ίδεων συνεστάναι ἰμάσι, τούτ' ἔστιν ἐκ τεττάρων στοιχείων πυρός, ἀέρος, ὦδατος, γῆς. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἐκάστων δυνάμεις, τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς τὸ θερμά, τοῦ δὲ ἀέρος τὸ ψυχρόν, τοῦ δὲ ὦδατος τὸ ύγρόν, τῆς δὲ γῆς τὸ ἔξορον. Cp. the speech of the physician Eryximachus in Symposium 186 d 6 ἐστι δὲ ἐξίσατα τὰ εὐανείστατα, ψυχρὸν θερμόν, πυρὸν γλυκεῖ, ἐξορὸν ύγρό... τούτων ἑπιστηθεὶς ἔρωτα ἐμποθοῦν καὶ ὀμόνοιαν ὑμέτερον πρόγονον Ἀσκληπιός... συνέστησαν τίνι ἵμετέραν τέχνην.

9 κράσιν, temperaturam. The word was properly used of the mixture of wine and water in the κρατῆρ in certain fixed proportions. This seems to have been an earlier way of describing what the later Pythagoreans called a ἀρμονία. Parmenides (fr. 16) already speaks of the κράσιμος μελέων, and Diogenes Laertius ix. 29 ascribes the theory to Zeno (cp. above b 8 n). The whole doctrine of the 'temperaments' is a development of this. Eryximachus (Symposium 188 a 1) uses both terms in connexion with climate (ὁ τῶν ὀρὸν τοῦ ἐναπείνον σύστασιν) which is good ἐπειδάν... πῶς ἄλληλα... τά εὐθερμά καὶ τά ψυχρά καὶ ἔρημα καὶ ύγρά... ἀρμονίαν καὶ κράσιμον λάβη σώφρονα.

2 εἴ οὖν τυγχάνει κτλ., 'if then our soul is just a tuning.' After the explanation given in the last parenthesis, the protasis is resumed (hence οὖν) in another form. For the present εἰ τίς διασχυρίζωντο κτλ. is dropped.

3 διὰν χαλασθῇ: χαλάν is a regular synonym of ἀνέναυ, relaxare, to loosen a string. The opposite is ἐπιστείνων, intendere.

6 ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις, 'in musical notes.' In Attic the word φθόγγος is practically confined to the meanings 'note' (whether in music or the notes of birds) and 'accent'.

1 ὅρα οὖν: this introduces the apodosis, which also contains, in the words εἶν τις ἀξιός, a reminiscence of the original protasis εἰ τίς διασχυρίζωντο.
(2) The objection of Cebes (86 d 5—88 b 8).

This verb occurs nowhere else before Aristotle Περί ἐνεπτιῶν 462 a 12 ἐνίοις γὰρ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ πάμπαι διαβλέπουσιν, ἔαν ἢ σκότος, φησίνεται εἶδωλα πολλὰ κινούμενα, where it plainly means ‘having the eyes wide open’. The words ὤσπερ...εἶναι suggest that the reference is to the well-known peculiarity of Socrates’ eyes described in Theaet. 143 e 9 as τὸ ἐξω τῶν ὄμματων, a peculiarity also referred to in Xen. Symph. 5. 5, where Socrates says that his eyes are able to see, not only what is in front of him (τὸ κατ’ εἶθι), but also τὸ ἐκ πλαγίου (obliquely) διὰ τὸ ἑτερολαυμὸν εἶναι (because they are à fleur de tête). That this is the meaning of τὸ ἐξω τῶν ὄμμάτων is, I think, proved by the opposition of ἐξοφθαλμὸς (so Plato, Theaet. 209 c 1) to κοιλόφθαλμος in Xen. Eq. 1. 9, though in itself Campbell’s suggestion that τὸ ἐξω refers to the position of the eyes and the width between them is perfectly possible. It is the same peculiarity which Aristophanes intends when he makes the Clouds say to Socrates (Clouds 362) τὸφθαλμὸν παραβάλλειν. If this is so, δια- does not mean ‘through’, but ‘apart’, as in διαβαίνω, so we must not translate ‘with a piercing glance’. The phrase ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέ-ψας below (117 b 5) means something rather different.

The aorist in such questions expresses impatience. Cp. Gorg. 509 e 2 τί οὐκ αὐτὸ γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω; So already Hdt. ix. 48 τὶ δὴ ὃδ ... ἐμαχεσάμεθα;

ἄπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου, ‘handling the argument.’ Cp. Euthyd. 283 a 2 ἐπεσκόπουν τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἐφοίτο τοῦ λόγου. Heindorf’s view that ἄπτεσθαι is here used reprehendendi et impugnandi potestate seems improbable, though adopted in L. and S.

χρόνου ἑγγενομένου, ‘when we have had time.’ Cp. Symp. 184 a 6 ἐὰν χρόνος ἑγγένηται. The phrase is common in Thucydides.

ἐπείτα [δὲ]: the balance of evidence is in favour of omitting δὲ.

συγχωρεῖν, sc. δοκεῖ χρὴναι.

αὐτοῖς, sc. Σιμμία καὶ Κέβητί.

ἐὰν τι δοκῶσι προσφέδειν, ‘if it appears that they are at all in tune.'
The voice and the accompanying instrument are said προσάδειν or ἀπάδειν. Socrates gently rallies the musical terminology of the Thebans. Cp. 92 c 5.

3 οὖτως ἡδη, tum dum, 'then and not till then.' There is a slight anacoluthon, as ἡ has preceded.

4 ὑπεράκειν is a poetical word found only in late prose.

5 τὸ...θράττον, 'what is troubling you.' Here we have an old word (Pind., Aesch.), though with Att. -ττ- for -σσ-. Cp. the Homeric τέρπχα. The reading τὸ is well attested, so ἀπιστίαν παρέχει is probably due to the same hand as the interpolation at 69 e 3. The change of τὸ to ὅ in later MSS. is clearly a 'conjecture.'

6 εὖ τῷ αὐτῷ...εἰναι, 'to have got no further.'

7 ὅπερ...ταύτον...ἐχεῖν, 'to be open to the same criticism as we made in our former argument' (77 b 1 sqq.).

2 τὸδε τὸ εἰδος, 'this (human) body.' Cp. 76 c 12.

3 οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι, 'I do not retract,' a metaphor ἀπὸ τῶν πεπειράτων καὶ τῶν κεκεκμένων ἡδη ψίφους ('pieces') διομοδούντων (Harpocration). Cp. Hippiarch. 229 e 3 ὧσσερ πεπειράτων ἐθέλω...ἀναθέσθαι. It takes the construction of verbs of denying.

3 ἐπαχθές, 'exaggerated.' The word is applied not only to arrogant self-praise (Dem. Cor. 10 ἐνα μηδεν ἐπαχθές λέγοι) but also to 'overdone' or 'fulsome,' praise of others. Cp. Lysis 688 d 6 λόγῳ...σε, ὅ εἰσιν, ἐπαχθάτεστερον. It is just this sensitiveness to τὸ ἐπαχθές which accounts for the way of speaking described in 68 e 2 n.

5 οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδε, sc. ἵκανός ἀποδεδείχθαι, 'I think the demonstration is deficient in this respect.'

3 ὑπελήψα, 'objection,' a metaphor from wrestling; cp. 84 c 7 ἀπε-λαβάς.

7 τι οὖν ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος: the argument is often personified in this way. Cf. Soph. 238 b 4 ὡς φησιν ὁ λόγος. For the position of ὁν cp. 102 a 1. The parenthesis was so familiar that φαίη ἂν was not consciously to the speaker a separate clause. (Riddell, Dig. § 25.)

4 ὡμοίως...ὡσσερ ἂν τει...λέγον, 'with as much right as if.' The whole of this section is thrown into the form of a reported dialogue between ὁ λέγων and ὁ ἀπιστῶν.
b 5  ἀνθρώπων ὄψιν τοὺς πρέσβυτου, simply 'an old weaver'. It is idiomatic to add ἀνθρωπός to the names of trades. In Scots we might say a 'webster body'.

b 6  διὰ οὐκ ἀπόλολεν κτλ., 'that the man is not dead, but is safe and sound somewhere.' Of course this is not supposed to be an argument for the continued existence of the weaver's soul, but is meant to disprove the fact of his death in the ordinary sense of the word. The weaver corresponds to the soul, and the garment to the body.

b 7  σῶς: all MSS. have ἂσως, but it is difficult to reject Forster's correction σῶς in view of the next line and c 5 below.

αὐτὸς ὑφηγάμενος: this touch is not necessary to the argument, nor indeed is it strictly necessary that the old man should be a weaver at all; but Cebes has in view a theory of the soul weaving the body as its garment, which is pretty nearly the opposite of the view that it is the ἀρμονία or κράσις of the elementary opposites. The latter makes the soul a resultant of the bodily organization, the former makes it the organizing principle. The view that the body is the garment of the soul is primitive (cp. the Orphic χιτών, and Empedocles, fr. 126 Diels σαμκών ἀλλόγνωσι περιστελλούσα χιτώνι, E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 258, n. 1); but the theory of Simmias is essentially Heraclitean. Such eclecticism was characteristic of the time.

c 1  ἀπιστοῖς is Heindorf's correction of the MS. ἀπιστῶν, which seems to involve an incredible anacoluthon; seeing that ἀνερροτήθη must have the τῶ in b 4, not that in b 8, for its subject.

C 3  τινὸς strikes me as a not very successful attempt at botching the sentence after ἀπίστοις had been corrupted into ἀπιστῶν. The argument surely requires that the person asked, not 'some one', should give the answer, and we can easily supply αὐτοῦ from the context.

c 6  τὸ δ(ε), 'whereas,' cum tamen. This is a fairly common Platonic idiom (cp. 109 d 8), though it can hardly be said that it has been satisfactorily explained.

c 7  πᾶς [γὰρ] ἀν ὑπολίβοι, 'any one would retort,' rather than 'every one would understand'. The γὰρ is more likely to have been inserted in B than dropped in TW. The asyndeton is quite correct.

ὁτι εὐνθεὶς λέγει κτλ., 'that this is a silly argument.' The verb is used twice over in order to make the construction personal.
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NOTES

c 8 ὦτος, ἵστε, 'this weaver of yours.'
d 4 ψυχή πρὸς σῶμα, 'the relation of soul to body will admit of the same comparison.'
d 5 μέτρι(a) ... λέγειν: i. q. εὖ λέγειν. Cp. 96 d 6.
d 7 ἄν φαίη: cp. 87 a 7 n.
d 8 εἰ γάρ ρίοι κτλ., 'for, even if the body is in a state of flux and is perishing while the man is still living, yet the soul always weaves aresh the web that is worn out.' This is a parenthesis intended to justify the statement that each soul wears out many bodies. The optative is regular in the parentheses of indirect speech, and ἄλλα means at. For the theory (which is just that of modern physiology) cp. Tim. 43 a 4 τὰς τής ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδρου εἰς ἐπίρημαν σῶμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτουν. It is essentially Heraclitean (E. Gr. Ph. 3 pp. 161 sqq.).

e 3 τυχεῖν ... ἔχουσαν, 'it must have at the time.'
e 4 τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας, ‘its natural weakness.' Such words as φύσι are often used with the genitive to form a mere periphrasis for the noun which they govern, but their proper meaning may emerge more or less, as here.
e 5 ἐπιδεικνύοι ... διοίκητο: the construction reverts to d 5 μέτρι ἃν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, òς ... All this is still the speech of ὁ ἀπιστῶν. There is a much stronger instance of an oblique optative with nothing to depend on below 95 d 3.
a 1 εἰ γάρ τὴς κτλ. These words are addressed, not (as Heindorf and Stallbaum thought) by Cebes to Simmias, but by the supposed objector to Cebes. ‘Even if,’ he says, ‘we were to make a still greater concession to the man who uses this argument (τῷ λέγομεν) than the concession which you (Cebes) mention’ (above 87 a 1 sqq.).
a 6 αὐτό, 'the thing in question,' i.e. the soul. Cp. below 109 a 9.
a 7 ψυχήν (τὴν ψυχὴν W) is added for clearness after χρημομενη. The more regular construction would be to say either αὐτήν or χρημάτωσ. α 8 μηκέτι συγχαροῖ: these words continue the protasis and still depend on εἰ, 88 a 1. ‘If, having granted this, he were to stop short of making the further admission that ...' 

πονεῖν was technical for λυπεῖσθαι in fifth-century philosophy. Cp. Anaxagoras (quoted in Aristotle's Ethics 1154 b 7) ὁεὶ πονεῖ τὸ ζῆν.
b 3  εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει κτλ. The original protasis, εἰ . . . τις . . .
συγχωρήσεις, which has just been continued by b 2 φαίη, is dropped, and a new protasis, resuming the argument of τις, is begun.
οithmetic, 'no one has a right', 'is entitled'. Stephanus reads προσήκεια.

b 4  θάνατον θαρποῦντι: as θαρπεῖν is equivalent to οὐ (μη) φοβεῖσθαι
(cpr. 63 e 10 n.) it naturally takes an object accusative.

b 6  ἀνάγκην εἶναι is dependent on b 2 φαίη. The reported speech which is dropped for a moment at b 4 προσήκει reasserts itself here.

Dramatic Interlude. The effect of the objections (88 c 1—89 a 8).

The importance of this break in the argument is marked by the fact that it takes us back to Phlius and Echecrates, and that the dramatic form is resumed. It has to be shown that current Pythagorean views about the soul are inadequate and that we must go deeper.

c 4  εἰς ἀπορίαν καταβαλεῖν: cp. Phileb. 15 e 4 εἰς ἀπορίαν αὐτὸν . . . καταβάλλων.
οὐ μόνον τοῖς . . . ἄλλα καὶ εἰς τὰ . . . The change of construction is characteristic.

c 6  μη . . . εἴμεν . . . ἕ: the change of mood is due to the fact that the first verb refers to the present, the second to the future. The opt. μη εἴμεν is the indirect form of μη . . . ἐσμεν, while μη . . . ἕ means 'lest they should prove to be'. The subj. here might also have become opt., but this would have obscured the difference of meaning. For other instances cp. Riddell, Dig. § 89.

d 1  ἐπίρχεται, 'it is borne in upon me.'

d 2  ὡς . . . ὡν: exclamations, like interrogations, may be conveyed by a participial phrase.

d 4  ἀντιλαμβάνεται: this is a different application of the metaphor from wrestling, explained 84 c 6 n. Cp. Parn. 130 e 2 οὕτω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἐτί ἀντιλίψεται.

d 9  μετηληθὲ τὸν λόγον: cp. 76 e 9 n. The λόγος is the game which is hunted. So Meno 74 d 3 εἰ οὖν ὦσπερ ἔγω μετήλη ὑπὸς τὸν λόγον, Soph. 252 b 8 ἐτὶ τοῖς ἄν . . . καταγελαστώτατα μετίσοιεν τὸν λόγον. That this is the meaning appears from the equivalent phrase διώκειν τὸν λόγον Theaet. 166 d 8.
NOTES

1 τι is internal object of ἄχθομενος.
2 ἐβοήθει τῷ λέγῳ. Here we have a different, but almost equally common, metaphor.
3 ἐκεῖνος: cp. Riddell, Dig. § 194.
2 ὃς ἡδεός θ. : cp. 58 e 4 n.
3 ἀγαμίνως: Plato often uses ἀγαμαί of the effect produced on Socrates by his interlocutors.

Protreptic interlude (89 a 9 - 91 c 5). A Warning against μυστολογία.
1 ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινὸς: Χαμαιζήλος· διφρύων μικρόν, ἦ ταπεινὸν σκιμπό-διον (Timaeus, s. v.).
2 καταψήςασαν μὲν θ. This is imitated in Xenophon's Αρολογία 28 τῶν δὲ λέγεται καταψήπαντα αὐτοὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν εἰπεῖν θ. In Xenophon, however, it is the head of Apollodorus that Socrates strokes. This is pointless; for he would hardly wear his hair long like the youthful Phaedo. It appears from the following words that Socrates wishes to see how Phaedo will look with his hair cropped as a sign of mourning.
8 Ἀλλὰ τί; 'What then?' Heindorf shows from Aristophanes that this was a regular colloquial formula.
10 ἐναβιώσασθαι: cp. 71 e 13 n. The metaphor here implied is the same as in ἔποιεῖν τῷ λίγῳ, 88 e 2.
1 εἰ ... μὲ διαφεύγοι: here we have the other metaphor, the hunting of the λόγος.
2 ῶσσερ Ἀργείου: Hdt. i. 82 Ἀργείοι μὲν γὰς ἄπο τοῦ τοῦ χρόνου κατακείμενοι τὰς κεφαλὰς, πρῶτον ἐπάναγκες κομέωντες, ἐπούσαντες μάμον τε καὶ κατάρην μὴ πρῶτον θρέψειν κόμην Ἀργείοι μηδένι ... ἰὰς θυρεάς ἀνασώσωνται.
2 πρὸς δὲ ... οἴδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς: the proverb is more fully explained in Euthyd. 297 c 1 τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, ὃς οὐχ οἶδ' ᾧ τῇ τῇ τῇ ὕδρα διαμάχεσθαι ... καὶ καρκίνον τῳ ... ἐκ θαλάττης ἄφυγμένον ... ὁς ἐπειδὴ αὐτῶν ἐλύπει αὐτῶς ἐκ τοῦ ἐπ᾽ ἀριστερὰ ... δίκτυων, τὸν ἱόλεον τὸν ἀδελφιδοῖν βοηθῶν ἐπεκαλέσατο, ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ ἰκανῶς ἐξοίβησεν.
5 πρὸς δόσ ... οἴδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς: the proverb is more fully explained in Euthyd. 297 c 1 τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, ὃς οὐχ οἶδ' ᾧ τῇ τῇ τῇ ὕδρα διαμάχεσθαι ... καὶ καρκίνον τῳ ... ἐκ θαλάττης ἄφυγμένον ... ὁς ἐπειδὴ αὐτῶν ἐλύπει αὐτῶς ἐκ τοῦ ἐπ᾽ ἀριστερὰ ... δίκτυων, τὸν ἱόλεον τὸν ἀδελφιδοῖν βοηθῶν ἐπεκαλέσατο, ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ ἰκανῶς ἐξοίβησεν.
7 ἐκεῖ φῶς ἑστὶν: cp. 61 e 4 n.
10 τὸν Ἡρακλῆ: the poetical form (cp. Soph. Τραχ. 476) is purposely
used to suggest a poetical reminiscence (Vahlen, *Opusc.* i, p. 485).

d 1 μυσόλογοι, ‘haters of discourses’ or ‘arguments’ (not ‘reason’), as appears from d 3 λόγους μυσώσας. Minucius Felix, *Octav.* xiv. 4, quoted by Geddes, translates quite correctly *igitur nobis providendum est ne odio identidem sermonum omnium laboremus.

d 2 τούτου . . . η . . . : cp. *Crito* 44 c 2 τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα η δοκεῖν κτλ. Riddell, Dig. § 163.

d 5 ἀνευ τέχνης: the meaning of this is made clear by e 5 ἀνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τῶν ἀρχώτεια.

e 2 οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ψυχὲς: cp. 90 c 3, Ar. *Plut.* 362 ὃς οὐδὲν ἀτεχνῶς ψυχὲς ἑστιν οὐδενὸς. So *Crit. 440* c 6 καὶ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ὀντων καταγιγυρώσκειν ὃς οὐδὲν ψυχὶς οὐδενὸς. For the meaning of ψυχὲς cp. 69 b 8 n.

90 a 1 σφόδρα qualifies χρηστοῖς καὶ ποιηροῖς, not ὀλίγους, as is shown by a 4 τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων.

a 8 τὰ . . . ἀκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων: the ἐσχάτα are opposed to τὰ μεταξὺ, and the ἀκρα are the extremes of these.

b 2 φανήναι: cp. 72 c 1 n.

b 4 ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ . . . ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνη, ἦ . . . , ‘that is not the point of comparison but this . . . ’

b 7 τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης: the term Logic (λογική, sc. τέχνη) originated from phrases like this, though neither ἦ λογική nor τὰ λογικά are used till a far later date. Logic is thought of here as an art of dealing with arguments, just as the art of life (ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια τέχνη 89 e 5) teaches us to deal with men.

b 8 ὅν, ‘being so.’ We cannot take ὅν here as equivalent to ‘being true’ with some editors. If anything, it is ψευδότις that must be supplied.

b 9 καὶ μάλιστα δῇ κτλ. The protasis which began at b 6 ἐπειδὰν is forgotten and never resumed.

οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρῆσαντες: the true originator of ἀντιλογικός λόγος was Zeno of Elea, who was some twenty years older than Socrates (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 358). From quite another point of view Protagoras maintained δῶ λόγους εἶναι περὶ ἄπαντων πράγματος, ἀντικειμένους ἄλληλοις, οἷς καὶ συνηρώτα, πρῶτος τοῦτο πράξις (Diog. Laert. ix. 51). Cp. 101 e 2.

c 4 ἀτεχνῶς ὡσπέρ ἐν Ἑυρίπω: the current in the Euripus was said to change its direction seven times a day (Strabo ix. 403). In reality
the παλίρροια is more irregular, being partly tidal and partly due to seiches. Cp. Pauly-Wissowa, vi, col. 1283. The current is strong enough to stop a steamer. For ἀτεχνῶς introducing such expressions cp. 59 a 4 n.

5 ἄνω κάτω στριφεται κτλ. The language of this sentence is just that which is elsewhere used of the followers of Heraclitus (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 417 n. 3). Cp. Crat. 440 c 6 αὐτών τε καὶ τῶν ὄντων καταγιγρώσκειν ὃς οὐδὲν ἐγέρῃ ὀδηγῶσ, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὡσπερ κερύμα ἰτεί, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὡσπερ οἱ κατάρρῳ νοσοῦντες ἄνθρωποι ὄντως οἰεσθαί καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακεῖσθαι, ἀπὸ ρεῖματός τε καὶ κατάρρου πάντα χρήματα ἔχονται. Now, in the Theaetetus Plato makes Socrates say that Protagoras justified his πάντων χρημάτων μέτρων ἄνθρωποι by basing it on the doctrine of Heraclitus. It seems, then, that Protagoras is mainly intended here. It is certain, at any rate, that Plato would not have made Socrates refer in this way either to Antisthenes or Euclides; for both are supposed to be present.

9 δὴ πίνος: the particle δὴ follows the interrogative τίς but precedes the indefinite τις. Cp. 107 d 7 ; 108 c 1 ; 115 a 4.

1 ἐπειτα marks inconsistency or inconsequence by emphasizing the preceding participle.

9 μὴ παρίωμεν, 'let us not admit' (from παρίημι).

2 τολύ μάλλον: we must supply ἐννοοῦμεν or some such word from the context.

2 oί πάνω ἀπαθετοι: here we have the beginnings of the characteristic Aristotelian use of ἀπαθετοι for ignorance of Logic. Aristotle applies the word to the followers of Antisthenes (Met. Z. 3. 1045 b 24 oί 'Ἀπισθενεῖοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαθετοι), but no such reference is admissible here. Cp. 90 c 5 n.

3 φιλονίκως: the MSS., as usual, have -ει- for -ει-, but it is very doubtful whether there ever was such a word as φιλόνικος, 'strife-loving,' and Plato certainly derives φιλόνικος from νίκη in Rep. 581 b 2 (see Adam, in loc.). In every passage where the word occurs in Plato the meaning 'victory-loving' is appropriate. Here the sense is clearly that Socrates may seem to be arguing for victory rather than truth.

5 ἀ αὑτοὶ ἔθνο, 'what they themselves have laid down,' their own θεσεῖς.
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a 8 ei μη ετη πάρεργον, 'except incidentally.' Cp. Polit. 286 d 5 πλήν ei (ei μη Τ) πάρεργον τι.

b 1 ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς: Socrates playfully suggests that he is taking an unfair advantage. It is 'Heads I win; tails you lose'.

b 3 ἀλλ' οὖν...γε, 'at any rate.' The emphatic word is placed between ἀλλ' οὖν and γε in this combination.

b 4 ἦτ. v...δινρόμενος, I shall be less likely to distress the company by lamentations.'

b 5 ἄνωια, 'folly.' Most editors follow Stephanus in reading ἄγνωια. apparently without MS. authority. B has διάνωια, a mistake due to the resemblance of Α and Δ. Schanz's ὅ δὲ δὴ ἄγνωια implies a much less likely corruption.

c 3 εὐλαβούμενοι is omitted in B, but this may be an accident.

c 5 τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλείπων: cp. the description of the oratory of Pericles by Eupol's (fr. 94 Kock) οὖτος ἐκήλει καὶ μόνος τῶν ἐπτάρων ἰ τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις.

Reply to the objection of Simmias (91 c 6—95 a 3).

The objection of Simmias is fully dealt with, but that of Cebes is found to raise a larger question, and leads up to the Third Proof of Immortality.

c 7 Συμμίας μὲν γὰρ κτλ. The two views are resumed and carefully distinguished. There is (1) the view that the soul is the ἀρμονία of the body and must therefore perish even before the body, and (2) the view that the soul weaves for itself many bodies, but perishes with, or even before, the last of them.

c 8 ὰμως...ἀν, 'in spite of its being.' The adv. ὰμως is 'attracted' by the participle.

d 1 ἐν ἀρμονίας εἶδεν οὖσα, a periphrasis which only differs from ἀρμονία οὖσα by being more emphatic. Cp. above 87 e 4 τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας.

d 3 τόδε ἄδηλον παντί, sc. φιάναι to be supplied from συγχωρεῖν.

d 7 ἀπολλυμένον οὖδὲν παύεται, 'is unceasingly perishing.' Cp. 87 d 8 εἰ γὰρ ἡτοῖ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύμενο ἐτι ζωντος τοῦ ἄνθρωπου. Distinguish οὖδὲν παύεται, finem nullum facit, from οὐ παύεται.

92 a 1 ἐνδεθήναι: cp. 62 b 3 n.

a 5 ἀλλο ποτὲ τι: I now observe that Heindorf suggested this reading, though he did not print it in his text.
It is shown first that the view of the soul as a ἀρμονία is inconsistent with the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις which Simmias accepts. A ἀρμονία could exist before the body of which it is the attunement just as little as it could survive it. This brings out the fundamental inconsistency of the later Pythagorean doctrine.

It is mere superstition to read αὐτὸν because B has αὐτοῖ.

The regular term for the consequences of αἴτων.

The two terms are synonymous.

μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπεῖας, "without demonstration, from a specious analogy."

αὐτῶν ὅστις 

τοῖς πολλοῖς . . . ἀνθρώπους, most people who do hold it. We cannot infer from this expression that it was a widespread popular belief.

Alexander, 'impostors.'

Socrates assumes that the meaning of ὑπόθεσις is familiar to his hearers from its use in geometry, which is illustrated in a well-known passage of the Meno (86 e sqq.). Even Xenophon knew the term: cp. Mem. iv. 6. 13 εἰ δὲ τις αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγοι μηδὲν ἔχων σαφῆς λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἂνευ ἀποδείξεως . . . φάσκων κτλ. . . ., εἰ τίν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανήγειν ἄν πάντα τὸν λόγον ὧδε πῶς κτλ. We shall learn shortly exactly what a hypothesis is. It
will be sufficient to say here that it is a statement of which the truth is postulated and from which we deduce its consequences (τὰ συμβαίνοντα). The phrase literally means 'the argument proceeded (ὁ λόγος ... εἰρηται) by means of a hypothesis worthy of acceptance'.

d 7 ἀξιάς ἀποδείκσθαι: we are not told here, nor were we told above, why the hypothesis in question is worthy of acceptance. We only know that Cebe and Simmias accepted it at once. The position of the argument, then, is this: Simmias declares that he cannot give up the doctrine that μάθησις is ἀνάμνησις so long as he accepts the hypothesis, and this he will not give up.

ἐρρήθη γάρ ποιν κτλ. The ἑπόθεσις is given formally above 76 d 7 εἰ ... ἐστίν ὁ θρυλοῦμεν ἄεί, καλὸν τὲ τι καὶ ἁγαθὸν καὶ πάσα ή τοιαύτη οὐσία ... Now it has been shown that we refer all our sensations to this standard, and that this means that our soul already possesses it and rediscovers it in the process of learning. From this it followed in turn that our soul must have existed before entering into a human body. These steps have been rigorously demonstrated (ἰκανῶς ἀποδείκται), and therefore, so long as we accept the ἑπόθεσις, we must accept the conclusion.

d 8 ὁσπερ αὐτῆς ἐστιν κτλ.: i.e. the pre-existence of the soul is as certain as the fact that the reality which bears the name of τὸ δ ἐστιν belongs to it (cp. 76 e 1 ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὐσίαν). This is the interpretation of Wytenbach and Heindorf. Most recent editors adopt Mudge's emendation ὁσπερ αὐτῇ ἐστιν κτλ. That would, no doubt, give a correct sense ('as certainly as the reality itself which bears the name of δ ἐστι exists'), and would even be a more accurate statement of the ultimate ἑπόθεσις. But αὐτῆς ἐστιν serves to remind us of the point on which the whole argument turns, namely that this οὐσία is really the soul's original possession, and that what we call learning is really οικεῖαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν (75 e 5). For the form of expression cp. TheaeT. 160 c 7 τῆς γάρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἄεί ἐστιν (ἡ ἐμῇ αὐθησις).

e 1 ταύτην, sc. τὴν ἑπόθεσιν. There is no doubt about the conclusion (τὸ συμβαίνον) being correctly demonstrated; what Simmias says here is that he firmly believes himself to be justified (ὁρβός) in accepting the ἑπόθεσις which forms the major premise.

e 4 Τί δὲ ... τιδε; the following argument proceeds on independent
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lines, and is based upon the nature of ἀρμονία itself. Socrates first gets Cebes to make two admissions. These are (1) that every ἀρμονία is determined by its component elements, (2) that no ἀρμονία admits of degrees.

4 δοκεῖ σοι κτλ. The first ὁμολόγημα (92 e 4—93 a 10). Every ἀρμονία is determined by its component elements. The note which anything will give out depends entirely upon what it is made of. It does not lead; it follows.

8 Πολλοῦ... δεῖ: the subject is ἀρμονία.

εἶναι... κινήθηναι... ἢ φθέγξασθαι, ‘to move (vibrate) or give out a sound in opposition to its parts,’ i.e. to the tension and relaxation which produces it, as explained below 94 c 3.

1 Τί δε; κτλ. The second ὁμολόγημα (93 a 11—b 7). No ἀρμονία admits of degree. A string is either in tune or it is not. To use the language of the Philebus, ἀρμονία is a form of πέρας and does not admit τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἤττον.

οὕτως... ὃς ἀν ἀρμοσθῇ, ‘just as it is tuned,’ i.e. according as it is tuned to the fourth (διὰ τεσσάρων), the fifth (διὰ πέντε), or the octave (διὰ πασῶν). Modern editors suppose the meaning to be just the opposite and vainly try to explain in what sense one ἀρμονία can be more a ἀρμονία than another; but the meaning is stated quite clearly below 93 d 2. Olympiodorus, representing the school tradition, is quite explicit: ὑποτίθεται μὴ εἶναι ἀρμονίαν ἀρμονίας πλεῖον μηδὲ ἔλαττω, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἤττον.

4 μᾶλλον... καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον: Olympiodorus refers the first term to pitch (ἐπίτασεις and ἀνέσεις) and the second to the intervals. If a string is in tune it cannot be made more in tune by tightening or loosening. Nor is it correct to say that the octave is more of a ἀρμονία than the fifth or the fifth than the fourth.

1 εἰπὲρ ἐνδέχεται τούτο γίγνεσθαι, ‘supposing this possible,’ a plain indication that it is not possible. Socrates is only explaining what would be implied in saying that one ἀρμονία is more a ἀρμονία than another. It would mean that it was more tuned, which is absurd; for, as we learn from Rep. 349 e 11 the musician, in tuning a lyre, will not be willing μουντικοῦ ἀνδρός ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν πλεονεκτεῖν ἡ ἄξον ἀρμονίαν ἔχειν.

2 ἤττον τὲ καὶ ἔλαττων: some inferior MSS. read ἤττον τε, which is more symmetrical, but the evidence is against it.

95
b 4 'Η οὖν κτλ. That being so, we must further admit that, if the soul is a ἁρμονία, no soul can be more or less a soul than another. Socrates does not express a view one way or the other on this point. He only wishes an admission from Simmias that, on his ὑπόθεσις, it must be so.

έστιν... ὑστε... So below 103 e 2. Cp. Lat. est ut.

b 5 μᾶλλον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας: some editors bracket μᾶλλον here, and it is in a sense redundant. We may say that it is more fully expressed by the words ἑτὶ πλέον... ἦττον.

b 8 Φίρε δὴ κτλ. Socrates now proceeds to make use of the two ὑμολογήματα, but in the reverse order. We have seen that, if the soul is a ἁρμονία, no soul can be more or less a soul than another, i.e. more or less a ἁρμονία. But goodness is also a ἁρμονία, and souls differ in that one is better than another, which would imply that one ἁρμονία is more or less of a ἁρμονία than another, which is absurd.

c 3 τί... ὄντα; ‘being what?’ We can say τί ἐστιν ταῖτα; and the question may be asked by a participle in Greek. We must render ‘What will he say that these things are which are in our souls?’ (εἶναι εἴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς go together).

c 6 τὴν μὲν ἡμῶνθαί κτλ. Are we to say that both the good and the bad soul are ἁρμονία, but that the good soul also has a ἁρμονία and is in tune, while the bad soul has none and is out of tune? If we say that the soul is a tuning, we shall have to say that a tuning may be tuned or untuned

d 2 τούτο δ’ ἐστὶν τὸ ὑμολόγημα, ‘this is just our admission.’ Here we have an explicit statement that our admission was that no ἁρμονία can be more or less a ἁρμονία than another. Editors who do not see this are obliged to bracket ἁρμονίας in d 4, or to explain it unnaturally as ‘the particular harmony which is the soul’.

d 6 τὴν δὲ γε, sc. ἁρμονίαν. The application of this to ψυχὴ only begins at d 12. The point here made depends on 93 a 14, where it was shown that being more or less tuned would involve being more or less a ἁρμονία, which is absurd.

d 9 ἔστιν ὅτι πλέον... μετέχει; ‘does it partake more in —?’ Here ὅτι is acc. neut. of ὅστις. Cp. e 7 ἄρ’ ἂν τι πλέον κακίας... μετέχοι;

94 a 1 Μᾶλλον δὲ γέ ποιον..., ‘yes, or rather, surely —.’

κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ‘according to the right account of the
matter, 'to put the matter correctly.' It the soul is a ἀρμονία, no soul can be better than another (for no ἀρμονία can be more in tune than another). Indeed, no soul can be bad at all (for no ἀρμονία can be out of tune).

12 πᾶσχεν ἄν ταῦτα, 'Do you think this would happen to our argument if our ὑπόθεσις were right?' Here the συμβαίνουσα are inadmissible, and therefore the ὑπόθεσις is destroyed (ἀπαιτεῖται). For the use of πᾶσχεν in dialectic cp. Parm. 128 d 4 τούτο βουλιέμεν δῆλοιν, ὃς ἐτε γελοιωτέρα πᾶσχει ἄν αὐτῶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἦ ἦ τοῦ ἐν εἰναι.

4 Τι δέ; Socrates now takes up the first of the two ὀμολογίματα and tests the hypothesis by it. It is the soul which rules the body, whereas a ἀρμονία is dependent upon that of which it is the ἀρμονία (93 a 6).

3 ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι: 92 e 4. μὴποτ' ἄν ... σ ὁποτ' ἄν ... Both negatives are legitimate after ὰμολογεῖν. Here they are alternated for variety.

4 οἰς ἐπιτείνουσα καὶ χαλάτο ... ἐκεῖνα: equivalent to ταῖς ἐπιτάθεσιν καὶ χαλάσεσιν ... ἐκεῖνων, οἷς representing τοῦτος ἄ, where ἄ is internal accusative. This is a favourite construction with Demosthenes (cp. Shilleto on de Fals. Leg. 415), but is not common in Plato. Observe that χαλάν is equivalent to ἀνένα (remittere) the usual opposite of ἐπιτείνων (intendere).

5 ψάλλοιτο is the reading of Stobaeus and seemingly of T before correction. As ψάλλειν is the proper word for striking strings, it is very appropriate here. The vulgate reading πάρλοιτο is supposed to refer to vibrations. The verb is used of 'brandishing' weapons and shaking lots, and in the passive of the heart 'quaking', but never of strings or instruments.

5 ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ... διαλεγομένη: the comma after τοῦθετοῦσα is due to Hermann and makes the construction more regular. It is to be observed, however, that such a construction as τα μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τα δὲ νοθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις is not indefensible.

6 ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ: Od. xx. 17. The passage is quoted in a similar connexion in Rep. 390 d 4; 441 b 6. ἢ καθ' ἀρμονίαν: in such phrases κατά means 'in a line with', 'on the level of'. Tr. 'far too divine a thing to be compared with a ἀρμονία.' Aristotle made use of the preceding argument in his

Reply to the Objection of Cebes begun, but broken off (95 a 4–e 6).

95 a 4 Εἶνεν δὴ κτλ. Socrates now goes back to the objection of Cebes. The transition is effected by means of a pleasantry about Harmonia of Thebes (Θηβαικῆς, not Θηβαίας, for the κτητικῶν, not the ἐθνικῶν, is used with names of women). She has become fairly propitious. and we must now tackle Cadmus (who married Harmonia in the Theban legend), i.e. the objection of Cebes. There is no need to seek a deeper meaning in the words.

a 8 θαυμαστῶς... ὡς are to be taken together. Cp. 102 a 4.

a 9 ὅτε: Forster's conjecture ὅ τι (or, as I prefer to write in accordance with ancient practice, ὅτι) is attractive, but it is hard to account for the ὅτε of all MSS. unless it is original. Linde proposes ὅ γε ἤπατε.

b 1 τι... χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ: cp. Theaet. 165 b 7 τί γὰρ χρήση ἀφύκτῳ ἐρωτήματι;

b 5 μὴ μέγα λέγε, 'do not boast.' Cp. μέγα φρονεῖν, 'to be proud' (the other sense 'do not speak loud' is less appropriate here). Cp. Hipp. ma. 295 a 7 Ἀ μὴ μέγα... λέγε. Eur. Her. 1244 ἵσχε στόμ', ὡς μὴ μέγα λέγουν μείζον πάθης.

b 6 βασκανία, 'malign influence,' lit. fascination of the 'evil eye,' to the effects of which those who boast of their luck are specially exposed. περιτρέψῃ, 'turn to flight,' keeps up the metaphor of ἐφοδος above.

b 7 Ὄμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἱόντες, 'coming to close quarters.' The metaphor is kept up. Homer nowhere uses the phrase ἐγγὺς ἱόντες, and Herwerden would read ἄσσον ἱόντες, but Ὄμηρικῶς may mean 'like Homeric warriors', not 'in Homeric phrase'.

b 8 τὸ κεφάλαιον, 'the sum and substance.' The word is derived from the ancient practice of writing the sum of an addition at the top. Cp. Lat. summa (sc. linea).

c 7 ἀθανασίαν μὲν μὴ, ὅτι δὲ... 'not immortality, but only that—'

d 3 ἡ... ἀπολλύοντο: the optatives are due to the indirect speech,
though there is no principal verb with \( \delta \tau \) (or \( \dot{o} \)) on which they can be said to depend. They cannot, as some editors say, depend on c 7 \( \phi' \), for \( \phi' \) only takes acc. c. inf. Cp. above 87 e 5 \( n \), where also the optatives occur after a clause introduced by \( \alpha \ll \gamma \). Riddell, Dig. § 282.

7 \( \epsilon \mu \eta \ldots \epsilon \eta \): the simplest explanation of this optative is to regard \( \tau \mu \eta \epsilon \dot{i} \dot{o} \) as equivalent to \( \epsilon \mu \eta \epsilon \dot{i} \dot{e} \eta \).

Narrative Interlude. The origin of the new Method (95 e 7—102 a 2).

8 Où \( \phi' \)\( au \)l\( o \)n \( \pi \)\( r \)\( \dot{a} \)\( g \)a\( m \)a, 'no light matter,' 'no easy task.' Cp. L. S. s. v. I. I.

9 \( \pi \)\( e \)\( p \)i \( \gamma \)\( e \)\( n \)\( i \)\( \sigma \)\( e \)\( w \)os \( k \)\( a \)i \( \phi \)\( b \)\( o \)\( r \)\( a \)\( s \) \( \tau \)\( \nu \) \( \alpha \)\( i \)\( \tau \)\( i \)\( a \) \( \eta \).

12 \( \tau \)\( a \) \( \gamma \) \( e \) \( \eta \)\( m \)\( a \) \( \pi \)\( a \)\( \theta \)\( n \), 'my own experiences.' It has been strangely supposed—so unwilling are interpreters to take the \( P h \)\( i \)\( e \)\( a \)\( o \) in its plain sense—that these are either Plato's own experiences or 'an ideal sketch of the history of the mind in the search for truth.' Besides the general considerations stated in the Introduction, there is this special point to be noted, that the questions raised are exactly such as were discussed in the middle of the fifth century B.C., when Socrates was young, and that they correspond closely with the caricature of Aristophanes in the Clouds, which was produced in 423 B.C., when Plato was a baby. By the time of Plato's youth quite another set of questions had come to the front at Athens.

18 \( \pi \)\( e \)\( p \)i \( \phi \)\( i \)\( s \)\( e \)\( w \)os \( \i \)\( s \)\( t \)\( o \)\( p \)\( i \)\( a \)\( n \): this is the oldest name for what we call 'natural science' (cf. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 14 n. 2). Heraclitus (fr. 17) said that Pythagoras had pursued \( \i \)\( s \)\( t \)\( o \)\( p \)\( i \)\( n \) further than other men, and it appears that even geometry was called by this name in the Pythagorean school (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 107 n. 1). The restriction of the term to what we call 'history' is due to the fact that Herodotus followed his predecessors in calling his work \( \i \)\( s \)\( t \)\( o \)\( p \)\( i \)\( n \), and his pre-
decessors belonged to Miletus, where all science went by that name (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 28). The term 'Natural History' partly preserves the ancient sense of the word, a circumstance due to the title of Aristotle's Περὶ τὰ ζώα ἱστορίαι (Historia Animalium).

a 3 ὑπερήφανος agrees with σοφία or ἱστορία and εἶδέναι is added to it exegetically. Heindorf compares Gorg. 462 c 8 οὐκοίν καλὸν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ μετωρικὴ εἶναι, χαράξεσθαι οἶνον τ' εἶναι ἀνθρώποις; The ὑπερήφανος of Eusebius and Stobaeus would simplify the construction, but the evidence is against it.

b 1 ἄνω κάτω: we say 'backwards and forwards'. Cp. 90 c 5 and Gorg. 481 d 7 ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου.

b 3 ὅσ τινες ἑλέγον. This is the doctrine of Archelaus, the disciple of Anaxagoras, and, according to a statement already known to Theophrastus, the teacher of Socrates (cp. Phìs. Op. fr. 4 'Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ὥ καὶ Σωκράτης συγγεγονέναι φασιν, Ἀναξιγόρου γενομένο μαθητή, Diels, Vors.² 323, 34; 324, 26). The following are the relevant quotations and rest ultimately on the authority of Theophrastus. Hippolytus, Ref. i. 9, 2 εἶναι δ' ἀρχῆν τῆς κηδήσεως (τὸ) ἄποκρίνεσθαι ἀπ' ἅλληλων τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, ib. i. 9, 5 περὶ δὲ ζῷων φήσιν ὅτι θερματομένης τῆς γῆς τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τῷ κάτω μέρει, ὅπου τὸ θερμόν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐμίσγετο, ἀνεφαινέτο τά τε ἅλλα ζώα πολλά καὶ ἀνθρώποι, ἀπαντά τῷ αὐτῷ διώματι ἐχθνα ακ τῆς ἑλώς τρεφόμενα. Diog. Laert. ii. 17 γεννᾶσθαι δὲ φησι τὰ ζώια ἐκ βερμῆς τῆς γῆς καὶ ἑλῶν παραπλησιᾶν γαλακτί οἶνον τροφήν ἁνείσις. This last touch explains the reference to putrefaction (σηπεδών). As Forster already pointed out, early medical theory made πέψις, ἄθικον ἄρτοις σύνθεσαμεν αὐτίκα καλέων ἀπερ ἡμείς ἀπεπτα λέγομεν. Now Aristotle criticizes Empedocles for applying the σηπεδών to milk. Cp. Gen. An. 777 a 7 τὸ γὰρ γάλα πεπεμμένον αὐτίκα ἐστιν, ἄλλ' οὖν διεφθαρμένου, Ἐμπέδοκλῆς δ' ἡ οὐκ ὤρθω ὑπελάμβανεν ἡ οὐκ εὖ μετῆνεγκε ('used a bad metaphor') ποιήσας ὅσ τὸ γάλα 'μηνὸς ἐν ὑγοϊαν τον δεκάτη τῶν ἐπίπτει λεκυνί, σαπρότητι γὰρ καὶ πέψις ἐναντίον, τὸ δὲ πῦον σαπρότης τῆς ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ γάλα τῶν πεπεμμένων. The meaning is, then, that the warm and cold gave rise by putrefaction (σηπεδών) to a milky slime (ἐλύς) by which the first animals were nourished. We are thus able to give ἀντιφεῖται its natural sense. It is significant that Socrates should mention the theory of Archelaus first.
NOTES

4 ὑ προνοο môiν, 'what we think with.' The question of the 'seat of the soul' or sensorium was keenly debated in the first half of the fifth century B.C. The views that the soul is blood or breath are primitive, but both had just been revived as scientific theories. Empedocles had said (fr. 105 Diels) άμα γάρ ἀνθρώπως περικάρδιαν ἐστι νόημα, and he was the founder of the Sicilian school of medicine (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 288 n. 3). The doctrine that the soul is air was as old as Anaximenes, but had just been revived by Diogenes of Apollonia (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 412), and is attributed in the Clouds (230) to Socrates. The Heracliteans at Ephesus of course maintained their master's view that the soul was fire.

5 ὁ δ' ἐγκέφαλος κτλ. The credit of being the first to see that the brain was the seat of consciousness belongs to Alcmaeon of Croton (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 224), and the same view was upheld in the fifth century B.C. by Hippocrates and his school. It is one of the strangest facts in the history of science that Aristotle, followed by the Stoics, should have gone back to the primitive view that the heart was the seat of sensation.

7 γίγνομαι: the optative is due to the general sense of indirect speech.

8 κατὰ ταῦτα: equivalent to οὕτως.

γίγνοσθαι: note ἐστιν (b 5) ... γίγνομαι (b 7) ... γίγνοσθαι (b 8), 'a gradual transition from the direct to the most pronounced form of the indirect speech' (Geddes).

ἐπιστήμην: Diels (Vors.² 102, 18) attributes to Alcmaeon this explanation of knowledge as arising from memory and belief 'when they have reached a state of quiescence'. We seem to have an echo of it in Aristotle An. Post. B. 19. 160 a 3 sqq. ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήτων γίγνεται μνήμη, ... ἐκ δὲ μνήμης ἐπιστήμα, ... ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἡρεμίαν ἄν τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ νοῆς ... τέλεσιν ἄρη καὶ ἐπιστήμην. From Gorg. 448 c 4 sqq. we learn that Polus of Agrigentum derived τέξευ from ἑπιστήμα. There is no reason for doubting that the distinction between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα is pre-Platonic. It is alluded to by Isocrates in Heléna 5 ὅτι πολὺ κρείττον ἦσιν περὶ τῶν χρησίμων ἐπεικείων δοξάζειν ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀκριβῶν ἀκριβέως ἐπιστήματα, and Blass dates the Heléna before 390 B.C. Antisthenes is said to have written four books Περὶ δόξας καὶ ἐπιστήμης (Diog. Laert. vi. 17).

9 τὰ περὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν (i.e. τοῦ οὐρανοῦ) ... πάθη: it is highly
characteristic of the middle of the fifth century B.C. that the theory of τὰ μετέωρα is mentioned last and in a somewhat perfunctory way. For the time, the rise of medicine had brought biological and psychological questions to the front, while astronomy and cosmology remained stationary in eastern Hellas until new life was given to them by the Pythagoreans. The state of science here indicated is quite unlike any we know to have existed either at an earlier or a later date. It belongs solely to the period to which it is here attributed, a period which I have endeavoured to characterize in E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 405, 406.

c 2 ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα: the Ionic χρῆμα only survives in Attic in a few phrases like this (L. S. s. v. II 3.) The Athenians only used freely the plural χρῆματα, and that in the sense of ‘property’. Cp. Laces 640 c 5 ὡς οὐδενὶ γε πράγματι.

c 5 ἐτυφλώθην (sc. τAutowired): cp. Soph. O. T. 389 τὴν τέχνην δ’ ἐφε τυφλῶς.

c 6 ἀ πρὸ τοῦ φιμιν εἰδίναι repeats c 4 ἀ καὶ πρῶτερον κτλ. (ἀ δ ἄ).

d 1 ἐπειδὰν γὰρ κτλ.: this refers to another great question of the time. Socrates means that his former beliefs were upset by the question of Anaxagoras (fr. 10) πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐκ μὴ τριχῶς γίνοιτο θρίξ καὶ σάρξ ἐκ μὴ σαμικός; This led to the doctrine that there were portions of everything in everything. Cp. also Aët. i. 3. 5 (Dox. 279 a) εἰδίκει αὐτῷ ἀπορώσατον εἶναι πῶς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος δύναται τί γίνεσθαι ἢ φθείρεσθαι εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν. τροφὴν γοῦν προσφερόμεθα ἀπλὴν καὶ μονοειδῆ, ἃρτον καὶ ᾿Ηωρ’ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τρέφεται θρίξ φλέψ ἀρτηρία σάρξ νείρα ὕστα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μόρια. τοῦτων οὖν γυνομένων, ὀμολογητέων ἑστὶν ὧτι ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τῇ προσφερόμενῃ πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων πάντα αὐξεῖται. (Cp. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 303.)

d 6 μετρίως, i. q. καλῶς. Cp. 68 e 2 σ.

d 8 φιμιν γὰρ κτλ. This refers to another set of questions, which stand in a close relation to Zeno’s criticism of the Pythagoreans. Roughly, we may say that the difficulty here touched upon is the nature of the unit, whether in measuring, weighing, or numbering.

e 1 αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ, ‘just by the head.’ This is an example of a popular unit of measurement. Cp. II. iii. 193 μείων μὲν κεφαλῆ Ἀγαμεμνόνων.

e 3 προσείναι (TW) is virtual passive of προσθείναι, which is the reading of B. That is a natural slip.
peritoutron... tην αιτίαν: cp. 95 e 9 n.

8 ἐπειδὰν ἐνὶ τις προσθῆ ἐν κτλ. The difficulty here is what is meant by the addition of units. How can it be that when one is added to one the result is two? How can either the original one or the one which is added to it become two; or how can the one which is added and the one which is added to it become two? The nature of the unit involved real difficulties which we need not discuss here; it is more important for our purpose to observe that in the Parmenides Plato actually represents the young Socrates as discussing such subjects with Parmenides and Zeno. The two dialogues confirm each other in the most remarkable way; for here too we are dealing with the youth of Socrates.

2 εἶ οτε μὲν ... ἐπεὶ δ’ ... Another instance of the disjunctive hypothetical sentence (cp. 68 a 3 n.) What causes surprise is that the two things should be true at the same time.

4 αὐτη, ‘this,’ sc. τὸ πληρωματικόν ἀλληλος, but assimilated in gender to the predicate αἰτία, and further explained by ἡ σύνοδος κτλ.

5 ἡ σύνοδος τοῦ ... τεθήναι, ‘the coming together which consists in their juxtaposition.’

οὔδε γε ὃς ... πεῖθοσθαί ὃς ... The repetition of ὃς is a colloquialism. We are still dealing here with the difficulty of conceiving a unit. In the Republic (525 d 8 sqq.) Socrates refers to the same difficulty, but he is not troubled by it, for he has come to see that the unit is an object of thought and not of sense. Plato can hardly have felt it seriously at any time.


6 τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ‘method of investigation.’ The noun μέθοδος by itself came to bear this meaning, as ‘method’ always does in our usage.

7 αὐτὸς εἰκή φύρω, ‘I make up a confused jumble of my own.’ There can be no doubt that φύρω is ‘to make a mess’ (cp. 101 e 1), and εἰκή, temere, emphasizes that meaning. Cp. Aesch. P. V. 450 ἐφυρον εἰκὴ πάντα. Of course, Socrates has not the slightest doubt of the superiority of his new method, and this description is only a piece of characteristic εἰρωνεία.

8 τινός, ... ἀναγιγώσκοντος: it is natural to think of the Anaxa-
gorean Archelaus, who was said to be the teacher of Socrates (cp. 96 b 3 n.).

c 1 ως ἄρα κτλ. The actual words of Anaxagoratas were (fr. 12 Diels) καὶ ὡστε ἔμελλεν ἑσεσθαι καὶ ὡστε ἥν, ἢσσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὡστε ἔστι, πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς. The familiar πάντα χρήματα ἡν ὥμοι, εἶτα νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησεν (Diog. Laert. ii. 6) is not a quotation, but a summary of the doctrine (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 299, n. 1).

c 7 περὶ ἐκάστον: cp. 95 e 9 n.

d 2 περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖνον: δὲ ἱλλο ἵππο, sc. περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. I formerly bracketed ἐκεῖνον, which rests only on the authority of B; but Vahlen has since shown (Opusc. ii. 558 sqq.) that αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖνον is too idiomatic to be a mistake.

d 7 κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, 'to my mind,' as we say. I cannot believe that this common phrase involves any reference to the νοῦς of Anaxagoratas. Such a joke would be very frigid.

d 8 πλατεῖα ... ἡ στρογγύλη: this was still a living problem in the days when Socrates was young, but not later. The doctrine that the earth is spherical was Pythagorean; the Ionian cosmologists (including Anaxagoratas himself and Archelaus) held it was flat, with the single exception of Anaximander, who regarded it as cylindrical.

e 3 ἐν μύσῳ: so far as we can tell, this was not only the doctrine of Anaxagoratas and Archelaus, but also of the early Pythagoreans. It is important to observe that the geocentric theory marked a great advance in its day as compared, e. g., with the belief of Thales that the earth was a disk floating on the water (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 32). Plato does not commit the anachronism of making Socrates refer to the later Pythagorean doctrine that the earth revolved with the planets round the Central Fire (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 344 sqq.). That was familiar enough in the fourth century B. C., but would have been out of place here.

98 a 1 παθεσέμενος: this is now known to be the reading of T as well as of Eusebius. B has ὑποθέμενος, which cannot be right, and the ὑποθησάμενος of W looks like an emendation of this.

a 4 τάξους ... πρὸς ἀλληλα, 'their relative velocity.' τροπῶν, 'turnings.' This refers to the annual movement of the sun from the 'tropic' of Capricorn to that of Cancer and back again, which is the cause of summer and winter. The Greeks gave
the name of τροποί to what the Romans, from a slightly different point of view, called solstitials.

6 ἀ πάσχει: symmetry would require the addition of καὶ ποιεῖ, but Plato avoids such symmetry.

1 ἐκάστῳ ... καὶ κοινῷ πᾶσι, 'to each individually and to all collectively.'

3 οὐκ ἀν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ, 'I would not have sold for a large sum.'

7 ἄφιμην φερόμενος: this is a slight variation on the usual phrase ἀπ' ἐπίθεος κατεβλήθην, κατέπεσον, 'I was dashed down from my hope' (cp. Euthyphro 15.6 ἀπ' ἐπίθεος με κοταβιλων μεγάλην). Socrates speaks as if he had been cast down from Olympus like another Hephaestus (πᾶν δ' ἡμώρ φερόμην, Πλ. i. 592).

8 ἄνδρα, 'a man.' The word expresses strong feeling, here disappointment. Wytenbach compares Soph. Αἰας 1142 ἡδὴν τοῖς ἄνδρι ἐγὼ γλῶσσῃ θραύσων, 1150 ἐγὼ ἐγ' ἄνδρι ὑπωσα μωρίας πλέων (cp. Arist. Aeth. i. 1128).

τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον: Plato expresses the same feeling in his own person in Licus 967 b 4 καὶ τινες ἐτάλμων τοιτό γε αὐτὸ παρικυνδωνεῖσαι καὶ τότε, λέγοντες ὃς νοῦς εἴη ὃ διακεκοσμίκως πάνθ' ὅπα κατ' οὐρανόν. οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ ... ἀπανθ' ὡς εἰπεῖν ἕπος ἀνετρέψαν πάλιν κτλ. Xenophon (Mem. iv. 7. 6) preserves a faint echo of this criticism of Anaxagoras. Aristotle (Met. A. 985 a 18) simply repeats it (E. Gr. Ph. ii. pp. 309 sq.).

b9 οὐδὲ τινας αἰτίας ἐπατιλέιμων, sc. τὸν νοῦν, 'nor ascribing to it any causality.' For the double acc. cp. Dem. Phorm. 25 τίν' ἀν ἐαυτοῦ αἰτίαν αἰτιασώμενον ... δικάζοιτο; Antiph. i. 29 ἄ ἐπιστιώμων τὴν γέναικα ταύτην. Aristotle (loc. cit.) says πάντα μάλλον αἰτίαται τῶν γιγαντείων ἢ νοῶν.

c7 νεύρων, 'sinews,' 'tendons,' not nerves. The nervous system only became known in the third century B.C. Cp. Galen, de plac. Hipp. et Plat., p. 647 'Ερασιστρατός μὲν οἶν (θορυβ. 258 B.C.), εἶ καὶ μὴ πρόσθεν, αλλὰ ἐπὶ γῆρος γε τὴν ἀληθῆ τῶν νεύρων ἄρρητην κατενώσαν' Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ μέχρι παντὸς ἀγνοῆσαι εἰκότως ἀπορεῖ χρείαν εἰπεῖν ἐγκεφάλου.

c8 διαφεύγει εἰς, 'are jointed.' The διαφαύι are the same thing as the συμβολαί (d 3), looked at from another point of view. Cicero, de Nat. D. ii. 139 says commissurae.

d2 αἰωρομένων ... ἐν ταῖς ... συμβολαῖς, 'swinging in their sockets.'
NOTES

98

d 5  συγκαμφθεῖς : cp. 60 b 2.
d 7  φωνᾶς τε κτλ. Cp. e.g. Diogenes of Apollonia (Diels, Vors.² p. 332, 14) τοῦ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ ἄρος ύπο τῆς φωνῆς τυπτομένου καὶ κινουμένου (τὴν ἀκοὴν γίνεσθαι).
e 4  παραμένοντα, ‘not running away.’ We have no English word for παραμένεων, any more than for θαρρεῖν (cp. 63 e 10 n.). It is the negative of ἀποδιδράσκειν (99 a 3). Cp. 115 d 9.
e 5  νῦ τὸν κίνα : such euphemisms seem to occur in all languages. Cp. parbleu! ecod! It is true that in Gorg. 482 b 5 Socrates says μᾶ τὸν κίνα τὸν Λεγομπτών θεόν (Anubis), but that seems to be only a passing jest. A euphemistic oath of this kind was called ’Ραδα-μάκθνος ὤμος (Suid. s. v.).

99 a 1  περὶ Μίγαρα ἡ Βοωτοῦς : cp. Crilu 53 b 4 where it is suggested that Socrates might escape ἡ Θήραζε ἡ Μέγαρά. He would have found friends in both places, as we know. This whole passage is reminiscent of the Crilu.
a 8  καὶ ταῦτα νῦ πράττον, ‘and that too though I act from intelligence,’ as was admitted above, 98 c 4. The MSS. have πράττω, but Heindorf’s πράττων is a great improvement and gives καὶ ταῦτα its proper idiomatic force.
b 2  τὸ γὰρ μὴ... οἴκν τ᾽ εἶναι κτλ. is another instance of the exclamation infinitive justifying a strong expression of feeling. Cp. 60 b 5 n. and Symph. 177 c 1 τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν πέρι πολλῆς σπουδῆς ποητισθείς, 'Ερωτα δὲ μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων τετολμηκέναι... ἀξίων ὑμνησαι.

b 3  ἀνευ οὖ : here we see the beginning of the technical term οὖ (or ὄν) οὖν ἀνευ, the conditio sine qua non. Such causes are called συναιτία in the Timaeus. Cp. 46 c 7 Ταῦτ᾽ οὖν πάντα ἔστιν τῶν συναιτίων οἷς θεὺς ὑπηρετοῦσιν χρῆται, τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου καθά τὸ δυνατὸν ἰδέαν ἀποτελέσων δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων οὐ συναιτία ἀλλὰ αὐτια εἰναι τῶν πάντων κτλ.
b 5  ἀλλοτρὶων ὅνοματι, ‘by a name that does not belong to them,’ which is not their οἰκεῖον ὄνομα. The vulgate ὅματι cannot be defended, though it is the reading also of BW.
b 6  αὐτό repeats ὅ (cp. 104 d 2 n.).
6 ὃ μὲν τις κτλ. Once more we have the scientific problems of the middle of the fifth century. The first theory is that the earth does not fall because of the rapidity of the revolution of the heavens. This was the western theory, and was originated by Empedocles, who supported it by the experiment of swinging a cup full of water rapidly round (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 274). Cp. Arist. de Caelo 295 a 16 οἱ ὀσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὴν τοῦ ὀφρανοῦ φορῶν κύκλῳ περιβέβουσαν καὶ θάπτων φερομένην τὴν τῆς γῆς φορίων κωλίεων, κυμαίπερ τὸ ἐν τοῖς κυλίδωις ὀδωρ’ καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο κύκλῳ τοῦ κυλίου φερομένου πολλάκις κάτω τοῦ χαλκοῦ γινόμενον ὅμως ὁ δὲ φέρεται κάτω περικύκλῳ φέρεσθαι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. The vortex theory of Leucippus was more subtle than this (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 399) and is not referred to here. In Clouds 379 Aristophanes makes fun of the αἰθέρος Δίως who has taken the place of Zeus.

7 ύπὸ τοῦ ὀφρανοῦ μένειν: these words are to be taken together, as Geddes says (after Hermann) and μένειν is a virtual passive, ‘is kept in its place by the heavens.’

8 ὃ δὲ κτλ. This is the eastern theory, which originated with Anaximenes and was still upheld by Anaxagoras and Democritus. As Aristotle tells us (de Caelo 294 b 14), they said τὸ πλάτος αἵτινς εἶναι . . . τοῦ μένειν αὐτὴν’ οὐ γὰρ τέμειν ἄλλ’ ἐπισωματίζειν τὸν ἀέρα τὸν κάτωθεν. Its breadth prevents it from cutting the air beneath it, and it lies on it ‘like a lid’ (πῶμα). It is absurd to suppose that Plato was ever troubled by crude notions of this kind, and even Socrates must soon have learnt better from his Pythagorean friends. Everything points to the Periclean age and no later date.

καρδότω, ‘a kneading-trough’. This, however, does not seem to be a very appropriate image, and I believe we should read καρδοπιόπω from Hesychius. As Aristophanes tells us (τῆς καρδότων τὸ πῶμα, ‘the lid of a kneading-trough’; cp. Aristotle’s ἐπισωματίζειν quoted above. The discussion of the word καρδόποσ in Arist. Clouds 670 has another bearing. It refers to the speculations of Protagoras about grammatical gender.

7 τὴν δὲ τοῦ κτλ. Constr. τὴν δὲ δύναμιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ νῦν (αὐτὰ) κεῖσθαι ὡς οἶδαν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθναυ. As we see from the following words, δύναμιν has its full meaning. The fact that they are in the best possible place is regarded as a force which keeps them there.
That being so, ταύτην (τὴν δέωμιν) is the subject of διαμονήν ἑκείν." 

**c 3** τούτου . . . ἵσχυρότερον, 'an Atlas stronger than this one' (τούτου is masc.).

**c 5** ὡς ἀληθὸς τὸ ἄγαθὸν καὶ δέον: I think these words must be taken together; for ὡς ἀληθὸς is often used to call attention to an etymology (cp. 80 d 6 n.), and here τὸ δέον, 'the fitting,' is taken as 'the binding'. The hyperbaton is of a normal type. For the etymology itself cp. *Cra*. 418 e 7 ἄγαθον γὰρ ἴδεα οὔσα ('being a form of good') τὸ δέον φαίνεται δεσμὸς εἴναι καὶ κώλυμα φορᾶς.

**c 9** τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν: the paroemiographers say this expression is used ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσφαλῶν τι πραττόντων, καθότι οἱ διαμαρτύρτες κατὰ τὸν πρώτερον πλοῦν ἀσφαλῶς παρασκευάζονται τὸν δεύτερον. According to this, the reference would be rather to a less adventurous than to a 'second-best' course. See, however, Eustathius in *Od*. p. 1453, 20 δεύτερος πλοῖος λέγεται διὰ ἀποτυχών τις αὐτίκα κόπους πλέγ κατὰ Πασχαλίαν. Cp. also *Cic. Tusc*. iv. 5, 'where pandere veli orationis is opposed to the slower method of proceeding, viz. dialecticorum resmis' (Geddes). In any case, Socrates does not believe for a moment that the method he is about to describe is a pis aller or 'makeshift.' The phrase is ironical like εἰκῇ φόρῳ above. Cp. Goodrich in *Class. Rev*. xvii, pp. 381 sqq. and xviii, pp. 5 sqq., with whose interpretation I find myself in substantial agreement.

**d 1** ἡ πεπραγμάτευμα: these words depend on ἐπὶδειξιν ποιήσωμαι and govern τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν.

**d 5** τὰ ὅντα like τὰ πράγματα just below (e 3) are 'things' in the ordinary sense of the word. It seems to me quite impossible that these terms should be applied to the ὄντως ὅντα, τὰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅντα. They must be the same as τὰ ὅντα in 97 d 7 τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὅντων, that is, the things of the visible world. It is quite true that Plato makes Socrates use the expression τὸ ὅν for τὸ ὄντως ὅν, but I know of no place in which he is made to use τὰ ὅντα simpliciter of the ἐϊδ. Further, the whole point of the passage is that Socrates had become exhausted by the study of physical science, and what he calls the δεύτερος πλοῖος is, we shall see, nothing else than the so-called 'Theory of Ideas.'

τὸν ἡλιον ἐκλείποντα, 'the sun during an eclipse.' This is a mere illustration. Socrates keeps up the irony of the phrase δεύτερος.
πλοῖς by suggesting that his eyes are too weak to contemplate the things of the visible world. He had to look at them in a reflexion, he says.

3 τοῖς ἐμμαστὶ καὶ ἐκάστῃ τῶν αίσθησεων: this makes it quite clear that τὰ ὄντα, τὰ πράγματα are the things of sense.

5 εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα, ‘taking refuge in the study of propositions’ or ‘judgements’, or ‘definitions’. It is not easy to translate λόγους here; but at least it is highly misleading to speak of ‘concepts’ (Begriffe), nor is there any justification in Plato’s writings for contrasting Socratic λόγοι with Platonic ἔδη. It is just in λόγοι that the ἐδή manifest themselves, and what Socrates really means is that, before we can give an intelligible answer to the question ‘what causes A to be B’, we must ask what we mean by saying ‘A is B’. So far from being a δείκτερος πλοῖς, this is really a previous question.

6 ἵσως μὲν οὖν κτλ. Here Socrates distinctly warns us not to take his ironical description too seriously. It is not really the case that the λόγοι are mere images of τὰ ὄντα or τὰ πράγματα. On the contrary, it will appear that the things of sense may more fitly be called images of the reality expressed in the λόγοι. To use the language of the Republic, we must not confuse διάνοια and ἐπιστήμη with ἐκκασία.

φ ἐικάξω: i.e. τοῖς φ ἐικάξω τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα.

1 ἐν [τοῖς] ἐργοῖς, ‘in realities’. The word ἐργα is equivalent to ὄντα and πράγματα, and is used here because it is the standing opposite to λόγοι.

3 ὑποθέμενοι ἐκάστοτε κτλ., ‘in any given case assuming as true.’ This amounts to saying that Socrates had recourse to the method of deduction. Here it is important to remember, first, that in the fifth century B.C. geometry had advanced far beyond all other sciences, just because it had adopted the deductive method, and, secondly, that this advance was due to the Pythagoreans. The ideal is that all science should become ‘exact science’.

4 ἐν ἄν κρίνω κτλ. We start from a proposition (λόγος) which we judge not to be open to attack. If this is admitted, we may proceed; if not, we cannot do so until we have established our ὑπόθεσις.

b 1 οὐδέν καίνον: if Plato had been the real author of the ‘Theory of
Ideas', and if, as is commonly believed, it was propounded for the first time in the *Phaedo*, this sentence would be a pure mystification.

b 2 οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι. 'Οὐ παύεται et οὐδὲν παύεται sic differunt ut Latine: finem non facit et finem nullum facit,' Cobet *Nov. Lect.* p. 500.

b 3 ἔρχομαι ... ἐπιχειρῶν ... ἐπιδείξασθαι, 'I am going to try to show'. In this construction ἔρχομαι usually takes a future participle; but, as Heindorf says, ἐπιχειρῶν ἐπιδείξασθαι is 'instar futuri ἐπιδεικτο-μενος'.

τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος, 'the sort of causation I have worked out'. A phrase like this shows how far εἶδος is from being a technical term. When Socrates wishes to be technical, he speaks of the 'just what it is' (τὸ αἰτὸ τὸ ἐστὶν).

b 4 ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρυλήτα: cp. 76 d 8 ά ἑπιλοίμιν νεὶ. Here once more the doctrine of εἶδος is assumed to be well known and generally accepted. What is new is the application of it, the method of ὑπόθεσις and deduction. This time it is Cebes who assents to the doctrine without hesitation; last time it was Simmias.

b 8 τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἐνευρήσειν ὡς: there is a curious and characteristic interlacing of words here (α β α β); for τὴν αἰτίαν ἐνευρήσεων and ἐπιδείξεων ὡς would naturally go together. Riddell, Dig. § 308 classes this under the head of *Hysteron proteron*.

c 1 ὡς διδόντος σοι κτλ., 'You may take it that I grant you this, so lose no time in drawing your conclusion.' Cp. *Symp.* 185 e 4 οἴκ αἈν φθάνως λέγων.

c 3 Σκότει . . . έαν . . . Cp. 64 c 10 n.

c 5 οἴδε δι' ἐν is more emphatic than δι' οὐδέν.

η διότι μετέχει κ.τ.λ. If we say that a, a, a are beautiful, that implies (1) that 'beautiful' has a meaning quite apart from any particular instance of beautiful things, and (2) that this meaning (A) is somehow 'partaken in' by the particular instances a, a, a. These have a meaning in common, and their relation to it is expressed in the relation of subject to predicate. This too Cebes admits at once.

d 1 χρώμα εὐανθῆς ἔχον, 'because it has a bright colour'. The participle explains δι' ὅτι, which is the indirect form of διὰ τί. The adjective εὐανθῆς is common in Hippocrates, especially of the bright red colour
of blood, &c. As applied to colour, ἀνθος is 'bloom', 'brightness', and is sometimes almost synonymous with χρώμα. Cp. *Rep.* 429 d 8 and 557 c 5 with Adam's notes. The point is that it is meaningless to say a, a, a are A because they are x, y, z, unless we have first shown that x, y, z necessarily 'partake in' A.

3 ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἓς ἡμῖν εὐθέως as opposed to the σοφαὶ αἰτίας mentioned above. The irony of 97 b 7 εἰκόνιγρω is here kept up, and this should warn us against taking the expression δεύτερος πλοῦς as seriously meant. (Distinguish ἀτέχνως from ἀτέχνως.)

5 εἰτε παρουσία κτλ. The precise nature of the relation between predicate and subject may be expressed in various more or less figurative ways. We may say that the predicate is 'present to' the subject, or that the subject 'partakes' in the common nature of the predicate. Socrates will not bind himself to any of these ways of putting it; he only insists that, however we may express it, it is beauty that makes things beautiful.

16 ὁποτέ ἢ καὶ ὁπως κ.τ.λ. These words are an echo of the formula used in the public prayers, for which cp. *Creat.* 400 e 1 ὡσπερ ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς νόμοι ἑστίν ἡμῖν εὐχεσθαι, ὁμιλείς τε καὶ ὁπάθει χαίρωσιν ὅνομαζόμενοι, ταῦτα καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς (sc. τοὺς θεοὺς) καλεῖν. It seems to me, therefore, that Wyttenbach's suggestion, προσαγορευμένη for προσαγευμένη, must certainly be right, though he did not adopt it himself. The manuscript προσαγευμένη goes well enough with παρουσία, but not with the other terms. The whole question is one of names; for Socrates has no doubt as to the fact. Plato elsewhere represents him as making use of this formula. Cp. *Prot.* 358 a 7 εἰτε γὰρ ἥδυ εἰτε τερπών λέγεις . . . εἰτε ὁπάθει καὶ ὁπως καὶ ἐχεῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁνομαζόμενα, *Phileb.* 12 c 3 τίν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὁπη ἀκεινής φιλον, ταύτη προσαγορευτέον, *Tim.* 28 b 2 διὶ πας οὐρανὸς ἡ κύριος ἡ καὶ ἀλλὰ διὶ ποτε ὁνομαζόμενος μᾶλιστ' ἄν δέχοσθο τουδ' ἡμῖν ὄνομασθο, *Laws* 872 d 7 ὁ γὰρ δῆ μεθὸς ἡ λόγος ἡ δη ἐτιρ προσαγορευειν αὐτῶν. The formula arose from fear that the gods should be addressed by the wrong name. Cp. *Aesch.* *Ag.* 160 Ζεὺς, ὃστις ποτ' ἐστίν, εἰ τοῦτ' αὐτῷ φιλον κεκλημένο, τοντὸ νυν προσενείπτο. This connexion is made quite clear in the passage from the *Philebus* quoted above, which is introduced by the words Τὸ δ' ἐμὸν ἐδος . . . ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὄνοματα οὐκ ἐστὶ κατ' ἅνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φῶς.*

6 οὕγαρ ἐτι κτλ., 'I do not go so far as to insist on that'. Cp.
Aristotle Met. A. 6. 987 b 13 τίν μέντοι γε μέθεξον ἢ τίν μέμησαι, ἢτις ἂν εἰ τῶν εἶδῶν, ἀφείσαν (sc. οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Πλάτων) ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν, i.e. 'they left it as a point for dialectical inquiry' (for this meaning of ἐν κοινῷ cp. de An. A. 4. 407 b 29 quoted in 86 b 6 n.). I think Aristotle is referring to the present passage. He is quite clear about the Pythagorean origin of the theory.

d 8 [γίγνεται] is omitted both here and below e 3 by B; and W, which inserts it in e 3, has it in a different place from T. Most likely, then, it is an interpolation, and the formula τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ καλὰ is much neater without it.

d 9 τούτον ἐχόμενος, 'holding to this.' Cp. 101 d ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἄσφαλος τῆς ὑποθέσεως.

101 a 5 φοβούμενος οἴμαι κτλ. The Euthydemus shows that Socrates is making no extravagant supposition in suggesting that the ἀντιλογικὸν might make such criticisms as (1) if A is taller than B 'by a head', B is also smaller than A 'by a head', therefore the same thing is the cause of greatness and smallness, and (2) that a head, being small, cannot be the cause of greatness.

a 6 ἐναντίον λόγος: for the personification of the λόγος cp. 87 a 8 n.

b 1 τέρας, 'a portent.' The word seems to have been common in dialectic as equivalent to ἄτοπον or ἀδύνατον. Cp. Meno 91 d 5 καίτοι τέρας λέγεις εἰ ..., Parm. 129 b 2 τέρας ἄν οἴμαι ἢν, Theaet. 163 d 6 τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἰπὸ λέγεις, Phil. 14 e 3 τέρατα ἐννάγακασται φιναί.

b 9 τὴν πρόσθεσιν ... c i τὴν σχίσιν: addition of unit to unit or division of the unit into fractions. Cp. above 96 e 7 sqq.

c 2 ἀλλος πως ... ἢ μετασχῶν κτλ., 'otherwise than by participation in the proper reality of any given form (ἐκαίστου) in which it participates.' The theory is thus summed up by Aristotle, de Gen. et Corr. 335 b 9 ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἰκανῶν φύσεων αἰτιάν εἶναι πρὸς τὸ γίγνεσθαι τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν φύσιν, ὡσπερ ο ἐν τῷ Φαίδων Σωκράτης· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ἐπιτιμήσας τοῖς ἀλλοις ὡς ὁδήγην ἐφηκόσιν, ὑποτίθεται ὅτι ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν εἰδῆ, τὰ δὲ μεθεκτικὰ τῶν εἰδῶν· καὶ ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἐκαίστον λέγεται κατὰ τὸ εἴδος, γίγνεσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὴν μεταληψιν, καὶ φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀποθελήν. Observe that Aristotle does not ascribe this theory to Plato, but to 'Socrates in the Phaedo.'

c 4 ἐν τούτοις, 'in the cases just mentioned.'

c 5 μετάσχησιν, i.e. μέθεξιν. The form seems to occur here only.

c 8 κομψεῖας: Wytenbach points out that Socrates has in mind the
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words of Euripides' *Antiope* which Plato makes him quote in *Gorg.* 486 c 6, ἀλλως τὰ κομψὰ ταύτ’ ἀφεὶς (*σοφίσματα*). It is part of the irony that the plain man's way of speaking is described as a 'subtlety', while the new theory of predication is called artless and naïve.

9 δειδω... τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιάν: Aristophanes is said to have used this expression in the *Babylonians*. It probably (like our phrase *take umbrage*) referred originally to horses shying at their shadows. We have to go warily with so many *ἀντιλογικοί* lying in wait for us.

1 ἐφόνευος ἐκεῖνον κτλ., 'holding fast to the safe support of the ἵππος' (cp. 100 d 9), which is regarded as a staff (Ar. *Ach.* 682 ὅς Ποσειδών ἀσβεῖλος ἔστιν ἣ βικτηρία).

3 εἰ δὲ τοῖς κτλ. It does not seem possible to take *ἐκεῖνον* here in the sense of 'attack', and Madvig's conjecture *ἐφοίτο* is the reverse of convincing. It does, however, seem possible to render 'if any one fastens on' or 'sticks to the ἵππος', that is, if he refuses to consider the *συμβαίνοντα* till the ἵππος has been completely established. The method of Socrates is different. He first considers the *συμβαίνοντα* to see whether they involve any contradiction or absurdity. If they do, the hypothesis is ἰψον ἱκατο destroyed. If the *συμβαίνοντα* are not contradictory or absurd, the ἵππος is not indeed established, but it has been verified, so far as it can be, by its application. When we have seen that the axioms of geometry lead to no contradictions or absurdities in their application, they are at least relatively established. Cp. *Men* 86 e 2 συγγρώψον εὗ ὑπόθεσεως αὐτὸ σκοπεῖμαι. For the terminology of the method cp. *Parm.* 135 e 9 εἰ ἐστὶν ἐκαστὸν ('a given thing') ἰποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως. Cp. e.g. the example immediately after (a 5) εἰ πολλά ἐστι (the *ὑπόθεσις*), τι χρή συμβαίνει κτλ. The method of experimental science is the same. The *ὑπόθεσις* is first tested by seeing whether it is verified or not in particular instances; the deduction of the *ὑπόθεσις* from a higher one is another matter, which must be kept distinct.

4 ἐως ἄν κτλ. It is doubtful whether ἄν can ever be retained with the opt. in *oratio obliqua*, though there are several examples in our texts (*G.* M. T. § 702). The better explanation is that given in L. & S. (s. 71. ἐως I. c) that 'ἄν...' is added to the Optat. (not to ἐως) if the
event is represented as conditional. In that case, the real construction is ἐως...σκέψαιν αὖν, and αὖν is anticipated. Cp. Isocrates, 17. 15 ματτιγων...ἐως ἀὖν ταληθῇ δοξειν αὐτοῖς λέγειν. The meaning, then, will be ‘till you have a chance of considering’.

d 4 τὰ ἄπτ᾽ ἐκεῖνης ὀρμηθέντα: i.e. τὰ συμβαίνοντα. In e 2 below the phrase is τῶν ἐξ ἐκεῖνης ὀρμηθέντων, and those who regard the sentence as spurious hold that the aorist participle is incorrect. But (1) the aorist is appropriate, because it is only after the consequences have been drawn that we can compare them with one another, and (2) it is more likely that Plato himself should vary the tense than that an interpolator should do so.

d 5 εἰ...διαφωνεῖ: Jackson holds that this clause is inconsistent with the account of the method given at 100 a 4 ἂ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ τοῦτο συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ἄντα κτλ., but that is a different stage in the process. We first posit as true whatever agrees with the ὑπόθεσις, and then we test the hypothesis by considering whether the things thus posited agree with one another.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ κτλ. Socrates recognizes that the ὑπόθεσις is not established by the process described so far. That can only be done by subsuming it under some higher ὑπόθεσις, and that in turn under a higher, till we come to one which is unassailable. This is the process described at greater length in Rep. 533 c 7 sqq.

d 7 τῶν ἀνωθεν, ‘higher,’ i.e. more universal. Cp. Rep. 511 a 5 τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν.

e 1 εἰ πιτικανῶν: i.e. to an ἀφχή which no one will question. This is not necessarily an ἀφχή ἀνυπόθετος (Rep. 510 b 7). A ὑπόθεσις may be, humanly speaking, adequate without that (cp. below 107 b 9).

οὐκ ἂν φύροι, ‘you will not jumble the two things together.’ Though the middle does not appear to occur elsewhere, φύρεσθαι τῶν λόγων, ‘to jumble one’s argument,’ seems very natural Greek, and it is hardly necessary to read φύροις. Otherwise we must take φύροι as passive, comparing Gorg. 465 c 4 φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ...σοφισταῖ καὶ ρήτορεσ.

ζεσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοί: Socrates is no doubt thinking of the attacks on mathematics made by Protagoras and others. When we study geometry, we must accept its fundamental ὑποθέσεις; the question of their validity is a different one altogether, and one with which the
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geometry as such has nothing to do. Only hopeless confusion can result from mixing up the two things.

2 τῆς ἀρχῆς, ‘your starting-point,’ i.e. the ὑπόθεσις. Though ἀρχή is sometimes used of an ultimate ἀρχή as opposed to an ἑπίθεσις, it can be used of any starting-point whatsoever. When we are discussing the συμβαίνοντα, we take the ὑπόθεσις as our ἀρχή and decline to give any account of it.

5 ἵκανοι ... ὑπὸ σοφίας κτλ., ‘their cleverness enables them ...’ There is a slight redundancy in the use of δύνασθαι after ἵκανοι, but it is easily paralleled. They can make a mess of everything without disturbing their own self-complacency.

3 Νη Δία κτλ. The distinction which Socrates has just made appeals at once to a Pythagorean mathematician. We are taken back to Phlius for the last time, in order that the next stage of the argument may have its full weight.

Third Proof of Immortality (102a 10 - 107b 10).

The first two proofs were based upon analogy. They both depended upon the Doctrine of Forms; but in neither was Immortality deduced from that doctrine. The Third Proof is intended to be such a deduction.

2 τάλλα: i.e. particular things.

τήν ἐπωνυμίαν ἵσχειν, ‘are called after them.’ This is how Socrates expresses the ‘extension’ of a class as opposed to its ‘intension’. Cp. Parm. 130a 5 δοκεῖ σοι ... εἶναι εἰδη ἄτα, δὲν τὰδε τὰ ἀλλα μετάλαμβανοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἵσχειν. Cp. 78c 2 πάντων τῶν ἐκείνων ὄρων μον. 8 ἀλλὰ γὰρ κτλ. The notion here formulated is that of the essential attribute. We say, indeed, as a facon de parler (τοῖς ρήμασι) that Simmias is greater than Socrates; but it is not qua Simmias or qua Socrates that they stand in this relation, but only in so far as greatness and smallness can be predicated of them. The emphatic words are πεφυκέναι and τυγχάνει ἵχων. The first expresses participation in an εἶδος which belongs φύσει to the subject, the latter participation in an εἶδος which belongs to the subject as a matter of fact, but not essentially. The sentence is anacoluthic; for the subject τὸ ... ὑπερῆχειν is dropped and a new subject τὸ ἐληθὸς is substituted.

10 ἐπωνυμίαν ἵχει ... εἶναι, ‘has the name of being.’ Heindorf

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quotes Hdt. ii. 44 ἵππον Ἡρακλέως ἐπώνυμην ἔχοντος Ἐσίόν εἶναι. So often ὀνομάζειν εἶναι.

c 11 τοῦ μὲν κτλ., ‘submitting his smallness to the greatness of A (Phaedo) to be surpassed by it, and presenting his own greatness to B (Socrates) as something surpassing his smallness.’ The reading ἵππον is not merely a conjecture of Madvig’s, as even the most recent editors say, but the best attested MS. reading (ΓΨ). The meaning of ἵππον is much the same as that of παρέχειν, and it takes the same construction, the epexegetic infinite active (ὑπὲρέχειν), which we express by a passive. Cp. Gorg. 497 b 9 ὑπόχειες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαν.

d 2 ‘Εοίκα ... συγγραφίκως ἔρειν, ‘it looks as if I were about to acquire a prose style.’ Wytenbach took συγγραφίκως as referring to the language in which ψηφίσματα were drafted, comparing Gorg. 451 b 7 ὀσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφέομενοι. Heindorf derived it from συγγραφή, a ‘bond’ or ‘indenture’, and thought of legal phraseology. On the whole, it seems to me more likely that there is a reference to the balanced antitheses of Gorgias and his followers, of which the preceding sentence certainly reminds one. The word συγγραφίκως only occurs in late writers, but there it is the adjective of συγγραφέος and always refers to prose style. This interpretation makes the fut. inf. ἔρειν more natural than the others.

d 7 τοῦ ἐν δὴ μέγεθος: the form of greatness, so far as it ‘is present’ in us or we ‘participate’ in it.

d 9 δυοὶν τὸ ἐτερον κτλ. This alternative is important for the argument, and the terminology should be noticed. If any form is ‘in’ a given thing, that thing will not admit (δέχεσθαι) any form which is opposed to it. The original form will either (1) withdraw from (or ‘evacuate’) the thing, or (2) perish. The metaphors are military throughout this discussion.

e 2 ὑπομένων δὲ κτλ. These words explain the following. ‘It refuses to be something other than it was by holding its ground and admitting smallness.’ Here ὑπομένειν ‘to hold one’s ground’ is used as the opposite of ὑπεκχορεῖν ‘to get out of the way’, ‘to withdraw in favour of’ (its opposite).

e 3 ὀσπερ ἔγω κτλ. Socrates can ‘admit’ either greatness or smallness without ceasing to be Socrates; but the greatness which is ‘in’ Socrates cannot ‘admit’ smallness.
5 tetôlmêkev seems to be suggested by the military metaphor.
1 év toûtô tû paâhmati, 'when this happens to it,' i.e. when it is attacked by its opposite.
4 ou safôi xuríma is probably nothing more than a touch of realism. We need not look for covert meanings.
5 év toîs próôsev . . . logôs: 70 d 7 sqq.
7 môv is the reading of W, but môv (B'T) is also possible.
8 aûtê éinai, 'to be this,' a change of construction from to muicôn gýnevthai. Both the personal and the impersonal construction are admissible with ómologéito.
11 parabâlanôn tûn kefalân, 'turning his head' as one naturally would to a new speaker (not 'bending').
3 tô ènântiôn prâyma: i.e. the thing in which there is an opposite form. It is a cold thing that becomes hot and a hot thing that becomes cold; hot does not become cold, or cold hot. In the previous illustration Socrates is the σμικραν prâyma which may become μεγα, though smallness cannot admit greatness.
5 tô év tû fûsei (sc. ènântiôn) is the opposite form aiâ tô kath aiâ as opposed to tô év môv which is chosen as an instance of the form so far as it is 'in' a thing. For this way of speaking of the eînê cp. Rep. 597 b 5 where the 'ideal bed' is spoken of as ἕν τῇ φύσει άσία, and Parm. 132 d 1 tû mèn eînê taûta òpoper paràeiçîmatà êstávna ên tû fûsei, tâ ðè ðîla toûtôs êóikênav. All Greek thinkers use the word φύσεως of that which they regard as most real. The Ionians meant by it the primary substance (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 131; Socrates means by it the world of eînê.
6 tôv êkôntôn tô ènântia: a clearer expression for tôv ènântioi prûymátov.
7 tô ëkeînîn épovnuwâ : cp. 102 b 2.
8 òn èkôntôn: governed by tôv épovnuwâ (not gen. abs.).
1 γênevîn allîlalôn, 'becoming one another', 'turning into one another'.
5 Oû'd'âv ktl. On previous occasions (77 a 8; 86 e 5) we have heard of the doubts of Cebes, but 'he does not feel his doubts return on this point' (Geddes).
καιταν oûti lêw ktl. Here we have another hint that the doctrine is not fully worked out. Cp. above 100 d 5 and below 107 b 5.

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C 10 ἐντ... καὶ τὸῦ κτλ. We now advance beyond the merely tautological judgements with which we have been dealing hitherto, to judgements of which the subject is a thing and the predicate a form. We have seen that hot will not admit cold or cold heat; we go on to show that fire will not admit cold, nor snow heat. We advance from the judgement ‘A excludes B’ to ‘a excludes b’.

C 11 θερμών τι καλεῖς: cp. 64 c 2 n. It will be found helpful to keep this simple instance in mind all through the following passage.

C 13 ὁπερ is regularly used to express identity. A is not identical with a nor B with b.

E 2 Ἕστιν... ὡστε: cp. 93 b 4 n.

E 3 τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄνοματος, ‘its own name,’ the name of the eidος, e. g. hot or cold (ἀξιοῦσθαι, ‘to be entitled to’).

E 4 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, sc. ἀξιοῦσθαι αὐτοῦ, i. e. τοῦ ὄνοματος τοῦ ἐιδούς, e. g. fire and snow; for fire is always hot and snow is always cold.

E 5 τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν: i.e. τὴν ἐκείνου ἰδέαν, τὸ ἐκείνου ἐιδός. The three words are synonyms. Observe how the doctrine is formulated. There are things, not identical with the form, which have the form as an inseparable predicate (ἀεί, ὁπαπίνει ὑ).

E 7 ὅει... τυγχάνειν, i. g. ἀξιοῦται.

ὁπερ νῦν λέγομεν, sc. τὸ περίττον.

I04 2 ἡτα τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὄνοματος, ‘along with its own name,’ whatever that may be. In addition to its own name we must also call it odd (τοῦτο καλείν, sc. περίττον) because it is essentially (φίσει, cp. πεφυκέναι) odd.

A 3 λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι κτλ., ‘I mean by the case mentioned (αὐτὸ) such a case as that of the number three,’ which is not only entitled to the name ‘three’, but also, and essentially, to the name ‘odd’. Similarly fire is not only entitled to the name ‘fire’, but also, and essentially, to the name ‘hot’.

A 6 ὁντος οὐχ ὁπερ κτλ. Most editors adopt Heindorf’s conjecture οὐφερ for ὁπερ, which is demanded by grammar; for ὁπερ ought to be followed by ἡ τριάς (sc. ἕστιν). On the other hand, it may be urged that ὁπερ was so common in geometry, especially to express ratios, that it may hardly have been felt to be declinable. It is a symbol like : or =, and nothing more.

A 8 ὁ ἐμισός τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἄπας, ‘one whole half of the numerical series.’ For ὁ ἐμισός instead of τὸ ἐμισον see L. & S. s u. I. 2, and, for
the expression, Theaet. 147 e 5 τῶν ἄριθμῶν πάντα δίχα διέλαβομεν ('we divided into two equal parts').

2 ὁ ἐτερος . . . στίχος, 'the other row' or 'series'.

0 ἐπιούσισ . . . c 2 ὑπομείναι: the military metaphors are still kept up. Cp. 102 d 9 n.

1 ἀπολλύμενα ἡ ὑπεκχωροῦντα, as if dependent on φαίνεται, b 7, the intervening ἐκές being ignored. We are now able to say that things which have opposite forms as their inseparable predicate refuse to admit the form opposite to that which is 'in' them, but either perish or withdraw at its approach. The simplest instance is that of snow which is not opposite to heat, but melts at its approach.

1 τάδε . . . ἀ κτλ. We are not defining a class of ἑιδή, but a class of things (c 8 ἀλλ' ἀπτα) which are not αὐτὰ ἐπαντία to the 'attacking' form. It has not been suggested in any way that fire and snow are ἑιδή, and it seems improbable that they are so regarded. On the other hand, 'three,' which, for the purposes of the present argument, is quite on a level with fire and snow, is spoken of (d 5) as an ἑδέα. It is this uncertainty which creates all the difficulties of the present passage. That, however, is not surprising: for, in the Parmenides, Plato represents Socrates as hesitating on this very point, and as doubtful whether he ought to speak of an ἑιδός of 'man, fire, or water'. This, however, does not affect the argument. We need only speak of 'things' without deciding whether they are 'forms' or not.

ἀ ὁτι ἄν κατάσχη κτλ. Things which, though not themselves opposite to a given thing, do not withstand its attack, are 'those which, if one of them has taken possession of anything, it compels not only to assume its own form, but also in every case that of something opposite to it' (i.e. to the attacking form). The illustration given just below makes it quite clear that this is the meaning, though the pronouns are a little puzzling, and will be dealt with in separate notes. The verb κατέχειν keeps up the military metaphor; for to 'occupy' a position is χωρίων κατέχειν.

2 τὴν αὐτοῦ ἱδέαν, sc. τὴν τοῦ κατασχάτων. There is nothing abnormal in the shift from plural (ἀ) to singular in a case like this. After an indefinite plural some such subject as 'any one of them' is often to be supplied, and κατάσχη is felt to be singular in meaning as well

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as in form, as is shown by ὅτι ἂν and aunque, whereas at d 5 we have ἂ ἂν κατὰσχῆ duly followed by αὐτοῖς. For the change of number cp. also 70 e 5 n. and Lutes 667 b 5 δεὶ τοῦδε... ύπάρχειν ἄπασιν ὅσοις συμπαρέπεται τις χάρις, ἡ τοῦτο αὐτὸ μόνον (sc. τὴν χάριν) αὐτὸ ὑπὸ τὸ σπουδαιότατον εἶναι κτλ.

d 2 αὐτὸ refers to ὅτι ἂν κατὰσχῆ, the thing occupied. For the slight pleonasm cp. 99 b 6; III c 8. The meaning is fixed by d 6 ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς referring to ἂ ἂν... κατὰσχῆ.

d 3 αὐτῷ is omitted by most editors, but the meaning of ἐναντίου is by no means clear without a dative. If we remember once more that we are defining a class of things which do not hold their ground before the onset of an opposite, it is not difficult to interpret αὐτῷ as 'the opposite in question' implied in τὰ ἐναντία ὧν ὑπομένει ἐπίώντα above. This is also borne out by the illustration given below. It is the form of the odd which prevents the approach of the even to three, just as it is the form of cold which prevents the approach of heat to snow. (Cp. below e 9 τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον δεὶ αὐτῶ ἐπιφέρει. This last passage is strongly against the reading δεὶ for ἃντι, which I regard as a mere corruption (ΔΕΙ, ΔΕΙ).

d 12 ἡ περιττή, sc. μορφή. There does not seem to be any other instance of this brachylogy. The normal use is seen just below in ἡ τοῦ ἄρτιον.

e 5 Ἀνάρτιος ἔρα. The precise point of this step in the argument only emerges at 105 d 13 sqq. The term περιττός, 'odd,' does not at first seem parallel to a term like ἄνθρωπος. As Wohlrab says, the point would not require to be made in German; for in that language the odd is called das Ungearte.

e 7 ὀρίσασθαι: W has ὀρίσασθαι δεῖν, which gives the meaning, but is probably due to interpolation. Tr. 'What I said we were to define'.

ποῖα κτλ. Fire, for instance, is not opposite to cold nor snow to heat, yet fire will not admit cold, nor will snow admit heat.

e 8 αὐτό, τὸ ἐναντίον. It is plain from αὐτὸ δέχεται in the next line that αὐτό must refer to the same thing as τωί, and, in that case, τὸ ἐναντίον can only be added if we suppose τωί to mean virtually τῶν ἐναντίων τωί, 'one of a pair of opposites,' and take αὐτό as 'the opposite in question.' I cannot attach any appropriate sense to the vulgate αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον, which ought to mean 'what is actually
opposite to it, which would imply e.g. that snow will not admit the cold. The same objection applies to the variant αὐτῷ τὸ ἑναντίον adopted by Schleiermacher and Stallbaum. Wytenbach proposed either to delete τὸ ἑναντίον or to read τὸ οἷκ ἑναντίον. The former proposal would simplify the sentence; the latter shows that he understood it.

8 νῦν, 'in the present case.'

10 ἐπιφέρει is another military metaphor (cp. ἐπιφέρειν πόλεσιν, bellum injette, ὀπλα ἐπιφέρειν &c.). Tr. 'it always brings into the field its opposite', i.e. τὸ περιττὸν. It is very important to notice that ἐπιφέρειν is always used of the thing 'attacked', while ἐπιέναι and κατέχειν are used of the thing which 'attacks' it. Ἐπιφέρειν refers to the means of defence. It is, we may say, τὸ ἀμφιμένον which ἑναντίον τι ἐπιφέρει τῷ ἑπιπτοί. Further, ἐπιέναι is not the same thing as κατέχειν, which implies a successful ἐφόδος.

1 ἥ δυᾶς τῷ περιττῷ, sc. τὸ ἑναντίον ἐπιφέρει, i.e. τὸ ἀρτιόν.

1 I ἀλλ' ὤρα κτλ. ἀλλά resumes after the parenthesis with a slight anacolouthon.

2 μὴ μοῦν κτλ. Taking the same instance as before, not only does cold refuse to admit its opposite, heat, but so does snow, which always brings cold (which is the opposite of heat) into the field against it in self-defence.

3 ἀλλά καὶ ἐκεῖνο κτλ. All editors seem to take ἐκεῖνο as subject of δείκνυα and antecedent to ὅ ἐν ἐπιφέρῃ, but that leads to great difficulties, the chief of which are that we have to refer ἐκεῖνο to something other than ἐκεῖνο and to take ἐφ' ὅτι ἄν αὐτῷ ὅτι of the thing which is being attacked instead of the attacking form. Riddell (Dig. § 19) took ἐκεῖνο (sc. ὁ ὅτι) as an accusative pronoun in apposition to what follows. I prefer to take it as the object of δείκνυα and closely with ἐφ' ὅτι ἄν αὐτῷ ὅτι. The subject of δείκνυα will then be ὅ ἐν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἑναντίον ἐκεῖνο. Then αὐτῷ τὸ ἐπιφέρειν repeats ὅ ἐν ἐπιφέρῃ κτλ. and τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφέρειμον ἑναντίοτητα repeats ἐκεῖνο. We have thus an instance of interlaced order (α β δ α δ) which is, I take it, what Socrates means by speaking συγγραφικῶς.

5 οὗ... χειρον, 'it is just as well.'


7 τὸ διπλάσιον, in apposition to τὰ δέκα, 'which is the double of five,' and therefore an even number.
a 8 τοῦτο μὲν οὖν κτλ. I formerly inserted οὐκ before ἐναντίον with most editors, but this leaves καὶ and the concessive μὲν οὖν without any meaning. I now interpret: 'It is quite true that this (the double) is itself opposite to another thing (viz. the single, τὸ ἄπλοκαν); but at the same time it will also refuse to admit the form of the odd' (to which it is not itself opposite). The reason is, of course, that τὸ διπλάκασιον always ἐπιφέρει τὸ ἄρτιον, brings the even into the field to resist the attack of the odd; for all doubles are even numbers. It goes without saying that it will not admit τὸ ἄπλοκαν which is its own opposite.

b 1 οὔδὲ δὲ κτλ. The almost accidental mention of double and single suggests another opposition, that of integral and fractional. With Heindorf, I take the construction to be οὔδὲ δὲ τὸ ἡμιλιον (½) οὐδὲ τάλλα τὰ τουαντά, τὸ ἡμισὺν (¼) καὶ τριτημόριον αὐ (¼) καὶ πάντα τὰ τουαντά (δέχεται) τὴν τοῦ ὀλου (ἰδέαν). If we observe the slight colloquial hyperbaton of τὴν τοῦ ὀλου, there is no need to interpret τὸ ἡμισὺν in an artificial way (as 'fractions whose denominator is 2', like ½ and ¼) or to delete it. No given fraction is itself opposite to τὸ ὀλου, but they all 'bring into the field' τὴν τοῦ μορίου ἰδέαν in self-defence against the attack of τὸ ὀλου.

b 5 ὁ ἄν ἐρωτῶ, 'in the terms of my question' (Church). The readings of the MSS. vary considerably, but the meaning is clear from the sequel.

b 6 λίγω δὲ κτλ., 'I say this because, as a result of our present argument, I see another possibility of safety over and above (παρ') that safe answer I spoke of at first' (100 d 8).

b 9 Ὁ ἄν τὶ κτλ., 'what must be present in anything, in its body (i.e. 'in a thing's body'), to make it warm?' The text is not quite certain, and it would no doubt be simpler to omit ἐν τῷ with Stephanus, thus making the construction the same as in c 3. It is possible, however, to understand ἐν τῷ σώματι as a further explanation of Ὁ ἄν ἐγγένηται, so I have let it stand.

c 1 τὴν ἡμαθὴ, 'foolish.' Cp. 100 d 3. The irony is kept up.

c 2 κομψοτίραν: κομψός is the urbane equivalent of σοφός, and ἡμαθὴς is the regular opposite of σοφός (cp. 101 c 8). We are taking a step towards the κομψεία which we deprecated before. ἐκ τῶν νῦν: cp. b 7. Ὁ ἄν πῦρ. It is safe to say this because θερμότης is an inseparable predicate of πῦρ, and so the presence of fire is a sufficient aitia of
bodily heat. This does not mean in the least that fire is the only such cause, as appears clearly from the other instances. There are other causes of disease than fever, and other odd numbers than the number one (ἡ μοῦας).

3 Ψυχή ἄρα κτλ. Previously we could only say that participation in the form of life was the cause of life; but, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων, we may substitute ψυχή for ζωή, just as we may substitute πῖρ, πυρετός, μοῦας for θερμότης, νόσος, περιττότης. There is not a word about the soul being itself a form or ἔδος, nor is such an assumption required. The soul may perfectly well be said to ‘occupy’ the body without being itself an ἓδεα. It is a simple military metaphor (cp. 104 d 1 n.), and implies no metaphysical theory.

10 ὦκοῦν ψυχή κτλ. The point is that, though ψυχή itself is not opposite to anything, it always ‘brings into the field’ something which has an opposite, namely life. We may say, then, that soul will not admit that opposite (i.e. death), but must either withdraw before it or perish.

13 Τί οὖν κτλ. The point here is mainly verbal. It has to be shown that what does not admit ἄδικας may be called ἄδικας.

2. Ἀμονον . . . τὸ δὲ ἄδικον stands for τὸ μὲν ἄμονον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον by an idiom of which Plato is specially fond. Cp. Prot. 330 a 3 ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, Theaet. 181 d 5 διὸ δὴ λέγω . . . εἰ δὴ καθήσεως, ἄλλοιόωσιν, τὴν δὲ φοράν, Rep. 455 ζ 6 γενὴ λατρική, ἡ δ᾽ οὐ, καὶ μονακη, ἡ δ᾽ ἄμουσας φύσει.

10 Τί οὖν κτλ. It has been proved that the soul will not admit death; but we have still to deal with two possible alternatives; for it may either ‘withdraw’ or ‘perish’. This alternative actually exists in all other cases; but in the case of τὸ ἄδικας the second is excluded; for τὸ ἄδικας is ipso facto ἀνώλεθρον. Therefore the soul must ‘withdraw’ at the approach of death.

1 άλλο πτ . . . ἡ, nonne. The interposition of the subject is unusual, but cp. 106 e 1. There is no contradiction in saying that ‘the uneven’ is perishable. If there were, three would be imperishable because it may be substituted for ‘the uneven’.

1 τὸ ἀθερμον, though the reading rests only on the authority of the corrector of T, must be right (θερμὸν BTW Stob.). The word is coined, like ἀνάρτιος, to furnish a parallel to ἄδικας. Snow is to τὸ ἀθερμον as soul is to τὸ ἄδικας.
another military metaphor.

Wyttenbach conjectured ἄψυχρον to correspond with ἄθερμον, but ἄψυκτον, 'what cannot be cooled,' is a better parallel in sense, if not in form, to ἀθάνατον.

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There are instances of μή with the potential optative in interrogations introduced by πῶς or τίνα τρόπον. We might have had πῶς ἄν... μή δέχωτο; 'how could anything else avoid receiving?' and this is virtually what the sentence means (G. M. T. § 292).

an instance of the optative without ἄν often found after such phrases as (οὐκ) ἐσθ' ὅστις... (οὐκ) ἐσθ' ὅπως.

if the text is sound, is a very striking anacoluthon due to the parenthesis. This sentence is just like the reference to the μακροτέρα ὀδός in Rep. 435d and the μακροτέρα περίοδος, ib. 504b. It is clear that the πρῶται ἱποθέσεις which are to be re-examined are just those mentioned above, 100b 5, that is to say, the 'Theory of Ideas' in the form in which it is presented to us in the Phaedo. Whether Socrates was conscious that the theory required revision, I am not prepared to say; but it is clear that Plato was. The re-examination of these ἱποθέσεις is to be found chiefly in the Parmenides and the Sophist, both dialogues in which Socrates does not lead the discussion.

viz. that you have followed up the argument as far as is humanly possible. If you make sure (σαφές) of this, you need seek no further. The argument ends with a fresh confession of the weakness of human arguments. Cp. 85c1 sqq.

The conclusion of the whole matter. The Myth (107c1--115a8).

eiper ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος κτλ. Cp. Rep. 608c9 Ti οὖν; οἷς ἀθανάτο πράγματι ὑπὲρ τοσοῦτον δεῖν χρόνον ἐσπουδακέναι, ἀλλ' ὦχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντὸς;
Iv καλοίμεν τὸ ζήν, 'for which what is called life lasts.' For this way of speaking cp. H. xi. 757 καὶ Ἀληθίου ἐνθα κολώνη | κέκληται. Wytenbach quotes several poetical parallels and Xen. Hell. v. 1. 10 ἐνθα Ἡ Ῥώμη ἔρρειται.

3 νῦν δὴ, nunc dēnum. Cp. 61 c 6 n.

4 ἔρρειον, 'a godsend,' Schol. τὸ ἀπρωσδόκηστον κέρδος. The word was properly used of treasure-trove ('windfall,' aubaine), which was sacred to Hermes. Cp. Symph. 217 a 3 ἔρμαον ἡγησάμην εἶναι καὶ εἰτύχη ἐμὸν θαυμαστῶν and the expression κοινὸς Ερρῆς, 'Shares!' (Jebb on Theophrastus, Characters, xxvi. 18).

5 νῦν δὲ, 'but, as it is ...'

6 τροφῆς: cp. 81 d 8 n.

λέγεται, sc. ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, in the mystic doctrine. Cp. 67 c 5 n.

7 δὲ ἔκαστον δαίμον: cp. for the mystic doctrine of the guardian δαίμων Menander (fr. 550 Kock) "Ἀπαντὶ δαίμον ἀνὴρ συμπαράσταται | εὐθὺς γενομένῳ μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου. The idea that the δαίμον has a soul allotted to it as its portion appears in the Ἐριθαφίῶν of Lysias 78 ὁ τε δαίμων ὁ τὴν ἡμετέραν μοίραν εἰληφὼς, and Theocritus iv. 40 αἰαὶ τῷ σκληρῷ μάλα δαίμονοι δὴ μὲ λελόγχει. It was doubtless the common view, but is denied by Socrates in the Myth of Er (Rep. 617 e 1), where the προφήτης says: οὐχ υἱὸς δαίμων ληξεται, ἀλλ' ἴμεις δαίμονα αἱρήσεσθε.

8 ἀδιακασαμένους κτλ. We learn what the place was from Gorg. 524 a 1 οὐσίαν οὖν ... δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειψαίνῃ. The 'meadow' of Judgement is Orphic. Note the use of δὴ τις in allusion to something mysterious. Cp. 108 c 1; 115 d 4. So ὅσ δὴ, 107 e 1, 2. All through this passage δὴ is used to suggest something known to the speaker and to those whom he addresses, but of which they shrink from speaking.

9 διαδικασάσεσθαι κτλ. In Rep. 614 c 4 we read that the Judges, ἐπειδὴ διαδικασάσεσθαι, bade the righteous proceed to the right upwards and the wicked to the left downwards. The active is used of the judges and the middle of the parties who submit their claims to judgement (cp. 113 d 3). The meaning cannot be, as has been suggested, 'when they have received their various sentences,' for that would require the passive, and διαδικασάσεσθαι always means 'to submit rival claims to a court'.

10 ὁ δὴ: cp. d 7 n.
NOTES

108  a  4  σχίσεις  τε  καὶ  τρίδοδος,  'partings  of  the  way  and  bifurcations.'
The  reading  τρίδοδος  was  that  of  Proclus  and  Olympiodorus  and  is  much  better  than  the  MS.  περίδοδος,  which  is  probably  due  to  περιόδος  in  e  4.  It  is  the  only  reading  which  gives  a  proper  sense  to  the  next  clause  (see  next  note),  and  goes  much  better  with  σχίσεις.  Cp.  also  Gorg.  524  a  2  ἐν  τῷ  λαμβάνω,  ἐν  τῇ  τρίῳδῳ  ἐξ  ἥς  φέρετον  τῷ  ὄδω,  ἥ  μὲν  εἰς  μακάρων  νήσους,  ἡ  δ'  εἰς  Τάρταρον.  Virgil,  Aen.  vi.  540  Hic  locus  est  partes  ubi  se  via  findit  in  ambas.

a  5  θυσίων  is  better  attested  (TW  Stob.)  than  the  ὀσίων  of  B,  though  that  is  an  ancient  variant  (cf. W).  The  MS.  of  Proclus,  in  Remp.  (85.  6  Kroll),  has  ὀσίων,  which  explains  the  corruption  (0  for  Θ).  The  reading  θυσίων  alone  fits  the  explanation  of  Olympiodorus,  ἀπὸ  τῶν  ἐν  τρίῳδος  τιμῶν  τῆς  Ἐκάτης  (cp.  last  note).  The  sacrifices  to  Hecate  (Trinia)  at  the  meeting  of  three  ways  are  well  attested,  and  Socrates  means  that  these  shadow  forth  the  τρίῳδος  in  the  other  world.

a  7  οὐκ  ἄγνοεῖ  τὰ  παρώντα:  i.e.  the  purified  soul  is  familiar  with  the  region  through  which  it  must  travel.

a  8  ἐν  τῷ  ἐκπροσθεν:  81  c  10.

περὶ  ἐκεῖνο  (sc.  τὸ  σῶμα)  .  .  .  ἐπτομημένη,  'in  eager  longing  for'.
The  verb  πτειοτοθαί  always  refers  to  fluttering  or  palpitation  of  the  heart,  often,  as  here,  caused  by  desire.  For  desire  of  the  corporeal  in  a  disembodied  soul  cp.  81  e  1.

b  4  ὃπερ:  Cobet  proposed  ὃπερ,  but  cp.  II3  a  2  οὗ  .  .  .  ἀφικνοῦνταi
(where,  however,  Schanz  reads  οἱ).  The  poetical  form  is  not  out  of  place  here.
NOTES

5 τοιοῦτον: ι. e. ἄκαθαρτον.

7 ταύτην μὲν resumes τὴν μὲν αὖν ἄνων.

8 συνιμπόρος: συναθοτόρος Τιμαέους. The word is poetical, like the use of the simple ἐμπόρος for ‘wayfarer’.

αὐτῆ, ‘by itself’, ‘alone’.

1 ἔως ἄν... γένωνται, ‘till they have passed.’ The χρόνοι are the περίοδοι. Cp. Prot. 320 a 7 πρὶν ἐξ μὺνας γεγονέναι.

δὴ τινες: cp. 107 d 7 n.

2 ὅν ἠθόντων, ‘when they are gone,’ i. e. when they have passed.

ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης is equivalent, as often, to ἐξ ἀνάγκης. There is no personification.

3 μετρίως: i. e. καλὸς. Cp. 68 e 2 n.

7 τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν. From the time of Anaximander and Hecataeus the construction of γῆς περίοδων had been a feature of Ionic science (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 53, n. 4). Aristophanes mentions a περίοδος containing the whole earth as among the furniture of the φροντιστήριον (Clouds 206). In this passage, as we shall see, Socrates abandons the central doctrine of Ionic geography.

8 ὑπὸ τινος πέπεισμα. It is best not to inquire too curiously who this was. It was not Archelaus; for he believed the earth to be a flat disk hollow in the centre. It was not Anaximander; for he regarded the earth as cylindrical. It was not a Pythagorean; for the ‘hollows’ are distinctively Ionic. The influence of Empedocles on the details of the description is well marked. Such an attempt to reconcile opposing views may well have been made at Athens during the second half of the fifth century B.C., but hardly at any other time or anywhere else. Personally, I am quite willing to believe that the theory is that of Socrates himself. It can scarcely have been seriously entertained by Plato at the time he wrote the Phaedo; but it continued to have great influence. The cosmology of Posidonius, as we know it from the Περὶ κόσμου wrongly included in the Aristotelian corpus, is based upon that of the Phaedo, and it was in substance the cosmology of Posidonius which ultimately prevailed over the more scientific doctrines of the Academy, and dominated European thought till the time of Copernicus. The leading thought is that, if the earth is spherical, there must be other οἰκονομεναι than the one we know; for our οἰκονομενη is but a small portion of the surface of the sphere.
NOTES

4 oũχ η Γλαύκου τέχνη: Eusebius has oũχι η, so perhaps we should read oũχι for oũχ η with Heindorf, who shows that later writers quote the proverb in this form. The paroemiographers give several explanations of it, the simplest of which is that it comes ἀπὸ Γλαύκου Σαμιόν ὅς πρῶτον κόλλησιν ἐφεισε σιδήρου (cp. Hdt. i. 25). I believe, however, that the more complicated explanation is right, and that the reference is to a working model of the 'harmony of the spheres' originally designed by Hippasus, for which see Appendix II.

5 ἡ γ' ἐστίν, sc. ἡ πέπεισμα, ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, sc. πέπεισμα, χαλεπῶτερον, sc. διηγήσασθαι.

9 ἔξορκεῖν is the best attested reading, but that of B, ἔξορκεῖ, might stand, if we take μοι δοκεῖ as a parenthesis.

4 Πέπεισμαι ὡς . . . δεῖν: anacoluthon.

5 ἐν μέσῳ . . . περιφερῆς οὐσα: the original Pythagorean doctrine (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 345). Note the propriety with which οὐρανὸς is used for 'the world', i.e. everything contained within the heavens (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 31). Plato does not commit the anachronism of making Socrates adopt the later Pythagorean view, that the earth revolves round the Central Fire (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 344 sqq.).

109 a 1 ἀέρος: the accepted Ionian doctrine (cp. 99 b 8 n.).

2 τὴν ὁμοιότητα, 'its equiformity.' This is another instance of historical accuracy in terminology; for the terms ὁμοιός and ὁμοιότης were originally employed where ὕσος and ἴσοτης would have been used later. Cp. Proclus' Commentary on the First Book of Euclid, p. 250. 22 Friedlein λέγεται γὰρ δὴ πρῶτος ἐκεῖνος (Θαλῆς) ἐπιστήσασι καὶ εἰπεῖν ὡς ἄρα παντὸς ἱσοσκελοὺς αἱ πρὸς τῇ βάσει γονίαι ἵστα ἐλεύθερον ἐκ τὰς ἱστα ὁμοίας προσειρηκέναι. Just as what we call equal angles were called similar angles, so a sphere was said to be 'similar every way'. Aristotle ascribes both the theory and the use of the term ὁμοιότης to Anaximander (de Coel. 295 b 11 εἰσὶ δὲ τίνες οἱ διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τὰ φαινόμενα αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς γῆς) μένειν, ὡσπερ τῶν ἀρχαίων 'Ἀναξίμανδρος', μᾶλλον μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν ἄνω ἢ κάτω ἢ εἰσὶ τὰ πλάγια φέρεισθαι προσήκοιτο ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἱσομένου καὶ ὁμοίως πρὸς τὰ ἐσχατὰ ἔχον, ἀμα δ' ἀδύνατον εἰς τὰνν ποιέσθαι τὴν κίνησιν ὡστ' εἰς ἀνίκης μένειν. It is quite wrong to take ὁμοιότης as referring to homogeneity of substance or density. As we shall see, the world is not homogeneous in substance at all.

3 τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἰσορροπίαν, 'the equilibrium of the earth itself.'
Anaximander's cylindrical earth could hardly be called ισόρροπον like the Pythagorean spherical earth in the centre of a spherical world (οἰκουμένη).

a 6 ὁμοίως ... ἔχον is equivalent to ὁμοιόν ὄν (πάντῃ). Cp. Aristotle loc. cit. (a 2 π.) ὁμοίως πρῶς τά ἐσχατα ἔχον.

a 8 Καὶ ὅρθως γε. The ready assent of Simmias marks the doctrine, so far, as Pythagorean.

a 9 πάμμεγα τι εἶναι is a direct contradiction of Archelaus, who said κείσαιι δὲ ἐν μέσῳ (τήν γῆν) οὐδὲν μέρος οὖσαν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, τοῦ παντός (Hippolytus, Ref. i. 9. 3).


b 1 τοὺς μίχρι κτλ. The Pillars of Herakles are well known as the boundary of the οἰκουμένη on the west, and Aeschylus spoke of the Phasis as the boundary of Europe and Asia (fr. 185) δίδυμον χθόνος Ἔλερωτος | μέγαν ἡ δ' Ἀσίας τεμμοῦνά Φάσιν), cp. Hdt. iv. 45. So Eur. ΗΗρ. 3 δοσι το Πόντου τεμμούνα τ' Ἀτλαντικῶν | ναιοῦσιν εὖσω.

b 2 περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν οἰκούντας, 'dwelling round the Mediterranean (the θάλασσα κατ' ἕξωχίν) like frogs or ants round a swamp.' ( Cp. Εἰ. Μ. τέλμα τόπου πελώδης ὑδωρ ἐχών.)

b 3 καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι κτλ. As Wyttenebach saw, this part of the theory comes from Anaxagoras (and Archelaus). Cp. Hippolytus, Ref. i. 8. 9 εἶναι γὰρ αὐτὴν (τὴν γῆν) κοιλὴν καὶ ἔχειν ὑδωρ ἐν τοῖς κοιλωμασίν ('Ἀναξιαγόρας φησίν), ib. 9. 4 λίμνην γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον (τὴν γῆν), ἀτε κέκλω μὲν οὖσαν ὕψηλην, μέσον δὲ κοιλὴν ('Ἀρχέλαος φησίν), a view which is obviously a generalization from the Mediterranean basin. Here it is combined with the theory of a spherical earth (Anaxagoras and Archelaus believed in a flat earth), and it is assumed that there are several such basins with water in the middle and inhabited land round them. According to Posidonius, too, there were many οἰκουμεναί, but they were islands, not hollows.

b 6 τὸ τε ὑδωρ καὶ τὴν ὅμιχλην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα. Here again Plato correctly represents fifth-century science, according to which water is condensed air, mist being the intermediate state between them (Ε. Gr. Ph.² p. 79, n. 1). The discovery of atmospheric air as a body different from mist was due to Empedocles (ib. p. 263) and Anaxagoras (ib. p. 309); but it appears that the Pythagoreans adhered to the older view. Cp. Ζητ. 58 χ ι ἄερος (γέννη) τὸ μὲν εἰσαγόστατον ἐπίκλην αἰθήρ καλούμενος, ὁ δ' ἐσχερωτάτος ὀρίξη τε καὶ σκότος.
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b 7 αὐτήν... τὴν γῆν: the true surface of the earth (called below 'the true earth'), as opposed to the basins or 'hollows'. It rises above the mist and 'air'. It is clear that we are to suppose considerable distances between the basins.

b 8 αἰθέρα: αἰθήρ is properly the sky regarded as made of blue fire. This, as we see from the passage of the Timaeus quoted in the last note, was supposed to be air still further rarefied. It is the intermediary between fire and air, as ὀμίχλη is that between air and water.

c 1 τοὺς πολλούς κτλ. This implies that Socrates knows the divergent views of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, the former of whom gave the name αἰθήρ to atmospheric air (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 263 sq.), while the latter used it of fire (ib. p. 312 n. 1).

τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰωθότων λέγειν: I do not know any other instance of περὶ c. acc. after λέγειν in Plato (Gorg. 490 c 8 is not one; for πλέον ἔχειν is 'understood' and λέγειν is parenthetical). I am inclined to think the words εἰωθότων λέγειν have been wrongly added from 108 c 7. For the resulting phrase cp. Phaedr. 272 c 7 ὅν (λόγον) τῶν περὶ ταυτά τιμων ἀκήκου, ib. 273 a 5 τῶν περὶ ταύτα.

c 2 ύποστάθμην, 'sediment,' lit. 'lees' (προγία, τρύξ Hesych.). Note that air, mist, and water are the sediment of the αἰθήρ.

d 4 παρὰ σφίσι: Socrates is thinking of a whole people dwelling at the bottom of the sea. This is not inconsistent with εἰ τις above (c 4); for εἰ τις is continued by a plural oftener than not.

d 7 διὰ τοὺν, sc. διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος.

d 8 τὸ δὲ εἰναι ταυτόν, 'whereas it is just the same thing,' with us as with the imaginary dwellers at the bottom of the sea. For τὸ δὲ cp. 87 c 6 n. I see no reason to suspect the text. The asyndeton explicativum is quite in order; for εἰναι ταυτόν is explanatory of ταυτόν δὴ τοῖτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονθέναι (cp. 72 c 3 n.).

e 2 ἐπ' ἀκρα: the surface of the 'air' is parallel to that of the sea (d 1).

e 3 κατιδεῖν (ἀν): the δῆ of Eusebius is probably a trace of the lost ἀν (ΑΝ, ΔΗ), which might easily be dropped by haplography.

e 4 ἀνακύπτοντες: cp. Phaedr. 249 c 3 (ψυχή) ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὄν ὀντως. The position of the attributive participle outside the article and its noun is normal when there is another attribute. Cp. Phil. 21 c 2 τῆς ἐν τῷ παραχρήμα ήδονῆς προσπιπτούσης.
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5. **Oυτος ἄν τινα... κατιδεῖν** is a good instance of a form of 'binary structure', noted by Riddell (Dig. § 209), in which 'the fact illustrated is stated (perhaps only in outline) before the illustration, and re-stated after it' (α β α).

7. ὁ ἄληθῶς... τὸ ἄληθινὸν... ἦ ὃς ἄληθῶς: observe how Plato varies the expression.

1. ἤδε... ἦ γῆ, 'this earth of ours,' i.e. the hollow in which we dwell and which we take to be the surface of the earth.

5. σφραγίες, σφραγίζεις, ὀφαλὸς πέτρα ῥήματα ἐχονσα, Hesych., Suid.

6. ὁποὺ ἄν καὶ [ἡ] γῆ ἦ, 'wherever there is earth' to mix with the water. Though there is no good authority for the omission of ἦ, it is certainly better away.

8. οἰκεῖα, the things above on the true earth which are in turn (αὐτός) as superior to what we have as those are to the things in the sea.

1. εἰ γὰρ δῆ... καλὸν is far the best attested reading, though B omits καλὸν and alters δῆ to δεῖ. Olympiodorus apparently had δεῖ and καλόν, for he finds it necessary to explain why the μῦδος is called beautiful. It is to be observed that a μῦδος is only in place where we cannot apply the strictly scientific method. There is nothing 'mythical' about the εἰδή, but all we call 'natural science' is necessarily so, as is explained at the beginning of the *Timaeus*. It is, at best, a 'probable tale'. Cp. Taylor, *Plato*, pp. 50-2.

6. ἦ γῆ αὐτή, 'the true earth.'

Ωσπερ αἱ δωδεκάκοσται σφαῖραι, 'like balls made of twelve pieces of leather.' This is an allusion to the Pythagorean theory of the dodecahedron, which was of special significance as the solid which most nearly approaches the sphere (E. Gr. Ph. p. 341 sq.). To make a ball, we take twelve pieces of leather, each of which is a regular pentagon. If the material were not flexible, we should have a regular dodecahedron; as it is flexible, we get a ball. This has nothing to do with the twelve signs of the zodiac, as modern editors incorrectly say. Cp. *Tim.* 55 c 4 ἔτι δὲ ὁδήσεις συστάσεως μᾶς περιπτης (a fifth regular solid besides the pyramid or tetrahedron, the cube, and the icosahedron), ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν ὀ θεῖς αὐτή κατεχρήσατο ἐκεῖνο διαζωγραφοῖν ('when he painted it', see next note). The author of the *Timaeus* *Locrus* is perfectly right in his paraphrase of this (98 e) τὸ δὲ δωδεκάδρων εἰκών τοῦ παντὸς ἐστίωσατο, ἔγγιστα σφαῖρας ἐόν. The whole matter is fully explained in Wyttenbach's note,
from which it will be seen that it was clearly understood by Plutarch, Simplicius, and others. Proclus, in his *Commentary on the First Book of Euclid*, shows how the whole edifice of the *Elements* leads up to the inscription of the regular solids (κοσμικά or Πλατωνικά σχήματα) in the sphere.

b 7 χρώμασιν διειλημμένη. The true earth is represented as a patchwork of different colours (for διειλημμένη cp. 81 c 4 n.). This must be the explanation of the words ἐκεῖνο διαξωγραφῶν, 'painting it in different colours' (cp. διαποικιλλω). Each of the twelve pentagons has its own colour.

b 8 δείγματα, 'samples.' In the same way our precious stones are 'pieces' (μορία) of the stones of the true earth (below, d 8).

c 2 πολὺ ἐτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων: for the position of ἐκ cp. 70 c 1 n.

η τοῦτων: the case after ἦ assimilated to that before it (Riddell, Dig. § 168). Cp. *Meno* 83 c 8 ἀπὸ μεῖζονοι . . . ἡ τοιαῦτης γράμμης, *Laws* 892 b 1 οὕσης γ' αὐτης (sc. ψυχῆς) πρεσβυτέρας ἡ σώματος.

τὴν μίν . . . , sc. γῆν, 'one portion of it,' one pentagon.

C 4 τὴν δὲ ὅσῃ λευκῆ, 'all the part of it which is white.'

c 6 καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταύτα κτλ. The meaning is that, as the basins or 'hollows' are full of 'air' and water, the surfaces of these produce the appearance of glistening patches among the other colours, so that the general appearance is that of a continuous (συνεχές) surface of various colours (ποικίλον).

C 7 ἐκπλεα is quite a good word, and there is no need to read ἐμπλεα with inferior authorities.

d 3 ἀνα λόγον, 'proportionally.'

d 6 τὴν τε λειότητα: so W. B makes the almost inevitable mistake τὴν τελευτήτα, and so at first did T, but erased it in time.

d 7 ταύτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα, 'the precious stones that are so highly prized in our world.' Prof. Ridgeway has some interesting observations on the relation between the Pythagorean solids and natural crystals in *Class. Rev.* x (1896) p. 92 sqq.

e 1 οἶδεν ὅτι οὕ, 'every one of them.' The phrase is regularly treated as a single word equivalent to πάντα. Hence the plural καλλίω.

e 3 οἶδι διεφθαρμένοι κτλ. Another instance of interlaced order (a b a b); for ἅπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ τῶν δειρὸ συνεργηκότων γο closely together, and ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἁλμῆς goes with διε-
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φθαρμένου (so Stallbaum). The συνερρυηκότα are water, mist, and air (cp. I0g b6).

τοίς ἄλλοις, 'to animals and plants besides.' Cp. Gorg. 473 c 7 ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔννοιαν.

ἐκφανη, 'exposed to view,' not, as with us, hidden beneath the earth.

This is an attempt to fit the old idea of the Islands of the Blest into the mythical landscape. Cp. Pindar, Ol. ii. 130 ἐνθα μακάρων | νάσος ὄκεανίδες | αἵρει περιπτεῖν οἰκίαν, which is humourously paraphrased by ἰα περιφρέει τὸν ἄφρα, the air being the sea in which these islands are. But they are 'close to the mainland', otherwise we should see them from our hollow! The suggestion of Olympiodorus, that these men feed on the apples of the Hesperides, is therefore not so wide of the mark as might appear.

οὐκ...τοῦτο..., the regular way of expressing a proportion. Cp. II d 5 ἀνά λόγον.

κράσιν, 'temperature.' In Greek, however, as in French, the word has a wider sense than in English. It is not only the due temperamentum of the hot and cold, but also that of the wet and dry (cp. 86 b9 n.). The κράσις τῶν ὅρων is 'climate'.

φρονήσει: sight and hearing stand for the senses generally (hence πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα), to which intelligence must of course be added. It is, therefore, wrong to read ὁφρήσει with Heindorf. Cp. Rep. 367 c 7 οἴον ὁρῶν, ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν.

ἄλση: Τ has ἐθη, and this reading was adopted by Heindorf from the apographa. In the Lexicon of Timaeus we read ἐθος τῷ ἐγκλημα, καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ὧ ἐδραντα, and, as the word does not occur elsewhere in Plato, this may indicate that Timaeus read it here, but ἄλση seems better. Cp. Livy, xxxv. 51 in fiano luceque.

φῆμας, 'sacred voices.' Like φίλας and κληθέν, φήμη is used of omens conveyed by the hearing of significant words. Virg. Aen. vii. 90 Et varias audit voces, fruiturque devorum | colloquent.

αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν: not in dreams or visions, as some say. The point is just that they see the gods with their waking senses.

αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτοῖς, 'face to face.' Here πρὸς αὐτοῖς (τοῖς θεοῖς) belongs to συμπωρίας and αὐτοῖς (τοῖς ἀνθρώποις) to γίγνεσθαι (a b b a).

οἰα τυγχάνει ὄντα, 'as they really are.' This is an astronomer's vision of blessedness.
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C 6 τούς μὲν κτλ. Three sorts of τότοι are enumerated (1) deeper and broader (than the Mediterranean basin), (2) deeper and narrower, (3) shallower and broader. The fourth possibility, shallower and narrower, is not mentioned. Plato does not care for symmetry of this kind.

C 8 αὐτοὺς: Heindorf read αὐτῶν from inferior MSS., and I formerly conjectured αὐτοῖς. No change, however, is necessary. For the pleonasm cp. Riddell, Dig. § 223. It assists the shift from ὁτις to ἔχειν.

D 2 ὑπὸ γῆν...συντετρήσθαι, 'are connected by subterranean openings.' This seems to come from Diogenes of Apollonia. Cp. Seneca, Nat. Quaest. iv. 2. 28 sunt enim perforata omnia et invicem pervia. The geological conformation of the country made such views seem very credible in Greece.

D 5 ὀσπερ εἰς κρατήρας: cp. Soph. Oed. Col. 1593 κοίλου πέλας κρατῆρος ('near the basin in the rock', Jebb). A scholium on this passage of Sophocles runs: τοῦ μυχοῦ τὰ γὰρ κοίλα ὁτίως ἐκάλουν ἐκ μεταφόρας· ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ Αἰτνη κοιλώματα κρατήρες καλοῦνται. Cp. such names as 'The Devil's Punchbowl' in English. It is easier to understand how the crater of a volcano got its name, if we may trust this scholium, and the rocky basins fit in very well with the present context.

E 1 ἐν Σικελία κτλ. This seems to come from the Sicilian Empedocles, who explained the hot springs of his native island by comparing them to pipes used for heating warm baths (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 277). The ρύαξ is the lava-stream. Cp. Thuc. iii. 116 ἐρρυή δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔαρ τοῦτο ὁ ρύαξ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκ τῆς Αἰτνης.

E 3 ὡς ἄν: the MSS. have ὧν ἄν, but Stallbaum's conjecture ὡς ἄν is now confirmed by Stobaeus.

E 4 ταύτα δὲ πάντα κτλ. The theory is thus stated in Aristotle's MeteoroLogiká, 355 b 32 sqq. τὸ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι γεγραμμένου περὶ τῇ τῶν ποταμῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάττης ἀδυνατῶν ἔστων. Λέγεται γὰρ ὃς ἄπαντα μὲν εἰς ἀλλήλα συντετρήτατα ὑπὸ γῆν, ἀρχὴ δὲ πάντων εἰς καὶ πηγὴ τῶν ὅδατων ὁ καλούμενος Τάρταρος, περὶ τὸ μέσον ὅδατος τῷ πλῆθος, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὰ βέοτα καὶ τὰ μὴ βέοτα ἀναδιδόμενα πάντα τῇ δ᾽ ἐπίφρυσιν ποιεῖν ἐφ᾽ ἐκαστα τῶν ἱεώματων διὰ τὸ σαλεύειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ περὶ τὸ μέσον εἰλεύθαι (I. Ἀλεσθα, 'oscillate'). κινούμενον δ᾽ ἀνώ καὶ κάτω ποιεῖν τὴν ἐπίθυσιν τῶν ἱεώματων. τὰ δὲ πόλλαχοι μὲν λιμνάζειν, οἶαν καὶ τὴν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν εἶναι θάλασσαν, πάντα δὲ

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πάλιν κύκλῳ περιάγεων εἰς τὴν ἄρχῃν, ὡθεὶν ἤρξαντο ἰδίων, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, τὰ δὲ καὶ καταντικρὺ τῇ δέσει τῆς ἐκροῆς, οἴον εἰ ἰδίων ἤρξαντο κάτωθεν, ἀνωθεν εἰσβάλλειν. εἴπατε δὲ μέχρι τοῦ μέσου τῆς κάθεσιν· τὸ γὰρ λοιπὸν πρὸς ἀνατες ἔνας ἑαυτὸν εἰσαί τὴν φοράν. τοὺς δὲ χμοίς καὶ τὰς χροῖς ὑπεχεὶν τὸ ὑδωρ δὲ οἴος ἕν τύχωσι ρέοντα γῆς.

e 4 ὠσπερ αἰώραν τινά (cp. 66 b 4 n.), 'a sort of see-saw,' ἀντιταλάντωσις Olympiodorus, cp. French balancement from Inluncem. The term αἰώρασις, gestatio, was familiar in medical practice, where it was used of any exercise in which the body is at rest, sailing, driving, &c. (cp. Tim. 89 a 7), and αἰώρα meant a 'swing' or 'hammock' (Laws 789 d 3). Aristotle's paraphrase has διὰ τὸ σαλέουσιν. The whole description shows that a sort of pulsation, like the systole and diastole of the heart, is intended. The theory is, in fact, an instance of the analogy between the microcosm and the macrocosm (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 79), and depends specially on the Empedoclean view of the close connexion between respiration and the circulation of the blood (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 253).

a 1 διαμπερὲς τετρημένον, 'perforated right through.' Tartarus has another opening antipodal to that first mentioned. We are not told that it is a straight tunnel, but that seems likely, and we shall see that it passes through the centre of the earth. So, too, Dante's Hell is a chasm bored right through the earth (Inferno, xxxiv, sub fin., Stewart, Myths of Plato, p. 101).

a 2 Ἄρμης: II. viii. 14. 'The Arcadian form of βερέθρον, scil. ζερεθρον, was the special name for the singular "Katavothra" of Arcadia' (Geddes). Cp. Strabo, p. 389 τὸν βερέθρον, ἀ καλοῦσιν οἱ Ἀρκιδῆς ζερεθρὶ, τυφλῶν ὄντων καὶ μὴ δεχομένων ἀπέρασιν. The whole account of Stymphalus, from which this is taken, is very suggestive of the present passage.

a 4 ἀλλοθε: II. viii. 481.

a 7 δι' οἴας ἄν... γῆς: Aristotle (l. c. sub fin.) specifies taste and colour as the characteristics the rivers derive from the earth they flow through.

b 2 πυθμένα... βάσιν: Aristotle (loc. cit.) says ἐδραν. There is no bottom at the centre of the earth. 'On comprendra la pensée de Platon en se rappelant que théoriquement une pierre jetée dans un puits traversant la terre selon un diamètre irait indéfiniment d'une extrémité à l'autre' (Couvreur). We must keep in mind....
throughout this passage that everything falls to the earth's centre. The impetus (ὄρμη) of the water takes it past the centre every time, but it falls back again, and so on indefinitely.

b 3 αισθάεται δὴ κτλ. Aristotle (loc. cit.) says ἄει περὶ τὸ μέσον εἰλει- σθαι, for which we must read ἅλλεσθαι, the proper word for oscillatory or pendulum motion. (Cp. Tim. 40 b 8, where I take the meaning to be the same. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 346 sq.)

καὶ κυμαίνει: the doxographical tradition connects this with the tides  Cp. Aëtius on the ebb and flow of the tides (Dox. p. 383) Πλάτων ἐπὶ τὴν αἰώναν φέρεται τῶν ὑδάτων· εἶναι γὰρ τινα φυσικὴν αἰώναν διὰ τινός ἐγγείον τρίματος περιφέρουσαν τὴν παλίρροιαν, ὅπ' ἦς ἀντι- κυμαίνεσθαι τὰ πελάγη. From this we may infer that there are two oscillations a day.

b 4 ὁ περὶ αὐτό, sc. ὁ περὶ τὸ ἔγραφν. The πνεῦμα is mentioned because the whole theory is derived from that of respiration. Cp. the account of ἀναπνοὴ in Tim. 80 d 1 sqq., where much of the phraseology of the present passage recurs: ὁ τῇ ἀναπνοῆς ... γέγονε ... τέρματος μὲν τὰ σιτία τοῦ πυρός, αἰνονυμένου δὲ ἐντὸς τῷ πνεύματι συνεπομένου (cp. b 4), τάς φλέβας ... τῇ συναισφύγει (cp. b 7) πλη- ροῦντος τῷ ... ἐπαντλείν (cp. c 3). Brunetto Latini 'speaks, very much in the same way as Plato does, of waters circulating in channels through the Earth, like blood through the veins of the body' (Stewart, Myths of Plato, p. 103).

b 5 εἰς τὸ ἐπί ἐκείνα ... εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, 'in the direction of the further side of the earth' (the antipodes), 'in the direction of the hither side'.

c 2 τῶν δὴ κατω καλούμενον: the words δὴ and καλούμενον are a protest against the popular view that the antipodes are 'down'. It is just to avoid this incorrectness that Socrates says τὰ ἐπί ἐκείνα, or τὰ κατ’ ἐκείνα.

τοῖς κατ’ ἐκείνα ... ἐλαστεῖ, 'the streams flow into the regions on the further side of the earth,' as opposed to τὰ ἐνθάδε. I apprehend that τοῖς κατ’ ἐκείνα must be explained in the same way as b 5 τὸ ἐπ’ ἐκείνα, and in that case τὰ βεύματα must be the subject. Further, if we omit διὰ in c 3 with Stobaeus, we may take τοῖς κατ’ ἐκείνα τῆς γῆς together. Even if we retain διὰ I have no doubt that we must 'understand' τῆς γῆς after τοῖς κατ’ ἐκείνα. Cp. Aristotle's paraphrase (loc. cit. III e 4 n.) τὴν δ᾽ ἐπίρρυσιν ποιεῖν ἔφ᾽ ἐκαστά τῶν πεν-
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μάτων, where τῶν ῥευμάτων is governed by ἐπιρρυσίν, and ὡς ἕκαστα means ἐπ’ ἐκείνα καὶ ἐπὶ τάδε.

3 ὡσπερ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες, sc. πληροῦσιν, 'like irrigators.' The word ἐπαντλεῖν is used by raising water to a height for purposes of irrigation (Dict. Ant. s. v. Antlia). No stress is to be laid on the particular process by which this is done; the point of the simile lies in the way the water rises to a point further from the centre (whether on this side of it or the other) and then flows off through the channels (ἀχεταί, τίνῃ) like irrigation waters.

4 ἐκεῖθεν... δεύο, 'from the antipodes... towards us.'

6 εἰς τοὺς τόπους κτλ. All the streams are raised by the οἰῶρα above the centre (on either side) and are drained off τὸ ποιον on the surface of the earth, from which they once more find their way back to Tartarus by subterranean channels.

7 ἐκάστος ὕδωροιήται, 'a way is made for each of them.' The simile of the irrigation-channels is kept up. The εἴδοποιείται of W confirms the ὕδωροιήται of Stobaeus, and T has ἐκάστος as well as Stobaeus. The reading of B (εἰς ὅσε ἐκάστους ὕδωροιήται) is inferior to this.

13 〈ἡ〉 ἦ: there is some doubt as to the necessity of inserting ἦ here and in d 5. It seems safer, however, to insert it. In Symp. 173 a 6 B has ἦ and TW ἦ ἦ. In Crito 44 a BTW have ἦ ἦ.

14 ὑποκάτω εἰσρέθ τῆς ἔκροις, 'at a lower level than the point of issue' really means nearer the centre of the earth, not nearer the antipodes.

15 καταντικρύ... κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος: Aristotle (loc. cit. III 4 n.) interprets these words by καταωθεὶν and ἄωθεὶ, by which he clearly means 'on the other side' and 'on this side of' the earth's centre. The choice of words is unfortunate (especially as he bases his criticism on them); for we have been warned (c 1) that to call the antipodes 'down' is only a popular way of speaking. In substance, however, Aristotle seems to me quite right in his interpretation. I do not see how κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος can mean 'on the same side of Tartarus', as many recent editors suppose. The phrase must surely be interpreted in the light of εἰς τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν... μέρος, which certainly refers to the sections of Tartarus on either side of the earth's centre. The difficulties which editors have raised about this interpretation are purely imaginary. So long as a stream falls
into Tartarus at a point nearer the earth’s centre than it issued from it, it may correctly be said to fall into it \( \upsilon \omega k \alpha \tau \omega \; \tau \dot{\iota} \dot{\iota} \; \epsilon \kappa \rho \omicron \iota \varsigma \), quite irrespective of whether it debouches on this side of the earth’s centre or on the other.

d 5  \( \dot{\eta} \dot{\eta} \; [\epsilon i \sigma \rho e \iota] \; \epsilon \xi \epsilon \pi e \sigma e \nu \), sc. \( \epsilon i \sigma \rho e \iota \). If we omit \( \epsilon i \sigma \rho e \iota \) with Stobaeus we can take \( \dot{\eta} \; (o r \; \dot{\eta} \; \dot{\eta}) \; \epsilon \xi \epsilon \pi e \sigma e \nu \) together as equivalent to \( \tau \dot{\iota} \dot{\iota} \; \epsilon \kappa \rho \omicron \iota \varsigma \). It is important to observe that \( \epsilon \kappa \pi \iota \pi t e \iota \nu \) is the verb corresponding to \( \epsilon \kappa \rho \omicron \iota \varsigma \), and that the reference is to the point at which the stream issues from Tartarus.

d 6  \( \dot{i} \sigma t i \; d \dot{e} \; \dot{a} \) κτλ. We have had the case of streams which issue from Tartarus in one hemisphere and fall into it in the other; we are now told of streams which come back to the hemisphere in which they started after circling round the other. They may even make this circuit several times, but with each circuit they will be ‘lower’, i.e. nearer the earth’s centre. Their course will therefore be a spiral, and that is the point of \( \pi e r i e l i x \delta \eta n t a \ldots \; \circ \sigma p e r \; o i \; \delta f e i s \), for \( \epsilon l i \zeta \) means just ‘spiral’. As to \( \pi e r i \; \tau \dot{\iota} \dot{\iota} \; \gamma \dot{\iota} \dot{\iota} \) it does not necessarily mean ‘round (the outside of) the earth’. Cp. πι3 b 1 n.

d 8  καθ\( \epsilon n t a \) is intransitive or rather ‘objectless’. Cp. Ar. Knights 430 \( \epsilon \xi e \epsilon m \iota \; \gamma \dot{\alpha} \rho \; s o u \; \lambda a m p r \rho \dot{\omicron} \; \dot{\eta} \dot{\iota} \; k a i \; \mu e \gamma a s \; k a t \dot{\iota} \epsilon i \epsilon s \) (of a wind), and \( \sigma \nu \gamma k a t \dot{i} \epsilon i \epsilon n a i \) (sc. \( \epsilon a u t \dot{\iota} \nu \)), ‘to condescend.’

e 1  \( \epsilon k a t \epsilon r \omega \nu \epsilon \; m \epsilon r i \; t o u \; \mu \dot{e} \sigma \nu \), ‘in either direction as far as the middle,’ that is to say, from either opening of Tartarus to its middle, which coincides with the centre of the earth.

e 2  \( \dot{a} \gamma n a t e s \; \gamma \dot{\alpha} \rho \; k t l . \), ‘for the part (of Tartarus) on either side (of the centre) is uphill to both sets of streams,’ i.e. both to those which fall into it \( k a t a u n t i k r \dot{\iota} \; \dot{\eta} \; \dot{\eta} \; \epsilon \xi \epsilon \pi e \sigma e \nu \) and to those which fall into it \( k a t a \; t o \; a u t o \; \mu e r o s \). The \( \pi r \dot{o} \dot{s} \) which B and W insert in different places is probably due to an ancient variant \( \pi r \dot{o} s a n t e s \). How old that variant must be is shown by the fact that Aristotle (loc. cit.) has \( \pi r \dot{o} s \; \dot{a} \gamma n a t e s \). Heindorf conjectured \( \pi r \dot{o} s o \), and recent editors follow him, but that is a non-Attic form and not used by Plato.

e 5  \( \tau u g h \chi a n e i \; \delta \dot{\alpha} \; \dot{a} \eta n t a \; k t l . \) Cp. Od. xi. 157 \( \mu e \sigma s \omega \; \gamma \dot{\alpha} \rho \; \mu e g \iota l o i \; \nu o t a m o i \; k a i \; \delta e m a \; \rho e \epsilon \theta r a \), | ‘\( \Omega \kappa e a n o s \) \( \mu e n \; \pi r \dot{o} t a \) κτλ., ib. x. 513 \( \dot{\epsilon} \nu \theta a \; m e n \) e\( i s \; \dot{\alpha} \chi \epsilon \rho o r t a \; P u r i f l e g e \epsilon \theta o w \) tε \( \rho \dot{e} \omega u i \) | ‘K\( \alpha \omega k t o s \; \theta \)’, \( \dot{\omicron} \; \dot{\omicron} \; \Sigma t u \dot{\gamma} \dot{\gamma} o s \; \dot{\omega} \delta a t o s \) \( \dot{e} \sigma t i n \; \dot{\alpha} p o r r o \rho \dot{o} s \).

e 6  \( \dot{\iota} \sigma o t a t o \), ‘furthest from the centre.’

e 7  \( \pi e r i \; k \dot{\nu} k l \omega \), ‘round in a circle.’ There seems to be no doubt that
\[\text{peri} \] can be used as an adverb in this phrase. \(\text{Cp. Tim. 40a6}\) neimâs peri pânta kûklw tôn ouvon, Lays 964 e 4 peri dhlwn kûklw tûn pûlin úrânw. The phrase is also found written in one word (v. L. & S. s. v. periuklovs) and this is how B writes it here. Perhaps Hermann is right in accenting peri to show that it is an adverb. We are not told that the \(\lambdaim\nu\) made by Oceanus is the Mediterranean, but that is doubtless so.

7 katauvkepù, 'diametrically opposite,' i.e. on the opposite side of the centre of the earth (cp. 112d5). Acheron is the antipodal counterpart of Oceanus, running in the opposite direction. It is fitting that the place of the dead should be in the other hemisphere. In the \(\text{Axiochus}\), an Academic dialogue of the third century B.C., we are told (371b2) that 'the gods below' took possession of to étetmu hmioualump.

1 upo \(\gamma\)nu \(\rho\)éw: the Acherusian Lake is subterranean.

2 oð: cp. 108b4n.

tûn pôllâw: all except ai tûn úrðous filosofiúntwv. \(\text{Cp. 114b6}\) sqq.

5 eis tás tûn zôfon genéses, 'for the births of animals.' \(\text{Cp. 81e2}\) sqq. toûton kata médos: i.e. at a point intermediate between Oceanus and Acheron. As Oceanus flows \(\varepsilon\)xotatw, i.e. furthest from the centre (112e6), Acheron will branch off from Tartarus nearer the centre, but on the other side. The point intermediate between these \(\varepsilon\)kôlai will therefore be above the centre on the same side as Oceanus.

6 \(\varepsilon\)kálalai, 'issues,' 'branches off' (from Tartarus). The word is synonymous with \(\varepsilon\)kapitéti (112d5) and so is \(\varepsilon\)kôlý with \(\varepsilon\)kroý.

7 \(\nu\)pî . . kaômevov. It seems to me that this may have been suggested by the remarkable statements in the \(\text{Peripète}\) of the Carthaginian Hanno (§§ 11-14) about the regions blazing with fire which were seen on the voyage southward from Cape Verde to Sierra Leone. If so, Pyriphelegethon is doubtless the Senegal. The \(\text{Peripète}\), if genuine, would be well known in Sicily in the fifth century B.C.

9 \(\text{peri}\)lçiptómevov . . . tû \(\gamma\)nu is generally assumed to mean 'winding round the earth', whereas it is clear that, like Cocytus (e 3), Pyriphelegethon must go under the earth after leaving the \(\lambdaim\nu\) in order to reach the Acherusian Lake, which is certainly subter-
ranean. In the erroneous belief that Eusebius omits τῇ γῇ, most editors bracket the words; but this is quite unnecessary. They can quite well mean 'coiling itself round inside the earth' (ambire terram intus in ipsa, Stallbaum); cp. II. xxi. 95 ἐλισσόμενος περὶ χεῖν of a serpent 'coiling himself round (the inside of) his nest' (Monro). Cp. ΠΙΙΙ. d 8 ὀσπερ οἱ ὀφεῖς.

b 3 οὐ συμμειγνύμενος τῷ ὑδατί: cp. II. ii. 753 οὐδ' ὤ γε (sc. Τεταρήσιος) Πηνείῳ συμμισγεταί ἀργυροδίνη, ἀλλα τέ μιν καθ' ἐπερθεν ἐπιρρέει ἐντ' ἐλαίουν | ὀμκου γὰρ δεινοῦ Στυνός ὑδατὸς ἐστιν ἀπορρωξ.

b 4 κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου, 'at a lower point in Tartarus,' i.e. nearer the earth's centre than the Acherusian Lake, which must itself be nearer the centre than the ἐκβολή of Pyrphlegethon, though on the opposite side.

b 6 ὅπῃ ἄν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς, 'at various points on the earth's surface.' This shows that Pyrphlegethon in its subterranean spiral course passes under Etna. For the βύakes cp. ΠΙΙΙ. ε. ι. n.

τοῦτον... καταντικρύ: i.e. on the other side of the earth's centre, but nearer it than the ἐκβολή of Acheron, though further from it than the Acherusian Lake.

b 8 οἶον ὁ κυάνος: it is not certain what substance is intended. In Theophrastus κυάνος is ἱαπὶς lazuli and that stone is probably meant here. In any case, we are to think of a bluish grey, steely colour, in strong contrast to the fiery plain of Pyrphlegethon.

c 1 ἐν δῇ, sc. τόπου (not ποταμών). For δῇ cp. ΙΟΤΕ. ι. n.

d 3 διέδικάσαντο: cp. ΙΟΤΕ. d 8 n.

βιώσαντες: the Ionic participle is in place in a solemn passage like this, though in 95 c 3 we have the Attic βιοῦσ. Later, the Ionic form became trivial, as in the λαθε βιώσας of Epicurus.

d 4 οἱ... ἄν δοξωσίν, 'those who are found to have —,' a regular forensic expression.

μέσως, 'middlingly,' to be distinguished from μετρίως which stands for εὖ.

d 5 ἄ δῇ κτλ. Another allusive and mysterious δῇ (cp. ΙΟΤΕ. ι. n.). The ὄχυματα on which they embark must be boats of some kind. Charon's bark is familiar, but there are other boats of the dead besides that.

d 6 τὴν λίμνην, sc. τὴν Ἀχέρουσιάδα.

d 7 καθαρόμενοι: Purgatory is an essentially Orphic idea. Cf. Suid.
NOTES

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(V. Aepoiov) ὁ δὲ Ἀχέρων καθαρσίας ἐσκε καὶ οὐ κολαστηρίῳ, βύττοις καὶ σμήχων τὰ ἀμαρτήματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων. They are purified by fire as well as by water.

7 διδόντες δίκας is subordinate to καθαρομένοι, ‘purged by punishment.’

8 ἑυεργεσίων, ‘good deeds,’ seems to have been the regular word in this connection (opp. ἀδικήματα). Cp. Rep. 615 b 6 εἰ τινας ἑυεργεσίας ἑυεργετηκότες καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσιοι γεγονότες εἰλὲν.

2 ἀνιάτως ἵχειν κτλ. The doctrine of the incurable sinners occurs also in the myths of the Gorgias (525 c sqq.) and the Republic (615 c sqq.). The rudiments of it are to be found in the picture of the three great sinners—Tantalus, Ixion, and Sisyphus—in the Νέκυια of the eleventh book of the Odyssey. From the Gorgias we learn that they are eternally punished as παραδειγμᾶτα.

6 οὐποτε, ‘nevermore,’ is more solemn than the everyday οὐδὲποτε, ‘never.’ The Neoplatonists are very anxious to get rid of the doctrine of eternal punishment, but it is stated quite explicitly.

1 μεταμίλων: accusative absolute, cum eos paenituerit. Tr. ‘and have lived (aor. subj.) the rest of their life in repentance?’ Any impersonal verb may take this construction: cp. Ἀρρ. 24 d 4 μέλων γέ σοι, Rep. 346 b 4 συμφέρων αὐτῷ, ‘when it is good for him.’

2 τοιοούτῳ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ, ‘in some other way of the same sort,’ viz. as those who have done wrong ἐπ’ ὀργῆς.

5 τὸ κύμα, ‘the reflux.’ Cp. 112 b 3 κυμαίνει ἕνω καὶ κάτω. This fits in well with the general scheme. Pyriphlegethon and Cocytus rise in opposite hemispheres. When the water in Tartarus rushes ἐπὶ ταῦτε it casts them out by Pyriphlegethon, when it rushes ἐπὶ ἔκεινα by Cocytus.

κατὰ τὸν Κώκυτον, ‘down Cocytus.’ Heindorf compares Xen. Ζυγ. vii. 5. 16 τὸ ὑδωρ κατὰ τὰς τάφρους ἐξωρεῖ. In a 7 κατὰ τὴν λίμνην we have another meaning of κατὰ, ‘on the level of,’ ‘opposite to’. It must be remembered that the waters of Pyriphlegethon and Cocytus do not mingle with the Purgatorial Lake.

7 διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ἔσως βιῶναι, ‘to have led exceptionally holy lives,’ as contrasted with those who have lived μέσως (113 d 4). We must ‘understand’ ζῆν or some such word with ὀσίως. For such an ellipse Stallbaum compares Euthyd. 281 a 5 τὸ ὄρθως (sc. χρῆσθαι) ἐπιστήμῃ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπεργαζομένη, Symph. 181 b 6 ἀμελοῖντες δὲ

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toû kalôs (sc. diapráxasvai) ἥ µή, Phileb. 61d 1 ἀρα ... τοῦ καλῶς ἃν μάλιστα ἐπιτύχωμεν; For similar brachylogies designed to obviate the repetition of the same word cp. Prot. 325b 3 σκέψαι ως θαυμασίως γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ (sc. ἀγαθοὶ), 344e 1 τῷ δὲ κακῷ (κακῷ) οὐκ ἐγχω-ρεῖ γενέσθαι, Meno 89a 6 οὐκ ἃν εἶν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ (sc. ἀγαθοὶ). The προκεκρίσθαι added by Theodoret is an obvious interpolation.

2 ἐπὶ γῆς: i. e. on the ‘true earth’, the Earthly Paradise.

3 ἀνευ ... σωμάτων: cp. 76c 12 χωρίς σωμάτων. This is the statement which brought upon Plato the condemnation of the Church as being inconsistent with the resurrection of the body. Eusebius has καμάτων for σωμάτων, which looks like a deliberate falsification.

4 οἰκήσεις ... τούτων καλλίους. ‘We are to think, perhaps, of the natal stars of the Timaeus’ (Stewart, Myths of Plato, p. 109). In any case, those alone reach the Celestial Paradise who have undergone the philosophic κάθαρσις. The ordinary purgation is not sufficient.


8 καλὸν ... τὸ θέλον: cp. Rep. 608b 4 Μέγας ... ὁ ἀγών, ... μέγας, οὐχ ὡστος δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι, c 1 Καὶ µὴν ... τὰ γε μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα ἀρέτης καὶ προκείμενα ἀδικοῦ ὡς διελθέωμεν.

1 τὸ µὲν οὖν κτλ. The difference between scientific knowledge and a ‘probable tale’ is once more insisted on. For the expression cp. 63c 1 sqq., 108d 5 sqq., Meno 86b 6 καὶ τὰ µὲν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἃν πᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διασχυρισμὴν, ὅτι δὲ ..., περὶ τούτων πᾶν ἃν διαμαχοῦμην. Contrast d 4 ἐπείπερ αἰθανάτων γε ᾗ ψυχῆ φαίνεται οὕσα (‘evidently is’).

5 πρέπειν, sc. διασχυρίσονται.

6 άξιον, sc. εἶναι, ‘that it is worth while to take the risk of thinking it is so.’ Cp. 85d 1.

7 ἐπάδειν: cp. 77e 8.

3 πλέον βάτερον ... ἀπεργάζονθαι, ‘to do more harm than good.’ The phrase occurs twice in the Euthydemus 280e 5 πλέον γὰρ πον ὁµαι βάτερον ἐστιν, ἐὰν τις χρήσατι ὀρθοῦν µή ὀρθῶς πράγματι ἢ ἐὰν εὖ, 297c 7 ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ ἰκανὸς ἐβοϊθήςεν (sc. Ἰδείως Ἰππακλεί), ὁ δὲ ἐμὸς Ἰδείως εἰ ἐλθοί, πλέον ἃν βάτερον ποιήσειν. Cp. also Isocr. Aeg. 25 τούτων τῶν ταλαίπωρον οὕδεις τῶν συγγενῶν ... ἐπισκεψομένοις ἀφίκετο, πλὴν τῆς µητρὸς καὶ τῆς ἄδελφῆς, αἱ πλέον βάτερον ἐποίησαν. I do not think that, in these places, the meaning is ‘to make bad worse’ (Hein-
dorl), or that δάτεροι has anything to do with Pythagorean views about ‘the other’. We should hardly find the phrase in a private speech of Isocrates if it had. More likely it is a colloquialism like τλέον τι ποιείν, οὐδὲν τλέον ποιείν.

2 ὡς . . . καλῆ: Hirschig for once seems to be justified in an ἀδετησία. It is very difficult to believe that Plato should spoil the effect of his own words two lines below by anticipating them here.

5 φαῖν ἄν ἀνήρ τραγικός, ‘as the man in the play would say’. The phrase does not occur in any extant tragedy.

8 νεκρὸν λούειν: for the construction cp. Μένος 76 a 9 ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτη

Practical Application. The real Socrates will not die (115 b 1—116 c 7).

2 ἐπιστιλλεῖς is the vox propria for the last wishes of the dying. Cp. 116 b 4.

9 ὡσπερ κατ’ ἵχνη: cp. Ρεπ. 365 d 2 ὡς τὰ ἵχνη τῶν λόγων φέρει. The hunting metaphor once more.

1 οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε, nil proficietis, ‘you will do no good’, ‘it will profit nothing’.

6 Οὐ πείθω κτλ. Aelian, V. H. i. 16, has another version of this, which he is not likely to have composed himself: Καὶ πῶς ἐπέρ ἡμῶν καλὸς Ἀπολλόδωρος δοξάζει, εἰ γε αὑτὸς πεπίστευκεν ὅτι μετὰ τὴν εἰς Ἀθηναίων φιλοτησίαν καὶ τὸ τοῦ φαρμάκου πῶμα ἔτι οὗτως ὄψεται Σωκράτην; εἰ γὰρ οἴεται τὸν ὁλίγον ύστερον ἐρρίμμενον ἐν ποιεῖ καὶ κεισόμενὸν γ’ ἐμε ἐιναι, δῆλος ἐστὶ με οὐκ εἰδώς. This may be a fragment of Aeschines or another.

7 οὖτος Σωκράτης, ‘Socrates here.’ The omission of ὁ is idiomatic when the pronoun is used δεικτικῶς.

1 πῶς με θάπτῃ: indirect deliberative. Goodwin, M. T. § 677.

4 δὴ τινας: once more the allusive and mysterious δῇ. Cp. 107 d 7 n.

5 ἀλλὰς λέγειν: cp. 76 e 4.

7 ἦν οὖτος . . . ἠγγυάτω does not refer to the offer of Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, to become security for the fine of 30 minae which Socrates proposed in his ἀντίτιμος (Απολ. 38 b 6). We may infer from Κρίτο 44 e 2 sqq. that Crito had further given security that Socrates would not run away (ἤ μὴν παραμενεῖν).
3 \(\pi\rho\theta\varepsilon\iota\beta\epsilon\tau\alpha\) ktl. The \(\nu\rho\\alpha\\delta\varepsilon\iota\sigma\iota\) (‘laying out for burial’) and the \(\varepsilon\kappa\phi\rho\rho\alpha\) (‘carrying to the tomb’) are the regular parts of the ceremony before the actual burial. The middle voice of \(\pi\rho\theta\iota\beta\epsilon\sigma\theta\iota\alpha\iota\) is justified because people lay out ‘their dead’. Cp. Eur. Alc. 663-4 καὶ βανίντα σε | περιστελλοῦσι καὶ προθήκονται νεκρόν, Thuc. ii. 34. 2 τὰ μὲν ὅστα προτίθενται ... ἐπειδὲν δὲ ἡ ἐκφορὰ ᾧ ... ἐμφανίζεται ... ὁ βουλόμενος.

5 \(\varepsilon\iota\ α\iota\tau\omicron\ o\iota\tau\omega\) ‘so far as the thing itself (inaccurate language) goes’.

The Closing Scene (116 a 1—118 a 17).

2 \(\alpha\nu\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\ \varepsilon\iota\) : cp. Prot. 311 a 4 ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν. οἰκήμα means ‘a room’.

5 τοτε ὃν, as if τοτε μὲν had preceded. Cp. the omission of ὁ μὲν,

1 ὅ σον κτλ. Cp. 60 a 2 π.

2 τὰ οἰκεῖα γυναῖκες ... ἕκείναι is certainly the original reading and ἕκείναις (to be construed with διαλέξθεις) is apparently a conjecture. It seems to be implied that the women of Socrates’ family were well known to Echecrates and his friends. In fact, ἕκείναι has much the same effect as the γυνώσκεις γὰρ with which Xanthippe is introduced (60 a 2). It is surely impossible to believe with some editors that Xanthippe is not included among the οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες. The mere fact that the youngest child is brought back seems to show that she is.

3 διαλέξθεις, sc. αὐτοῖς, i.e. τοῖς παιδίοις καὶ ταῖς γυναιξίν. The vulgate reading ἕκείναις would imply that he had no last words for his sons.

6 χρόνον ... πολὺν κτλ. As the conversation recorded in the Phaedo began in the morning, and it is now close upon sunset on one of the longest days of the year, it is plain that Socrates spent several hours alone with the women and children. There is no trace of indifference to them. Cp. 60 a 7 π. Of course Phaedo can only narrate conversations at which he was present.

8 οτάς παρ’ αὐτόν, ‘stepping up to him.’

5 ἵν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, during the thirty days (cp. 58 a 4 π.) for which Socrates had been in prison.

6 ἄνδραν λόγος, ‘the best of men.’ In Attic λόγος is confined to a few phrases.
NOTES

1. It is to be observed that the man who administers the hemlock-draught is not the same person as the officer of the Eleven. The seeds were pounded in a mortar to extract the juice. Cp. App. I.

2. γέλωτα ὄφλησεν παρ' ἵμαντῷ, 'to make myself ridiculous in my own eyes.'


4. τῷ παιδί, 'to his servant.'

5. καὶ μάλα ἰλέως, 'very cheerfully indeed.' For καὶ μάλα cp. 61 e 1 n. ἰλέως is the adverb.

6. οὐδὲ διαφθείρας: Plutarch uses φθείρειν and φθορά of mixing colours (L. S. s.v.), and the expression employed here seems to be derived from that technical use. Cp. II. xiii. 284 τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ οὕτως τρέπεται χρῶς κτλ.

7. ταυρηδόν ὑποβλέψας. This does not seem to have anything to do with ταυρῳδθα, ἀποταυρῳδθα, which refer to the glare of an angry bull. An angry or threatening look would be quite out of the picture here. In Arist. Fros. 804 ἐβλεψε γοῦν ταυρηδόν ἐγκύψας κατω is, indeed, given as a sign that Aeschylus ἐβρέως φέρει, but ὑποβλέψας is quite different from ἐγκύψας κάτω, which suggests the bull about to toss. It means 'to look askance at' (ὑπόθρα), and, from its use in Hippocrates and Aristotle (L. S. s.v.), we see that
the original meaning was to look with the eyes half open. It is, then, a 'mischievous look' rather than a threatening one.

b 6 πρὸς τὸ ἀποστείσαι τιν. Perhaps Socrates thought of pouring a libation in honour of Anytus, just as Theramenes had toasted Critias in hemlock-juice. Cp. Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 56 καὶ ἐπεὶ γε ἀποθυ-σκευ ἀναγκαζόμενος τὸ κώνειον ἔπει, τὸ λειπόμενον ἔφεσαν ἀποκοσμᾶσαντα ἐπείν αὐτῶν' Κριτία τοῦτ’ ἐστιν τῷ καλῷ. For the use of πρὸς cp. Symip. 174 b 1 πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἐθέλειν ἄν ἴναι ἀκλίτος ἐπὶ δείπνον.

c 4 ἐπισχόμενος . . . ἐξέπιν, 'he held his breath and drank it to the last drop.' Stallbaum shows that πίνειν ἐπισχόμενος was a standing phrase. Cp. e.g. Stesichorus fr. 7 Σκύβιον δὲ λαβὼν δέπας ἐμμετρον ὡς τριλάγνυν | πὴ ἐπισχόμενος κτλ. The rendering 'putting it to his lips,' though grammatically possible, does not seem strong enough for this and other passages where the phrase occurs, so I prefer K. F. Hermann's interpretation. The sense assigned to ἐπισχό-μενος is not unlike that which it has in Symip. 216 a 7 ἐπισχόμενος τὰ ὁτα.

καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς, 'without the very least disgust'. As δυσχερῆς means 'fastidious' and δυσχεραινεῖν fastidire, the meaning is that he drank the poison as if it was quite a pleasant drink.

c 5 ἐπιεικῶς, 'fairly', 'pretty well'.

c 7 ἄστακτι: not in single drops, but in a flood. Cp. Soph. Oed. Col. 1251 ἄστακτι λείβων δάκρυν, 1646 ἄστακτι . . . στένοντες. W has ἄστακτικ, which would mean the same thing, and also preserves an ancient variant ἄβαστακτι, which would mean 'unbearably'.

c 8 ἀπέκλασον ἐμαυτόν, 'I covered my face and wept for my loss.'

c 9 οἴον ἀνδρὸς κτλ., 'to think what a friend I was bereft of.' This is another 'dependent exclamation'. Cp. 58 e 4 n.

d 5 κατέκλασε, which Stephanus conjectured for κατέκλασε, is actually the reading of T. Cp. Homer, Od. iv. 481 κατεκλάσθη φίλον ἐτορ, Plut. Timoleon 7 τὸ δὲ Τιμολέοντος . . . πάθος . . . κατέκλασε καὶ συνε-τριψεν αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν.

e 1 ἐν εὐφημίᾳ: cp. 60 a 3 n.

ii8 a 1 τὰς κνήμας: cp. Arist. Frgs 123 Ἀλλ’ ἐστιν ἄτριπος ἔντομος τετριμμένη | ἦ διὰ θυείας.—Ἀρα κόψειν λέγεις ;— | Μάλιστά γε,— Ψυχράν γε καὶ δυσχείμερον | εὔβους γὰρ ἀποτήγγυσι τάντικνήμια.

a 2 πῆγνυτο: cp. 77 b 4 n.

καὶ αὐτὸς ἡπτετο, 'the man himself' (not Socrates). It is im-
plied that the others had touched Socrates by the executioner's directions.

5 τὸ ἱτρον: ο μεταξὺ ὁμφαλὸς τε καὶ αἰδοίου τόπος Τιμαεύς, ἱτρον... 'Αττικὸς ἵππαστριον Ἐλληνικὸς Μοερίς.

7 τὸ Ἀσκληπιοῦ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα: for the offering of a cock to Asclepius cp. Herondas iv. 11 ἔλεω δεῦτε | τοὺ ἀλέκτορος τοῦ ὀντιν' οἰκής τοίχων | κηρύκα θῶ, τάπιδορπα δέξασθε. Socrates hopes to awake cured like those who are healed by ἐγκοίμησις (incubatio) in the Asklepieion at Epidaurus.

16 ἡμῖν, 'we,' his disciples.

16 τῶν τότε, 'of the men of his time.' The phrase is regular in such appreciations. Stallbaum compares Hdt. i. 23 Ἀριόνα...κιβαρφόδον τῶν τότε ἐώντων οὔδενος δεύτερον, Xen. An. ii. 2. 20 κηρύκα ἀριστον τῶν τότε. Cp. Plato, Epist. vii. 324 d 8 φίλον ἄνδρα ἐμοὶ πρεσβύερον Σωκράτη, δὺν ἐγὼ σχεδόν οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνοίμην εἰπὼν δικαιότατον εἶναι τῶν τότε.

17 καὶ ἄλλως, 'and in general.' The calm of the closing sentence is characteristically Attic. We find the same thing in tragedy and in the Orators.
APPENDIX I

DEATH BY HEMLOCK

It is expressly stated by Xenophon (Hell. ii. 3. 56) that Thera-
menes was put to death by a draught of κώμειον, and Plutarch says
the same of Phocion (Phoc. 36). As described in the Phaedo, the
drug acts by producing a gradual refrigeration proceeding from
the feet upwards to the heart. Death ensues when the heart is affected.
and is accompanied by a spasm or convulsion (ἐκνυφθήν, 118 a 12).
The same symptoms are implied in the passage of Aristophanes
(Frogs 123) quoted in the note on 118 a 1, where κώμειον is men-
tioned by name, and where we are told that it was pounded, as the
drug referred to in the Phaedo also was (117 a 6). Pliny (Hist. Nat.
xxv. 95) speaks of the vis refrigeratoria of the cicuta, and says
that the juice was prepared from pounded seeds. It is to be noted
further that wine was used as an antidote in cases of such poisoning.
Pliny tells us this of cicuta (Hist. Nat. xiv. 7), and Plato himself
implies the same of κώμειον in the Lysis.\footnote{Lys. 219 ε 2 οἶνον εἰ
cαθάναιτο σύτων (τῶν ὑδόν) κώμειον πεπακύτα, ἀρα
περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖτ’ ἄν οἶνον, εἰπὲ τούτῳ ἤγοιτο τῶν ὑδον σῶσειν;}
There can be no doubt, then, that Socrates was poisoned by
κώμειον, or that κώμειον is cicuta. That cicuta is ‘hemlock’ is shown
by the use of the word in the Romance languages (Fr. cigné).
In the face of all this, it is disturbing to be told, as we are by
some authorities, that hemlock-juice would produce quite different
symptoms. I cannot pronounce an opinion on that; but I have
submitted the case to an eminent pharmacologist, my colleague
Professor C. R. Marshall, who says that ‘as evidence against the
view that Socrates died of conium poisoning I do not think the
statements’ (of the authorities referred to) ‘worthy of serious con-
sideration. Personally I am decidedly of opinion that his death

1 Lys. 219 ε 2 οἶνον εἰ αἰσθάνατο σύτων (τῶν ὑδόν) κώμειον πεπακύτα, ἀρα
περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖτ’ ἄν οἶνον, εἰπὲ τούτῳ ἤγοιτο τῶν ὑδον σῶσειν;
was due to conium. It is difficult to be absolutely positive on the point, as conium is somewhat peculiar in its action, and the symptoms produced vary with the dose and probably with the individual. From this it appears that there is certainly no scientific ground for rejecting the philological evidence.

**APPENDIX II**

**Γλαύκου τέχνη**

The correct text of the scholium in Ven. T is as follows:

παροιμία ἦτοι ἐπὶ τῶν μῆνι βρῶνι κατεργαζομένων, ἡ ἐπὶ τῶν πάνυ ἐπιμελῶς καὶ ἐντέχνως εἰργασίμοιν. Ἡσπασος γὰρ τις κατεικένασε χαλκοὺς ἑτταρας δίσκους οὗτος, ὡστε ταῖς μὲν διαμέτρους αὐτῶν ὕψα ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ πρῶτον δίσκου πάχος ἐπίτριτον μὲν εἶναι τοῦ δευτέρου, ἡμῶλιον δὲ τοῦ τρίτου, διπλάσιον δὲ τοῦ τετράτου, κρονωμένους δὲ τούτους ἐπιτελεῖν συμφωνίαν τινά. καὶ λέγεται Γλαύκου ἰδώμα τοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν δίσκων φθόγγους πρῶτον ἐγχειρήσας δὲ αὐτῶν χειρουργεῖν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταῦτης τῆς πραγματείας ἑπὶ καὶ νῦν λέγεσθαι τὴν καλουμένην Γλαύκου τέχνην. μένηται δὲ τούτων Ἀριστότελους περὶ τῆς μονοθείας ἀκρόασεως, καὶ Νικοκῆς ἐν τῷ περὶ θεωρίας. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἑτέρα τέχνη γραμμάτων, ἡν ἀναπτύεισι Γλαύκῳ Σαμῖο, ἄφ’ ἡς ἔσως καὶ ἡ παροιμία διεδόθη. οὖτος δὲ καὶ σιδήρου κόλλησεν εὑρεί, ὡς φησιν Ἰρύδοτος.

This comes from the paroemiographer Lucillus Tarrhaeus (cp. L. Cohn, *Quellen der Platonscholien*, pp. 836 sqq.), and the reference to Aristoxenus takes us back to the time when there was a living Pythagorean tradition. Eusebius, *c. Marc. 15 D* (quoted by Heindorf), is fuller, and mentions some other versions. One says that Glaucus was drowned at sea (just like Hippasus!) before his invention was spread abroad; another agrees with the story in the scholium; a third refers to Glaucus of Samos and the ἄνωθ’μα at Delphi. The fourth is as follows: ἔτερος δὲ Γλαύκου αὐτῶν ἀναθεινα τρίποδα χαλκοῦν δημουργήσαντα τοῖς παχῶς τε (τοῖς πάχεσιν ὡστε;) κρυμμένοι τοὺς τε πόδας ἐφ’ ὄν βέβηκε καὶ τὸ ἄνω περικείμενον καὶ τὴν στεφαῖνι τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ λέβητος καὶ τὰς ράβδους διὰ μέσου τεταγμένας φθέγγεσθαι λύμας φωνῆ. If this is genuine tradition, as it appears to be, it is not without significance that Socrates should allude to a distinctively Pythagorean invention.

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